Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 03-15-2023

You can follow the link in the tweet to the source, the "Fighter Bomber" Russian telegram channel which seems to have sources with the RuAF. I think the video you linked is some later edit. In any case, unclear exactly what this video is showing, if a sequence in yesterday's crash, or some prior interception, which presumably has happened many times over the Black Sea between American drones and Russian jets.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 03-16-2023

Drone's view

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/TSoufiBurridge/status/1636313584736108545?s=20[/tweet]

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 03-16-2023

I don't know why this video seems to be a screen capture on a phone.  There's a better video out there. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-64974825


The video shows two passes, the 2nd much closer than the first.  (The RU video could have been an earlier pass, or been of an entirely different encounter.)   The momentary video issues at the first pass could be consistent with transmission issues due to the near pass.  The loss of video at the 2nd pass looks consistent with the temporary loss of transmission.

It does appear that the speed of the props slows down after the first pass.  I don't know if that is because of the effects of the jet's air turbulence or, more likely (to my unknowledgeable mind) the ground pilot trying to stabilize the drone from  the effects of the pass.

At the beginning of the video, note the "N" at the bottom of the image centered under the cross-hairs.  I presume this gives some indication of the angle of the drone to horizontal, as well as N/S.  I believe the drone's nose is up.

The heading of the drone has changed somewhat between the two passes. The camera tracking the SU-27 certainly moves, consistently with trying to track the SU-27.  Judging from the position of the "N" relative to the cross-hairs, it appears the drone starts raising its nose just before the SU-27 starts dumping its fuel, and the nose is pointed downward quite a bit after the video returns.  

In the first pass, you can see another aircraft coming from the left to the right in the video, near the center vertically from the left to about 1/4 of the frame.

And, of course, you see the damaged propeller after the video returns after the 2nd pass.

From the video, I can't be sure the two passes were the same SU-27.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 03-16-2023

Newsy day.

Poland is sending Migs. Think these would be the first whole fighter jets sent to Ukraine during the entire conflict. These are modernized as compared to Ukraine's existing Migs, perhaps may be better able to integrate NATO weaponry but I'm not sure.

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/AP/status/1636349281643757568[/tweet]

WSJ and NYT both with articles about artillery ammo

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-reaches-deep-into-its-global-ammunition-stockpiles-to-help-ukraine-8224d985

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/16/world/europe/ukraine-ammunition-bakhmut.html

And Israel is for the first time approving military export licenses to Ukraine, specifically for anti-drone devices.

https://www.axios.com/2023/03/15/israel-ukraine-anti-drone-system-approve-russia-war

Interesting that Israel may be doing it to gauge their performance against Iranian drones.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 03-16-2023

Good article that accurately enumerates what missiles Ukraine currently has the ability to engage with a good probability of success and also which ones it cannot defend against.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/air-force-specifies-missiles-cannot-110140778.html

The term "ballistic" missile is not literally applicable to hardly any Russian missiles in use today, because they all can maneuver in at least one phase of their trajectory, even if it is only the warhead itself that maneuvers. That makes statements about the ability of the Patriot to shoot them down dependent on lots of things. The 40 km number in the article is dependent on the kinetic energy available to the interceptor and to what extent the target can actually evade. Kh-22s generally don't maneuver before the dive onto the target, so they can be shot down at longer ranges. However, since you can predict where they are going, the Patriot will wait until it has the "best" geometry for the intercept, UNLESS there is a high value target on or near the flight path before the best geometry is reached. Obviously the Patriot was not originally designed to shoot down anti-ship missiles. I am pretty sure that by now the software has been modified to improve performance against those targets. That said, Patriots actual performance against these threats is unknown. We may find out pretty soon.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 03-16-2023

More on the Nordstream pipeline investigation...

https://www.wsj.com/articles/who-blew-up-nord-stream-investigators-focus-on-six-mysterious-passengers-on-a-yacht-25b47e9b?st=vbrejywxv1j04np&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

(sharing a free link so it should get you past the paywall)

The focus has turned to a rented yacht.  It makes sense that it would have been Ukranian partisans.

BC

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 03-16-2023

(03-16-2023, 09:59 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Newsy day.

