[FarmBoy]

For all the criticism heaped on Shaw for the endgame, no one is giving near enough credit for the gameplan that was developed and executed to perfection for 59:57. Some argue OSU should have been in the NCG. Some pundits expected at least a chance of a big win by the Cowboys. The coaching staff prepared the team, put together the gameplan, called the plans, and managed  the game to put us in a position to win. I would say the coaching, overall, was an A/A-.

Do I agree with Shaw's endgame strategy? Yes and no. I think we should have run a couple of more plays, tried to get a first down, get a little closer, and make the field goal easier. But I don't think you play for the TD in that situation. Setting up a chip shot FG as time expires is the smart play. Too many people are myopic and can't separate "good process" from the "bad outcome." Just because the strategy didn't work, doesn't mean it wasn't the right decision. I'm glad Shaw is sticking to his guns on this.

[FarmBoy]

For all the criticism heaped on Shaw for the endgame, no one is giving near enough credit for the gameplan that was developed and executed to perfection for 59:57. Some argue OSU should have been in the NCG. Some pundits expected at least a chance of a big win by the Cowboys. The coaching staff prepared the team, put together the gameplan, called the plans, and managed  the game to put us in a position to win. I would say the coaching, overall, was an A/A-.

Do I agree with Shaw's endgame strategy? Yes and no. I think we should have run a couple of more plays, tried to get a first down, get a little closer, and make the field goal easier. But I don't think you play for the TD in that situation. Setting up a chip shot FG as time expires is the smart play. Too many people are myopic and can't separate "good process" from the "bad outcome." Just because the strategy didn't work, doesn't mean it wasn't the right decision. I'm glad Shaw is sticking to his guns on this.

[FarmBoy]

For all the criticism heaped on Shaw for the endgame, no one is giving near enough credit for the gameplan that was developed and executed to perfection for 59:57. Some argue OSU should have been in the NCG. Some pundits expected at least a chance of a big win by the Cowboys. The coaching staff prepared the team, put together the gameplan, called the plans, and managed  the game to put us in a position to win. I would say the coaching, overall, was an A/A-.

Do I agree with Shaw's endgame strategy? Yes and no. I think we should have run a couple of more plays, tried to get a first down, get a little closer, and make the field goal easier. But I don't think you play for the TD in that situation. Setting up a chip shot FG as time expires is the smart play. Too many people are myopic and can't separate "good process" from the "bad outcome." Just because the strategy didn't work, doesn't mean it wasn't the right decision. I'm glad Shaw is sticking to his guns on this.

[FarmBoy]

For all the criticism heaped on Shaw for the endgame, no one is giving near enough credit for the gameplan that was developed and executed to perfection for 59:57. Some argue OSU should have been in the NCG. Some pundits expected at least a chance of a big win by the Cowboys. The coaching staff prepared the team, put together the gameplan, called the plans, and managed  the game to put us in a position to win. I would say the coaching, overall, was an A/A-.

Do I agree with Shaw's endgame strategy? Yes and no. I think we should have run a couple of more plays, tried to get a first down, get a little closer, and make the field goal easier. But I don't think you play for the TD in that situation. Setting up a chip shot FG as time expires is the smart play. Too many people are myopic and can't separate "good process" from the "bad outcome." Just because the strategy didn't work, doesn't mean it wasn't the right decision. I'm glad Shaw is sticking to his guns on this.

[FarmBoy]

For all the criticism heaped on Shaw for the endgame, no one is giving near enough credit for the gameplan that was developed and executed to perfection for 59:57. Some argue OSU should have been in the NCG. Some pundits expected at least a chance of a big win by the Cowboys. The coaching staff prepared the team, put together the gameplan, called the plans, and managed  the game to put us in a position to win. I would say the coaching, overall, was an A/A-.

Do I agree with Shaw's endgame strategy? Yes and no. I think we should have run a couple of more plays, tried to get a first down, get a little closer, and make the field goal easier. But I don't think you play for the TD in that situation. Setting up a chip shot FG as time expires is the smart play. Too many people are myopic and can't separate "good process" from the "bad outcome." Just because the strategy didn't work, doesn't mean it wasn't the right decision. I'm glad Shaw is sticking to his guns on this.

[FarmBoy]

For all the criticism heaped on Shaw for the endgame, no one is giving near enough credit for the gameplan that was developed and executed to perfection for 59:57. Some argue OSU should have been in the NCG. Some pundits expected at least a chance of a big win by the Cowboys. The coaching staff prepared the team, put together the gameplan, called the plans, and managed  the game to put us in a position to win. I would say the coaching, overall, was an A/A-.

Do I agree with Shaw's endgame strategy? Yes and no. I think we should have run a couple of more plays, tried to get a first down, get a little closer, and make the field goal easier. But I don't think you play for the TD in that situation. Setting up a chip shot FG as time expires is the smart play. Too many people are myopic and can't separate "good process" from the "bad outcome." Just because the strategy didn't work, doesn't mean it wasn't the right decision. I'm glad Shaw is sticking to his guns on this.

[FarmBoy]

For all the criticism heaped on Shaw for the endgame, no one is giving near enough credit for the gameplan that was developed and executed to perfection for 59:57. Some argue OSU should have been in the NCG. Some pundits expected at least a chance of a big win by the Cowboys. The coaching staff prepared the team, put together the gameplan, called the plans, and managed  the game to put us in a position to win. I would say the coaching, overall, was an A/A-.

Do I agree with Shaw's endgame strategy? Yes and no. I think we should have run a couple of more plays, tried to get a first down, get a little closer, and make the field goal easier. But I don't think you play for the TD in that situation. Setting up a chip shot FG as time expires is the smart play. Too many people are myopic and can't separate "good process" from the "bad outcome." Just because the strategy didn't work, doesn't mean it wasn't the right decision. I'm glad Shaw is sticking to his guns on this.

[FarmBoy]

For all the criticism heaped on Shaw for the endgame, no one is giving near enough credit for the gameplan that was developed and executed to perfection for 59:57. Some argue OSU should have been in the NCG. Some pundits expected at least a chance of a big win by the Cowboys. The coaching staff prepared the team, put together the gameplan, called the plans, and managed  the game to put us in a position to win. I would say the coaching, overall, was an A/A-.

Do I agree with Shaw's endgame strategy? Yes and no. I think we should have run a couple of more plays, tried to get a first down, get a little closer, and make the field goal easier. But I don't think you play for the TD in that situation. Setting up a chip shot FG as time expires is the smart play. Too many people are myopic and can't separate "good process" from the "bad outcome." Just because the strategy didn't work, doesn't mean it wasn't the right decision. I'm glad Shaw is sticking to his guns on this.

