[washingtonismoney]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

Stanford ran 935 plays all year; Stanford turned the ball over on 17 of those plays. That means there was roughly a 1.8% chance of turning it over on any given play.  Meanwhile, Stanford scored 66 touchdowns all year. That means roughly a 7% chance of scoring a touchdown on any given play. Obviously, these are averages and not necessarily indicative of the chances of scoring a touchdown on the particular plays we're arguing about. But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Not using all of your opportunities in this situation is like relying on one raffle ticket instead of four--pretty silly.

[washingtonismoney]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

Stanford ran 935 plays all year; Stanford turned the ball over on 17 of those plays. That means there was roughly a 1.8% chance of turning it over on any given play.  Meanwhile, Stanford scored 66 touchdowns all year. That means roughly a 7% chance of scoring a touchdown on any given play. Obviously, these are averages and not necessarily indicative of the chances of scoring a touchdown on the particular plays we're arguing about. But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Not using all of your opportunities in this situation is like relying on one raffle ticket instead of four--pretty silly.

[washingtonismoney]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

Stanford ran 935 plays all year; Stanford turned the ball over on 17 of those plays. That means there was roughly a 1.8% chance of turning it over on any given play.  Meanwhile, Stanford scored 66 touchdowns all year. That means roughly a 7% chance of scoring a touchdown on any given play. Obviously, these are averages and not necessarily indicative of the chances of scoring a touchdown on the particular plays we're arguing about. But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Not using all of your opportunities in this situation is like relying on one raffle ticket instead of four--pretty silly.

[washingtonismoney]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

Stanford ran 935 plays all year; Stanford turned the ball over on 17 of those plays. That means there was roughly a 1.8% chance of turning it over on any given play.  Meanwhile, Stanford scored 66 touchdowns all year. That means roughly a 7% chance of scoring a touchdown on any given play. Obviously, these are averages and not necessarily indicative of the chances of scoring a touchdown on the particular plays we're arguing about. But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Not using all of your opportunities in this situation is like relying on one raffle ticket instead of four--pretty silly.

[washingtonismoney]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

Stanford ran 935 plays all year; Stanford turned the ball over on 17 of those plays. That means there was roughly a 1.8% chance of turning it over on any given play.  Meanwhile, Stanford scored 66 touchdowns all year. That means roughly a 7% chance of scoring a touchdown on any given play. Obviously, these are averages and not necessarily indicative of the chances of scoring a touchdown on the particular plays we're arguing about. But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Not using all of your opportunities in this situation is like relying on one raffle ticket instead of four--pretty silly.

[washingtonismoney]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

Stanford ran 935 plays all year; Stanford turned the ball over on 17 of those plays. That means there was roughly a 1.8% chance of turning it over on any given play.  Meanwhile, Stanford scored 66 touchdowns all year. That means roughly a 7% chance of scoring a touchdown on any given play. Obviously, these are averages and not necessarily indicative of the chances of scoring a touchdown on the particular plays we're arguing about. But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Not using all of your opportunities in this situation is like relying on one raffle ticket instead of four--pretty silly.

[washingtonismoney]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

Stanford ran 935 plays all year; Stanford turned the ball over on 17 of those plays. That means there was roughly a 1.8% chance of turning it over on any given play.  Meanwhile, Stanford scored 66 touchdowns all year. That means roughly a 7% chance of scoring a touchdown on any given play. Obviously, these are averages and not necessarily indicative of the chances of scoring a touchdown on the particular plays we're arguing about. But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Not using all of your opportunities in this situation is like relying on one raffle ticket instead of four--pretty silly.

[washingtonismoney]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

Stanford ran 935 plays all year; Stanford turned the ball over on 17 of those plays. That means there was roughly a 1.8% chance of turning it over on any given play.  Meanwhile, Stanford scored 66 touchdowns all year. That means roughly a 7% chance of scoring a touchdown on any given play. Obviously, these are averages and not necessarily indicative of the chances of scoring a touchdown on the particular plays we're arguing about. But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Not using all of your opportunities in this situation is like relying on one raffle ticket instead of four--pretty silly.

[Treebound]

Shaw went with the percentages, but I did not like watching the time tick off the clock from my seats in the stadium.  You have the BEST player in college football in a generation and you take the ball out of his hands?  He's not going to throw a pick 6.  Give him a shot to lead the team into the end zone and win the game with his "signature moment!"    A play action rollout by Luck would have yielded either a first down, a td, a run to the sidelines or an incomplete.  Luck is the best player and deserved at least a shot given his effort in the game, his return this year and his contributions to the program and the school overall.    If he can't move it then let a jittery freshman kicker (understandably so) take the shot ideally at least a few yards closer.  Andrew deserved his chance to win this game!

I'm sad for Andrew and for the seniors.  The coaching staff did a great job for 59 minutes.  The last minute we will debate for years just like Harbaugh's miscue in the Big Game with Toby two years ago.    Voldemort caliber players don't come our way very often and in my humble opinion we should trust them to win the day for Stanford. 

[Treebound]

Shaw went with the percentages, but I did not like watching the time tick off the clock from my seats in the stadium.  You have the BEST player in college football in a generation and you take the ball out of his hands?  He's not going to throw a pick 6.  Give him a shot to lead the team into the end zone and win the game with his "signature moment!"    A play action rollout by Luck would have yielded either a first down, a td, a run to the sidelines or an incomplete.  Luck is the best player and deserved at least a shot given his effort in the game, his return this year and his contributions to the program and the school overall.    If he can't move it then let a jittery freshman kicker (understandably so) take the shot ideally at least a few yards closer.  Andrew deserved his chance to win this game!