Poland is sending Migs. Think these would be the first whole fighter jets sent to Ukraine during the entire conflict. These are modernized as compared to Ukraine's existing Migs, perhaps may be better able to integrate NATO weaponry but I'm not sure.

https://twitter.com/AP/status/1636349281643757568

https://theaviationist.com/2013/03/18/polish-fulcrums/

As near as I can determine, the upgrades are to communications, navigation, and display systems. The displays undoubtedly have 1553 bus capability and an interface to the navigation system (which was also upgraded). This could allow a "full hand-off" to JDAMs. The need for hardpoint adapters and wing wiring would remain, but the airplanes at least have the right interfaces already. The real big questions on this front are who owns the software for the upgraded MIGs and how available is the interface documentation for the JDAMs. The Poles used these aircraft as air defense, not ground support/bombing (AFAIK) and therefore this work probably has not been done (yet). The Germans (from which many of these aircraft came) certainly did not. I have no idea if the new electronics can "fly" the airplane to make toss bombing easier and more accurate. I would assume not yet anyway, because fighters don't do that.

The radar was not upgraded apparently, so no obvious help for the AMRAAM launches. Ditto HARMs, as the RWR is still the same AFAIK.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 03-17-2023

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/CBSNews/status/1636753259070210049?s=20[/tweet]

Good. He will probably never actually stand trial (and it's not like the US plays nice or at all with the ICC anyway, for good or bad, saying it so we can move past that), but this is a positive development and will hurt Putin on the world stage. Will impact his ability to travel, will impact what other world leaders will meet with him, etc.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 03-17-2023

https://apnews.com/article/turkey-finland-sweden-nato-russia-ukraine-0142a4a5ae30940888d10ff7b8230a44

It’d be nice to get Sweden in too, but this is a great first step. Finland is the one who shares a long border with Russia, and probably needs the protection of the alliance more than Sweden does.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 03-17-2023

Things in Türkiye are "interesting" to say the least. After the earthquake, it is actually possible that the opposition candidate might win the election. I will believe it when I see it, but if it happens, will Erdoğan transfer power peacefully or will he try to hold on? If the opposition doesn't win (or it is said not to have won) but thinks they did win, what then? What does this mean for Sweden's membership? I think conventional wisdom was that Erdoğan would eventually give in after extracting the most he could from everybody. In the new political climate, it may be much less probable IMO. At the very least, after the election it is assumed Erdoğan will lack a majority in parliament. If that is the case, he may not be able to "back off" on his position and make it stick. If there is martial law due to election issues, it will be even messier.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 03-17-2023

I recognize that Sweden would like to have a pledge from NATO to aid its defense if Russia were to attack.  But let's assume Finland is admitted to NATO.  In that world: 

--Is there a remotely plausible scenario in which Russia attacks Sweden without attacking any NATO member?  
--Would NATO be deprived of defensive fortifications that it otherwise would be able to erect with Sweden admitted?  

My guess is that NATO will obtain most of the value of Nordic accession from Finland joining (assuming that moves forward).

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 03-17-2023

(03-17-2023, 12:49 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  I recognize that Sweden would like to have a pledge from NATO to aid its defense if Russia were to attack.  But let's assume Finland is admitted to NATO.  In that world: 

--Is there a remotely plausible scenario in which Russia attacks Sweden without attacking any NATO member?

Sweden absolutely thinks there is. Russia has for years "messed around" in Swedish territorial waters in ways indicating hostile intent. This occurred both before and after the fall of the Soviet Union. Sweden has always engaged in a "balancing act" between to what extent NATO membership would get them dragged into a war that they otherwise would not be vs how probable it is that Russia might try to overrun their country or at least destabilize it.

Quote:--Would NATO be deprived of defensive fortifications that it otherwise would be able to erect with Sweden admitted?

Fortifications, probably not. Joint bases, probably so. I share you belief this isn't a "big deal", but there are lots of political issues in Sweden that NATO membership would avoid. In particular, the US would be able to openly maintain some permanent detachments in Sweden that they cannot under the present conditions. There are also quite a few NATO documents that can't be shown to Sweden until they are members. The most important factors are probably psychological for both Sweden and for NATO.  

