Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 09-25-2024

Could such a drone improve the chance of taking out the Kerch Bridge?

Speaking of that bridge, Russia is building something alongside it
https://www.newsweek.com/mystery-structure-crimea-bridge-speculation-1942475

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-25-2024

(09-25-2024, 12:03 AM)GK3 Wrote:  This article describes to some extent a new Ukrainian drone that is faster and carries a much bigger payload with a range of several hundred miles.  Basically a cruise missile, using a small, cheap turbofan jet engine.  I have seen other articles that say it has a payload of nearly 1 ton of explosives.
Will be interesting to see if they really did put something like this together.

https://simpleflying.com/ukraine-building-jet-powered-drones-strike-russian-targets/#:~:text=Ukraine%20uses%20new%20%22Palyanytsia%22%20jet%20drone%20against%20Russia&text=Footage%20has%20recently%20emerged%20on,variety%20of%20jet%2Dpropelled%20drones.

Ukraine definitely has the technical ability to put something like this together. As the article points out they can manufacture jet engines, which most countries cannot. There is always the question of how many they can build, and that we don't know. The guidance system (both design and construction) for such a weapon is also a challenge. These days having a combination GPS-INS is the "bottom tier". IR target recognition is becoming de regueur.  Like any new weapons system it will undoubtedly have its teething problems.

The fact that Russia  evacuates flyable aircraft from targeted airfields is mind-boggling. I get it that an SU-34 is not an "air-to-air" weapon and is not something that one would choose to hunt drones. However, if you have time to evacuate the target you also have time to put up an air-to-air response. Just crazy Russia doesn't.

One immense disadvantage of relying on point-defense missile systems as your primary anti-drone defense is that it is inherently very short range. This is a product of the drone flight profile. The missile radars can't see the drones at all until they are quite close. You need lots and lots of the point defense systems because there are lots of valuable targets. How many such systems can/has Russia built and supplied trained crews for? Nowhere near enough. These missile systems are also a "last line of defense". If these point defense systems miss/are overwhelmed the drone hits the target. Aircraft OTOH have the look-down shoot down capability. Their radars can see the drones along the entire drone flight path. If they miss the first time they can quickly re-attack. Aircraft can also rapidly re-deploy from relatively far away. Aircraft can concentrate to defend the target being attacked. They don't have to be everywhere all the time.

Why isn't Russia doing this??? There must be a reason. It is the "textbook" response. There is an interesting link in the cited article. https://simpleflying.com/russia-arms-prop-yak-52-trainers-shoot-down-ukranian-drones/ OK, that kind of makes sense. You don't need a multi-million dollar fighter to shoot down a propeller driven drone flying at about 100 mph. However, why in any rational universe would Russia not use the fighters they already have to protect their assets?

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(09-25-2024, 02:32 AM)M T Wrote:  Could such a drone improve the chance of taking out the Kerch Bridge?

Maybe. The quoted range is just on the edge of making it from Kherson to the bridge. The quoted range is undoubtedly an estimate/guess. The actual range may be longer. There is also the option of fitting a smaller warhead. Actually hitting the bridge is tricky unless the missile is equipped with some kind of target recognition system. GPS won't quite do it. A CEP of 10 meters (Tomahawk CEP) probably won't do it. Damage the bridge yes, destroy it no. If you fire "several" missiles the odds of an almost direct hit go way up. An IR or W band seeker makes for "one missile, no bridge". The bridge is also very well protected against drone attacks. There are lots of point defense systems scattered all over the approaches, at least on the Ukraine side. A single missile of this class probably wouldn't make it through. A "swarm" of such missiles accompanied by radar jammers/dummy targets certainly can.

As Ukraine has stated, they will destroy the bridge "when the time is right". IMO they are doing more good blowing up Russian air bases and arsenals than getting rid of the bridge would do ATM. If Ukraine generates a ground attack against Crimea, that could change,

Quote:Speaking of that bridge, Russia is building something alongside it
https://www.newsweek.com/mystery-structure-crimea-bridge-speculation-1942475

Could be some kind of decoy to confuse drone targeting. I am guessing it is a platform on which to mount very short range missile defenses and/or defenses against Ukrainian USVs.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-26-2024

https://www.yahoo.com/news/orb-n-aide-faces-backlash-124848569.html

The aide  simply expressed what lots of people in Hungary actually believe. They believe Ukraine's attempts to defend themselves are simply futile. As the aide said, Hungary would be in the same position. The backlash from the Hungarian population against this concept while undoubtedly a majority view is not at all universal. The aide of course tried to walk it back, but he actually said what he believed. It just wasn't politically acceptable.

