Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 11-07-2022

FYI, he is quoting from the reports description of the first phase of bombing and missiles back in February. Not what's going on currently.

Joshi is good and part of reason I recently sub'd to Economist. I really appreciate the global outlook.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 11-07-2022

Quote:The Ukrainian air defences progressively recovered
as jammed and damaged radar systems were reset and assets were rapidly repositioned during
the second and third days. After that, the Air Force and air defence infrastructures worked
in tandem. Deconfliction between aircraft and GBAD was coordinated by time until 3 March,
after which deconfliction began to be coordinated by space because of friendly fire incidents.15
In other words, SAM systems and combat aircraft sorties began to be deconflicted by being
allocated separate operational areas.

If this is accurate (and it probably is), the Ukrainians are not using IFF. As I have suggested from the beginning, this fact really cuts down the ability of an air force to operate. Deconfilicting aircraft and missiles can be done by geography, but it is a big tactical disadvantage to operate this way. Worse still, you can't deconflict fighters from other fighters that way. Given that both sides use the same aircraft types, even visual identification isn't a good discriminant. I surmise Russia is fighting the same constraints, as the Ukrainians have the same IFF systems. Answering an interrogation and squawking would be saying "kill me". No wonder air operations are limited.

Quote:For Goose re A50 Mainstay

Quote:On the Donbas front and in the south, a similar task was performed by A-50M/U Mainstay
AWACS aircraft which flew an average of two–three sorties per day, providing higher-resolution early warning and vector information on low-flying Ukrainian aircraft in those sectors.39
However, the effectiveness of A-50M as a force multiplier has been limited throughout the war by two factors. First, Ukrainian forces have found A-50 to be fairly easy to degrade via
electronic attack, and report consistent success in doing so.40 Second, because the Russian air operation is subordinated to the Ground Forces, surveillance information is not typically
relayed directly between A-50M and fighters on CAP or to long-range GBAD units such as S-400 batteries. Instead, information is normally relayed via the military district command post or a
combined arms army command post, then either directly or via an Il-20M relay aircraft to the GBAD units and fighter patrols.41 This significantly slows the rate of data transfer and limits the
VKS’s ability to use A-50M/U to directly guide weapon engagements by GBAD assets or fighters.

The A-50 radar isn't that easy to defeat by EA when properly operated, especially by Soviet origin EA. However, it is very much a "manual" system. It, like many Soviet systems, requires good operators. If Ukraine is having good luck with EA it must be significantly due to the Russian operators lack of training. This is very believable, because training is expensive. Another factor is that Russia has been engaged in a very long program of upgrading their A-50s. This program, like many Russian programs, has great press releases and very few upgraded aircraft delivered. It also means the operators may not be using the system they trained on or the latest and greatest. Not to say the radar "jam proof", but a good operator can "work through" lots of EA. Obviously, one also wonders why "home on jam" attacks haven't made it difficult for the Ukrainians to maintain reliable EA.

The Russian decision cycle requiring the A-50 data to pass through a bureaucratic interface to the IAD system is very Russian. For BC, this is why using overhead data to find HIMARS just won't work. It takes too long. The A-50 itself has the organic capability to directly control what used to be a Russian "section" of 12 aircraft. (a section is not a squadron, just to be clear) It can control them directly. The Russians did that in Syria and routinely practice doing it. It is however true that the A-50 can "see" a much bigger area than one section can cover. The aircraft has a data link that can update the IAD in real time. In theory, the updates should go directly to all the section controllers on the ground. This apparently isn't happening, and the section controller in the Mainstay also isn't operating. Many reasons why this isn't happening are plausible, from administrative constraints to not having the data link resources. Not how it was designed to work. However, controlling a single section from the air is entirely feasible, so why they aren't doing it is anybody's guess.

The interface between the Mainstay and the missile elements of the IAD has always been a bit of a bureaucratic question mark. The S-400s aren't air force. Supposedly, a Mainstay can actually designate and fire an S-400 via it's data link. AFAIK, nobody has ever seen this happen, but the Russians have claimed that ability exists. The Army would have to permit the Mainstay to do this, and that may be a bridge too far. Since the rest of the IAD isn't functioning as "designed" on Mainstay data, even less probable the army part would.

The thing I think we should all be concerned about is that to the extent these problems are administrative, the Russians can figure that out and remove them. For sure, using a Mainstay to control a small number of fighters is possible. Doing so could make things quite difficult for the Ukrainian forces in that area and cause significant losses in Ukrainian aircraft.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 11-08-2022

(11-07-2022, 07:34 PM)BostonCard Wrote:  Maybe the Ukranians know when a Russian missile is going to hit a vacated spot and don't try to down it?