I'm sad for Andrew and for the seniors.  The coaching staff did a great job for 59 minutes.  The last minute we will debate for years just like Harbaugh's miscue in the Big Game with Toby two years ago.    Voldemort caliber players don't come our way very often and in my humble opinion we should trust them to win the day for Stanford. 

[Treebound]

Shaw went with the percentages, but I did not like watching the time tick off the clock from my seats in the stadium.  You have the BEST player in college football in a generation and you take the ball out of his hands?  He's not going to throw a pick 6.  Give him a shot to lead the team into the end zone and win the game with his "signature moment!"    A play action rollout by Luck would have yielded either a first down, a td, a run to the sidelines or an incomplete.  Luck is the best player and deserved at least a shot given his effort in the game, his return this year and his contributions to the program and the school overall.    If he can't move it then let a jittery freshman kicker (understandably so) take the shot ideally at least a few yards closer.  Andrew deserved his chance to win this game!

I'm sad for Andrew and for the seniors.  The coaching staff did a great job for 59 minutes.  The last minute we will debate for years just like Harbaugh's miscue in the Big Game with Toby two years ago.    Voldemort caliber players don't come our way very often and in my humble opinion we should trust them to win the day for Stanford. 

[Treebound]

Shaw went with the percentages, but I did not like watching the time tick off the clock from my seats in the stadium.  You have the BEST player in college football in a generation and you take the ball out of his hands?  He's not going to throw a pick 6.  Give him a shot to lead the team into the end zone and win the game with his "signature moment!"    A play action rollout by Luck would have yielded either a first down, a td, a run to the sidelines or an incomplete.  Luck is the best player and deserved at least a shot given his effort in the game, his return this year and his contributions to the program and the school overall.    If he can't move it then let a jittery freshman kicker (understandably so) take the shot ideally at least a few yards closer.  Andrew deserved his chance to win this game!

I'm sad for Andrew and for the seniors.  The coaching staff did a great job for 59 minutes.  The last minute we will debate for years just like Harbaugh's miscue in the Big Game with Toby two years ago.    Voldemort caliber players don't come our way very often and in my humble opinion we should trust them to win the day for Stanford. 

[Treebound]

Shaw went with the percentages, but I did not like watching the time tick off the clock from my seats in the stadium.  You have the BEST player in college football in a generation and you take the ball out of his hands?  He's not going to throw a pick 6.  Give him a shot to lead the team into the end zone and win the game with his "signature moment!"    A play action rollout by Luck would have yielded either a first down, a td, a run to the sidelines or an incomplete.  Luck is the best player and deserved at least a shot given his effort in the game, his return this year and his contributions to the program and the school overall.    If he can't move it then let a jittery freshman kicker (understandably so) take the shot ideally at least a few yards closer.  Andrew deserved his chance to win this game!

I'm sad for Andrew and for the seniors.  The coaching staff did a great job for 59 minutes.  The last minute we will debate for years just like Harbaugh's miscue in the Big Game with Toby two years ago.    Voldemort caliber players don't come our way very often and in my humble opinion we should trust them to win the day for Stanford. 

[Treebound]

Shaw went with the percentages, but I did not like watching the time tick off the clock from my seats in the stadium.  You have the BEST player in college football in a generation and you take the ball out of his hands?  He's not going to throw a pick 6.  Give him a shot to lead the team into the end zone and win the game with his "signature moment!"    A play action rollout by Luck would have yielded either a first down, a td, a run to the sidelines or an incomplete.  Luck is the best player and deserved at least a shot given his effort in the game, his return this year and his contributions to the program and the school overall.    If he can't move it then let a jittery freshman kicker (understandably so) take the shot ideally at least a few yards closer.  Andrew deserved his chance to win this game!

I'm sad for Andrew and for the seniors.  The coaching staff did a great job for 59 minutes.  The last minute we will debate for years just like Harbaugh's miscue in the Big Game with Toby two years ago.    Voldemort caliber players don't come our way very often and in my humble opinion we should trust them to win the day for Stanford. 

[Treebound]

Shaw went with the percentages, but I did not like watching the time tick off the clock from my seats in the stadium.  You have the BEST player in college football in a generation and you take the ball out of his hands?  He's not going to throw a pick 6.  Give him a shot to lead the team into the end zone and win the game with his "signature moment!"    A play action rollout by Luck would have yielded either a first down, a td, a run to the sidelines or an incomplete.  Luck is the best player and deserved at least a shot given his effort in the game, his return this year and his contributions to the program and the school overall.    If he can't move it then let a jittery freshman kicker (understandably so) take the shot ideally at least a few yards closer.  Andrew deserved his chance to win this game!

I'm sad for Andrew and for the seniors.  The coaching staff did a great job for 59 minutes.  The last minute we will debate for years just like Harbaugh's miscue in the Big Game with Toby two years ago.    Voldemort caliber players don't come our way very often and in my humble opinion we should trust them to win the day for Stanford. 

