Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine - Printable Version

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-06-2022

(09-05-2022, 09:33 PM)81alum Wrote:  I don't follow these events with the detailed knowledge of some of you, but this NYT article made an impression on me 3 days ago--making me wonder how well sanctions of any kind will work in the future.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/03/world/americas/ships-gps-international-law.html

Quote:"...But over the past year, Windward, a large maritime data company that provides research to the United Nations, has uncovered more than 500 cases of ships manipulating their satellite navigation systems to hide their locations. The vessels carry out the deception by adopting a technology that until recently was confined to the world’s most advanced navies. The technology, in essence, replicates the effect of a VPN cellphone app, making a ship appear to be in one place, while physically being elsewhere."

This discussion of "manipulating the ship's GPS" is nonsense. It isn't necessary or useful. The AIS transponder receives data from an external source (NMEA bus, RS-232 etc). Any laptop can be substituted to supply fake location data. The ship's GPS is not involved at all, and there is nothing "advanced" about it. It has been going on for many years. There are other AIS spoofs as well, such as pretending to be a different vessel. One dodge that is a bit more sophisticated is to have an AIS transmitting the location of the spoofing ship as anchored someplace, while the ship transits either with no AIS operating or transmitting the ID of a different ship. Unless you can actually overfly the ship transmitting the fake ID, you are none the wiser, and even then it can be tricky if the fake ID is plausible, eg using the ID of a ship of the same manufacture and class.

The US used to have a large enough VP community that we could minimize this type of activity by monitoring "chokepoints" in maritime commerce and aggressively surveilling suspected violators when they "wandered off" someplace . It wasn't by any means airtight but it was somewhat effective. No more. Satellites  are now being used to receive AIS signals and some anomalies can be detected that way. However, they can't actually "see" the ships, so cheating is still easy. All those P-3s actually did something after all.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 09-06-2022

Finally, some sense from the Germans…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/thorstenbenner/status/1567185354842689537?s=21&t=7matSQ9qU9beG89nCf0L-g[/tweet]

It shows that they are learning the right lessons from the crisis.

BC

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[tweet]https://twitter.com/julianbarnes/status/1566965700308131846?s=21&t=7matSQ9qU9beG89nCf0L-g[/tweet]

What does it say that Russia is buying arms from North Korea?

BC

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 09-06-2022

Doesn’t it just say that China is supplying Russia but wants plausible deniability that it didn’t approve the sales?

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-06-2022

(09-06-2022, 11:21 AM)BostonCard Wrote:  What does it say that Russia is buying arms from North Korea?

BC

It says they aren't stupid. N. Korea uses the same weapons and has stockpiled millions of shells, just as Russia did. Unlike Russia, N. Korea is still building this stuff full speed. Their stuff isn't past the "use by" date that Russia has to worry about with their massive stockpile of Soviet era weapons. While I am not so sure I would trust N. Korean QA, it may be safer than using 40 year old shells.

(09-06-2022, 11:40 AM)TrumpCard Wrote:  Doesn’t it just say that China is supplying Russia but wants plausible deniability that it didn’t approve the sales?

Probably not. While China may be supplying Russia with material, N. Korea has 1.3 million people in the military, the vast majority in the army. The have LOTS of shells and continue to refresh their stockpiles. No reason for China to dirty their hands.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 09-06-2022

Russia probably has hit their peak of artillery shelling in June, but seem unable to sustain it. This is probably related to Ukrainian strikes on ammo dumps and Russian supplies dwindling, along with barrel wear. 

Russian industry needs to produce shells, charges, and replace or refurbish their artillery and they seem unable to do so.

Really good thread on this below from Jack Watling of RUSI

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/Jack_Watling/status/1567088816732635138?s=20&t=eMQl5OzLm9g_WknEjD2iew[/tweet]
I doubt China is supplying things through NK as a front. They seem to see the writing on the wall and don't want to get entangled. NK supplies will probably be a bit limited as well. They will need to keep a large stockpile because their war fighting plans entail lots and lots of shelling, so this is not by any means an unlimited resource for Russia. Pretty pathetic honestly for Russia to be reliant on NK and Iran for arms supplies.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 09-06-2022

(09-06-2022, 12:18 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Russia probably has hit their peak of artillery shelling in June, but seem unable to sustain it. This is probably related to Ukrainian strikes on ammo dumps and Russian supplies dwindling, along with barrel wear. 

