Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: TrumpCard - Goose - 08-21-2024

(08-21-2024, 12:01 AM)TrumpCard Wrote:  I have my doubts that Russian troops are trapped. The maps all show plenty of escape routes for individuals on foot. It’s just that Ukraine blew the bridges needed to get the equipment out with the troops. Of course Ukraine would be thrilled to get 2k POWs, but just capturing the land and equipment still would be nice.

Indeed capturing the land will be nice. The main reason the bridges were blown was to prevent reinforcements and supplies from entering the area. Obviously there are places where individuals can swim the river. It is a big enough river that I doubt it is fordable in many places, if any. However, experience has shown that "every man for himself" evacuations have extremely high attrition.

First, you have to get to the river. The area is forested so if you stay in the forest you are hard to see. However you have to navigate to the river avoiding open areas, roads, and obstacles that are difficult to cross. These you must go around.  Most of the conscripts and plenty of the veterans do not have the skills required to do that, and they know it. Presumably they are carrying what food they can and drinking water. Lots of them will get lost. If they do get to the river they have to get across it. Hard to do in full kit, so you must leave all your "stuff" behind. There isn't a welcoming committee waiting on the other side so you then have to find "help" carrying nothing but yourself.  The vast majority of the troops aren't great swimmers and either won't attempt it or will drown trying. The alternative of surrendering looks pretty good if these are your options.

Of course, if I am incorrect and the river is easily fordable it is a lot less daunting task. Russia is putting up pontoon bridges (that Ukraine destroys) but that may be because Russia needs vehicles (particularly trucks) to get across.

On top of all this you have Ukrainians looking for concentrations of Russian troops. Most troops, particularly the untrained ones, have no concept of an E&E operation at all. Spetsnaz units can split up and do so, but I doubt there are many such in this previously quiet area. Retreating troops need to be led by someone who does understand E&E. Unfortunately for Russia, their officers have an annoying habit of running away and leaving their troops behind. Most units with no leader tend to remain together. They feel safer in groups. Of course, these units can't move faster than their slowest elements. That makes Ukraine's ability to find them much greater. Finding two guys in the forest is a needle in a haystack. Even if you do find them using a IR drone it probably isn't worth sending a bunch of troops after them. A company or even a platoon is another matter. If such a unit does make it to the river, they will be out in the open when attempting to cross. Artillery fire can really tear them up. The reality is that these leaderless units tend to stick to the roads. That may be the only way out they know. Not hard to find at all.

Russia executed a very well planned retreat from Kherson City. The got basically everyone out in one night. The Ukrainians let them. The bridge was not destroyed and when it became clear a retreat was in progress the Ukrainians did not press.  Capturing Russians was not a priority. This time, the Russians who will be retreating are not concentrated. That will be a two edged sword. However, if they are "pressed" it should net a lot of prisoners. IMO what Ukraine nets will say a lot about the relative ability and skill of both forces. Lots of POWs sends a big message to both sides. Ukraine is already "talking up" their POW numbers. Adding a thousand or (preferably) more in a short period will make boasting unnecessary. The raw numbers will do the talking.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 08-21-2024

Ukraine targeting Russian pontoon bridges and engineering equipment in Kursk with FPV drones and GMLRS.

https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1826165779978424719/mediaviewer

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 08-21-2024

What was old is new again.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-appears-using-wired-unjammable-180442633.html

Of course when one reads the following link one realizes that FPV drones controlled via fiber optics have been in military use since the 1990s

https://www.g2mil.com/efogm.htm

The above article does point out why the Hellfire is in general a "better" weapon. The argument to use the FPV missiles was weak if sufficient Hellfires were available and therefore the US did not pursue it beyond the development phase. All fiber guided missiles/drones have an inherent  very serious range limitation due to the ability to spool out fiber. Eventually the fiber becomes too heavy and breaks, causing the missile to "go dumb". Obviously the length of fiber that can be carried is not infinite but the mechanical stress limit is usually the limiting factor. No point in carrying more cable than that.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 08-21-2024

Oops.