[Treebound]

Shaw went with the percentages, but I did not like watching the time tick off the clock from my seats in the stadium.  You have the BEST player in college football in a generation and you take the ball out of his hands?  He's not going to throw a pick 6.  Give him a shot to lead the team into the end zone and win the game with his "signature moment!"    A play action rollout by Luck would have yielded either a first down, a td, a run to the sidelines or an incomplete.  Luck is the best player and deserved at least a shot given his effort in the game, his return this year and his contributions to the program and the school overall.    If he can't move it then let a jittery freshman kicker (understandably so) take the shot ideally at least a few yards closer.  Andrew deserved his chance to win this game!

I'm sad for Andrew and for the seniors.  The coaching staff did a great job for 59 minutes.  The last minute we will debate for years just like Harbaugh's miscue in the Big Game with Toby two years ago.    Voldemort caliber players don't come our way very often and in my humble opinion we should trust them to win the day for Stanford. 

[Spiny_Norman]

Coach Shaw may have been playing the percentages, but I still think he missed a key consideration if he did not gauge the mental readiness of his kicker.  Coach Shaw placed the game on the foot of a kicker who had never attempted a FG in a game where Stanford was behind or tied.  The most "pressured" kick was with a 7 point lead already at home against Cal and 3 minutes to play.  I have read accounts that described Williamson on the sidelines as "deer-in-headlights" and "appeared to be hyperventilating."  If he had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker to win the game, Coach Shaw should have used the clock to move the ball closer and make it as easy as possible.  I wish that the media would challenge him just a little so that we could understand what was going through his head during the final minute of regulation. 

Even so, I also watched the team finish its on-field drills before the game.  The last thing that the team did before returning to the locker room was gather under the goal post as the snapper, holder and kicker attempt a PAT and then a 35 yard FG.  To my observation in the upper deck to the side of the end zone, Williamson nailed it.

[Spiny_Norman]

Coach Shaw may have been playing the percentages, but I still think he missed a key consideration if he did not gauge the mental readiness of his kicker.  Coach Shaw placed the game on the foot of a kicker who had never attempted a FG in a game where Stanford was behind or tied.  The most "pressured" kick was with a 7 point lead already at home against Cal and 3 minutes to play.  I have read accounts that described Williamson on the sidelines as "deer-in-headlights" and "appeared to be hyperventilating."  If he had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker to win the game, Coach Shaw should have used the clock to move the ball closer and make it as easy as possible.  I wish that the media would challenge him just a little so that we could understand what was going through his head during the final minute of regulation. 

Even so, I also watched the team finish its on-field drills before the game.  The last thing that the team did before returning to the locker room was gather under the goal post as the snapper, holder and kicker attempt a PAT and then a 35 yard FG.  To my observation in the upper deck to the side of the end zone, Williamson nailed it.

[Spiny_Norman]

Coach Shaw may have been playing the percentages, but I still think he missed a key consideration if he did not gauge the mental readiness of his kicker.  Coach Shaw placed the game on the foot of a kicker who had never attempted a FG in a game where Stanford was behind or tied.  The most "pressured" kick was with a 7 point lead already at home against Cal and 3 minutes to play.  I have read accounts that described Williamson on the sidelines as "deer-in-headlights" and "appeared to be hyperventilating."  If he had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker to win the game, Coach Shaw should have used the clock to move the ball closer and make it as easy as possible.  I wish that the media would challenge him just a little so that we could understand what was going through his head during the final minute of regulation. 

Even so, I also watched the team finish its on-field drills before the game.  The last thing that the team did before returning to the locker room was gather under the goal post as the snapper, holder and kicker attempt a PAT and then a 35 yard FG.  To my observation in the upper deck to the side of the end zone, Williamson nailed it.

[Spiny_Norman]

Coach Shaw may have been playing the percentages, but I still think he missed a key consideration if he did not gauge the mental readiness of his kicker.  Coach Shaw placed the game on the foot of a kicker who had never attempted a FG in a game where Stanford was behind or tied.  The most "pressured" kick was with a 7 point lead already at home against Cal and 3 minutes to play.  I have read accounts that described Williamson on the sidelines as "deer-in-headlights" and "appeared to be hyperventilating."  If he had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker to win the game, Coach Shaw should have used the clock to move the ball closer and make it as easy as possible.  I wish that the media would challenge him just a little so that we could understand what was going through his head during the final minute of regulation. 

Even so, I also watched the team finish its on-field drills before the game.  The last thing that the team did before returning to the locker room was gather under the goal post as the snapper, holder and kicker attempt a PAT and then a 35 yard FG.  To my observation in the upper deck to the side of the end zone, Williamson nailed it.

[Spiny_Norman]

Coach Shaw may have been playing the percentages, but I still think he missed a key consideration if he did not gauge the mental readiness of his kicker.  Coach Shaw placed the game on the foot of a kicker who had never attempted a FG in a game where Stanford was behind or tied.  The most "pressured" kick was with a 7 point lead already at home against Cal and 3 minutes to play.  I have read accounts that described Williamson on the sidelines as "deer-in-headlights" and "appeared to be hyperventilating."  If he had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker to win the game, Coach Shaw should have used the clock to move the ball closer and make it as easy as possible.  I wish that the media would challenge him just a little so that we could understand what was going through his head during the final minute of regulation. 

Even so, I also watched the team finish its on-field drills before the game.  The last thing that the team did before returning to the locker room was gather under the goal post as the snapper, holder and kicker attempt a PAT and then a 35 yard FG.  To my observation in the upper deck to the side of the end zone, Williamson nailed it.