BC

In general, they can't know the target of a cruise missile. It may be on a direct track over some point that Ukraine wants to defend and therefore it needs to be shot down for sure. However, the missile can target anywhere along the track and Ukraine can't know where it will dive and hit. The Kalibr and KH-1xx missiles can also maneuver on their flight path so they may appear to be overflying nothingness and then turn toward a vital target, giving Ukraine little (or inadequate anyway) time to react. The  Kh-22 series hard enough to shoot down that if Ukraine has a shot, they will take it IMHO. These high speed missiles don't give you a lot of time to figure out what they are aimed at. Fortunately, they are inaccurate enough they probably won't hit it anyway.

The low altitude missiles and drones give the air defenses such a short tracking window (from the ground) it is probable nobody even attempts to predict where they are going. The Iranian drones have also been also seen to maneuver, but whether that is pre-programmed or a "real time" action is not in general known. In any case, any maneuver capable missile has to be attacked whenever possible because you can't kno where its is actually going.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 11-08-2022

It’s my fault for reading the tweet but not the underlying document.  I was trying to reconcile the quote that missiles were getting through and hitting nothing with the claim that Ukraine was shooting 80% down, but dabigv helpfully explained that the piece by RUSI report was referring to the early parts of the war, while the Economist piece (likely by Joshi) was referring to the most recent timepoint.  There is no need to reconcile, but I appreciate your patience.

BC

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 11-08-2022

I was wondering how the weather is holding in Ukraine.  It looks chilly but not too bad.  Here is an adequate weather map.  Freezing temperatures will arrive in a week for a couple of days, but it looks like it may not be accompanied by precipitation.

For Kyiv specifically, in the next 14 days, 2 half-days of showers are predicted. The lowest high will be 40F. For the second week, lows will be a bit below freezing.

At least one long-range forecast predicted a warmer winter for Ukraine and Europe.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Treefence - 11-08-2022

A few rumors coming in about Snihurivka again, we will see if these pan out, unlike previous rumors.  Russian Telegram channels are saying Ukraine made a breakthrough and has a foothold in the town.  There's also reports that Ukraine took out a convoy going south of the town to Kherson.  Lots of confusion still about Russia's plans for the right bank of the Dnipro, and we might see changes soon.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 11-08-2022

(11-08-2022, 11:20 AM)M T Wrote:  I was wondering how the weather is holding in Ukraine.  It looks chilly but not too bad.  Here is an adequate weather map.  Freezing temperatures will arrive in a week for a couple of days, but it looks like it may not be accompanied by precipitation.

For Kyiv specifically, in the next 14 days, 2 half-days of showers are predicted. The lowest high will be 40F. For the second week, lows will be a bit below freezing.

At least one long-range forecast predicted a warmer winter for Ukraine and Europe.

Kherson has a 10 day forecast with rain probability in the low teens the entire time. Lows are just below freezing. In the north, it looks like both sides are "bedding down" a bit, although not totally. Presumably the "battle of Kherson city" is about to begin. I hate to see Ukraine batter their way in there, but it unfortunately looks probable that is exactly what they are going to do. Hopefully the casualty count won't be as bad as I fear. Hopefully the weather won't get so bad they have to pause. That will only help Russia.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Treefence - 11-09-2022

Lots of rumors flying from both sides in the Kherson region right now.  It seems Russians blew several key bridges, and have also left several settlements.  It also seems the deputy head of the Kherson region, appointed by Russian, Kirill Stremousov was killed in a car accident.  Reports of the Ukrainian flag going up in Snihurivka, unconfirmed for now.  We will see if this is Russia falling back to a second line of defense, or if they are leaving the right bank completely.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 11-09-2022

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1590364844053925888?s=20&t=WohhLUaLVCUZnXzlBF4T-w[/tweet]

Hell yeah. 

Ukraine also happy that there was no red wave that could've cut aid to them. Even if R's have a House majority, likely there won't be enough of the isolationist far right in the majority to press Ukraine policy.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 11-09-2022

Let’s celebrate the victory in Kherson but keep domestic elections out of it. I don’t want to “both sides” this but there are skeptical elements in both parties, and rhetoric aside, no one has actually made moves to cut off aid from Ukraine.