Quote:Ukrainian troops crossed the border earlier this month to find Russian troops in disarray. Missteps by Moscow are characteristic of a top brass often out of touch with battlefield realities.

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-general-alexander-lapin-kursk-9a624abd

BC

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 08-21-2024

(08-21-2024, 02:31 PM)BostonCard Wrote:  Oops.

Quote:Ukrainian troops crossed the border earlier this month to find Russian troops in disarray. Missteps by Moscow are characteristic of a top brass often out of touch with battlefield realities.

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-general-alexander-lapin-kursk-9a624abd

BC

IMO the main problem in the border area was lack of a unified command. Councils are a very bad way to run a war. If it was a "normal" border area where the main problems are smuggling and illegal migration it might work. When you are at war with that country it won't. Unity of command is an established military principle.  Getting rid of the council was probably a good idea.

However, when one makes such a decision, there needs to be a plan in place to unify the force, establish the new reporting lines, enforce common training (and associated standards) and establish overall and unit objectives. Doing all this in the face of the enemy is suicidal. It would be hard enough to do in peacetime. In the event, the Russian Army did none of the above. This probably was due in part to the fact the Army had no "new" forces and/or experienced commanders to execute the effort. Col. Gen. Lapin probably did not have the authority to issue orders to members of the FSB. Even if he did, he had no administrative method to do so. He is not in their reporting chain. The council was probably a kludge with the goal of unifying different command elements without changing their official reporting lines. Such kludges seldom work. How much difference having the "council" in existence when Ukraine attacked would have made is conjectural, but I suspect not much. The members each had little "reserve" to commit and they too are "stove-piped" by their command structure in requesting help. Lateral cooperation was not a Soviet strength and that hasn't changed in the Russian Federation. The article in Business Insider points out:

Quote:It's unclear how effective the agency's response would have been to Ukraine's surprise attack, per the outlet. But without it, Russia has definitely struggled to push back Ukraine's forces.

Even in the US transferring the USCG to the Navy in time of war historically introduces a significant glitch into USCG operations. In that case, there are clear reporting lines that move with the transfer. Now imagine if the USCG command structure remained part of the DHS but it was expected to fight as part of the Navy.

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RE: TrumpCard - GK3 - 08-21-2024

(08-21-2024, 12:01 AM)TrumpCard Wrote:  I have my doubts that Russian troops are trapped. The maps all show plenty of escape routes for individuals on foot. It’s just that Ukraine blew the bridges needed to get the equipment out with the troops. Of course Ukraine would be thrilled to get 2k POWs, but just capturing the land and equipment still would be nice.

True, and even just forcing another 50,000 people to withdraw somewhere safe is only going to increase the mumbling that must be going on about what the Putin is doing. When it was all about the Ukrainians suffering, my guess is that few Russians cared, now the shoe is on the other foot. Many of these people are not in the category of being able to rebuild if they come back to a pile of bricks in the future.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 08-21-2024

The area ukraine has captured is pretty big, like the area of Los Angeles, but the population that has to move is << 1/10th the population of Los Angeles. I don’t think it moves the needle that much.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 08-21-2024

(08-21-2024, 05:38 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  The area ukraine has captured is pretty big, like the area of Los Angeles, but the population that has to move is << 1/10th the population of Los Angeles. I don’t think it moves the needle that much.

Agree. Also, it won't get the news coverage that it arguably deserves. The kind of coverage it does get will be oriented to demonizing the Ukrainians and justifying the "Special Military Operation" on the grounds it was necessary to avoid this kind of activity. The drone strikes on Moscow however will be noticed by many more people.