Quote:My guess is that NATO will obtain most of the value of Nordic accession from Finland joining (assuming that moves forward).

Sweden brings much more to the table militarily than Finland. Sweden has a significant defense industry that Finland does not. They manufacture fighter aircraft and quite a few missiles. Sweden is also twice the population of Finland. The Swedish navy is much superior, featuring both submarines and the Visby class GMCs. Of the two, Sweden is a much "better deal" than Finland in that it is better poised to defend itself without bringing along a very long land border with Russia. Obviously, NATO wants both.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 03-17-2023

(03-16-2023, 09:59 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Newsy day.

Poland is sending Migs. Think these would be the first whole fighter jets sent to Ukraine during the entire conflict. These are modernized as compared to Ukraine's existing Migs, perhaps may be better able to integrate NATO weaponry but I'm not sure.

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/AP/status/1636349281643757568[/tweet]

More MiG's on the way; 13 from Slovakia.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/slovakia-to-send-13-mig-jet-fighters-to-ukraine-ahead-of-counteroffensive-b69ba9b7?st=cl7w52ghf7oewl4&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

BC

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 03-17-2023

(03-17-2023, 01:23 PM)Goose Wrote:  Sweden brings much more to the table militarily than Finland. Sweden has a significant defense industry that Finland does not. They manufacture fighter aircraft and quite a few missiles. Sweden is also twice the population of Finland. The Swedish navy is much superior, featuring both submarines and the Visby class GMCs. Of the two, Sweden is a much "better deal" than Finland in that it is better poised to defend itself without bringing along a very long land border with Russia. Obviously, NATO wants both.

It's possible that I was viewing a liability as an asset.  Finland clearly sees its border with Russia as a liability.  I don't know how NATO should view it.  Is it an obligation to defend a long border?  Or a long border along which NATO can position troops and military equipment to deter an attack by Russia (even including potential attacks in other locations)?

I wasn't focusing on the military assets that Sweden or Finland can contribute in a war because those seemed small compared with the military assets of the US, UK, Germany, France, Poland, etc.  Maybe I underestimated that value.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 03-18-2023

(03-17-2023, 03:44 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  It's possible that I was viewing a liability as an asset.  Finland clearly sees its border with Russia as a liability.  I don't know how NATO should view it.  Is it an obligation to defend a long border?  Or a long border along which NATO can position troops and military equipment to deter an attack by Russia (even including potential attacks in other locations)?

It is an interesting question. Finland vs Russia one on one it is for sure a liability to Finland because there is no way they can garrison the entire border while Russia can. That said, historically the important fighting in Finland vs Russia is always near the Baltic sea, because that is what Russia wants. The northern part is sparsely populated and cold. The necessity to protect their left flank has always been the problem for Finland. Russia can (at least threaten) to go around them to the north and come down on them from there. NATO can provide more troops to compensate for Finland's small population. However, those are troops that NATO wants to use in the far north to threaten/capture the bases of the Northern Fleet. The USMC doesn't spend all that time in Norway because they like to ski. Having Sweden and Finland in the mix helps because they can add to the force. It hurts because that long border being penetrated also threatens Sweden as it does Finland, as well as the right flank of any NATO attack following the northern coast.

No attack across this long border in the "middle" areas would be logistically easy for either NATO or Russia. During the cold war it was pretty much assumed Russia could do whatever it wanted in Finland because southern Finland was basically indefensible. The Finns, despite their great history of fighting Russia, basically agreed, from hard experience. That is one reason they stayed out of NATO because they didn't want to be in a war they couldn't win. They hoped their military was strong enough that they could maintain some independence from Russia and reach an accommodation if push came to shove. This is one reason that their joining NATO is such a "big deal", because it says that calculus no longer applies. Sweden OTOH believed they could make it so costly for Russia to invade them that "it just wouldn't be worth it". They had no illusions about winning if Russia really wanted to take them over, but believed that they could, like the Swiss, make it so costly that it wouldn't be practical. That is why they have a very strong navy. Getting to the populated part of Sweden through the middle of Finland is difficult. Keeping Russian forces out from the south is a naval problem. It appears that Russia's irrational actions in Ukraine has convinced the Swedes that the "too costly" calculation no longer applies.