BC

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - OutsiderFan - 11-09-2022

I can't wait for the corporate infotainment news media headlines:  Russia Leaves Annexed Territory of Ukraine

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 11-09-2022

I'm sorry but it's very relevant to Ukraine. McCarthy, the likely Republican leader, has said a Republican house would be more restrictive on Ukraine aid.

Ukraine was happy with the results in any case.

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/zoyashef/status/1590253897662464000?s=20&t=J8QX5s-fIeoljgbZx98fSA[/tweet]

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 11-09-2022

(11-09-2022, 08:29 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:  https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1590364844053925888?s=20&t=WohhLUaLVCUZnXzlBF4T-w



Hell yeah. 

Hopefully that retreat will be very chaotic and costly for the Russians. If not, it will be a major tactical victory for them. It is also important that Ukraine capture bridgeheads on the left bank now, because doing so later will be much more difficult and costly. The fact Russia has so recently sent conscripts to the right bank makes one wonder what they are actually doing. Conscripts as a rear guard makes no sense. They will not be able or willing to put up much of a fight and just clogging the roads won't be enough to prevent a Ukrainian force from cutting through them and capturing the river crossings.

This retreat, if it actually happens, will also tell us a lot about the Ukrainian military and their abilities to push the Russians and achieve their goals. Just taking what they were given by Russian incompetence isn't going to win them the war.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 11-09-2022

I think our view through the fog of war is pretty hazy, hard to say what percentage of Ukraine retaking Kherson is through Russian's retreating versus Ukrainian's pushing. Taking Kherson will be a brobdingnagian victory for Ukraine, whether or not they encircle most of the retreating Russians or simply kill a lot of them as they retreat as in Kharkiv and Kyiv. Victory in Kherson, as the only regional capital to fall to Russia, will be a big morale boost,  and more importantly will place large sections of Crimea in range of Ukrainian fire.

Kherson was also a test of wills. Putin threw a lot there to try and hold it, and still it will not be enough. Ukraine retains the initiative and probably will choose the time and place for the next major battle of the war.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 11-09-2022

Interesting

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1590405107169914881?s=20&t=RJ4jr1zKlVkpoti-voSauw[/tweet]

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gocard14 - gocard14 - 11-09-2022

(11-09-2022, 10:13 AM)Goose Wrote:  

(11-09-2022, 08:29 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:  https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1590364844053925888?s=20&t=WohhLUaLVCUZnXzlBF4T-w



Hell yeah. 

Hopefully that retreat will be very chaotic and costly for the Russians. If not, it will be a major tactical victory for them. It is also important that Ukraine capture bridgeheads on the left bank now, because doing so later will be much more difficult and costly. The fact Russia has so recently sent conscripts to the right bank makes one wonder what they are actually doing. Conscripts as a rear guard makes no sense. They will not be able or willing to put up much of a fight and just clogging the roads won't be enough to prevent a Ukrainian force from cutting through them and capturing the river crossings.

This retreat, if it actually happens, will also tell us a lot about the Ukrainian military and their abilities to push the Russians and achieve their goals. Just taking what they were given by Russian incompetence isn't going to win them the war.

I hope, given the long time for which a retreat from Kherson has been a possibility, Ukraine has their fire control on the retreat/crossings mapped out. I also have to hope that in the era of drones and satellites, Russia would not be able to hide a false retreat/fake out.

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RE: gocard14 - Goose - 11-09-2022

(11-09-2022, 01:24 PM)gocard14 Wrote:  I hope, given the long time for which a retreat from Kherson has been a possibility, Ukraine has their fire control on the retreat/crossings mapped out. I also have to hope that in the era of drones and satellites, Russia would not be able to hide a false retreat/fake out.

I am sure Ukraine has mapped out their fire control. I am also sure that they know that they have to be within about 15-18 km of the target to use their 155 mm howitzers to reliably attack it. They are not yet close enough to do that. They also know that these guns need to move frequently or they will be goners. Right now, they have to use HIMARS and while HIMARS can provide devastating barrages they can only do it for a short time. They then must move and reload. That is not good enough to interdict a retreating force. They will suffer significant losses, but they will get out. If the Ukrainians can get into gun range, they can make the retreat almost impossible. They need to do that.

It isn't "normal" for a military organization to publicly announce a retreat, for many reasons. The Russians on the west bank have been dead men walking for months. It appears probable Russian will keep them there until Ukraine basically drives them out. They will not go totally of their own accord. If that were the intention, it would have already happened.