The psychology of all this in Russia is interesting and hard to read. The milbloggers are excoriating the Russian military for letting it happen. Nobody has the courage to question why Putin has such an incompetent military, at least in public. Privately however many people have to be at least wondering if Putin is still "the answer". As I have stated before however, Putin has ensured there is no obvious alternate. That fact alone will make it almost impossible for a popular insurgency to take root. IMO the only thing that can defenestrate  Putin in the near term would be a military coup, like the one Prigozhin almost executed. The problem is nobody in the Russian military today has the combination of military skill, leadership ability and courage to pull it off. Putin made sure of that too. Unfortunately for Putin, that necessity makes his military much less effective than by all rights it should be.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 08-22-2024

https://www.yahoo.com/gma/drone-attack-sets-fire-russian-091008916.html

Ukraine is clearly making a maximum effort to damage the Russian Air Force wherever it may be located. Apparently they too believe it is the force that can alter the strategic balance in both Ukraine's offense into Russia and Russia's grinding offensives in Ukraine. Up until last summer the VKS basically opted out. Russian strategic air launched long range missiles but that was it. The advent of the glide bomb attacks, conservative though they are, have made themselves felt and need to be countered. If the VKS ever "lives up to its potential" Ukraine is toast. Ukraine wants to make sure that doesn't happen.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - gocard14 - 08-22-2024

(08-22-2024, 07:24 AM)Goose Wrote:  https://www.yahoo.com/gma/drone-attack-sets-fire-russian-091008916.html

Ukraine is clearly making a maximum effort to damage the Russian Air Force wherever it may be located. Apparently they too believe it is the force that can alter the strategic balance in both Ukraine's offense into Russia and Russia's grinding offensives in Ukraine. Up until last summer the VKS basically opted out. Russian strategic air launched long range missiles but that was it. The advent of the glide bomb attacks, conservative though they are, have made themselves felt and need to be countered. If the VKS ever "lives up to its potential" Ukraine is toast. Ukraine wants to make sure that doesn't happen.

Also makes sense as a spot where limited payloads inherent to these drones can do maximum damage. 

The main reports we see of these overnight drone attacks tend to be air defense systems (makes sense, to enable everything else), fuel or munition storage facilities, and airfields due to fragility of planes and tendency of everything else to go Kaboom. Lots of fires from fuel storage at ports, which makes sense both as a military and economic target. 

I'm a bit surprised we haven't seen a more systemic targeting of electrical substations used to power rail transit. I could be wrong, but that seems a weak link in the rail transport chain relative to targeting tracks or hard targets like bridges. Maybe they are too numerous or just not enough muntiions to get that far down the list, but they should also be more poorly defended.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 08-22-2024

(08-22-2024, 09:10 AM)gocard14 Wrote:  I'm a bit surprised we haven't seen a more systemic targeting of electrical substations used to power rail transit. I could be wrong, but that seems a weak link in the rail transport chain relative to targeting tracks or hard targets like bridges. Maybe they are too numerous or just not enough muntiions to get that far down the list, but they should also be more poorly defended.

The reason for this is twofold. First, the transformers themselves and associated electrical equipment are quite rugged. Most drones don't carry large enough payloads to reliably destroy this equipment. This equipment, unlike munitions depots and oil storage tanks does not in general explode and catch fire. If you miss, you won't get any sympathetic detonations. Cluster type munitions which work well on fuel dumps don't work well on substations. They don't catch fire easily.

The second problem is that the electrical wiring itself (and its supports) often deflects or detonates the incoming suicide drone/warheads. These obstacles are located well above the actual substation itself. They will be damaged/destroyed, but they are relatively easy to repair and use material that is normally associated with railway maintenance and therefore readily available. Long range drones, being larger, will often hit these obstacles with parts of their structure (like wings and arms supporting lift fans). The collision usually knocks the drone down well away from its objective. These are not FPV drones so the pilot can't avoid such obstacles. Even FPV drones would have a tough time threading their way through the wiring :-).

Ukraine thinks it has better targets for its drone force.

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RE: TrumpCard - GK3 - 08-23-2024

(08-21-2024, 08:09 AM)Goose Wrote:  

(08-21-2024, 12:01 AM)TrumpCard Wrote:  I have my doubts that Russian troops are trapped. The maps all show plenty of escape routes for individuals on foot. It’s just that Ukraine blew the bridges needed to get the equipment out with the troops. Of course Ukraine would be thrilled to get 2k POWs, but just capturing the land and equipment still would be nice.