Russian industry needs to produce shells, charges, and replace or refurbish their artillery and they seem unable to do so.

Really good thread on this below from Jack Watling of RUSI

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/Jack_Watling/status/1567088816732635138?s=20&t=eMQl5OzLm9g_WknEjD2iew[/tweet]
I doubt China is supplying things through NK as a front. They seem to see the writing on the wall and don't want to get entangled. NK supplies will probably be a bit limited as well. They will need to keep a large stockpile because their war fighting plans entail lots and lots of shelling, so this is not by any means an unlimited resource for Russia. Pretty pathetic honestly for Russia to be reliant on NK and Iran for arms supplies.

Man, how do they plan to get those munitions from NK to Western Russia?  By rail all the way, ship then rail, or ship all the way to the Black Sea?
Lots of bad things could happen to munition shipments when they get close to the Ukraine.  I don't how air shipments make any sense.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-06-2022

(09-06-2022, 12:18 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Russia probably has hit their peak of artillery shelling in June, but seem unable to sustain it. This is probably related to Ukrainian strikes on ammo dumps and Russian supplies dwindling, along with barrel wear.

Ukraine's strikes on ammo dumps and distribution points have undoubtedly destroyed lots of ordinance. Even more importantly it has forced the Russians to move their dumps significantly further from the FEBA. This requires more transport, which Russia was already short on. They need more trucks and drivers. Since they load and unload all the ammo manually, they need more people to do this as well. They can't fire any faster than supplies can be delivered and now that is much slower.

The Ukraine has also shown some significant improvement in counter battery fire. More and more reports of Russian artillery destroyed. That is undoubtedly partly due to more HIMARS that outranges the Russian tube artillery and can do the dirty work, but it it also an acquired skill. More important than the destroyed artillery, this capability forces the Russians to at least consider "shoot and scoot" rather than sitting in one place for days pounding away. This also reduces the rate of fire because towed artillery (which Russia has lots of) can't fire while moving and even self propelled guns fire much slower while moving (if they can do so at all). This movement also makes supply more difficult as the supply trucks have to find the guns. If the movement wasn't planned and pre-briefed that can be difficult and time consuming. Another factor slowing down rate of fire.

UPDATE: Just saw this. Take it with a grain of salt, but sounds good!
https://www.yahoo.com/news/counter-battery-war-harsh-only-123723597.html

Casualties also cannot be ignored. During the Luhansk battles, Ukraine lost a lot of troops, but so did Russia. Many Russian batteries may be down to a couple of guns because there are too few cannon cockers. Any replacements Russia can dredge up at this point are undoubtedly even more poorly trained and motivated than the guys they replace. This leads to lower rates of fire and mistakes.

Replacing gun barrels isn't a simple task. The prime movers and SP gun engines require maintenance as well. Due to the extremely high operational tempo during the Luhansk operations this maintenance has undoubtedly been deferred. At some point you just have to do it. However, Russia lacks the skilled troops to do these tasks swiftly and reliably. That alone will force a reduction in tempo. On top of that, the Russian army is just plain tired. They have been operating at maximum tempo for months in the face of casualties. I don't hear about units being pulled out of the line to go on "R & R". Troops can only do that for so long, and if morale is poor to begin with it just gets worse. This also will hinder massive shelling.

Quote:Russian industry needs to produce shells, charges, and replace or refurbish their artillery and they seem unable to do so.

Really good thread on this below from Jack Watling of RUSI

https://twitter.com/Jack_Watling/status/1567088816732635138?s=20&t=eMQl5OzLm9g_WknEjD2iew

I am glad Mr Watling adds the caveat about not over reacting in the other way. While the west may lack insight into the rate Russia can produce shells, we do have a pretty good idea about what they started with. Even if they made essentially nothing at all they could fire at their previous rate until some time in early 2023, and this is without tapping into Soviet era material. Running low on shells at the supply end isn't the reason they are slowing down. The above reasons plus shipping bottlenecks from remote storage may be the issues, but they have the shells. Next May, maybe not.  Unwise to assume that next week they can't significantly up their game, but the reasons you cited plus a few more it looks difficult.