Both Sweden and Finland (as does the rest of NATO) suffered from the civilian population regarding the end of the cold war as liberating them from any military danger. This resulted in budget restrictions and a lack of interest in the military. This effect has eventually forced both Nordic countries to realize their "risk force" strategies were no longer credible, if they ever were. All in all, the border is probably a net negative for NATO, (IMO) but not as big of one as it appears at first glance.

Quote:I wasn't focusing on the military assets that Sweden or Finland can contribute in a war because those seemed small compared with the military assets of the US, UK, Germany, France, Poland, etc.  Maybe I underestimated that value.

I am biased, admittedly, but the armed forces of Sweden are very professional and very motivated. They are "better", pound for pound, than most of the other NATO forces. Their problem has always been lack of mass, and that problem is only getting worse. Germany, a country of 84 million, has 6 U-212A class submarines. There was a period between 2017 and 2018 that NONE of these were operational. Three were in the yards and three were broken, waiting to go into the yards. Sweden, a country of 10 million, has 3 A-19 (Gotland) and 2 A-17S (Södermanland). They would have at least one more of a new class, except their experiences in San Diego led them to stop construction on what they were building and make substantial changes. These are "serious" folks. They can do Russia some real damage in the Baltic. Russia constantly probes their defenses. Having them in NATO is a plus. The problem is, there are not nearly enough of them (and Kockums is still a bit of a problem).

Additional info on the "state of play" in Germany. The Bundeswehr deserves better (IMO). God forbid they have to fight anybody in the near future. https://www.yahoo.com/news/germany-buy-airbus-civil-helicopter-123839237.html

Actions like this does not give one much confidence they are improving.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 03-18-2023

(03-18-2023, 09:32 AM)Goose Wrote:  

(03-17-2023, 03:44 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  It's possible that I was viewing a liability as an asset.  Finland clearly sees its border with Russia as a liability.  I don't know how NATO should view it.  Is it an obligation to defend a long border?  Or a long border along which NATO can position troops and military equipment to deter an attack by Russia (even including potential attacks in other locations)?

It is an interesting question. Finland vs Russia one on one it is for sure a liability to Finland because there is no way they can garrison the entire border while Russia can. That said, historically the important fighting in Finland vs Russia is always near the Baltic sea, because that is what Russia wants. The northern part is sparsely populated and cold. The necessity to protect their left flank has always been the problem for Finland. Russia can (at least threaten) to go around them to the north and come down on them from there. NATO can provide more troops to compensate for Finland's small population. However, those are troops that NATO wants to use in the far north to threaten/capture the bases of the Northern Fleet. The USMC doesn't spend all that time in Norway because they like to ski. Having Sweden and Finland in the mix helps because they can add to the force. It hurts because that long border being penetrated also threatens Sweden as it does Finland, as well as the right flank of any NATO attack following the northern coast.

No attack across this long border in the "middle" areas would be logistically easy for either NATO or Russia. During the cold war it was pretty much assumed Russia could do whatever it wanted in Finland because southern Finland was basically indefensible. The Finns, despite their great history of fighting Russia, basically agreed, from hard experience. That is one reason they stayed out of NATO because they didn't want to be in a war they couldn't win. They hoped their military was strong enough that they could maintain some independence from Russia and reach an accommodation if push came to shove. This is one reason that their joining NATO is such a "big deal", because it says that calculus no longer applies. Sweden OTOH believed they could make it so costly for Russia to invade them that "it just wouldn't be worth it". They had no illusions about winning if Russia really wanted to take them over, but believed that they could, like the Swiss, make it so costly that it wouldn't be practical. That is why they have a very strong navy. Getting to the populated part of Sweden through the middle of Finland is difficult. Keeping Russian forces out from the south is a naval problem. It appears that Russia's irrational actions in Ukraine has convinced the Swedes that the "too costly" calculation no longer applies.