[Spiny_Norman]

Coach Shaw may have been playing the percentages, but I still think he missed a key consideration if he did not gauge the mental readiness of his kicker.  Coach Shaw placed the game on the foot of a kicker who had never attempted a FG in a game where Stanford was behind or tied.  The most "pressured" kick was with a 7 point lead already at home against Cal and 3 minutes to play.  I have read accounts that described Williamson on the sidelines as "deer-in-headlights" and "appeared to be hyperventilating."  If he had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker to win the game, Coach Shaw should have used the clock to move the ball closer and make it as easy as possible.  I wish that the media would challenge him just a little so that we could understand what was going through his head during the final minute of regulation. 

Even so, I also watched the team finish its on-field drills before the game.  The last thing that the team did before returning to the locker room was gather under the goal post as the snapper, holder and kicker attempt a PAT and then a 35 yard FG.  To my observation in the upper deck to the side of the end zone, Williamson nailed it.

[Spiny_Norman]

Coach Shaw may have been playing the percentages, but I still think he missed a key consideration if he did not gauge the mental readiness of his kicker.  Coach Shaw placed the game on the foot of a kicker who had never attempted a FG in a game where Stanford was behind or tied.  The most "pressured" kick was with a 7 point lead already at home against Cal and 3 minutes to play.  I have read accounts that described Williamson on the sidelines as "deer-in-headlights" and "appeared to be hyperventilating."  If he had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker to win the game, Coach Shaw should have used the clock to move the ball closer and make it as easy as possible.  I wish that the media would challenge him just a little so that we could understand what was going through his head during the final minute of regulation. 

Even so, I also watched the team finish its on-field drills before the game.  The last thing that the team did before returning to the locker room was gather under the goal post as the snapper, holder and kicker attempt a PAT and then a 35 yard FG.  To my observation in the upper deck to the side of the end zone, Williamson nailed it.

[Spiny_Norman]

Coach Shaw may have been playing the percentages, but I still think he missed a key consideration if he did not gauge the mental readiness of his kicker.  Coach Shaw placed the game on the foot of a kicker who had never attempted a FG in a game where Stanford was behind or tied.  The most "pressured" kick was with a 7 point lead already at home against Cal and 3 minutes to play.  I have read accounts that described Williamson on the sidelines as "deer-in-headlights" and "appeared to be hyperventilating."  If he had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker to win the game, Coach Shaw should have used the clock to move the ball closer and make it as easy as possible.  I wish that the media would challenge him just a little so that we could understand what was going through his head during the final minute of regulation. 

Even so, I also watched the team finish its on-field drills before the game.  The last thing that the team did before returning to the locker room was gather under the goal post as the snapper, holder and kicker attempt a PAT and then a 35 yard FG.  To my observation in the upper deck to the side of the end zone, Williamson nailed it.

[76lsjumb]

I'm likely to agree with Teejers 99% of the time, but this appears to be that 1%.  So far, in none of the alternative universe endgame scenarios positing how we should have kept moving the ball forward has anyone added in a play where someone -- say, for example, a tight end -- gets called for illegal motion when he slightly jumps the snap, thereby moving the ball BACK another five yards and making the prospective field goal that much harder.  But that could never happen, right?  Oh..., wait a minute, it actually did, and just a few minutes later...  Or the play where Luck hands it off just a little bit high and it gets fumbled and we have no chance to even kick a field goal.  But that couldn't happen, either, right?

As for knowing what your [(1) Lou Groza watchlist, (2) completely healed [per his father], (3) 6 for 7 from 30-39 yards, (4) kicked a kick-off out of bounds only a few yards shy of a perfect kick had it crossed the goal line] kicker is thinking right before he has to kick, I think that's probably the primary responsibility of the Special Teams Coach, rather than the Head Coach, who also has to be thinking about a couple hundred other things at that moment.  I'm interested in knowing the evidence that suggests we have reason to believe that Shaw actually had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker. 

And, after all, it's not like Shaw sent out a kicker who had already missed a 37-yarder this season that would have gotten us into the NCG [that, of course, would have been the "goat" who klicked for OSU].

Forty years ago, John Ralston sent a kicker out to win the game against Michigan who had missed TWO field goals earlier in the game and, just seven weeks earlier, had missed ALL FIVE of his field goal attempts AND an extra point in a loss to San Jose State.  Ralston's decision was completely the wrong choice, of course.  Except for one thing:

From Wikipedia:  "Following the free kick, Stanford held Michigan to a three-and-out and got the ball back on their own 22-yard line with 1:48 to go. Bunce then threw five consecutive completions to take Stanford to the Michigan 17 with 22 seconds left. The Indians ran two more running plays to get to the Michigan 14 with 12 seconds left, and Garcia successfully kicked a 31-yard field goal to give Stanford a 13–12 upset."

My initial reaction when it happened was pretty much the same as Teejers' continuing analysis, but, upon further review, I'm reversing my ruling on the field because there's no indisputable evidence that doing it some other way than it was done would definitely have changed the outcome.

[76lsjumb]

I'm likely to agree with Teejers 99% of the time, but this appears to be that 1%.  So far, in none of the alternative universe endgame scenarios positing how we should have kept moving the ball forward has anyone added in a play where someone -- say, for example, a tight end -- gets called for illegal motion when he slightly jumps the snap, thereby moving the ball BACK another five yards and making the prospective field goal that much harder.  But that could never happen, right?  Oh..., wait a minute, it actually did, and just a few minutes later...  Or the play where Luck hands it off just a little bit high and it gets fumbled and we have no chance to even kick a field goal.  But that couldn't happen, either, right?