The fact Russia is buying shells from N. Korea says essentially nothing about their current ammunition situation. If the N. Korean ammunition is any good, it has the big advantage that it is already built. While I am sure Russia is trying to increase their ammunition output, if they have the opportunity to buy another years worth to not do so would be insane. If they later don't need so much, they can just reduce domestic production for a year. It is doubly good because it helps an ally that needs it. I also expect Russia will pay with Sakhalin POL which right now are hard to sell. I am sure N. Korea won't mind if it arrives in Russian bottoms.

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(09-06-2022, 12:54 PM)GK3 Wrote:  Man, how do they plan to get those munitions from NK to Western Russia?  By rail all the way, ship then rail, or ship all the way to the Black Sea?
Lots of bad things could happen to munition shipments when they get close to the Ukraine.  I don't how air shipments make any sense.

Via ship to Vlad, then rail. Lots of material moves that way every day. This will not be viewed as a big challenge for Russia. What Ukraine can do about it remains to be seen. In the next few months, probably doesn't matter.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - GK3 - 09-06-2022

(09-06-2022, 04:11 PM)Goose Wrote:  

(09-06-2022, 12:18 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Russia probably has hit their peak of artillery shelling in June, but seem unable to sustain it. This is probably related to Ukrainian strikes on ammo dumps and Russian supplies dwindling, along with barrel wear.

Ukraine's strikes on ammo dumps and distribution points have undoubtedly destroyed lots of ordinance. Even more importantly it has forced the Russians to move their dumps significantly further from the FEBA. This requires more transport, which Russia was already short on. They need more trucks and drivers. Since they load and unload all the ammo manually, they need more people to do this as well. They can't fire any faster than supplies can be delivered and now that is much slower.

The Ukraine has also shown some significant improvement in counter battery fire. More and more reports of Russian artillery destroyed. That is undoubtedly partly due to more HIMARS that outranges the Russian tube artillery and can do the dirty work, but it it also an acquired skill. More important than the destroyed artillery, this capability forces the Russians to at least consider "shoot and scoot" rather than sitting in one place for days pounding away. This also reduces the rate of fire because towed artillery (which Russia has lots of) can't fire while moving and even self propelled guns fire much slower while moving (if they can do so at all). This movement also makes supply more difficult as the supply trucks have to find the guns. If the movement wasn't planned and pre-briefed that can be difficult and time consuming. Another factor slowing down rate of fire.

UPDATE: Just saw this. Take it with a grain of salt, but sounds good!
https://www.yahoo.com/news/counter-battery-war-harsh-only-123723597.html

Casualties also cannot be ignored. During the Luhansk battles, Ukraine lost a lot of troops, but so did Russia. Many Russian batteries may be down to a couple of guns because there are too few cannon cockers. Any replacements Russia can dredge up at this point are undoubtedly even more poorly trained and motivated than the guys they replace. This leads to lower rates of fire and mistakes.

Replacing gun barrels isn't a simple task. The prime movers and SP gun engines require maintenance as well. Due to the extremely high operational tempo during the Luhansk operations this maintenance has undoubtedly been deferred. At some point you just have to do it. However, Russia lacks the skilled troops to do these tasks swiftly and reliably. That alone will force a reduction in tempo. On top of that, the Russian army is just plain tired. They have been operating at maximum tempo for months in the face of casualties. I don't hear about units being pulled out of the line to go on "R & R". Troops can only do that for so long, and if morale is poor to begin with it just gets worse. This also will hinder massive shelling.

Quote:Russian industry needs to produce shells, charges, and replace or refurbish their artillery and they seem unable to do so.

Really good thread on this below from Jack Watling of RUSI

https://twitter.com/Jack_Watling/status/1567088816732635138?s=20&t=eMQl5OzLm9g_WknEjD2iew

I am glad Mr Watling adds the caveat about not over reacting in the other way. While the west may lack insight into the rate Russia can produce shells, we do have a pretty good idea about what they started with. Even if they made essentially nothing at all they could fire at their previous rate until some time in early 2023, and this is without tapping into Soviet era material. Running low on shells at the supply end isn't the reason they are slowing down. The above reasons plus shipping bottlenecks from remote storage may be the issues, but they have the shells. Next May, maybe not.  Unwise to assume that next week they can't significantly up their game, but the reasons you cited plus a few more it looks difficult.