Both Sweden and Finland (as does the rest of NATO) suffered from the civilian population regarding the end of the cold war as liberating them from any military danger. This resulted in budget restrictions and a lack of interest in the military. This effect has eventually forced both Nordic countries to realize their "risk force" strategies were no longer credible, if they ever were. All in all, the border is probably a net negative for NATO, (IMO) but not as big of one as it appears at first glance.

Quote:I wasn't focusing on the military assets that Sweden or Finland can contribute in a war because those seemed small compared with the military assets of the US, UK, Germany, France, Poland, etc.  Maybe I underestimated that value.

I am biased, admittedly, but the armed forces of Sweden are very professional and very motivated. They are "better", pound for pound, than most of the other NATO forces. Their problem has always been lack of mass, and that problem is only getting worse. Germany, a country of 84 million, has 6 U-212A class submarines. There was a period between 2017 and 2018 that NONE of these were operational. Three were in the yards and three were broken, waiting to go into the yards. Sweden, a country of 10 million, has 3 A-19 (Gotland) and 2 A-17S (Södermanland). They would have at least one more of a new class, except their experiences in San Diego led them to stop construction on what they were building and make substantial changes. These are "serious" folks. They can do Russia some real damage in the Baltic. Russia constantly probes their defenses. Having them in NATO is a plus. The problem is, there are not nearly enough of them (and Kockums is still a bit of a problem).

Additional info on the "state of play" in Germany. The Bundeswehr deserves better (IMO). God forbid they have to fight anybody in the near future. https://www.yahoo.com/news/germany-buy-airbus-civil-helicopter-123839237.html

Actions like this does not give one much confidence they are improving.

At this point I am not sure whether Russia could mount any significant offensive operations against Finland or anyone else.  I am quite sure they are not where they expected to be at this time.  I think Putin believed his forces would seize the capital of Ukraine and the country would collapse and he would then be on the borders of Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland and he would be there without expending much in the way of manpower, and military equipment.  The Ukraine has ground up a significant amount of his more or less ready men and equipment.  I simply don't think he has enough other forces capable of launching an attack on Finland or anywhere else with any chance of winning.  By this I mean non-nuclear forces.  
Poland and the Baltic States might have enough forces to put some serious pressure on St. Petersburg.  
The challenge as I see it is for the West to keep Ukraine in the game.  Like it or not, the Ukraine is being used to grind up a significant amount of Russia's most ready units and tons of their equipment.  They can't make tanks as fast as they are losing them and they can't replace experienced infantry anywhere near as fast as they are losing them.
How long can Putin remain in power if the stalemate grinds on?  How long can Ukraine hold on without more significant outside help?  At this point can the West afford to let Ukraine lose?  Poland's dislike of Russia is very strong.  If Ukraine seemed on the verge of losing, seeing Poland getting involved would not surprise me.  I am not sure any country hates Russia more than Poland.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Maple Leaf - 03-18-2023

(03-18-2023, 12:07 PM)GK3 Wrote:  

(03-18-2023, 09:32 AM)Goose Wrote:  

(03-17-2023, 03:44 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  It's possible that I was viewing a liability as an asset.  Finland clearly sees its border with Russia as a liability.  I don't know how NATO should view it.  Is it an obligation to defend a long border?  Or a long border along which NATO can position troops and military equipment to deter an attack by Russia (even including potential attacks in other locations)?

It is an interesting question. Finland vs Russia one on one it is for sure a liability to Finland because there is no way they can garrison the entire border while Russia can. That said, historically the important fighting in Finland vs Russia is always near the Baltic sea, because that is what Russia wants. The northern part is sparsely populated and cold. The necessity to protect their left flank has always been the problem for Finland. Russia can (at least threaten) to go around them to the north and come down on them from there. NATO can provide more troops to compensate for Finland's small population. However, those are troops that NATO wants to use in the far north to threaten/capture the bases of the Northern Fleet. The USMC doesn't spend all that time in Norway because they like to ski. Having Sweden and Finland in the mix helps because they can add to the force. It hurts because that long border being penetrated also threatens Sweden as it does Finland, as well as the right flank of any NATO attack following the northern coast.