[fullmetal]

Wildcard was run twice, iirc, and both went for losses of 3-4 yds each.

Not going for more yards probably immediately put the pressure on JW.  If you go for more yards, you can at least tell your kicker, "we're going to get this ball farther downfield, and if we can't break a run, you'll get this on fourth down."

But as history shows, killing the clock for a game-winning FG is generally more successful than not.  Shaw could have seen signs of worry about the situation...but hey, he has to live with this decision too.

[fullmetal]

Wildcard was run twice, iirc, and both went for losses of 3-4 yds each.

Not going for more yards probably immediately put the pressure on JW.  If you go for more yards, you can at least tell your kicker, "we're going to get this ball farther downfield, and if we can't break a run, you'll get this on fourth down."

But as history shows, killing the clock for a game-winning FG is generally more successful than not.  Shaw could have seen signs of worry about the situation...but hey, he has to live with this decision too.

[fullmetal]

Wildcard was run twice, iirc, and both went for losses of 3-4 yds each.

Not going for more yards probably immediately put the pressure on JW.  If you go for more yards, you can at least tell your kicker, "we're going to get this ball farther downfield, and if we can't break a run, you'll get this on fourth down."

But as history shows, killing the clock for a game-winning FG is generally more successful than not.  Shaw could have seen signs of worry about the situation...but hey, he has to live with this decision too.

[fullmetal]

Wildcard was run twice, iirc, and both went for losses of 3-4 yds each.

Not going for more yards probably immediately put the pressure on JW.  If you go for more yards, you can at least tell your kicker, "we're going to get this ball farther downfield, and if we can't break a run, you'll get this on fourth down."

But as history shows, killing the clock for a game-winning FG is generally more successful than not.  Shaw could have seen signs of worry about the situation...but hey, he has to live with this decision too.

[fullmetal]

Wildcard was run twice, iirc, and both went for losses of 3-4 yds each.

Not going for more yards probably immediately put the pressure on JW.  If you go for more yards, you can at least tell your kicker, "we're going to get this ball farther downfield, and if we can't break a run, you'll get this on fourth down."

But as history shows, killing the clock for a game-winning FG is generally more successful than not.  Shaw could have seen signs of worry about the situation...but hey, he has to live with this decision too.

[fullmetal]

Wildcard was run twice, iirc, and both went for losses of 3-4 yds each.

Not going for more yards probably immediately put the pressure on JW.  If you go for more yards, you can at least tell your kicker, "we're going to get this ball farther downfield, and if we can't break a run, you'll get this on fourth down."

But as history shows, killing the clock for a game-winning FG is generally more successful than not.  Shaw could have seen signs of worry about the situation...but hey, he has to live with this decision too.

[fullmetal]

Wildcard was run twice, iirc, and both went for losses of 3-4 yds each.

Not going for more yards probably immediately put the pressure on JW.  If you go for more yards, you can at least tell your kicker, "we're going to get this ball farther downfield, and if we can't break a run, you'll get this on fourth down."

But as history shows, killing the clock for a game-winning FG is generally more successful than not.  Shaw could have seen signs of worry about the situation...but hey, he has to live with this decision too.

[fullmetal]

Wildcard was run twice, iirc, and both went for losses of 3-4 yds each.

Not going for more yards probably immediately put the pressure on JW.  If you go for more yards, you can at least tell your kicker, "we're going to get this ball farther downfield, and if we can't break a run, you'll get this on fourth down."

But as history shows, killing the clock for a game-winning FG is generally more successful than not.  Shaw could have seen signs of worry about the situation...but hey, he has to live with this decision too.

[berto41]

You said that the percentages were in Shaw's favor. I submit that while that may have been true in the abstract, looking back at season percentages, it is not the case given how poorly the kicker had performed all night -- missing left, barely making one and kicking off out of bounds to the right (giving them the ball on the 40). As his father said, that was a telltale sign that something wasn't right. In short, immediate and recent context matters when determining 'what the percentages
were' and whether they were in his favor.

A couple of things:

1)The clock stoppage at 53 seconds was not a TV timeout. (TV timeouts follow scores, kickoffs or punts; they don't interrupt an on-going series of plays.) An OSU player was down on the sidelines, near the Stanford bench.

2)If you sub in somebody for Andrew Luck on the wildcat, you tip the play. The idea -- at least as Stanford plays the wildcat -- is to have the defense surprised at the line of scrimmage.

3)Dump on the wildcat all you want, but we made some impressive yardage with it over the course of the season. I'd bet Tyler Gaffney's per-carry average out of the wildcat is close to double figures. But it did look as if Oklahoma State had prepared for it pretty well -- those plays were snuffed immediately.

4)I don't think Shaw's play-calling at the end was stupid; the percentages were in his favor. But I would have been more aggressive. I think teejers is right: It's not that he didn't go for the touchdown, it's that he didn't push harder to improve field position (which might have included a touchdown). Jacketree asked, do we think it would have made any difference to kick from 29 yards? Well, maybe. Every yard makes the target bigger. And maybe it would have been from 20 instead of 29.

[berto41]

You said that the percentages were in Shaw's favor. I submit that while that may have been true in the abstract, looking back at season percentages, it is not the case given how poorly the kicker had performed all night -- missing left, barely making one and kicking off out of bounds to the right (giving them the ball on the 40). As his father said, that was a telltale sign that something wasn't right. In short, immediate and recent context matters when determining 'what the percentages
were' and whether they were in his favor.

A couple of things:

1)The clock stoppage at 53 seconds was not a TV timeout. (TV timeouts follow scores, kickoffs or punts; they don't interrupt an on-going series of plays.) An OSU player was down on the sidelines, near the Stanford bench.

2)If you sub in somebody for Andrew Luck on the wildcat, you tip the play. The idea -- at least as Stanford plays the wildcat -- is to have the defense surprised at the line of scrimmage.

3)Dump on the wildcat all you want, but we made some impressive yardage with it over the course of the season. I'd bet Tyler Gaffney's per-carry average out of the wildcat is close to double figures. But it did look as if Oklahoma State had prepared for it pretty well -- those plays were snuffed immediately.

4)I don't think Shaw's play-calling at the end was stupid; the percentages were in his favor. But I would have been more aggressive. I think teejers is right: It's not that he didn't go for the touchdown, it's that he didn't push harder to improve field position (which might have included a touchdown). Jacketree asked, do we think it would have made any difference to kick from 29 yards? Well, maybe. Every yard makes the target bigger. And maybe it would have been from 20 instead of 29.