As for knowing what your [(1) Lou Groza watchlist, (2) completely healed [per his father], (3) 6 for 7 from 30-39 yards, (4) kicked a kick-off out of bounds only a few yards shy of a perfect kick had it crossed the goal line] kicker is thinking right before he has to kick, I think that's probably the primary responsibility of the Special Teams Coach, rather than the Head Coach, who also has to be thinking about a couple hundred other things at that moment.  I'm interested in knowing the evidence that suggests we have reason to believe that Shaw actually had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker. 

And, after all, it's not like Shaw sent out a kicker who had already missed a 37-yarder this season that would have gotten us into the NCG [that, of course, would have been the "goat" who klicked for OSU].

Forty years ago, John Ralston sent a kicker out to win the game against Michigan who had missed TWO field goals earlier in the game and, just seven weeks earlier, had missed ALL FIVE of his field goal attempts AND an extra point in a loss to San Jose State.  Ralston's decision was completely the wrong choice, of course.  Except for one thing:

From Wikipedia:  "Following the free kick, Stanford held Michigan to a three-and-out and got the ball back on their own 22-yard line with 1:48 to go. Bunce then threw five consecutive completions to take Stanford to the Michigan 17 with 22 seconds left. The Indians ran two more running plays to get to the Michigan 14 with 12 seconds left, and Garcia successfully kicked a 31-yard field goal to give Stanford a 13–12 upset."

My initial reaction when it happened was pretty much the same as Teejers' continuing analysis, but, upon further review, I'm reversing my ruling on the field because there's no indisputable evidence that doing it some other way than it was done would definitely have changed the outcome.

[76lsjumb]

I'm likely to agree with Teejers 99% of the time, but this appears to be that 1%.  So far, in none of the alternative universe endgame scenarios positing how we should have kept moving the ball forward has anyone added in a play where someone -- say, for example, a tight end -- gets called for illegal motion when he slightly jumps the snap, thereby moving the ball BACK another five yards and making the prospective field goal that much harder.  But that could never happen, right?  Oh..., wait a minute, it actually did, and just a few minutes later...  Or the play where Luck hands it off just a little bit high and it gets fumbled and we have no chance to even kick a field goal.  But that couldn't happen, either, right?

As for knowing what your [(1) Lou Groza watchlist, (2) completely healed [per his father], (3) 6 for 7 from 30-39 yards, (4) kicked a kick-off out of bounds only a few yards shy of a perfect kick had it crossed the goal line] kicker is thinking right before he has to kick, I think that's probably the primary responsibility of the Special Teams Coach, rather than the Head Coach, who also has to be thinking about a couple hundred other things at that moment.  I'm interested in knowing the evidence that suggests we have reason to believe that Shaw actually had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker. 

And, after all, it's not like Shaw sent out a kicker who had already missed a 37-yarder this season that would have gotten us into the NCG [that, of course, would have been the "goat" who klicked for OSU].

Forty years ago, John Ralston sent a kicker out to win the game against Michigan who had missed TWO field goals earlier in the game and, just seven weeks earlier, had missed ALL FIVE of his field goal attempts AND an extra point in a loss to San Jose State.  Ralston's decision was completely the wrong choice, of course.  Except for one thing:

From Wikipedia:  "Following the free kick, Stanford held Michigan to a three-and-out and got the ball back on their own 22-yard line with 1:48 to go. Bunce then threw five consecutive completions to take Stanford to the Michigan 17 with 22 seconds left. The Indians ran two more running plays to get to the Michigan 14 with 12 seconds left, and Garcia successfully kicked a 31-yard field goal to give Stanford a 13–12 upset."

My initial reaction when it happened was pretty much the same as Teejers' continuing analysis, but, upon further review, I'm reversing my ruling on the field because there's no indisputable evidence that doing it some other way than it was done would definitely have changed the outcome.

[76lsjumb]

I'm likely to agree with Teejers 99% of the time, but this appears to be that 1%.  So far, in none of the alternative universe endgame scenarios positing how we should have kept moving the ball forward has anyone added in a play where someone -- say, for example, a tight end -- gets called for illegal motion when he slightly jumps the snap, thereby moving the ball BACK another five yards and making the prospective field goal that much harder.  But that could never happen, right?  Oh..., wait a minute, it actually did, and just a few minutes later...  Or the play where Luck hands it off just a little bit high and it gets fumbled and we have no chance to even kick a field goal.  But that couldn't happen, either, right?

As for knowing what your [(1) Lou Groza watchlist, (2) completely healed [per his father], (3) 6 for 7 from 30-39 yards, (4) kicked a kick-off out of bounds only a few yards shy of a perfect kick had it crossed the goal line] kicker is thinking right before he has to kick, I think that's probably the primary responsibility of the Special Teams Coach, rather than the Head Coach, who also has to be thinking about a couple hundred other things at that moment.  I'm interested in knowing the evidence that suggests we have reason to believe that Shaw actually had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker. 

And, after all, it's not like Shaw sent out a kicker who had already missed a 37-yarder this season that would have gotten us into the NCG [that, of course, would have been the "goat" who klicked for OSU].