The fact Russia is buying shells from N. Korea says essentially nothing about their current ammunition situation. If the N. Korean ammunition is any good, it has the big advantage that it is already built. While I am sure Russia is trying to increase their ammunition output, if they have the opportunity to buy another years worth to not do so would be insane. If they later don't need so much, they can just reduce domestic production for a year. It is doubly good because it helps an ally that needs it. I also expect Russia will pay with Sakhalin POL which right now are hard to sell. I am sure N. Korea won't mind if it arrives in Russian bottoms.

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(09-06-2022, 12:54 PM)GK3 Wrote:  Man, how do they plan to get those munitions from NK to Western Russia?  By rail all the way, ship then rail, or ship all the way to the Black Sea?
Lots of bad things could happen to munition shipments when they get close to the Ukraine.  I don't how air shipments make any sense.

Via ship to Vlad, then rail. Lots of material moves that way every day. This will not be viewed as a big challenge for Russia. What Ukraine can do about it remains to be seen. In the next few months, probably doesn't matter.

Yes, that would be pretty much the standard way to get stuff from Eastern Russia to Western.  My concern would be how much stuff can they move and how fast will it get there.  That is a several day trip at best.  Then they have to unload it and move it closer to the FEBA.  I would assume that munition trains will stop some distance East of the FEBA and then be shipped in smaller amounts by train and truck.  I think the Ukraine will have a pretty good idea of when shipments are coming and will make a concerted effort to interdict them.  The big question is can they?  How much do they have currently in stock and available in the area of current operations.  If it is a lot, then the transit time is not that big a deal, if they are truly short of ammo, then that is something else.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 09-06-2022

Looks like while all eyes are on Kherson, Ukraine has made a surprise advance near Kharkiv, encircling the town of Balakliya. Further advances here would put Russian GLOC lines to Izyum at risk.

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/Caucasuswar/status/1567287123593596935?s=20&t=9MIs5MfXJDHi4LqjwOm5KQ[/tweet]

I have heard bubblings of big news this morning on Twitter, I think this might be what it was about. Zelensky has hinted that other fronts might become more active.

https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-zelensky-counteroffensives-plans-strategy-1740177

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-06-2022

(09-06-2022, 06:28 PM)GK3 Wrote:  Yes, that would be pretty much the standard way to get stuff from Eastern Russia to Western.  My concern would be how much stuff can they move and how fast will it get there.  That is a several day trip at best.  Then they have to unload it and move it closer to the FEBA.  I would assume that munition trains will stop some distance East of the FEBA and then be shipped in smaller amounts by train and truck.  I think the Ukraine will have a pretty good idea of when shipments are coming and will make a concerted effort to interdict them.  The big question is can they?  How much do they have currently in stock and available in the area of current operations.  If it is a lot, then the transit time is not that big a deal, if they are truly short of ammo, then that is something else.

I think Russia has "plenty" of ammo (except possibly 122mm) available in European Russia. They have undoubtedly been shipping it in from all over Russia. Some significant quantity of the N. Korean deliveries will probably go to replacing stuff already sent west. For sure the train trip will take a while, probably several weeks. It will not exactly be a Z train :-). Russia's real problem now is the last 50-100 km of delivery. That is also the problem for fuel, food, and in many places water. Ukraine probably knows what is on which trains and has had some success selectively attacking large shipments. In some places they now have the rail lines within artillery range. However, the other sources of "friction" that Ukraine has put in place are the ones doing the most damage. We shall see to what extent that is "enough" in the next few weeks.

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(09-06-2022, 06:49 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Looks like while all eyes are on Kherson, Ukraine has made a surprise advance near Kharkiv, encircling the town of Balakliya. Further advances here would put Russian GLOC lines to Izyum at risk.

https://twitter.com/Caucasuswar/status/1567287123593596935?s=20&t=9MIs5MfXJDHi4LqjwOm5KQ

I have heard bubblings of big news this morning on Twitter, I think this might be what it was about. Zelensky has hinted that other fronts might become more active.

https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-zelensky-counteroffensives-plans-strategy-1740177

This is important because it further complicates the Russian decision tree and potentially stretches them even thinner. A bunch of Russian POWs, especially elite units, is a good thing too. If they can surrender, anyone can.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - BostonCard - 09-07-2022

This is shaping up to be a pretty big deal.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukrainian-troops-advance-in-east-threatening-russian-supply-route-11662544101?st=iecwskorquaeq38&reflink=article_copyURL_share

If Ukraine can seize or eve threaten Russian GLOC to Izium, that is a very big opportunity for them.