One would hope that such a statement would result in the immediate removal of the aide and quite probably the fall of the government. The former might happen but very probably will not. The latter certainly will not. It is important to remember that Hungary as a NATO member would not be fighting alone unlike Ukraine. The 1956 uprising wasn't simply a patriotic outburst but equally (or more so) an opposition to what Russia was doing to Hungary, physically, economically and intellectually. The concept that there are a large minority of people in Hungary that are not cognizant of that is absolutely amazing. But it is a fact. Many Hungarians also believe that Hungary is somehow a victim in the EU and would be better off aligning themselves with Russia. Unfortunately that group is even larger and is what keeps Orbán and his henchmen in power. Similar groups (of greatly varying sizes) exist to at least some degree in all former Warsaw pact countries. It is a mistake to ignore them. If the US maintains some aid to Ukraine but Ukraine eventually folds,  these groups will have an very strong case to present to their populations. Resistance is indeed futile. If the US abandons Ukraine that case becomes irrefutable. For better or worse, the US has lots of "skin in the game". I am not at all reassured that the public at large understands this and the probable consequences of failure.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 09-26-2024

There are foolish statements made every day. Unfortunately, today, a careless comment will become a big point for the opposition. 

If surely is getting hard to keep US politics out of this topic. Why, it’s as sensible as not being able to do to the invader what they’re doing to you. 

I would hate seeing the defense of Ukraine becoming a political football just as COVID became. We are still paying for that divisiveness and its echoes 4.5 years hence.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 10-02-2024

I presume we all wish for peace.  I hope those in control can find a way to pull back from where the world seems to be.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - fullmetal - 10-02-2024

How quickly the world changes.

I'm sorry to hear that Ukraine has lost Vuhledar. Time is not on the side of the Ukrainians.

Quote:While not a transport and logistics hub like Pokrovsk, Vuhledar was heavily fortified and viewed as a crucial bastion at the intersection of Ukraine’s eastern and southern fronts. One prominent Russian war blogger Boris Rozhin said this made the victory “operational, if not operational-strategic.”

“The fact is that this ‘balcony’ [an apparent reference to Vuhledar’s elevated position] was located at the junction of the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk fronts posed a constant threat to the grouping that covered the approaches to Mariupol,” he noted, referring to the southern Ukrainian city that has been in Russian hands since 2022.

Just like Avdiivka, another strategic eastern town which fell in February, Vuhledar is a victim not of Russian strategic prowess but brute-force attrition.

https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/02/europe/vuhledar-russia-ukraine-war-capture-intl/index.html

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TrumpCard - TrumpCard - 10-02-2024

(10-02-2024, 01:42 PM)M T Wrote:  I presume we all wish for peace.  I hope those in control can find a way to pull back from where the world seems to be.

Happy new year, presuming that was the impetus for this post. For Ukraine and anyone else facing aggressors, peace through strength.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 10-04-2024

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-f-16-fighter-pilots-111701844.html

This article points out (once again) the difficulty of transitioning from Warsaw Pact era aircraft to F-16s and similar NATO aircraft. None of this is a surprise. Both Germany and Poland went through this evolution and concluded it was best to simply not do it. Let the pilots who flew MIGs keep doing so until both they and their aircraft were retired. Train new younger pilots to fly the younger NATO aircraft.  They have nothing to "unlearn" and in any case you need a training pipeline. Your existing force is not your future force.

The F-16 "conversion" in Ukraine is not going well. The delivery of aircraft from the European sources is going slower than planned. No large increase in pilot training has taken place or is contemplated. Even if such training began in early 2025 the results would not be felt until near the end of 2025. Ukraine will apparently go through another year (at least) without an effective air force. The VKS is continually using glide bombs against Ukrainian positions (and cities in some cases) with little opposition. There are not and will not be anywhere near enough SAMs to stop them. While Ukraine is doing a great job of striking Russian air bases and ammunition storage points using their increasingly capable drone forces it remains to be seen how effective that will be. As of now, the VKS doesn't seem much affected. That isn't to say the cumulative effect is insignificant.