Indeed capturing the land will be nice. The main reason the bridges were blown was to prevent reinforcements and supplies from entering the area. Obviously there are places where individuals can swim the river. It is a big enough river that I doubt it is fordable in many places, if any. However, experience has shown that "every man for himself" evacuations have extremely high attrition.

First, you have to get to the river. The area is forested so if you stay in the forest you are hard to see. However you have to navigate to the river avoiding open areas, roads, and obstacles that are difficult to cross. These you must go around.  Most of the conscripts and plenty of the veterans do not have the skills required to do that, and they know it. Presumably they are carrying what food they can and drinking water. Lots of them will get lost. If they do get to the river they have to get across it. Hard to do in full kit, so you must leave all your "stuff" behind. There isn't a welcoming committee waiting on the other side so you then have to find "help" carrying nothing but yourself.  The vast majority of the troops aren't great swimmers and either won't attempt it or will drown trying. The alternative of surrendering looks pretty good if these are your options.

Of course, if I am incorrect and the river is easily fordable it is a lot less daunting task. Russia is putting up pontoon bridges (that Ukraine destroys) but that may be because Russia needs vehicles (particularly trucks) to get across.

On top of all this you have Ukrainians looking for concentrations of Russian troops. Most troops, particularly the untrained ones, have no concept of an E&E operation at all. Spetsnaz units can split up and do so, but I doubt there are many such in this previously quiet area. Retreating troops need to be led by someone who does understand E&E. Unfortunately for Russia, their officers have an annoying habit of running away and leaving their troops behind. Most units with no leader tend to remain together. They feel safer in groups. Of course, these units can't move faster than their slowest elements. That makes Ukraine's ability to find them much greater. Finding two guys in the forest is a needle in a haystack. Even if you do find them using a IR drone it probably isn't worth sending a bunch of troops after them. A company or even a platoon is another matter. If such a unit does make it to the river, they will be out in the open when attempting to cross. Artillery fire can really tear them up. The reality is that these leaderless units tend to stick to the roads. That may be the only way out they know. Not hard to find at all.

Russia executed a very well planned retreat from Kherson City. The got basically everyone out in one night. The Ukrainians let them. The bridge was not destroyed and when it became clear a retreat was in progress the Ukrainians did not press.  Capturing Russians was not a priority. This time, the Russians who will be retreating are not concentrated. That will be a two edged sword. However, if they are "pressed" it should net a lot of prisoners. IMO what Ukraine nets will say a lot about the relative ability and skill of both forces. Lots of POWs sends a big message to both sides. Ukraine is already "talking up" their POW numbers. Adding a thousand or (preferably) more in a short period will make boasting unnecessary. The raw numbers will do the talking.

Unless they are Spetsnaz, I am not sure Russia has any troops at all who are even remotely qualified in real E&E. After Vietnam the US Military began SERE training (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape) training. It is no day at the beach, and many who start the course don't make it through it.  But over the years the course has provided all branches of the service a pool of personnel qualified to actually lead in this environment.

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(08-22-2024, 10:08 AM)Goose Wrote:  

(08-22-2024, 09:10 AM)gocard14 Wrote:  I'm a bit surprised we haven't seen a more systemic targeting of electrical substations used to power rail transit. I could be wrong, but that seems a weak link in the rail transport chain relative to targeting tracks or hard targets like bridges. Maybe they are too numerous or just not enough muntiions to get that far down the list, but they should also be more poorly defended.

The reason for this is twofold. First, the transformers themselves and associated electrical equipment are quite rugged. Most drones don't carry large enough payloads to reliably destroy this equipment. This equipment, unlike munitions depots and oil storage tanks does not in general explode and catch fire. If you miss, you won't get any sympathetic detonations. Cluster type munitions which work well on fuel dumps don't work well on substations. They don't catch fire easily.