I wouldn't want to be the Russian commanders organizing this withdrawal. The goals of withdrawal are 1) extract as many men and as much material from the area to be abandoned as possible, 2) position your evacuated forces to defend the next line of defense, and 3) inflict as much damage as possible on the force that is pressing your defeat. In order to accomplish # 2, it is generally considered necessary to break contact with your opponent, i.e. to create enough distance between your forces and the enemy forces to allow you to organize the next line of defense. If you fail to do that, there is no reason your opponent can't just keep pushing you along (until he stretches his supply line too far). It is easier if you are going to pass through a force that can help you hold the enemy off, but you still have to do it. In order to accomplish # 1, you have to get your forces moving before the enemy can put a blocking force on your rear. If your enemy is aware of your intentions, he will move heaven and earth to do that. If he beats you to it, you can't retreat unless it becomes a "break out" operation, which is an order of magnitude harder.

Doing these things is difficult with a well trained and well motivated force. Doing it with a poorly trained and low morale force is even harder. The key will be how hard the Russians are pressed. If the Ukraine can get a blocking force in place, they can do catastrophic damage. If Ukraine can't quite manage that but can keep in contact with the retreating Russians and drive them, they can still do great damage and even more important cross the river before Russia can organize to stop them. This is actually pretty critical, and why Remagen is so well remembered and important. The allies kept driving the retreating Germans. Patton also did the same in the south, jumped  the river right on the heels of the Germans and secured several bridgeheads. Nobody wants to be faced with an opposed river crossing in the spring. Grabbing it now will save lots of lives, and conversely.

If Ukraine is "only" able to shell the Russians with HIMARS as they retreat, Russia will take that and be thankful. They are going to take a beating, but not one that destroys their combat capability in the Kherson Oblast. Two months ago, that level of destruction looked probable. Let's hope we see exactly that.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Treefence - 11-10-2022

Wouldn't the Russians fleeing be in range of Ukraine's longer range self propelled artillery?  Krab's, M109, Zuzana, and Caesars all might stand a chance to hit river crossing Russians if they are moved to the recently liberated Ukrainian towns.  Would that be too risky though?

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 11-10-2022

(11-10-2022, 10:09 AM)Treefence Wrote:  Wouldn't the Russians fleeing be in range of Ukraine's longer range self propelled artillery?  Krab's, M109, Zuzana, and Caesars all might stand a chance to hit river crossing Russians if they are moved to the recently liberated Ukrainian towns.  Would that be too risky though?

I suggest looking at https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1590549998894448640/photo/1. This map shows that there are no "blue areas" closer than about 30km from the boundary of Kherson city. The bridges across the river are about another 10 km away. Unless they are sitting right on the front lines and firing RAP, the M109s can't reach the bridges. The Zuzana uses a 155mm/L45 (or L52 in the -2) that can just barely reach. The Krebs and Caesars also uses an L52 gun. Obviously, sitting on the line of contact isn't viable. It is also important when considering range to specify the ammunition type. RAP and Excalibur will go further, but Ukraine doesn't have enough of either to generate continuous fire missions over days of fighting. Just to be clear, all these guns use "NATO standard" 155 mm ammunition. These rounds go further when fired by longer guns, thus the L52 guns outrange the L42 and L39 firing the same ammunition.

The standoff distance for towed artillery is often given as 1/3 the range, meaning that an M777/L39 needs to be 1/3 * 22.5 km behind the lines, or about 7.5 km. This standoff is a rule of thumb, not absolute. Self-propelled artillery can be much closer to the FEBA, but the corresponding important constraint is that their supply vehicles generally don't want to be. It is also necessary that the self-propelled artillery have room to disperse and reposition in order to survive counter-battery. Therefore a narrow salient isn't ideal as a firing position. To interdict the retreat by fire, Ukraine needs the ability to deliver sustained artillery fire at the crossing points. They are still too far away to do that. They need to get closer by 10-15 km on a fairly broad front near Kherson city. It is much worse around Nova Kakhovka, unfortunately.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Treefence - 11-10-2022

The standoff range makes sense, but in this scenario with a fully retreating enemy, you'd think they'd get a bit more aggressive. I think the ISW map is outdated, as we now have a lot of towns visually confirmed to be liberated that are listed in red, and other much closer settlements rumored to be liberated (Chornobaivka & Mylove), but that being said, it would still take time for AFU to move their big guns to those cities anyway.

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A much faster updated map can be found here.

  https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1gO8X7RC8cUzc-1q7-s4-09X53HNIEJA&ll=46.63175787081257%2C32.794542135571206&z=9

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