BC

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Question for Goose and other experts.  Is the move out of Kharkiv a target of opportunity enabled by Russian redeployment of forces to the South to defend Kherson, or was this all part of the strategy?  While I recognize that in this day and age, it is impossible to have true operational secrecy, I always wondered whether the Ukrainians were too open about their intentions in the south, and now I wonder whether that might not have been deliberate.



BC

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-07-2022

(09-07-2022, 07:35 AM)BostonCard Wrote:  This is shaping up to be a pretty big deal.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukrainian-troops-advance-in-east-threatening-russian-supply-route-11662544101?st=iecwskorquaeq38&reflink=article_copyURL_share

If Ukraine can seize or eve threaten Russian GLOC to Izium, that is a very big opportunity for them.

Is the move out of Kharkiv a target of opportunity enabled by Russian redeployment of forces to the South to defend Kherson, or was this all part of the strategy?  While I recognize that in this day and age, it is impossible to have true operational secrecy, I always wondered whether the Ukrainians were too open about their intentions in the south, and now I wonder whether that might not have been deliberate.

BC

Obviously I don't know what Ukraine's intentions or capabilities around Kharkiv actually are. The unit they have surrounded is basically a militarized SWAT team. It doesn't have any organic heavy weapons. I am sure the Russians figured that was OK because occupying a village that is already taken shouldn't require them. The fact they got themselves cut off is bad tactical planning on their part. We now will find out if Russia has available a quick reaction force to relieve the situation. If Russia does not, that is telling. I don't think this was a "trap". I think Russia is stretched thin and Ukraine took advantage.

The actual importance of this event is totally contingent on what resources Ukraine has available to take advantage of the situation and how thin Russia actually is. Ukraine is a long way from cutting the Russian's GLOC toward the south. Ukraine is probably also well aware of what they can and cannot risk. However, I am sure Ukraine will try to exploit as much as possible. If Russia doesn't respond, it could get "interesting". One would think Russia must ensure it's GLOCs are safe. I am pretty sure this wasn't a "planned" event by Ukraine and I am also pretty sure they will be cautious. They last thing Ukraine wants is a long salient into Russian held territory that they must defend. Ukraine will make sure it can hold what it takes or they won't do it.

As far as Ukraine "telegraphing" their intentions in Kherson, I think it wasn't intended to deceive the Russians. While Putin is an idiot, many Russian military personnel are not and they can read a map. Kherson is the place Ukraine can do the most harm with the smallest advance. Ukraine could take back 90% of Luhansk and not really injure Russia's tactical position much. The open terrain in Kherson makes banging away with artillery as a defensive tactic less effective because the attack need not follow roads. It can come from anywhere. Kherson is also pretty solidly "Ukrainian" so there is a 5th column for Russia to deal with. A victory there cuts off supply to the advance along the south coast towards Odessa and threatens Crimea. It is a "no brainer". That is why I am a bit surprised that Russia hasn't committed more forces to retaining it. They apparently think there is enough already there. Relying on the ability to move assets there at the last minute is risky because all Ukraine has to do is block the road for a while and it will be too late. Ukraine has shown they can do unexpected things, so if I were a Russian, I would have taken more precautions.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - TrumpCard - 09-07-2022

Kharkiv has been under daily artillery fire since the beginning of the war. If Ukraine could push Russia out of artillery range (which seems like it would be very difficult and might even require a push into Russian territory), that would be a big boost to the safety of Ukrainian civilians and might allow Kharkiv to come back to life in a way reminiscent of Kiev. To me, that seems like the big prize, more than lengthening GLOC to Izyum, which looks like it can be accessed from a number of rail lines. But as per usual, this is not close to my field of expertise.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 09-07-2022

The area where they have achieved a breakthrough is really south east of the city. To push Russia out of artillery range of Kharkiv would probably need a bigger push northeast, but that is closer to Russia and better fortified.

This seems to have been a planned offensive, or at least Russian sources indicate that's likely. Ukraine has backed it up and continued to push north and east from their breakthrough, taking other settlements in the area. If they can make it to Kupyansk, the Russian position in Izyum would be in big trouble, and the Russian gains in the Donbas would be at risk of evaporating.

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1567397733627035648?s=20&t=rIX22rALy5HzXN7ZEKWvrQ[/tweet]

.....