The second problem is that the electrical wiring itself (and its supports) often deflects or detonates the incoming suicide drone/warheads. These obstacles are located well above the actual substation itself. They will be damaged/destroyed, but they are relatively easy to repair and use material that is normally associated with railway maintenance and therefore readily available. Long range drones, being larger, will often hit these obstacles with parts of their structure (like wings and arms supporting lift fans). The collision usually knocks the drone down well away from its objective. These are not FPV drones so the pilot can't avoid such obstacles. Even FPV drones would have a tough time threading their way through the wiring :-).

Ukraine thinks it has better targets for its drone force.

Thanks Goose, I had wondered the same thing.  I still think the transformers can be hard to replace, but if they are really hard to hit, there have to be better targets.

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RE: TrumpCard - Goose - 08-23-2024

(08-23-2024, 09:27 AM)GK3 Wrote:  

(08-22-2024, 10:08 AM)Goose Wrote:  

(08-22-2024, 09:10 AM)gocard14 Wrote:  I'm a bit surprised we haven't seen a more systemic targeting of electrical substations used to power rail transit. I could be wrong, but that seems a weak link in the rail transport chain relative to targeting tracks or hard targets like bridges. Maybe they are too numerous or just not enough muntiions to get that far down the list, but they should also be more poorly defended.

The reason for this is twofold. First, the transformers themselves and associated electrical equipment are quite rugged. Most drones don't carry large enough payloads to reliably destroy this equipment. This equipment, unlike munitions depots and oil storage tanks does not in general explode and catch fire. If you miss, you won't get any sympathetic detonations. Cluster type munitions which work well on fuel dumps don't work well on substations. They don't catch fire easily.

The second problem is that the electrical wiring itself (and its supports) often deflects or detonates the incoming suicide drone/warheads. These obstacles are located well above the actual substation itself. They will be damaged/destroyed, but they are relatively easy to repair and use material that is normally associated with railway maintenance and therefore readily available. Long range drones, being larger, will often hit these obstacles with parts of their structure (like wings and arms supporting lift fans). The collision usually knocks the drone down well away from its objective. These are not FPV drones so the pilot can't avoid such obstacles. Even FPV drones would have a tough time threading their way through the wiring :-).

Ukraine thinks it has better targets for its drone force.

Thanks Goose, I had wondered the same thing.  I still think the transformers can be hard to replace, but if they are really hard to hit, there have to be better targets.

You are correct that the transformers are difficult to replace. It is a relatively major engineering task. Moving and unloading the replacement transformer isn't easy. They are very heavy. In many cases road transport is unavailable to the substation site. In that case the transformer and the crane to lift it has to be brought in by rail. The most impactful problem is that even if an exact replacement transformer exists (and can be located) it will take weeks (at a minimum) to replace the transformer. This is not something the Maintenance of Way (MOW) crews do. You need the specialized railway construction crews to do it. Organizing and scheduling the effort is a major undertaking. During all this time the rail line will be down. If synchronized with a major Ukrainian offensive that can have serious effects on the defense.  Since these transformers last quite long, often several decades, it is common that no direct replacement is available. In that case the mounting structure and electrical layout may need to be re-designed to accommodate what is easily available. This will add even more down time to the line.

It must also be noted that some railroads are "over engineered". Their power stations are placed on the line at much more frequent intervals than actually required. Any given power station can be removed from service and the line can continue to operate, possibly at lower speeds and/or reduced capacity. On high volume lines this is often the case. I doubt the lines in the Kursk area fall into this category.

There are two "normal" means of replacing transformers that are getting old, perhaps leaking fluid (used to be PCB laden) and not performing to spec. One is to manufacture an exact replacement, schedule the work, get all the people to the site and swap the transformer as quickly as possible. If well coordinated the actual swap can often be done in 48 hours or less. The planning and manufacturing may have taken months but the line downtime is only the "cut-over" interval.