[berto41]

You said that the percentages were in Shaw's favor. I submit that while that may have been true in the abstract, looking back at season percentages, it is not the case given how poorly the kicker had performed all night -- missing left, barely making one and kicking off out of bounds to the right (giving them the ball on the 40). As his father said, that was a telltale sign that something wasn't right. In short, immediate and recent context matters when determining 'what the percentages
were' and whether they were in his favor.

A couple of things:

1)The clock stoppage at 53 seconds was not a TV timeout. (TV timeouts follow scores, kickoffs or punts; they don't interrupt an on-going series of plays.) An OSU player was down on the sidelines, near the Stanford bench.

2)If you sub in somebody for Andrew Luck on the wildcat, you tip the play. The idea -- at least as Stanford plays the wildcat -- is to have the defense surprised at the line of scrimmage.

3)Dump on the wildcat all you want, but we made some impressive yardage with it over the course of the season. I'd bet Tyler Gaffney's per-carry average out of the wildcat is close to double figures. But it did look as if Oklahoma State had prepared for it pretty well -- those plays were snuffed immediately.

4)I don't think Shaw's play-calling at the end was stupid; the percentages were in his favor. But I would have been more aggressive. I think teejers is right: It's not that he didn't go for the touchdown, it's that he didn't push harder to improve field position (which might have included a touchdown). Jacketree asked, do we think it would have made any difference to kick from 29 yards? Well, maybe. Every yard makes the target bigger. And maybe it would have been from 20 instead of 29.

[berto41]

You said that the percentages were in Shaw's favor. I submit that while that may have been true in the abstract, looking back at season percentages, it is not the case given how poorly the kicker had performed all night -- missing left, barely making one and kicking off out of bounds to the right (giving them the ball on the 40). As his father said, that was a telltale sign that something wasn't right. In short, immediate and recent context matters when determining 'what the percentages
were' and whether they were in his favor.

A couple of things:

1)The clock stoppage at 53 seconds was not a TV timeout. (TV timeouts follow scores, kickoffs or punts; they don't interrupt an on-going series of plays.) An OSU player was down on the sidelines, near the Stanford bench.

2)If you sub in somebody for Andrew Luck on the wildcat, you tip the play. The idea -- at least as Stanford plays the wildcat -- is to have the defense surprised at the line of scrimmage.

3)Dump on the wildcat all you want, but we made some impressive yardage with it over the course of the season. I'd bet Tyler Gaffney's per-carry average out of the wildcat is close to double figures. But it did look as if Oklahoma State had prepared for it pretty well -- those plays were snuffed immediately.

4)I don't think Shaw's play-calling at the end was stupid; the percentages were in his favor. But I would have been more aggressive. I think teejers is right: It's not that he didn't go for the touchdown, it's that he didn't push harder to improve field position (which might have included a touchdown). Jacketree asked, do we think it would have made any difference to kick from 29 yards? Well, maybe. Every yard makes the target bigger. And maybe it would have been from 20 instead of 29.

[berto41]

You said that the percentages were in Shaw's favor. I submit that while that may have been true in the abstract, looking back at season percentages, it is not the case given how poorly the kicker had performed all night -- missing left, barely making one and kicking off out of bounds to the right (giving them the ball on the 40). As his father said, that was a telltale sign that something wasn't right. In short, immediate and recent context matters when determining 'what the percentages
were' and whether they were in his favor.

A couple of things:

1)The clock stoppage at 53 seconds was not a TV timeout. (TV timeouts follow scores, kickoffs or punts; they don't interrupt an on-going series of plays.) An OSU player was down on the sidelines, near the Stanford bench.

2)If you sub in somebody for Andrew Luck on the wildcat, you tip the play. The idea -- at least as Stanford plays the wildcat -- is to have the defense surprised at the line of scrimmage.

3)Dump on the wildcat all you want, but we made some impressive yardage with it over the course of the season. I'd bet Tyler Gaffney's per-carry average out of the wildcat is close to double figures. But it did look as if Oklahoma State had prepared for it pretty well -- those plays were snuffed immediately.

4)I don't think Shaw's play-calling at the end was stupid; the percentages were in his favor. But I would have been more aggressive. I think teejers is right: It's not that he didn't go for the touchdown, it's that he didn't push harder to improve field position (which might have included a touchdown). Jacketree asked, do we think it would have made any difference to kick from 29 yards? Well, maybe. Every yard makes the target bigger. And maybe it would have been from 20 instead of 29.

[berto41]

You said that the percentages were in Shaw's favor. I submit that while that may have been true in the abstract, looking back at season percentages, it is not the case given how poorly the kicker had performed all night -- missing left, barely making one and kicking off out of bounds to the right (giving them the ball on the 40). As his father said, that was a telltale sign that something wasn't right. In short, immediate and recent context matters when determining 'what the percentages
were' and whether they were in his favor.

A couple of things:

1)The clock stoppage at 53 seconds was not a TV timeout. (TV timeouts follow scores, kickoffs or punts; they don't interrupt an on-going series of plays.) An OSU player was down on the sidelines, near the Stanford bench.

2)If you sub in somebody for Andrew Luck on the wildcat, you tip the play. The idea -- at least as Stanford plays the wildcat -- is to have the defense surprised at the line of scrimmage.

3)Dump on the wildcat all you want, but we made some impressive yardage with it over the course of the season. I'd bet Tyler Gaffney's per-carry average out of the wildcat is close to double figures. But it did look as if Oklahoma State had prepared for it pretty well -- those plays were snuffed immediately.

4)I don't think Shaw's play-calling at the end was stupid; the percentages were in his favor. But I would have been more aggressive. I think teejers is right: It's not that he didn't go for the touchdown, it's that he didn't push harder to improve field position (which might have included a touchdown). Jacketree asked, do we think it would have made any difference to kick from 29 yards? Well, maybe. Every yard makes the target bigger. And maybe it would have been from 20 instead of 29.

[berto41]

You said that the percentages were in Shaw's favor. I submit that while that may have been true in the abstract, looking back at season percentages, it is not the case given how poorly the kicker had performed all night -- missing left, barely making one and kicking off out of bounds to the right (giving them the ball on the 40). As his father said, that was a telltale sign that something wasn't right. In short, immediate and recent context matters when determining 'what the percentages
were' and whether they were in his favor.

A couple of things:

1)The clock stoppage at 53 seconds was not a TV timeout. (TV timeouts follow scores, kickoffs or punts; they don't interrupt an on-going series of plays.) An OSU player was down on the sidelines, near the Stanford bench.

2)If you sub in somebody for Andrew Luck on the wildcat, you tip the play. The idea -- at least as Stanford plays the wildcat -- is to have the defense surprised at the line of scrimmage.