No attack across this long border in the "middle" areas would be logistically easy for either NATO or Russia. During the cold war it was pretty much assumed Russia could do whatever it wanted in Finland because southern Finland was basically indefensible. The Finns, despite their great history of fighting Russia, basically agreed, from hard experience. That is one reason they stayed out of NATO because they didn't want to be in a war they couldn't win. They hoped their military was strong enough that they could maintain some independence from Russia and reach an accommodation if push came to shove. This is one reason that their joining NATO is such a "big deal", because it says that calculus no longer applies. Sweden OTOH believed they could make it so costly for Russia to invade them that "it just wouldn't be worth it". They had no illusions about winning if Russia really wanted to take them over, but believed that they could, like the Swiss, make it so costly that it wouldn't be practical. That is why they have a very strong navy. Getting to the populated part of Sweden through the middle of Finland is difficult. Keeping Russian forces out from the south is a naval problem. It appears that Russia's irrational actions in Ukraine has convinced the Swedes that the "too costly" calculation no longer applies.

Both Sweden and Finland (as does the rest of NATO) suffered from the civilian population regarding the end of the cold war as liberating them from any military danger. This resulted in budget restrictions and a lack of interest in the military. This effect has eventually forced both Nordic countries to realize their "risk force" strategies were no longer credible, if they ever were. All in all, the border is probably a net negative for NATO, (IMO) but not as big of one as it appears at first glance.

Quote:I wasn't focusing on the military assets that Sweden or Finland can contribute in a war because those seemed small compared with the military assets of the US, UK, Germany, France, Poland, etc.  Maybe I underestimated that value.

I am biased, admittedly, but the armed forces of Sweden are very professional and very motivated. They are "better", pound for pound, than most of the other NATO forces. Their problem has always been lack of mass, and that problem is only getting worse. Germany, a country of 84 million, has 6 U-212A class submarines. There was a period between 2017 and 2018 that NONE of these were operational. Three were in the yards and three were broken, waiting to go into the yards. Sweden, a country of 10 million, has 3 A-19 (Gotland) and 2 A-17S (Södermanland). They would have at least one more of a new class, except their experiences in San Diego led them to stop construction on what they were building and make substantial changes. These are "serious" folks. They can do Russia some real damage in the Baltic. Russia constantly probes their defenses. Having them in NATO is a plus. The problem is, there are not nearly enough of them (and Kockums is still a bit of a problem).

Additional info on the "state of play" in Germany. The Bundeswehr deserves better (IMO). God forbid they have to fight anybody in the near future. https://www.yahoo.com/news/germany-buy-airbus-civil-helicopter-123839237.html

Actions like this does not give one much confidence they are improving.

At this point I am not sure whether Russia could mount any significant offensive operations against Finland or anyone else.  I am quite sure they are not where they expected to be at this time.  I think Putin believed his forces would seize the capital of Ukraine and the country would collapse and he would then be on the borders of Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland and he would be there without expending much in the way of manpower, and military equipment.  The Ukraine has ground up a significant amount of his more or less ready men and equipment.  I simply don't think he has enough other forces capable of launching an attack on Finland or anywhere else with any chance of winning.  By this I mean non-nuclear forces.  
Poland and the Baltic States might have enough forces to put some serious pressure on St. Petersburg.  
The challenge as I see it is for the West to keep Ukraine in the game.  Like it or not, the Ukraine is being used to grind up a significant amount of Russia's most ready units and tons of their equipment.  They can't make tanks as fast as they are losing them and they can't replace experienced infantry anywhere near as fast as they are losing them.
How long can Putin remain in power if the stalemate grinds on?  How long can Ukraine hold on without more significant outside help?  At this point can the West afford to let Ukraine lose?  Poland's dislike of Russia is very strong.  If Ukraine seemed on the verge of losing, seeing Poland getting involved would not surprise me.  I am not sure any country hates Russia more than Poland.

The Germans are a close second in their hate of the Russians, of course the feeling is mutual.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 03-18-2023

(03-18-2023, 12:07 PM)GK3 Wrote:  At this point I am not sure whether Russia could mount any significant offensive operations against Finland or anyone else.  I am quite sure they are not where they expected to be at this time.  I think Putin believed his forces would seize the capital of Ukraine and the country would collapse and he would then be on the borders of Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland and he would be there without expending much in the way of manpower, and military equipment.  The Ukraine has ground up a significant amount of his more or less ready men and equipment.