https://www.amarcexperience.com/ui/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=205&Itemid=274
FWIW the US has 342 F-16s preserved at Davis-Monthan. Of these, 143 are the "C" model which would be reasonable to use in Ukraine. The F-16AM/BM models Ukraine is receiving from other sources are somewhat similar to an F-16C (created by upgrade instead of "new built", +/-). This is in addition to the newer model currently flyable F-16s that are continually being replaced by F-35As in the active duty and reserve USAF squadrons. We have this hardware. We will have to pay contractors to "de-militarize" it or add it to AMARCs collection. IMO not sending it to Ukraine is just plain nuts. Every Ukrainian pilot trained in the US should go home with his "own" aircraft from the ANG until there are no more.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 10-04-2024

F16s won't solve the glide bomb problem. Pretty much every Ukrainian and Western analyst has stated as much. To get within range of the bombers, the F16s would be within range of Russian air defenses.

Still would be great to have them operational in larger numbers for a variety of reasons, but F16s themselves would not be a decisive or "war winning" weapon.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 10-04-2024

(10-04-2024, 08:37 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:  F16s won't solve the glide bomb problem. Pretty much every Ukrainian and Western analyst has stated as much. To get within range of the bombers, the F16s would be within range of Russian air defenses.

Indeed the analysts state  the F16s "would be within range of Russian air defenses". That being true it is tacitly assumed that F-16s could not effectively operate against Russian aircraft launching glide bombs. There are all kinds of major problems with that reasoning.

The definition of "Russian air defenses" is not uniform across the front. The "tactical" (SHORAD) air defense assets (Tor, Pantsir etc.) are normally used to defend troop concentrations and important "point" targets. Their short range generally doesn't reach high enough to threaten F-16s that are hunting SU-34. Russia does not have enough "long range" S-400s to defend everywhere all the time. If a flight of F-16s runs into one, is not aware it has launched on them, and is not prepared to defend, they are toast. Ukraine demonstrated that effect by moving a Patriot battery to counter SU-34s launching glide bombs. The were all of the above, including "toast". Percentage wise, Russia has a lot more S-400s than Ukraine has Patriots, but the principle is the same. There is however one important factor favoring Ukraine. There are some areas that are much more dangerous than others. Ukraine knows pretty much exactly where every Russian S-400 near the battle area is located. They know because we know. Ukraine has shown the ability to destroy these systems by drone attacks. If an S-400 is located to defend against F-16s threatening SU-34s, attack it. Ukraine can use drones and/or F-16s carrying HARMs. Experience has shown that such attacks sometimes destroys the target radar. In any case, it almost invariably causes the battery to either shut down or go into "self-preservation" mode. From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-88_HARM

Quote:During Operation Allied Force, NATO reportedly fired 743 HARMs during the course of the 78-day campaign, but could confirm the destruction of only 3 of the original 25 SA-6 batteries. Over half of the HARMs expended were preemptive targeting shots (PETs), fired at suspected SAM sites, but without a radar to target. During the campaign, Serbian SAM sites fired more than 800 SAMs with only 2 NATO aircraft downed, the majority from fixed sites were fired without radar guidance. Radars were also forced to operate for only 20 seconds or less to avoid destruction by HARMs.

An S-400 acquiring a target, firing a missile, and then turning off the illuminator isn't going to hit anything. SEAD is a "real" thing. Russia and Ukraine were not trained or resourced to do it. The "experts" treat that as an immutable premise. It isn't. Ukraine can change that. Israeli non-stealth aircraft operate all the time in areas where they are "within range of air defenses". It doesn't mean you can't do it. It means you have to be aware of and honor the threat.

Ukrainian F-16s threatening Russian SU-34s do not have to penetrate deeply into Russia to accomplish their mission. The SU-34s stay above "friendly" territory. Ukrainian F-16s can do the same. The range of Russian glide bombs are in the range of 50 km. The range of the AIM-120C is on the order of 140 km. Can an appropriately located S-400 hit and F-16 flying at 30k ft 100 km inside Ukrainian air space? Yes, it can if the F-16 doesn't do anything to defend itself and the S-400 can stay on the air. If the F-16 dives for the deck, it probably will be "safe". If the S-400 fears a HARM inbound, it may shut down. After a few S-400s are destroyed because they didn't, you can bet the remainders will.