The second approach is to install a new transformer (whose form factor and power rating may differ from the original) right next to the existing transformer. This can be done only if there is space available near the existing transformer. The required engineering and procurement can be done at somewhat leisurely pace, keeping the old transformer in service. When all is ready, the wiring will be moved from the old transformer to the new. This can usually be done quite quickly. All railroads have daily MOW intervals where no trains are allowed on specific sections of the line. This rapid cut-over usually is folded into a normal MOW interval and no down time is introduced. When using this method it is common to install bus bars that will allow either the "old" or the "new" transformers to power the line. Next time a transformer needs replacement, it is easy. There is already the infrastructure in place to do it. The "old" transformer sometimes isn't pulled out until it is time to replace its successor. In many "modern" electric railroads today two transformers are normally in place. If one needs to be taken offline for any reason, the switch to the other is fast, sometimes requiring no manual operations at all. Of course, if both are damaged the railroad is back to the original crash program of replacement.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 08-24-2024

An interesting take on U.S. strategy in supporting Ukraine from Boris Bondarev, a Geneva-based former Russian diplomat who resigned in 2022 to protest the war: “When you put your enemy’s red lines, so to speak, as the crucial factor of your own strategy, you will always be on the losing side,” he said.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/24/putin-red-lines-war-ukraine/

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 08-24-2024

Was about to post the same article. I wonder if that is the biggest upshot of Ukraine’s invasion of the Kursk region, a message to Western supporters that Putin’s red lines are pure bluster and that no, letting Ukraine use ATACMS directed towards targets in Russia itself will not provoke a response from Putin, just as sending HIMARS, tanks, and other offensive weapons didn’t.

If I want to be charitable, I’d say that Western slowly incrementalism approach of sending a toe over the red line, followed by a foot, etc. winds up being less provocative than full on obliterating it, but we have to remember that every limitation we put on Ukraine makes their defense less effective, which reduces their chance of pushing the Russians back and increases Ukrainian casualties.

BC

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 08-24-2024

(08-24-2024, 03:30 PM)BostonCard Wrote:  If I want to be charitable, I’d say that Western slowly incrementalism approach of sending a toe over the red line, followed by a foot, etc. winds up being less provocative than full on obliterating it, but we have to remember that every limitation we put on Ukraine makes their defense less effective, which reduces their chance of pushing the Russians back and increases Ukrainian casualties.

BC

IMO you are correct that the "slow incrementalism" is a bit "safer". It does come with some significant costs however. As the ISW has pointed out, the "technological" advances each side makes often changes the balance of power significantly. However, the other side successfully adapts to the changed threat relatively quickly and that advantage is negated. The also point out that the ability to combine several such changes together has a synergistic effect that is a major force multiplier. It can put the opponent at a very significant disadvantage that can be a game-changer. Slow incrementalism precludes the arrival of multiple technologies simultaneously and forfeits that advantage.

The second major disadvantage is that we are slowly training the Russian military to be a better force. I have seen several repetitions in the press of the "immunization" analogy. At the start of this war the Russian army was a basket case. They had mile upon mile of immobile military vehicle convoys stopped dead on the roads for days. Their attempt to seize an airhead to outflank Kiev became a laughingstock despite the quite anemic force Ukraine sent to oppose it. The Russian army today isn't great shakes but it doesn't make those kinds of mistakes on a daily basis anymore. They have at least pretty much figured out what they can and can't do and are doing it. At the start of the war the VKS was a non-factor. They have finally developed a glide bomb capability that they never had before. It is causing Ukraine major problems. When first introduced the HIMARS and other GPS guided weapons were very effective. This forced the Russians to manufacture and deploy their GPS jamming capability at scale, which negated much of the benefit of our weapons. Ukraine and the west have (IMO mysteriously) failed to counter that action effectively. It goes on and on.