I think this is all correct.

Quote:I simply don't think he has enough other forces capable of launching an attack on Finland or anywhere else with any chance of winning.  By this I mean non-nuclear forces.

It probably isn't wise to extrapolate too far here. If NATO wasn't going to get involved, Russia would have no trouble with the Baltic states or Finland. The are simply too small. Ukraine is a big country. They can (and did) lose lots of territory and survive. Ukraine also had a rather large air force and an IADS they inherited from the Soviet Union. Finland and the Baltics have none of the above. The Russian Air Force would have a field day. Fortunately, the Baltics are inside NATO and Finland has NATO "status", so they wouldn't be fighting alone. If they were, Russia would do just fine.

Quote:Poland and the Baltic States might have enough forces to put some serious pressure on St. Petersburg.

Doubt it, for lots of  reasons. The Baltic states are not configured for offense. They rely on what is effectively militia for lots of their (very small) army. Their offensive potential is nugatory. Poland has access problems. The Baltics are in the way. The roads suck (at best). They have Kaliningrad and its missiles to deal with. In addition, the air defenses around Leningrad are some of the best in the country. That is why Russia could remove most of the S-300s to use against Ukraine. They have so many S-400s in the area their radars interfere with each other. They are prepared for USAFE, not the Polish Air force. It is well to remember that the state of Poland as it exists today has never fought a war. They are beefing up their capability, but totally lack experience. Early on, they are going to make lots of mistakes. It is inevitable. It also is wise to take into account that Russian airmen defending Russia are going to be a whole different thing than Russian airmen attacking Ukraine. Fortunately, this is hypothetical :-).

Quote:The challenge as I see it is for the West to keep Ukraine in the game.  Like it or not, the Ukraine is being used to grind up a significant amount of Russia's most ready units and tons of their equipment.  They can't make tanks as fast as they are losing them and they can't replace experienced infantry anywhere near as fast as they are losing them.

How long can Putin remain in power if the stalemate grinds on?  How long can Ukraine hold on without more significant outside help?  At this point can the West afford to let Ukraine lose?  Poland's dislike of Russia is very strong.  If Ukraine seemed on the verge of losing, seeing Poland getting involved would not surprise me.  I am not sure any country hates Russia more than Poland.

IMO all good points/questions. The West simply can't let Ukraine lose at this point. I don't see Poland getting directly involved in the form of a voluntary choice. I can certainly see it happen in response to a "provocation", and that provocation may not be investigated too closely if Ukraine is losing. The US has undoubtedly made it clear to all involved that everybody must stay "on side", but if things get bad enough that may not matter. This is the kind of thing that needed to be thought through and planned for from the beginning. Unfortunately, I am unsure it was, and that is how big mistakes happen. Lets hope Ukraine starts to push Russia back and threatens Crimea. At that point, I think Putin is history and maybe the Russian state will realize this war was a mistake.
EDIT:
Possibly I am on to something here?
https://www.yahoo.com/news/polish-ambassador-france-poland-forced-201021342.html

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Mick - 03-18-2023

(03-18-2023, 01:51 PM)Goose Wrote:  The West simply can't let Ukraine lose at this point. I don't see Poland getting directly involved in the form of a voluntary choice. I can certainly see it happen in response to a "provocation", and that provocation may not be investigated too closely if Ukraine is losing. The US has undoubtedly made it clear to all involved that everybody must stay "on side", but if things get bad enough that may not matter. This is the kind of thing that needed to be thought through and planned for from the beginning. Unfortunately, I am unsure it was, and that is how big mistakes happen. Lets hope Ukraine starts to push Russia back and threatens Crimea. At that point, I think Putin is history and maybe the Russian state will realize this war was a mistake.

I wonder about that. I think it's extraordinarily difficult to plan for a war, and plans work until you get punched in the face as Mr. Tyson says. Ukraine seems as if they were much more prepared than Russia, who never seemed to be prepared at all. Ukraine seems to be winning in a walk, they have a significant amount of assistance from the west, they appear to be outplanning the Russians at every turn and the Russians are absolutely getting their hats handed to them as they lose personnel, territory and ordnance.