Forty years ago, John Ralston sent a kicker out to win the game against Michigan who had missed TWO field goals earlier in the game and, just seven weeks earlier, had missed ALL FIVE of his field goal attempts AND an extra point in a loss to San Jose State.  Ralston's decision was completely the wrong choice, of course.  Except for one thing:

From Wikipedia:  "Following the free kick, Stanford held Michigan to a three-and-out and got the ball back on their own 22-yard line with 1:48 to go. Bunce then threw five consecutive completions to take Stanford to the Michigan 17 with 22 seconds left. The Indians ran two more running plays to get to the Michigan 14 with 12 seconds left, and Garcia successfully kicked a 31-yard field goal to give Stanford a 13–12 upset."

My initial reaction when it happened was pretty much the same as Teejers' continuing analysis, but, upon further review, I'm reversing my ruling on the field because there's no indisputable evidence that doing it some other way than it was done would definitely have changed the outcome.

[76lsjumb]

I'm likely to agree with Teejers 99% of the time, but this appears to be that 1%.  So far, in none of the alternative universe endgame scenarios positing how we should have kept moving the ball forward has anyone added in a play where someone -- say, for example, a tight end -- gets called for illegal motion when he slightly jumps the snap, thereby moving the ball BACK another five yards and making the prospective field goal that much harder.  But that could never happen, right?  Oh..., wait a minute, it actually did, and just a few minutes later...  Or the play where Luck hands it off just a little bit high and it gets fumbled and we have no chance to even kick a field goal.  But that couldn't happen, either, right?

As for knowing what your [(1) Lou Groza watchlist, (2) completely healed [per his father], (3) 6 for 7 from 30-39 yards, (4) kicked a kick-off out of bounds only a few yards shy of a perfect kick had it crossed the goal line] kicker is thinking right before he has to kick, I think that's probably the primary responsibility of the Special Teams Coach, rather than the Head Coach, who also has to be thinking about a couple hundred other things at that moment.  I'm interested in knowing the evidence that suggests we have reason to believe that Shaw actually had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker. 

And, after all, it's not like Shaw sent out a kicker who had already missed a 37-yarder this season that would have gotten us into the NCG [that, of course, would have been the "goat" who klicked for OSU].

Forty years ago, John Ralston sent a kicker out to win the game against Michigan who had missed TWO field goals earlier in the game and, just seven weeks earlier, had missed ALL FIVE of his field goal attempts AND an extra point in a loss to San Jose State.  Ralston's decision was completely the wrong choice, of course.  Except for one thing:

From Wikipedia:  "Following the free kick, Stanford held Michigan to a three-and-out and got the ball back on their own 22-yard line with 1:48 to go. Bunce then threw five consecutive completions to take Stanford to the Michigan 17 with 22 seconds left. The Indians ran two more running plays to get to the Michigan 14 with 12 seconds left, and Garcia successfully kicked a 31-yard field goal to give Stanford a 13–12 upset."

My initial reaction when it happened was pretty much the same as Teejers' continuing analysis, but, upon further review, I'm reversing my ruling on the field because there's no indisputable evidence that doing it some other way than it was done would definitely have changed the outcome.

[76lsjumb]

I'm likely to agree with Teejers 99% of the time, but this appears to be that 1%.  So far, in none of the alternative universe endgame scenarios positing how we should have kept moving the ball forward has anyone added in a play where someone -- say, for example, a tight end -- gets called for illegal motion when he slightly jumps the snap, thereby moving the ball BACK another five yards and making the prospective field goal that much harder.  But that could never happen, right?  Oh..., wait a minute, it actually did, and just a few minutes later...  Or the play where Luck hands it off just a little bit high and it gets fumbled and we have no chance to even kick a field goal.  But that couldn't happen, either, right?

As for knowing what your [(1) Lou Groza watchlist, (2) completely healed [per his father], (3) 6 for 7 from 30-39 yards, (4) kicked a kick-off out of bounds only a few yards shy of a perfect kick had it crossed the goal line] kicker is thinking right before he has to kick, I think that's probably the primary responsibility of the Special Teams Coach, rather than the Head Coach, who also has to be thinking about a couple hundred other things at that moment.  I'm interested in knowing the evidence that suggests we have reason to believe that Shaw actually had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker. 

And, after all, it's not like Shaw sent out a kicker who had already missed a 37-yarder this season that would have gotten us into the NCG [that, of course, would have been the "goat" who klicked for OSU].

Forty years ago, John Ralston sent a kicker out to win the game against Michigan who had missed TWO field goals earlier in the game and, just seven weeks earlier, had missed ALL FIVE of his field goal attempts AND an extra point in a loss to San Jose State.  Ralston's decision was completely the wrong choice, of course.  Except for one thing:

From Wikipedia:  "Following the free kick, Stanford held Michigan to a three-and-out and got the ball back on their own 22-yard line with 1:48 to go. Bunce then threw five consecutive completions to take Stanford to the Michigan 17 with 22 seconds left. The Indians ran two more running plays to get to the Michigan 14 with 12 seconds left, and Garcia successfully kicked a 31-yard field goal to give Stanford a 13–12 upset."

My initial reaction when it happened was pretty much the same as Teejers' continuing analysis, but, upon further review, I'm reversing my ruling on the field because there's no indisputable evidence that doing it some other way than it was done would definitely have changed the outcome.