IMO the reason Ukraine and Russia have not engaged in a more aggressive air war is that Ukraine absolutely must preserve its air force's ability to counter the Russian air force. Ukraine arguably can't survive the attrition of the current very low intensity air war. It certainly can't survive an increase in that attrition. Russia arguably could sustain an increase in attrition. However, since Russia lacks the training/ability to do SEAD and had no ability to do air support of ground troops above MANPADS altitudes they have no real reason to risk aircraft in Ukraine. The "new" glide bombs give them the ability to deliver air support with very low risk. Using F-16s to counter glide bombing will involve losses, but not "unsustainable" ones if properly executed. Of course that assumes a large enough force that using F-16s in this way is viable. 20 planes or so can't do that. 2 aircraft is a 10% loss rate.

Quote: 
Still would be great to have them operational in larger numbers for a variety of reasons, but F16s themselves would not be a decisive or "war winning" weapon.

Indeed there are reasons to want F-16s operational to do other tasks, such as shooting down air-breathing drones of all kinds. I also agree that the F-16 is not a "war winning" weapon. However, IMO the inability to counter glide bombing by Russia may be a "war losing" inability. The Russians are using this capability in increasingly effective amounts and proficiency. It is making "meat attacks" much more effective. Countering this capability is necessary to give Ukrainian infantry any hope of defending. 2 kG bombs put even the Russian artillery superiority in the shade. It is especially demoralizing if you have absolutely no defense against it.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 10-08-2024

Will the weather soon be on the Ukrainians' side?  Does not seem like much good has happened recently, so the Ukrainians might benefit from a reduction in battlefield activity with both sides hunkering down.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 10-08-2024

https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-military-compiled-list-american-185236386.html

This article confirms that "Ukraine has not been supplied with Link-16". Exactly how that statement should be interpreted is unclear, but in so far as it is true it definitely handicaps Ukraine considerably. I can understand that equipping each and every F-16 with Link-16 may be considered too much of a security risk, as F-16s can and will get shot down, possibly in Russian controlled territory. However, I would be quite upset if the Ukrainian Air Defense center doesn't have it. They are as "secure" as anything can ever be in war. They are well inside Ukrainian territory. They are privy to lots of US classified information. Knowing what the US "sees" in the battlespace has to be important in responding to the ongoing Russian attacks. They could also then see the information gathered from any Ukrainian Link-16 operators. That  synergy would be formidable. I just can't imagine we would not provide that capability. Yet, unless this is an intentional disinformation operation, we are not.

The US has to know that some Link-16 equipped aircraft have crashed in Iraq and Afghanistan under circumstances where the Link-16 hardware may have been compromised. Virtually all allies have Link-16 equipped aircraft. I am virtually certain the Russians have obtained the manuals. In theory, even if you have the hardware itself without the codes it is useless. IMO the benefits to Ukraine of using Link-16 tactically are worth the risk. The US presumably has taken into account that if the US is fighting a war the enemy will undoubtedly capture some Link-16 hardware.

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(10-08-2024, 05:38 PM)TrumpCard Wrote:  Will the weather soon be on the Ukrainians' side?  Does not seem like much good has happened recently, so the Ukrainians might benefit from a reduction in battlefield activity with both sides hunkering down.

https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/10/02/frontline-report-russian-forces-race-against-time-in-pokrovsk-offensive-as-mud-season-looms/

The mud season starts approximately the end of the month, give or take. It makes supplying troops difficult. The fact it inhibits mechanized operations almost doesn't matter in this war, but logistics does. Unfortunately, it also affects both sides. This year, Russia may try to keep the pressure on Ukraine as much as they possibly can. Russia seems to believe they have the upper hand in the Donbas and will try to press Ukraine as opposed to hunkering down. This will of course put pressure on Russia too. Let's hope it does them more harm than good!

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 10-10-2024

https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-ukraine-self-fulfilling-prophecies-140000102.html

IMO a good insight into what the "NATO thinking" is and has been. I do not agree with the belief that providing a limited set of weapons to Ukraine would have prevented the invasion. In fact, it may have forced Russia to actually plan for significant resistance and resulted in them winning many of the initial battles they actually "lost" in the event. Of course, it may not have mattered to Russia at all. Ukraine wasn't ready to fight an all-out war and supplying a few weapons wouldn't have changed that. In any case, it is good to know what the "official" line is.