Every time we deploy a new weapon or give Ukraine permission to use an existing weapon in new ways, it causes the Russians major problems for awhile. However, since we do it in isolation Russia can endure the problem while developing the necessary "antibodies" to beat the infection. We need to overwhelm their immune system and we can't do it staying with "slow incrementalism". Should we ever have to fight the Russian army directly we will be fighting a much better organized and more appropriately equipped force. They will also be much more accustomed to NATO SAMs in "real life", which is very valuable to them. Not good for Ukraine and not good for us.

IMO we must take Putin at his word. He says he will not use nuclear weapons unless there is a "threat to the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Russia". Until the latest offensive by Ukraine it was pretty clear none of the conditions Putin set were being met. Arguably, the Russian territorial integrity has been breached by Ukraine. Putin did nothing. He could believe that he will defeat Ukraine so any such incursions are meaningless and not a "real" threat. It could also mean he isn't sure what would happen if he did respond with a nuclear weapon and therefore won't do so unless it becomes an "emergency". FWIW I believe this is the actual case. It is also possible that Putin is unsure his military would obey the order.

The real question is: "Does Putin believe an imminent Ukrainian victory and reconquest of all their territory necessitate a nuclear action?". If we believe he does, do we actually want a Ukrainian victory? If we do not want that victory, why are we assisting Ukraine? If we do want such a victory, we (actually Ukraine mostly) will have to face that nuclear response in any case. What will we do? Better to decide now than wait for the event and then decide under great pressure. OTOH, if we don't believe Putin would escalate if he is about to lose the war, why go slow?

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - fullmetal - 08-24-2024

The immunization is not just in tactics and weaponry, but also in personnel.  While Russia is indeed throwing bodies into the woodchipper, a lot of less competent old guard officers are being replaced with younger, savvier officers who have seen the errors of their predecessors' ways.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 08-24-2024

(08-24-2024, 06:38 PM)fullmetal Wrote:  The immunization is not just in tactics and weaponry, but also in personnel.  While Russia is indeed throwing bodies into the woodchipper, a lot of less competent old guard officers are being replaced with younger, savvier officers who have seen the errors of their predecessors' ways.

Exactly so! Some of the younger officers may not be so effective and that will be noted and they will be replaced.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Mick - 08-26-2024

Russian drone / missile attack, numbering in the hundreds, targeting critical civilian infrastructure. How soon before the Ukrainians adopt the same strategy?
Zelenskyy says Russian overnight attack involved over 100 missiles and about 100 drones | AP News

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 08-26-2024

(08-26-2024, 06:48 AM)Mick Wrote:  Russian drone / missile attack, numbering in the hundreds, targeting critical civilian infrastructure. How soon before the Ukrainians adopt the same strategy?
Zelenskyy says Russian overnight attack involved over 100 missiles and about 100 drones | AP News

Not soon, and probably not ever. They don't have the ability to do so. Russia has several overwhelming advantages.

Ukraine's major population centers are close to their national boundaries. Relatively short range low technology drones can reach them from nearby Russian soil. Russia's major population centers are quite far from Ukraine, so short range drones and ballistic missiles are completely off the table for them.

Russia has submarines that can launch missiles from the Black Sea with impunity. Ukraine has no such capability. Russia can also fire weapons from the Sea of Azov. Ukraine cannot.

Russia is importing massive quantities of cheap missile/drone  weapons from Iran and North Korea. Ukraine's partners that could supply such weapons restrict their use. Many of the weapons in this class are relatively short range and therefore of limited utility in Ukrainian service anyway.

Most importantly Russia possesses large stockpiles of older fast long-range air launched cruise missiles with large warheads. They also have the platforms to launch them. Ukraine does not. Russia also has platforms to launch their "new" hypersonic missiles. Ukraine has no such missiles and no such platforms.

Ukraine is building more cruise missiles with longer ranges. They are doing a very good job of this and the Palyanitsa missile can be a real PITA for Russia. It is a cheaper, simpler Tomahawk that Ukraine can use anywhere without restriction. It is doubtful Ukraine can manufacture hundreds of them, particularly quickly. Ukraine therefore will use them strategically, not as mass terror weapons. http://www.hisutton.com/Ukraine-Palyanitsa.html

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