3)Dump on the wildcat all you want, but we made some impressive yardage with it over the course of the season. I'd bet Tyler Gaffney's per-carry average out of the wildcat is close to double figures. But it did look as if Oklahoma State had prepared for it pretty well -- those plays were snuffed immediately.

4)I don't think Shaw's play-calling at the end was stupid; the percentages were in his favor. But I would have been more aggressive. I think teejers is right: It's not that he didn't go for the touchdown, it's that he didn't push harder to improve field position (which might have included a touchdown). Jacketree asked, do we think it would have made any difference to kick from 29 yards? Well, maybe. Every yard makes the target bigger. And maybe it would have been from 20 instead of 29.

[berto41]

You said that the percentages were in Shaw's favor. I submit that while that may have been true in the abstract, looking back at season percentages, it is not the case given how poorly the kicker had performed all night -- missing left, barely making one and kicking off out of bounds to the right (giving them the ball on the 40). As his father said, that was a telltale sign that something wasn't right. In short, immediate and recent context matters when determining 'what the percentages
were' and whether they were in his favor.

A couple of things:

1)The clock stoppage at 53 seconds was not a TV timeout. (TV timeouts follow scores, kickoffs or punts; they don't interrupt an on-going series of plays.) An OSU player was down on the sidelines, near the Stanford bench.

2)If you sub in somebody for Andrew Luck on the wildcat, you tip the play. The idea -- at least as Stanford plays the wildcat -- is to have the defense surprised at the line of scrimmage.

3)Dump on the wildcat all you want, but we made some impressive yardage with it over the course of the season. I'd bet Tyler Gaffney's per-carry average out of the wildcat is close to double figures. But it did look as if Oklahoma State had prepared for it pretty well -- those plays were snuffed immediately.

4)I don't think Shaw's play-calling at the end was stupid; the percentages were in his favor. But I would have been more aggressive. I think teejers is right: It's not that he didn't go for the touchdown, it's that he didn't push harder to improve field position (which might have included a touchdown). Jacketree asked, do we think it would have made any difference to kick from 29 yards? Well, maybe. Every yard makes the target bigger. And maybe it would have been from 20 instead of 29.

[berto41]

I'm not "crapping on a coach," whatever that means, I'm criticizing his decisions at end of game and in OT. My apologies, I wasn't aware that having an 11-2 record immunized a coach from reasoned criticism of some of his decisions. Re your what-if question, look at the facts. Luck was 27 for 31 to that point and his interception rate over the year was 1 for about every 40 passes thrown. Even the fumble close to our goal line was not due to OSU. It was because AL's handoff was too high. Moreover, AL could have been instructed to throw it away if there was any doubt. Btw, it wasn't an "easy" field goal for a rs freshman who had had a dismal night kicking up to the point and who was clearly stressing bigtime on the sidelines. I still like DS but that doesn't mean his more dubious decisions should be off limits.

Yeah, it was a kick in the gut, but your crapping on a coach who took us 11-2 is also "pathetic." If we had gone for a TD and they had intercepted (they are No. 1 in the nation in turnover ratio), you would be asking why he didn't go for the "easy" field goal.

[berto41]

I'm not "crapping on a coach," whatever that means, I'm criticizing his decisions at end of game and in OT. My apologies, I wasn't aware that having an 11-2 record immunized a coach from reasoned criticism of some of his decisions. Re your what-if question, look at the facts. Luck was 27 for 31 to that point and his interception rate over the year was 1 for about every 40 passes thrown. Even the fumble close to our goal line was not due to OSU. It was because AL's handoff was too high. Moreover, AL could have been instructed to throw it away if there was any doubt. Btw, it wasn't an "easy" field goal for a rs freshman who had had a dismal night kicking up to the point and who was clearly stressing bigtime on the sidelines. I still like DS but that doesn't mean his more dubious decisions should be off limits.

Yeah, it was a kick in the gut, but your crapping on a coach who took us 11-2 is also "pathetic." If we had gone for a TD and they had intercepted (they are No. 1 in the nation in turnover ratio), you would be asking why he didn't go for the "easy" field goal.

[berto41]

I'm not "crapping on a coach," whatever that means, I'm criticizing his decisions at end of game and in OT. My apologies, I wasn't aware that having an 11-2 record immunized a coach from reasoned criticism of some of his decisions. Re your what-if question, look at the facts. Luck was 27 for 31 to that point and his interception rate over the year was 1 for about every 40 passes thrown. Even the fumble close to our goal line was not due to OSU. It was because AL's handoff was too high. Moreover, AL could have been instructed to throw it away if there was any doubt. Btw, it wasn't an "easy" field goal for a rs freshman who had had a dismal night kicking up to the point and who was clearly stressing bigtime on the sidelines. I still like DS but that doesn't mean his more dubious decisions should be off limits.

Yeah, it was a kick in the gut, but your crapping on a coach who took us 11-2 is also "pathetic." If we had gone for a TD and they had intercepted (they are No. 1 in the nation in turnover ratio), you would be asking why he didn't go for the "easy" field goal.

[berto41]

I'm not "crapping on a coach," whatever that means, I'm criticizing his decisions at end of game and in OT. My apologies, I wasn't aware that having an 11-2 record immunized a coach from reasoned criticism of some of his decisions. Re your what-if question, look at the facts. Luck was 27 for 31 to that point and his interception rate over the year was 1 for about every 40 passes thrown. Even the fumble close to our goal line was not due to OSU. It was because AL's handoff was too high. Moreover, AL could have been instructed to throw it away if there was any doubt. Btw, it wasn't an "easy" field goal for a rs freshman who had had a dismal night kicking up to the point and who was clearly stressing bigtime on the sidelines. I still like DS but that doesn't mean his more dubious decisions should be off limits.

Yeah, it was a kick in the gut, but your crapping on a coach who took us 11-2 is also "pathetic." If we had gone for a TD and they had intercepted (they are No. 1 in the nation in turnover ratio), you would be asking why he didn't go for the "easy" field goal.

[berto41]

I'm not "crapping on a coach," whatever that means, I'm criticizing his decisions at end of game and in OT. My apologies, I wasn't aware that having an 11-2 record immunized a coach from reasoned criticism of some of his decisions. Re your what-if question, look at the facts. Luck was 27 for 31 to that point and his interception rate over the year was 1 for about every 40 passes thrown. Even the fumble close to our goal line was not due to OSU. It was because AL's handoff was too high. Moreover, AL could have been instructed to throw it away if there was any doubt. Btw, it wasn't an "easy" field goal for a rs freshman who had had a dismal night kicking up to the point and who was clearly stressing bigtime on the sidelines. I still like DS but that doesn't mean his more dubious decisions should be off limits.