Quote:I don’t believe we can change Putin’s mind, but I believe we can change his calculus, that he realizes that the cost of continuing the war is too high.

This belief is very common in the NATO members that are not former Warsaw Pact members. It is held by both the public and the politicians. IMO it is dangerously incorrect. Putin will never stop fighting because the cost of continuing is too high. Putin will not stop until 1) continuing is impossible (i.e. Russia simply is incapable of continuing), or 2) the political cost of continuing becomes greater than the political cost of stopping.

It is very unlikely the latter case can arise because Ukraine isn't willing to sign away 20% of their land area, allow Putin to "declare victory" and set up for the next war. Failing that, Putin must continue trying or he has failed to bring about a new Russian empire. He knows that. He also knows retaining power after that failure will be at best difficult. Putin will fight until Russia can't or Russia "wins".

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Leftcoast - 10-10-2024

Honest question.  Why do so many people assume Putin couldn't retain power if Russia retrenches back to Crimea?  I've seen nothing in the last 20 years which suggests his power is that brittle.  In fact I've seen quite the opposite.

I suppose this could be like the Hemingway (mis) quote:  "How do you lose power?  Two ways, Gradually and then suddenly" but I don't see any evidence of "gradually".  If anything his hold on power looks stronger.

People keep claiming he couldn't retain power but rarely support the claim.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 10-10-2024

A cogent and balanced look at the state of the war in this interview with Michael Kofman.

https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/ukraine-war-why-russia-is-in-more-trouble-than-it-looks.html

Quote:Is there any limit to the Russian supply of troops? Do you see that advantage fading at all, whether because of diminishing numbers or political backlash? 

It’s a good question. Russia’s advantage has been the ability to withstand very high levels of attrition because of the materiel and manpower resources they have, and also their significant capacity for mobilization of resources on a national scale — that is, defense industrial production, manpower recruitment, and the like.

But Russia’s actually operating under very significant constraints. And if anything, its advantage on the battlefield is likely to decline as we get into this winter and look further ahead into 2025. First, in terms of equipment, the Russian military has been sustaining very high levels of loss that are principally being replaced by Soviet-era stocks — not entirely, but at this stage, Russia is eating through its Soviet legacy, and its rate of equipment production is quite low relative to the numbers being lost on the battlefield.

This doesn’t mean that Russia is going to run out of armored fighting vehicles. What it does mean is that the Russian military has increasingly been forced to adjust tactics to minimize their losses, and that also reduces their ability to achieve any operationally meaningful breakthroughs. When you look at manpower, the Russian government has significantly increased the payouts and benefits to recruit personnel. The reason for that is straightforward. It’s clear that at this rate of loss, the Russian contract recruitment campaign is unable to keep up. This too does not mean that Russia is going to run out of manpower, but it’s clear that they’re struggling, and they are not likely to be able to sustain this pace of operations, staying on the offensive with this rate of loss.

Which could mean there’s an incentive for both sides to come to the negotiating table. Perhaps a bit more of an incentive than there was a year ago?

The way I would put it is that the Russian military is actually operating under significant constraints. Given the likely decline in the relative advantage at the front line, Russia’s potential negotiating position actually isn’t all that strong. And while Russia has the resources to sustain the war in the near term, looking just a bit beyond that you see a fairly problematic picture in terms of the rate of inflation in Russia’s overheating economy, the deficit of skilled labor — because the state is pulling workers into the defense industry and contracting them to fight in the war — the steady depletion of Russia’s liquid reserves, and the fact that much of the budget is tied to the current oil price. The economic picture for Russia isn’t particularly rosy. The effort to juggle several different parts of this equation may not be sustainable. And this too must at some point weigh on the Russian leadership’s mind.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 10-10-2024

(10-10-2024, 11:45 AM)Leftcoast Wrote:  Honest question.  Why do so many people assume Putin couldn't retain power if Russia retrenches back to Crimea?  I've seen nothing in the last 20 years which suggests his power is that brittle.  In fact I've seen quite the opposite.

I suppose this could be like the Hemingway (mis) quote:  "How do you lose power?  Two ways, Gradually and then suddenly" but I don't see any evidence of "gradually".  If anything his hold on power looks stronger.

People keep claiming he couldn't retain power but rarely support the claim.