[76lsjumb]

I'm likely to agree with Teejers 99% of the time, but this appears to be that 1%.  So far, in none of the alternative universe endgame scenarios positing how we should have kept moving the ball forward has anyone added in a play where someone -- say, for example, a tight end -- gets called for illegal motion when he slightly jumps the snap, thereby moving the ball BACK another five yards and making the prospective field goal that much harder.  But that could never happen, right?  Oh..., wait a minute, it actually did, and just a few minutes later...  Or the play where Luck hands it off just a little bit high and it gets fumbled and we have no chance to even kick a field goal.  But that couldn't happen, either, right?

As for knowing what your [(1) Lou Groza watchlist, (2) completely healed [per his father], (3) 6 for 7 from 30-39 yards, (4) kicked a kick-off out of bounds only a few yards shy of a perfect kick had it crossed the goal line] kicker is thinking right before he has to kick, I think that's probably the primary responsibility of the Special Teams Coach, rather than the Head Coach, who also has to be thinking about a couple hundred other things at that moment.  I'm interested in knowing the evidence that suggests we have reason to believe that Shaw actually had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker. 

And, after all, it's not like Shaw sent out a kicker who had already missed a 37-yarder this season that would have gotten us into the NCG [that, of course, would have been the "goat" who klicked for OSU].

Forty years ago, John Ralston sent a kicker out to win the game against Michigan who had missed TWO field goals earlier in the game and, just seven weeks earlier, had missed ALL FIVE of his field goal attempts AND an extra point in a loss to San Jose State.  Ralston's decision was completely the wrong choice, of course.  Except for one thing:

From Wikipedia:  "Following the free kick, Stanford held Michigan to a three-and-out and got the ball back on their own 22-yard line with 1:48 to go. Bunce then threw five consecutive completions to take Stanford to the Michigan 17 with 22 seconds left. The Indians ran two more running plays to get to the Michigan 14 with 12 seconds left, and Garcia successfully kicked a 31-yard field goal to give Stanford a 13–12 upset."

My initial reaction when it happened was pretty much the same as Teejers' continuing analysis, but, upon further review, I'm reversing my ruling on the field because there's no indisputable evidence that doing it some other way than it was done would definitely have changed the outcome.

[76lsjumb]

I'm likely to agree with Teejers 99% of the time, but this appears to be that 1%.  So far, in none of the alternative universe endgame scenarios positing how we should have kept moving the ball forward has anyone added in a play where someone -- say, for example, a tight end -- gets called for illegal motion when he slightly jumps the snap, thereby moving the ball BACK another five yards and making the prospective field goal that much harder.  But that could never happen, right?  Oh..., wait a minute, it actually did, and just a few minutes later...  Or the play where Luck hands it off just a little bit high and it gets fumbled and we have no chance to even kick a field goal.  But that couldn't happen, either, right?

As for knowing what your [(1) Lou Groza watchlist, (2) completely healed [per his father], (3) 6 for 7 from 30-39 yards, (4) kicked a kick-off out of bounds only a few yards shy of a perfect kick had it crossed the goal line] kicker is thinking right before he has to kick, I think that's probably the primary responsibility of the Special Teams Coach, rather than the Head Coach, who also has to be thinking about a couple hundred other things at that moment.  I'm interested in knowing the evidence that suggests we have reason to believe that Shaw actually had any doubts about the readiness of his kicker. 

And, after all, it's not like Shaw sent out a kicker who had already missed a 37-yarder this season that would have gotten us into the NCG [that, of course, would have been the "goat" who klicked for OSU].

Forty years ago, John Ralston sent a kicker out to win the game against Michigan who had missed TWO field goals earlier in the game and, just seven weeks earlier, had missed ALL FIVE of his field goal attempts AND an extra point in a loss to San Jose State.  Ralston's decision was completely the wrong choice, of course.  Except for one thing:

From Wikipedia:  "Following the free kick, Stanford held Michigan to a three-and-out and got the ball back on their own 22-yard line with 1:48 to go. Bunce then threw five consecutive completions to take Stanford to the Michigan 17 with 22 seconds left. The Indians ran two more running plays to get to the Michigan 14 with 12 seconds left, and Garcia successfully kicked a 31-yard field goal to give Stanford a 13–12 upset."

My initial reaction when it happened was pretty much the same as Teejers' continuing analysis, but, upon further review, I'm reversing my ruling on the field because there's no indisputable evidence that doing it some other way than it was done would definitely have changed the outcome.

[76lsjumb]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

***
But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Two points.  First, this was the first time all year we played the No. 1 team in the country in causing turnovers.  Second, the point about only having missed kicks in the endzone is a tad bit misleading.  Prior to the Fiesta Bowl, we were in the red zone 64 times.  We scored 50 touchdowns and 13 field goals, and we missed one field goal. To my recollection, we attempted to score touchdowns ALL 64 times we made it into the red zone, but "failed" to do so on 14 of those attempts [for a touchdown "success" rate of 78%].  On those 14 "failed" touchdown attempts, we attempted 14 field goals and were successful on 13 of them [for a field goal "success" rate of almost 93%].  In other words, our remarkable scoring percentage inside the red zone owes a fair bit to our successful field goal percentage.