Yeah, it was a kick in the gut, but your crapping on a coach who took us 11-2 is also "pathetic." If we had gone for a TD and they had intercepted (they are No. 1 in the nation in turnover ratio), you would be asking why he didn't go for the "easy" field goal.

[berto41]

I'm not "crapping on a coach," whatever that means, I'm criticizing his decisions at end of game and in OT. My apologies, I wasn't aware that having an 11-2 record immunized a coach from reasoned criticism of some of his decisions. Re your what-if question, look at the facts. Luck was 27 for 31 to that point and his interception rate over the year was 1 for about every 40 passes thrown. Even the fumble close to our goal line was not due to OSU. It was because AL's handoff was too high. Moreover, AL could have been instructed to throw it away if there was any doubt. Btw, it wasn't an "easy" field goal for a rs freshman who had had a dismal night kicking up to the point and who was clearly stressing bigtime on the sidelines. I still like DS but that doesn't mean his more dubious decisions should be off limits.

Yeah, it was a kick in the gut, but your crapping on a coach who took us 11-2 is also "pathetic." If we had gone for a TD and they had intercepted (they are No. 1 in the nation in turnover ratio), you would be asking why he didn't go for the "easy" field goal.

[berto41]

I'm not "crapping on a coach," whatever that means, I'm criticizing his decisions at end of game and in OT. My apologies, I wasn't aware that having an 11-2 record immunized a coach from reasoned criticism of some of his decisions. Re your what-if question, look at the facts. Luck was 27 for 31 to that point and his interception rate over the year was 1 for about every 40 passes thrown. Even the fumble close to our goal line was not due to OSU. It was because AL's handoff was too high. Moreover, AL could have been instructed to throw it away if there was any doubt. Btw, it wasn't an "easy" field goal for a rs freshman who had had a dismal night kicking up to the point and who was clearly stressing bigtime on the sidelines. I still like DS but that doesn't mean his more dubious decisions should be off limits.

Yeah, it was a kick in the gut, but your crapping on a coach who took us 11-2 is also "pathetic." If we had gone for a TD and they had intercepted (they are No. 1 in the nation in turnover ratio), you would be asking why he didn't go for the "easy" field goal.

[berto41]

I'm not "crapping on a coach," whatever that means, I'm criticizing his decisions at end of game and in OT. My apologies, I wasn't aware that having an 11-2 record immunized a coach from reasoned criticism of some of his decisions. Re your what-if question, look at the facts. Luck was 27 for 31 to that point and his interception rate over the year was 1 for about every 40 passes thrown. Even the fumble close to our goal line was not due to OSU. It was because AL's handoff was too high. Moreover, AL could have been instructed to throw it away if there was any doubt. Btw, it wasn't an "easy" field goal for a rs freshman who had had a dismal night kicking up to the point and who was clearly stressing bigtime on the sidelines. I still like DS but that doesn't mean his more dubious decisions should be off limits.

Yeah, it was a kick in the gut, but your crapping on a coach who took us 11-2 is also "pathetic." If we had gone for a TD and they had intercepted (they are No. 1 in the nation in turnover ratio), you would be asking why he didn't go for the "easy" field goal.

[teejers1]

Guys – and specifically Griff78 – you are not thinking this out.  I remain 100% convinced that Shaw – who admittedly prepped the team very well – blew it in the end game.  And it’s not close.
First of all, you need to recognize that Stanford was in TOTAL CONTROL of the clock.  Stanford was guaranteed the ability to attempt a FG as time expired, no matter what OSU did (or did not) do.  So, if that’s the goal – and it obviously was for Shaw – then it is only a question of where you want to be (or potentially be) when taking that final FG try.
Shaw opted to let 30+ seconds drain off the clock and attempt a 34 yarder with 3 seconds left.  That just wasn’t the best play, even assuming a FG was the best strategy (that is a separate issue, but one I won’t bother going into right now).  As a reminder, here is what happened on last handful of plays:

1st and 10 at OKST 25 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:52.
1st and 10 at OKST 25 Stepfan Taylor rush for 6 yards to the OKSt 19.
2nd and 4 at OKST 19 Stepfan Taylor rush for 2 yards to the OKSt 17.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout STANFORD, clock 00:03.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:03.

Stanford has first and 10 at 25 yard line and 52 seconds to go (OSU forced to use its second TO due to injury).  Stanford runs the ball and gains 6 yards.  Second and 4 with 40+ seconds left.  Third and 2 with 30+ seconds left.

Question:  Why not run the ball again and possibly get a first down?  (and more after that?).

Potential Answer 1:  we don’t want OSU using its final TO to assure that it has 25 seconds and the ball (whether or not Stanford makes the FG).  WRONG!  To the extent that is a real concern, Stanford can calculate exactly when it snaps the third down try (call a TO with 25 seconds left; or 20 seconds left or fewer if you’re really paranoid).

Potential Answer 2:  we want the FG try on third down so that if there is a bad snap, then Stanford can recover the ball, call a TO, and try again.  WRONG!  We waited until there were 3 seconds left to call our TO, so there was no ability to “try again” – clearly this was not a motivating factor.

Potential Answer 3:  we were close enough and didn’t want to risk another play.  WRONG!  If that were the case, then why do anything other than take a centered knee on second down?  Is a 36 yard FG versus a 34 yard FG really the magic dividing line?  Clearly not.  For some inexplicable reason, Shaw decided “this was good enough.”

That’s not a crazy decision, but it’s not the decision that gives you the best chance to win.  I think that is pretty clear, even if you accept the FG parameter.

Here is what Stanford should have done – again, assuming you rule out passing for a TD:  run the ball with 20-25 seconds left (you don’t even need to use a TO to do that).  If you don’t get a first down, then you take your FG try – no different than what you had before.  [A risk of OSU responding with a score of its own with 10-12 seconds left is just not that reasonable to merit consideration – indeed, only Stanford fans would consider even  30 seconds and no TOs a risk].

But if you DO get a first down, then you burn a TO and run the ball again.  And again.  Get as close as you can.  Then try the game-winner.  That is the scenario that gives you the best chance to win (again, even if you accept that a FG as time expired was the smart play).  And the way Stanford was playing on that last drive, I think Stanford would have come awfully close to scoring a TD by running 2-3 more times.  And I have no doubt that the FG try would have been a true chippy (or at worst, no worse off than what was actually attempted).

That is the debate.  No one is saying Shaw didn't prepare the team well.  No one is saying Stanford didn't play well.  They clearly outplayed OSU in that game.  All I'm saying is that Shaw misplayed the end game (it may have had absolutely zero impact on the final result, but I would have liked to have seen it unfold as above).