US trained the Ukrainians who used truck mounted Harpoons to take out two Russian ships. Not a surprise but interesting.

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/09/us-trained-ukrainian-missileers-who-sunk-russian-warship-pentagon-official-says/376808/

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-07-2022

(09-07-2022, 08:45 AM)TrumpCard Wrote:  Kharkiv has been under daily artillery fire since the beginning of the war. If Ukraine could push Russia out of artillery range (which seems like it would be very difficult and might even require a push into Russian territory), that would be a big boost to the safety of Ukrainian civilians and might allow Kharkiv to come back to life in a way reminiscent of Kiev. To me, that seems like the big prize, more than lengthening GLOC to Izyum, which looks like it can be accessed from a number of rail lines. But as per usual, this is not close to my field of expertise.

(09-07-2022, 09:29 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:  The area where they have achieved a breakthrough is really south east of the city. To push Russia out of artillery range of Kharkiv would probably need a bigger push northeast, but that is closer to Russia and better fortified.

Yes, I think we all agree that is a much bigger ask, and with all the missile bombardment Russia is doing best case there would still be some danger. One can hope.

Quote:This seems to have been a planned offensive, or at least Russian sources indicate that's likely. Ukraine has backed it up and continued to push north and east from their breakthrough, taking other settlements in the area. If they can make it to Kupyansk, the Russian position in Izyum would be in big trouble, and the Russian gains in the Donbas would be at risk of evaporating.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1567397733627035648?s=20&t=rIX22rALy5HzXN7ZEKWvrQ

I am sure it was planned. Exactly what was planned is of course unknown. However, as I have pointed out, the MO of both Russia and Ukraine has been to attack everywhere and reinforce success. That may be what we are seeing in this case. I still am of the opinion Ukraine will be careful. They have found a "crack", probably initially by intensive patrolling and by special forces operations. They are exploiting it. If Russia doesn't respond very forcefully, the Ukrainians will keep going. However, they don't want to get themselves in a situation where they too could be cut off. It is good to see they are going east as well as south IMHO.

I do think it improbable the Russian gains in the Donbas are generally at risk. As has been pointed out there are plenty of GLOCs from Russia proper into Donbas. While losing the shortest route is definitely a "bad" thing, it needn't be fatal. However such a loss does require a response. Russia can't just sit there, they are going to need a defense. If they don't (or can't) put together a response, Ukraine will keep coming. Reinforce success.

A big question is the current location and intended destination of the so-called "3rd Army Corps" recently sent to Ukraine. Are they going to the Kherson Oblast or to "finish" the battle in the Donbas. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/08/29/russia-is-sending-a-fresh-army-corps-to-ukraine-its-troops-are-unfit-and-old/?sh=59f87bb14d90
While everybody is skeptical of the combat effectiveness of this force, where it goes might tell us a lot about Russia's plans. If they go towards Donetsk Oblast, Putin is still living in a dreamworld. If they go to Kherson Oblast, that means the Russians recognize they have a serious problem there and intend to defend. This could expose the new force to significant attrition before it actually fully engages. I can't imagine at this point Russia would commit such a force on the west bank. If it goes to Kupyansk, that is the response.

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Quote:US trained the Ukrainians who used truck mounted Harpoons to take out two Russian ships. Not a surprise but interesting.

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/09/us-trained-ukrainian-missileers-who-sunk-russian-warship-pentagon-official-says/376808/

The statement from the pentagon is weird. They appear to be saying the training was in the US and then they say "Oh no, it wasn't in the US". I am not sure I believe that. In any case, it doesn't matter IMHO. The "neat" thing is that the US replicated the shipboard environment by just putting everything (including power sources) on two flatbeds. We have all the drawings, connectors and cables to do that. It may be bigger than one wants, but it is like Aegis Ashore. Preserve all the interfaces, don't worry about it being too big. Very good idea and I hope we sent several such kludges.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Treefence - 09-07-2022

Goose, what are the chances the 3rd army corps ends up supplying Ukraine with a lot of nice modern military equipment, with out brobdingnagian losses for Ukraine?  It would be nice for Ukraine, that's for sure.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - dabigv13 - 09-07-2022

Lots of videos past few days of happy Ukrainian soldiers toting away IFVs, guns, rockets and ammo from overrun positions in Kherson and near Kharkiv. The Russians are abandoning a LOT of kit.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - M T - 09-07-2022

(09-07-2022, 11:31 AM)Goose Wrote:  https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/09/us-trained-ukrainian-missileers-who-sunk-russian-warship-pentagon-official-says/376808/

The statement from the pentagon is weird. They appear to be saying the training was in the US and then they say "Oh no, it wasn't in the US". I am not sure I believe that.