[76lsjumb]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

***
But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Two points.  First, this was the first time all year we played the No. 1 team in the country in causing turnovers.  Second, the point about only having missed kicks in the endzone is a tad bit misleading.  Prior to the Fiesta Bowl, we were in the red zone 64 times.  We scored 50 touchdowns and 13 field goals, and we missed one field goal. To my recollection, we attempted to score touchdowns ALL 64 times we made it into the red zone, but "failed" to do so on 14 of those attempts [for a touchdown "success" rate of 78%].  On those 14 "failed" touchdown attempts, we attempted 14 field goals and were successful on 13 of them [for a field goal "success" rate of almost 93%].  In other words, our remarkable scoring percentage inside the red zone owes a fair bit to our successful field goal percentage.

[76lsjumb]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

***
But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Two points.  First, this was the first time all year we played the No. 1 team in the country in causing turnovers.  Second, the point about only having missed kicks in the endzone is a tad bit misleading.  Prior to the Fiesta Bowl, we were in the red zone 64 times.  We scored 50 touchdowns and 13 field goals, and we missed one field goal. To my recollection, we attempted to score touchdowns ALL 64 times we made it into the red zone, but "failed" to do so on 14 of those attempts [for a touchdown "success" rate of 78%].  On those 14 "failed" touchdown attempts, we attempted 14 field goals and were successful on 13 of them [for a field goal "success" rate of almost 93%].  In other words, our remarkable scoring percentage inside the red zone owes a fair bit to our successful field goal percentage.

[76lsjumb]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

***
But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Two points.  First, this was the first time all year we played the No. 1 team in the country in causing turnovers.  Second, the point about only having missed kicks in the endzone is a tad bit misleading.  Prior to the Fiesta Bowl, we were in the red zone 64 times.  We scored 50 touchdowns and 13 field goals, and we missed one field goal. To my recollection, we attempted to score touchdowns ALL 64 times we made it into the red zone, but "failed" to do so on 14 of those attempts [for a touchdown "success" rate of 78%].  On those 14 "failed" touchdown attempts, we attempted 14 field goals and were successful on 13 of them [for a field goal "success" rate of almost 93%].  In other words, our remarkable scoring percentage inside the red zone owes a fair bit to our successful field goal percentage.

[76lsjumb]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

***
But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Two points.  First, this was the first time all year we played the No. 1 team in the country in causing turnovers.  Second, the point about only having missed kicks in the endzone is a tad bit misleading.  Prior to the Fiesta Bowl, we were in the red zone 64 times.  We scored 50 touchdowns and 13 field goals, and we missed one field goal. To my recollection, we attempted to score touchdowns ALL 64 times we made it into the red zone, but "failed" to do so on 14 of those attempts [for a touchdown "success" rate of 78%].  On those 14 "failed" touchdown attempts, we attempted 14 field goals and were successful on 13 of them [for a field goal "success" rate of almost 93%].  In other words, our remarkable scoring percentage inside the red zone owes a fair bit to our successful field goal percentage.

[76lsjumb]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

***
But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Two points.  First, this was the first time all year we played the No. 1 team in the country in causing turnovers.  Second, the point about only having missed kicks in the endzone is a tad bit misleading.  Prior to the Fiesta Bowl, we were in the red zone 64 times.  We scored 50 touchdowns and 13 field goals, and we missed one field goal. To my recollection, we attempted to score touchdowns ALL 64 times we made it into the red zone, but "failed" to do so on 14 of those attempts [for a touchdown "success" rate of 78%].  On those 14 "failed" touchdown attempts, we attempted 14 field goals and were successful on 13 of them [for a field goal "success" rate of almost 93%].  In other words, our remarkable scoring percentage inside the red zone owes a fair bit to our successful field goal percentage.

[76lsjumb]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

***
But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Two points.  First, this was the first time all year we played the No. 1 team in the country in causing turnovers.  Second, the point about only having missed kicks in the endzone is a tad bit misleading.  Prior to the Fiesta Bowl, we were in the red zone 64 times.  We scored 50 touchdowns and 13 field goals, and we missed one field goal. To my recollection, we attempted to score touchdowns ALL 64 times we made it into the red zone, but "failed" to do so on 14 of those attempts [for a touchdown "success" rate of 78%].  On those 14 "failed" touchdown attempts, we attempted 14 field goals and were successful on 13 of them [for a field goal "success" rate of almost 93%].  In other words, our remarkable scoring percentage inside the red zone owes a fair bit to our successful field goal percentage.

[76lsjumb]

Well, except the percentages weren't in Shaw's favor.

***
But I wouldn't rely on this argument as a Shaw defender--do you think it's more or less likely that Stanford scores a touchdown from the 23 than otherwise, and given that we haven't turned the ball over in the redzone all year, do you think it's more or less likely that we turn the ball over than otherwise? (The only times we've failed to score in the redzone were...missed kicks.)

Two points.  First, this was the first time all year we played the No. 1 team in the country in causing turnovers.  Second, the point about only having missed kicks in the endzone is a tad bit misleading.  Prior to the Fiesta Bowl, we were in the red zone 64 times.  We scored 50 touchdowns and 13 field goals, and we missed one field goal. To my recollection, we attempted to score touchdowns ALL 64 times we made it into the red zone, but "failed" to do so on 14 of those attempts [for a touchdown "success" rate of 78%].  On those 14 "failed" touchdown attempts, we attempted 14 field goals and were successful on 13 of them [for a field goal "success" rate of almost 93%].  In other words, our remarkable scoring percentage inside the red zone owes a fair bit to our successful field goal percentage.