[teejers1]

Guys – and specifically Griff78 – you are not thinking this out.  I remain 100% convinced that Shaw – who admittedly prepped the team very well – blew it in the end game.  And it’s not close.
First of all, you need to recognize that Stanford was in TOTAL CONTROL of the clock.  Stanford was guaranteed the ability to attempt a FG as time expired, no matter what OSU did (or did not) do.  So, if that’s the goal – and it obviously was for Shaw – then it is only a question of where you want to be (or potentially be) when taking that final FG try.
Shaw opted to let 30+ seconds drain off the clock and attempt a 34 yarder with 3 seconds left.  That just wasn’t the best play, even assuming a FG was the best strategy (that is a separate issue, but one I won’t bother going into right now).  As a reminder, here is what happened on last handful of plays:

1st and 10 at OKST 25 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:52.
1st and 10 at OKST 25 Stepfan Taylor rush for 6 yards to the OKSt 19.
2nd and 4 at OKST 19 Stepfan Taylor rush for 2 yards to the OKSt 17.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout STANFORD, clock 00:03.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:03.

Stanford has first and 10 at 25 yard line and 52 seconds to go (OSU forced to use its second TO due to injury).  Stanford runs the ball and gains 6 yards.  Second and 4 with 40+ seconds left.  Third and 2 with 30+ seconds left.

Question:  Why not run the ball again and possibly get a first down?  (and more after that?).

Potential Answer 1:  we don’t want OSU using its final TO to assure that it has 25 seconds and the ball (whether or not Stanford makes the FG).  WRONG!  To the extent that is a real concern, Stanford can calculate exactly when it snaps the third down try (call a TO with 25 seconds left; or 20 seconds left or fewer if you’re really paranoid).

Potential Answer 2:  we want the FG try on third down so that if there is a bad snap, then Stanford can recover the ball, call a TO, and try again.  WRONG!  We waited until there were 3 seconds left to call our TO, so there was no ability to “try again” – clearly this was not a motivating factor.

Potential Answer 3:  we were close enough and didn’t want to risk another play.  WRONG!  If that were the case, then why do anything other than take a centered knee on second down?  Is a 36 yard FG versus a 34 yard FG really the magic dividing line?  Clearly not.  For some inexplicable reason, Shaw decided “this was good enough.”

That’s not a crazy decision, but it’s not the decision that gives you the best chance to win.  I think that is pretty clear, even if you accept the FG parameter.

Here is what Stanford should have done – again, assuming you rule out passing for a TD:  run the ball with 20-25 seconds left (you don’t even need to use a TO to do that).  If you don’t get a first down, then you take your FG try – no different than what you had before.  [A risk of OSU responding with a score of its own with 10-12 seconds left is just not that reasonable to merit consideration – indeed, only Stanford fans would consider even  30 seconds and no TOs a risk].

But if you DO get a first down, then you burn a TO and run the ball again.  And again.  Get as close as you can.  Then try the game-winner.  That is the scenario that gives you the best chance to win (again, even if you accept that a FG as time expired was the smart play).  And the way Stanford was playing on that last drive, I think Stanford would have come awfully close to scoring a TD by running 2-3 more times.  And I have no doubt that the FG try would have been a true chippy (or at worst, no worse off than what was actually attempted).

That is the debate.  No one is saying Shaw didn't prepare the team well.  No one is saying Stanford didn't play well.  They clearly outplayed OSU in that game.  All I'm saying is that Shaw misplayed the end game (it may have had absolutely zero impact on the final result, but I would have liked to have seen it unfold as above).

[teejers1]

Guys – and specifically Griff78 – you are not thinking this out.  I remain 100% convinced that Shaw – who admittedly prepped the team very well – blew it in the end game.  And it’s not close.
First of all, you need to recognize that Stanford was in TOTAL CONTROL of the clock.  Stanford was guaranteed the ability to attempt a FG as time expired, no matter what OSU did (or did not) do.  So, if that’s the goal – and it obviously was for Shaw – then it is only a question of where you want to be (or potentially be) when taking that final FG try.
Shaw opted to let 30+ seconds drain off the clock and attempt a 34 yarder with 3 seconds left.  That just wasn’t the best play, even assuming a FG was the best strategy (that is a separate issue, but one I won’t bother going into right now).  As a reminder, here is what happened on last handful of plays:

1st and 10 at OKST 25 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:52.
1st and 10 at OKST 25 Stepfan Taylor rush for 6 yards to the OKSt 19.
2nd and 4 at OKST 19 Stepfan Taylor rush for 2 yards to the OKSt 17.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout STANFORD, clock 00:03.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:03.

Stanford has first and 10 at 25 yard line and 52 seconds to go (OSU forced to use its second TO due to injury).  Stanford runs the ball and gains 6 yards.  Second and 4 with 40+ seconds left.  Third and 2 with 30+ seconds left.

Question:  Why not run the ball again and possibly get a first down?  (and more after that?).

Potential Answer 1:  we don’t want OSU using its final TO to assure that it has 25 seconds and the ball (whether or not Stanford makes the FG).  WRONG!  To the extent that is a real concern, Stanford can calculate exactly when it snaps the third down try (call a TO with 25 seconds left; or 20 seconds left or fewer if you’re really paranoid).

Potential Answer 2:  we want the FG try on third down so that if there is a bad snap, then Stanford can recover the ball, call a TO, and try again.  WRONG!  We waited until there were 3 seconds left to call our TO, so there was no ability to “try again” – clearly this was not a motivating factor.

Potential Answer 3:  we were close enough and didn’t want to risk another play.  WRONG!  If that were the case, then why do anything other than take a centered knee on second down?  Is a 36 yard FG versus a 34 yard FG really the magic dividing line?  Clearly not.  For some inexplicable reason, Shaw decided “this was good enough.”

That’s not a crazy decision, but it’s not the decision that gives you the best chance to win.  I think that is pretty clear, even if you accept the FG parameter.

Here is what Stanford should have done – again, assuming you rule out passing for a TD:  run the ball with 20-25 seconds left (you don’t even need to use a TO to do that).  If you don’t get a first down, then you take your FG try – no different than what you had before.  [A risk of OSU responding with a score of its own with 10-12 seconds left is just not that reasonable to merit consideration – indeed, only Stanford fans would consider even  30 seconds and no TOs a risk].

But if you DO get a first down, then you burn a TO and run the ball again.  And again.  Get as close as you can.  Then try the game-winner.  That is the scenario that gives you the best chance to win (again, even if you accept that a FG as time expired was the smart play).  And the way Stanford was playing on that last drive, I think Stanford would have come awfully close to scoring a TD by running 2-3 more times.  And I have no doubt that the FG try would have been a true chippy (or at worst, no worse off than what was actually attempted).