Hopefully honest answer :-). Obviously predicting what will happen in Russia is a very inexact science. However, the belief that Putin would have serious problems retaining power if the Ukraine war ended without something that looks like "victory" is based on fairly solid ground IMO.

It is indeed true that Putin has done a great job removing potential competitors for the post of running the Russian Federation. One serious problem that he has not solved is the "minority problems" inside the Russian Federation. One of Putin's main accomplishments was suppressing the rebellion in Chechnya. The situation there is not stable and the accommodation operating today is based on Russia being a "success". If Russia starts to be viewed as "weak", there are plenty of local religious and political leaders that would be more than happy to rule an independent Chechnya. These leaders have no interest in taking over Russia. They are "local" forces that are not easily reached by Putin's Russia.

Unfortunately for Putin there are quite a few other minorities in Russia that would very much like to leave the Russian federation. Many of these groups have provided a disproportionate share of soldiers for Putin's war in Ukraine. Despite high casualties many soldiers make their way "home". Most of them have no job prospects and are embittered by their experience in the Russian military. They do know how to fight. Again, if Russia is seen as "weak" the formation of "Freikorps" is inevitable. These groups may have both a political and a kleptocratic motive. The rebellion started by Prigozhin rattled Putin to the core. Worthy of note also is that the rest of the military did not rush to suppress the coup attempt. They wanted to be on the "winning" side.  Imagine several such happening at once in different places.

When the war in Ukraine ends, Russia will have to demobilize a lot of troops that have not exactly been treated well. These troops will be a problem in the best of times. Even today crime by ex-serviceman is problematic. Imagine if that demobilization is the 500,000 combat troops fighting in Ukraine ATM. If the demobilization takes place after a "less than successful" end of hostilities for Russia it is very probable lots of bitter, violent men will be unleashed in Russia contemporaneously. Unrest is inevitable. The ramp down of military production will also create lots of job losses in the military-industrial sector. There are plenty of articles on the internet forecasting inevitable economic problems for Russia when the war ends, even if it is a "victory".

Putin holds on to power in Russia by providing, first and foremost, stability. Relative Economic prosperity is very useful but not essential. Russians don't complain much if things are "stable". The above scenario is anything but stable. Even if many of these "rebellions" aren't really a major threat, suppressing them while demobilizing an army that fought "for nothing" won't be easy or pretty. The true scale of the personnel losses in Ukraine will also start to filter out into public view. This instability will be the thing that motivates the "Russian majority" to support the replacement of Putin with a leader, any leader, that brings back their stability. Putin will have demonstrably disqualified himself from retaining that job. "If not Putin, who?" will finally be answered with "almost anybody else would be better".

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 10-10-2024

Seems Russia has made a deep penetration into Ukrainian held Kursk. If they are unable to quickly counter attack and reclaim that territory, they will probably need to withdraw from a good chunk of the Kursk territory they control.

https://x.com/RALee85/status/1844488109662273866

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 10-10-2024

Funny you should mention the Caucuses

https://x.com/MinkinaNataly/status/1844502595756491111

Apparently Ramzan Kadyrov, who is often called the "leader" of Chechnya, has declared a blood feud against MPs from the nearby region of Dagestan.  Really hard to follow what has been going on, but I get the sense that it is as you say, about political and kleptocratic motives.

BC

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 10-10-2024

(10-10-2024, 02:55 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Seems Russia has made a deep penetration into Ukrainian held Kursk. If they are unable to quickly counter attack and reclaim that territory, they will probably need to withdraw from a good chunk of the Kursk territory they control.

https://x.com/RALee85/status/1844488109662273866

Waiting for more definite info on this, but not sounding good. Reports indicate that Russian VDV troops and Marines from the Pacific Fleet participated in the offensive. This is a far cry from the "national guard" troops that we previously the quality of the opposition Russia rushed to Kursk. If true, diverting those units from use in Donbas is a "win". I hope the Ukrainians have a plan to cut them off. That will be yet another test of Ukrainian contingency planning. Up to now, Russia hasn't surprised Ukraine much in Kursk. Let's hope that remains true and there is a plan to make Russia pay yet again.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 10-10-2024

What a f-ing waste.

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/10/russian-casualties-have-topped-600k-us-says/400181/

Estimates are that Russian casualties have exceeded 600,000.  Ukrainian casualties are fewer, but still way too many.

BC

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