DefenseOne's full quote is

Quote:“We got them[i.e., the Harpoons] off the ship, put them on some flatbed trucks, put the Harpoons, the modules on the flatbed truck, and then a different flatbed truck for the power source, connected a cable between it, figured out was exportable, brought the Ukrainians to train on it over Memorial Day weekend, in our country, over Memorial Day weekend, and the next week two Russian ships were sunk with those Harpoons,”

The clarification was

Quote:he meant that the weekend the Ukrainians received training is called Memorial Day in the United States.

Also

Quote:The U.S. was part of a coalition team that did the training, a U.S. defense official said later.

I believe the phrasing indicates the training was not in the U.S.  I think he was using that reference as a familiar date, to point out it was shortly before the first attack on the Russian ship.

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-07-2022

(09-07-2022, 02:34 PM)Treefence Wrote:  Goose, what are the chances the 3rd army corps ends up supplying Ukraine with a lot of nice modern military equipment, with out of immense proportions losses for Ukraine?  It would be nice for Ukraine, that's for sure.

(09-07-2022, 02:39 PM)dabigv13 Wrote:  Lots of videos past few days of happy Ukrainian soldiers toting away IFVs, guns, rockets and ammo from overrun positions in Kherson and near Kharkiv. The Russians are abandoning a LOT of kit.

We know the 3rd army corps has lots of "modern" Russian kit, because Ukraine and others have been kind enough to post photos of the trains carrying it towards Ukraine. We also know that many of the troops in the alleged "corps" are new recruits, and that it doesn't have nearly the manning that a "corps" should have. That would tend to indicate Ukraine could indeed gather a windfall if they engage it.
That said, it is historically bad luck to assume your opponent can't or won't fight. Anybody can get victory disease. If it were me I would assume the third corps is smaller than some but may actually be quite good. When Ukraine gets intelligence that they aren't very good, that can change.

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(09-07-2022, 03:00 PM)M T Wrote:  I believe the phrasing indicates the training was not in the U.S.  I think he was using that reference as a familiar date, to point out it was shortly before the first attack on the Russian ship.

You could be correct, but here is the problem:

Quote:“We got them off the ship, put them on some flatbed trucks, put the Harpoons, the modules on the flatbed truck, and then a different flatbed truck for the power source, connected a cable between it, figured out was exportable, brought the Ukrainians to train on it over Memorial Day weekend, in our country, over Memorial Day weekend, and the next week two Russian ships were sunk with those Harpoons,” he said.

This is a nice step-by-step of what we did. Each step is somewhat meticulously spelled out. What's missing? Right after they "figured out it was exportable", they could have easily added "We then exported it" or words to that effect. They didn't say that, which is totally out of keeping with the detailed rest of the statement. The statement "brought the Ukrainians to train on it" is there instead. As originally stated by the pentagon it certainly makes it sound like the men traveled and not the missile system. It could be just a very poorly organized statement. It also could be the literal truth. I suspect the latter.

There are good reasons to do the training in the US. If problems developed with the system during training, it is lots easier to fix it here instead of there. It is kind of a kludge so there are lots of things that could show up when the Ukrainians try to use it. Again, not to say I know that is what happened, but.....

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RE: Way OT: Ukraine - Goose - 09-07-2022

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-mysterious-battle-retake-kherson-092210728.html

Some real encouraging news in there. One part I particularly found especially encouraging was the references to the success of Ukrainian armored forces. It apparently isn't just a "here and there" thing. They are going to need that for this offensive to succeed. One quote from retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe really jumps out:

Quote:And as for the thousands of Russian troops all but trapped on the Dnipro's western bank, "they haven't been properly resupplied," he added. "Their chances of getting out of there are not good."

That kind of matches what I have seen in the situation recently. Either prepare to defend like their lives depends on it (because it very well may) or get them out of there. Russia appears to be a deer in the headlights right now. Russia needs those thousands of troops alive and ready to fight. It looks like they aren't going to get that.

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