That is the debate.  No one is saying Shaw didn't prepare the team well.  No one is saying Stanford didn't play well.  They clearly outplayed OSU in that game.  All I'm saying is that Shaw misplayed the end game (it may have had absolutely zero impact on the final result, but I would have liked to have seen it unfold as above).

[teejers1]

Guys – and specifically Griff78 – you are not thinking this out.  I remain 100% convinced that Shaw – who admittedly prepped the team very well – blew it in the end game.  And it’s not close.
First of all, you need to recognize that Stanford was in TOTAL CONTROL of the clock.  Stanford was guaranteed the ability to attempt a FG as time expired, no matter what OSU did (or did not) do.  So, if that’s the goal – and it obviously was for Shaw – then it is only a question of where you want to be (or potentially be) when taking that final FG try.
Shaw opted to let 30+ seconds drain off the clock and attempt a 34 yarder with 3 seconds left.  That just wasn’t the best play, even assuming a FG was the best strategy (that is a separate issue, but one I won’t bother going into right now).  As a reminder, here is what happened on last handful of plays:

1st and 10 at OKST 25 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:52.
1st and 10 at OKST 25 Stepfan Taylor rush for 6 yards to the OKSt 19.
2nd and 4 at OKST 19 Stepfan Taylor rush for 2 yards to the OKSt 17.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout STANFORD, clock 00:03.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:03.

Stanford has first and 10 at 25 yard line and 52 seconds to go (OSU forced to use its second TO due to injury).  Stanford runs the ball and gains 6 yards.  Second and 4 with 40+ seconds left.  Third and 2 with 30+ seconds left.

Question:  Why not run the ball again and possibly get a first down?  (and more after that?).

Potential Answer 1:  we don’t want OSU using its final TO to assure that it has 25 seconds and the ball (whether or not Stanford makes the FG).  WRONG!  To the extent that is a real concern, Stanford can calculate exactly when it snaps the third down try (call a TO with 25 seconds left; or 20 seconds left or fewer if you’re really paranoid).

Potential Answer 2:  we want the FG try on third down so that if there is a bad snap, then Stanford can recover the ball, call a TO, and try again.  WRONG!  We waited until there were 3 seconds left to call our TO, so there was no ability to “try again” – clearly this was not a motivating factor.

Potential Answer 3:  we were close enough and didn’t want to risk another play.  WRONG!  If that were the case, then why do anything other than take a centered knee on second down?  Is a 36 yard FG versus a 34 yard FG really the magic dividing line?  Clearly not.  For some inexplicable reason, Shaw decided “this was good enough.”

That’s not a crazy decision, but it’s not the decision that gives you the best chance to win.  I think that is pretty clear, even if you accept the FG parameter.

Here is what Stanford should have done – again, assuming you rule out passing for a TD:  run the ball with 20-25 seconds left (you don’t even need to use a TO to do that).  If you don’t get a first down, then you take your FG try – no different than what you had before.  [A risk of OSU responding with a score of its own with 10-12 seconds left is just not that reasonable to merit consideration – indeed, only Stanford fans would consider even  30 seconds and no TOs a risk].

But if you DO get a first down, then you burn a TO and run the ball again.  And again.  Get as close as you can.  Then try the game-winner.  That is the scenario that gives you the best chance to win (again, even if you accept that a FG as time expired was the smart play).  And the way Stanford was playing on that last drive, I think Stanford would have come awfully close to scoring a TD by running 2-3 more times.  And I have no doubt that the FG try would have been a true chippy (or at worst, no worse off than what was actually attempted).

That is the debate.  No one is saying Shaw didn't prepare the team well.  No one is saying Stanford didn't play well.  They clearly outplayed OSU in that game.  All I'm saying is that Shaw misplayed the end game (it may have had absolutely zero impact on the final result, but I would have liked to have seen it unfold as above).

[teejers1]

Guys – and specifically Griff78 – you are not thinking this out.  I remain 100% convinced that Shaw – who admittedly prepped the team very well – blew it in the end game.  And it’s not close.
First of all, you need to recognize that Stanford was in TOTAL CONTROL of the clock.  Stanford was guaranteed the ability to attempt a FG as time expired, no matter what OSU did (or did not) do.  So, if that’s the goal – and it obviously was for Shaw – then it is only a question of where you want to be (or potentially be) when taking that final FG try.
Shaw opted to let 30+ seconds drain off the clock and attempt a 34 yarder with 3 seconds left.  That just wasn’t the best play, even assuming a FG was the best strategy (that is a separate issue, but one I won’t bother going into right now).  As a reminder, here is what happened on last handful of plays:

1st and 10 at OKST 25 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:52.
1st and 10 at OKST 25 Stepfan Taylor rush for 6 yards to the OKSt 19.
2nd and 4 at OKST 19 Stepfan Taylor rush for 2 yards to the OKSt 17.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout STANFORD, clock 00:03.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:03.

Stanford has first and 10 at 25 yard line and 52 seconds to go (OSU forced to use its second TO due to injury).  Stanford runs the ball and gains 6 yards.  Second and 4 with 40+ seconds left.  Third and 2 with 30+ seconds left.

Question:  Why not run the ball again and possibly get a first down?  (and more after that?).

Potential Answer 1:  we don’t want OSU using its final TO to assure that it has 25 seconds and the ball (whether or not Stanford makes the FG).  WRONG!  To the extent that is a real concern, Stanford can calculate exactly when it snaps the third down try (call a TO with 25 seconds left; or 20 seconds left or fewer if you’re really paranoid).

Potential Answer 2:  we want the FG try on third down so that if there is a bad snap, then Stanford can recover the ball, call a TO, and try again.  WRONG!  We waited until there were 3 seconds left to call our TO, so there was no ability to “try again” – clearly this was not a motivating factor.

Potential Answer 3:  we were close enough and didn’t want to risk another play.  WRONG!  If that were the case, then why do anything other than take a centered knee on second down?  Is a 36 yard FG versus a 34 yard FG really the magic dividing line?  Clearly not.  For some inexplicable reason, Shaw decided “this was good enough.”

That’s not a crazy decision, but it’s not the decision that gives you the best chance to win.  I think that is pretty clear, even if you accept the FG parameter.

Here is what Stanford should have done – again, assuming you rule out passing for a TD:  run the ball with 20-25 seconds left (you don’t even need to use a TO to do that).  If you don’t get a first down, then you take your FG try – no different than what you had before.  [A risk of OSU responding with a score of its own with 10-12 seconds left is just not that reasonable to merit consideration – indeed, only Stanford fans would consider even  30 seconds and no TOs a risk].