And when May comes, and Ukrainian troops return from NATO countries freshly trained on powerful armaments, I think they're going to beat the tar out of the Russians, no matter how many Chinese missiles, bombs and other arms are used by Russia.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 03-18-2023

(03-18-2023, 02:21 PM)Mick Wrote:  

(03-18-2023, 01:51 PM)Goose Wrote:  The West simply can't let Ukraine lose at this point. I don't see Poland getting directly involved in the form of a voluntary choice. I can certainly see it happen in response to a "provocation", and that provocation may not be investigated too closely if Ukraine is losing. The US has undoubtedly made it clear to all involved that everybody must stay "on side", but if things get bad enough that may not matter. This is the kind of thing that needed to be thought through and planned for from the beginning. Unfortunately, I am unsure it was, and that is how big mistakes happen. Lets hope Ukraine starts to push Russia back and threatens Crimea. At that point, I think Putin is history and maybe the Russian state will realize this war was a mistake.

I wonder about that. I think it's extraordinarily difficult to plan for a war, and plans work until you get punched in the face as Mr. Tyson says. Ukraine seems as if they were much more prepared than Russia, who never seemed to be prepared at all.

Actually, I was referring to the US/West/NATO response. There are lots of "branches" in that response depending on what actually happens. The last thing anybody should want to happen is that the war takes a path we haven't considered and gets "out of control", especially if that happens because somebody like Poland decides to "do something". I haven't be reassured that the US has a "plan" even before they get punched. The ATACMS situation, the main battle tank situation, and the fighter situation makes one wonder. Consider, why is it that we keep saying no tanks, no tanks, and then after a year we say "OK, tanks"? What changed?

Quote:Ukraine seems to be winning in a walk,

At best, Ukraine is not losing. Russia is still deep into Ukrainian territory. Right now, Russia clearly has the initiative. They are still attacking Ukrainian infrastructure and causing casualties. I think we all are looking at it from the point of view that it could be much worse than it is. That is undoubtedly true. That doesn't mean it is good. We also think that things are going to turn around. That's fine, and when they do we can celebrate. Now is not yet that time.

Quote:they have a significant amount of assistance from the west, they appear to be outplanning the Russians at every turn and the Russians are absolutely getting their hats handed to them as they lose personnel, territory and ordnance.

Ukrainian planning at the start of the war was spotty at best (partially due to treason). The units that were supposed to defend in Kherson Oblast were off on exercises far down the river on the right bank. They might as well have been in Boston. The guards at the Kiev airport attempted to keep the National Guard troops out. They almost started shooting at each other. It was a very near thing they were allowed in before the Russians arrived. And Russia is still in Ukraine and they are still attacking. When that starts turning around, then one can say Ukraine's strategy was a success, at least to that point. Until then, it is TBD.

Quote:And when May comes, and Ukrainian troops return from NATO countries freshly trained on powerful armaments, I think they're going to beat the tar out of the Russians, no matter how many Chinese missiles, bombs and other arms are used by Russia.

I hope they do. They might, there is reason to believe they can. However, a well-planned effort by the US has to include a response for "What if they don't". The thing that gives me pause is that the total number of trained Ukrainians, even after all that is going on at present, is well less than two divisions (actually less than one depending on what you count as "trained"). Ukraine is a big country. Two divisions isn't enough to actually "drive" Russia out. Russia will have to either panic and run away (quite possible) or change governments and negotiate a withdrawal (also quite possible). If neither of those things happen, Ukraine is weaker than the Wehrmacht and without a Luftwaffe. They can still win, but it will require another, probably much larger, training effort. It may also require an Air Force. As was said about Iraq, "How does this end?".
I hope Ukraine makes deep penetrations in the south and makes it look like they will invade Crimea. That has a good chance to produce mass panic and lots of prisoners. The less trained National Guard troops can round them up without much of a fight. That is the "easy way" for it to end. If the Russians don't panic and hold on, it will get very messy. How much attrition can Ukraine's striking force absorb before it becomes ineffective?

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