But if you DO get a first down, then you burn a TO and run the ball again.  And again.  Get as close as you can.  Then try the game-winner.  That is the scenario that gives you the best chance to win (again, even if you accept that a FG as time expired was the smart play).  And the way Stanford was playing on that last drive, I think Stanford would have come awfully close to scoring a TD by running 2-3 more times.  And I have no doubt that the FG try would have been a true chippy (or at worst, no worse off than what was actually attempted).

That is the debate.  No one is saying Shaw didn't prepare the team well.  No one is saying Stanford didn't play well.  They clearly outplayed OSU in that game.  All I'm saying is that Shaw misplayed the end game (it may have had absolutely zero impact on the final result, but I would have liked to have seen it unfold as above).

[teejers1]

Guys – and specifically Griff78 – you are not thinking this out.  I remain 100% convinced that Shaw – who admittedly prepped the team very well – blew it in the end game.  And it’s not close.
First of all, you need to recognize that Stanford was in TOTAL CONTROL of the clock.  Stanford was guaranteed the ability to attempt a FG as time expired, no matter what OSU did (or did not) do.  So, if that’s the goal – and it obviously was for Shaw – then it is only a question of where you want to be (or potentially be) when taking that final FG try.
Shaw opted to let 30+ seconds drain off the clock and attempt a 34 yarder with 3 seconds left.  That just wasn’t the best play, even assuming a FG was the best strategy (that is a separate issue, but one I won’t bother going into right now).  As a reminder, here is what happened on last handful of plays:

1st and 10 at OKST 25 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:52.
1st and 10 at OKST 25 Stepfan Taylor rush for 6 yards to the OKSt 19.
2nd and 4 at OKST 19 Stepfan Taylor rush for 2 yards to the OKSt 17.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout STANFORD, clock 00:03.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:03.

Stanford has first and 10 at 25 yard line and 52 seconds to go (OSU forced to use its second TO due to injury).  Stanford runs the ball and gains 6 yards.  Second and 4 with 40+ seconds left.  Third and 2 with 30+ seconds left.

Question:  Why not run the ball again and possibly get a first down?  (and more after that?).

Potential Answer 1:  we don’t want OSU using its final TO to assure that it has 25 seconds and the ball (whether or not Stanford makes the FG).  WRONG!  To the extent that is a real concern, Stanford can calculate exactly when it snaps the third down try (call a TO with 25 seconds left; or 20 seconds left or fewer if you’re really paranoid).

Potential Answer 2:  we want the FG try on third down so that if there is a bad snap, then Stanford can recover the ball, call a TO, and try again.  WRONG!  We waited until there were 3 seconds left to call our TO, so there was no ability to “try again” – clearly this was not a motivating factor.

Potential Answer 3:  we were close enough and didn’t want to risk another play.  WRONG!  If that were the case, then why do anything other than take a centered knee on second down?  Is a 36 yard FG versus a 34 yard FG really the magic dividing line?  Clearly not.  For some inexplicable reason, Shaw decided “this was good enough.”

That’s not a crazy decision, but it’s not the decision that gives you the best chance to win.  I think that is pretty clear, even if you accept the FG parameter.

Here is what Stanford should have done – again, assuming you rule out passing for a TD:  run the ball with 20-25 seconds left (you don’t even need to use a TO to do that).  If you don’t get a first down, then you take your FG try – no different than what you had before.  [A risk of OSU responding with a score of its own with 10-12 seconds left is just not that reasonable to merit consideration – indeed, only Stanford fans would consider even  30 seconds and no TOs a risk].

But if you DO get a first down, then you burn a TO and run the ball again.  And again.  Get as close as you can.  Then try the game-winner.  That is the scenario that gives you the best chance to win (again, even if you accept that a FG as time expired was the smart play).  And the way Stanford was playing on that last drive, I think Stanford would have come awfully close to scoring a TD by running 2-3 more times.  And I have no doubt that the FG try would have been a true chippy (or at worst, no worse off than what was actually attempted).

That is the debate.  No one is saying Shaw didn't prepare the team well.  No one is saying Stanford didn't play well.  They clearly outplayed OSU in that game.  All I'm saying is that Shaw misplayed the end game (it may have had absolutely zero impact on the final result, but I would have liked to have seen it unfold as above).

[teejers1]

Guys – and specifically Griff78 – you are not thinking this out.  I remain 100% convinced that Shaw – who admittedly prepped the team very well – blew it in the end game.  And it’s not close.
First of all, you need to recognize that Stanford was in TOTAL CONTROL of the clock.  Stanford was guaranteed the ability to attempt a FG as time expired, no matter what OSU did (or did not) do.  So, if that’s the goal – and it obviously was for Shaw – then it is only a question of where you want to be (or potentially be) when taking that final FG try.
Shaw opted to let 30+ seconds drain off the clock and attempt a 34 yarder with 3 seconds left.  That just wasn’t the best play, even assuming a FG was the best strategy (that is a separate issue, but one I won’t bother going into right now).  As a reminder, here is what happened on last handful of plays:

1st and 10 at OKST 25 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:52.
1st and 10 at OKST 25 Stepfan Taylor rush for 6 yards to the OKSt 19.
2nd and 4 at OKST 19 Stepfan Taylor rush for 2 yards to the OKSt 17.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout STANFORD, clock 00:03.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:03.

Stanford has first and 10 at 25 yard line and 52 seconds to go (OSU forced to use its second TO due to injury).  Stanford runs the ball and gains 6 yards.  Second and 4 with 40+ seconds left.  Third and 2 with 30+ seconds left.

Question:  Why not run the ball again and possibly get a first down?  (and more after that?).

Potential Answer 1:  we don’t want OSU using its final TO to assure that it has 25 seconds and the ball (whether or not Stanford makes the FG).  WRONG!  To the extent that is a real concern, Stanford can calculate exactly when it snaps the third down try (call a TO with 25 seconds left; or 20 seconds left or fewer if you’re really paranoid).

Potential Answer 2:  we want the FG try on third down so that if there is a bad snap, then Stanford can recover the ball, call a TO, and try again.  WRONG!  We waited until there were 3 seconds left to call our TO, so there was no ability to “try again” – clearly this was not a motivating factor.

Potential Answer 3:  we were close enough and didn’t want to risk another play.  WRONG!  If that were the case, then why do anything other than take a centered knee on second down?  Is a 36 yard FG versus a 34 yard FG really the magic dividing line?  Clearly not.  For some inexplicable reason, Shaw decided “this was good enough.”

That’s not a crazy decision, but it’s not the decision that gives you the best chance to win.  I think that is pretty clear, even if you accept the FG parameter.

Here is what Stanford should have done – again, assuming you rule out passing for a TD:  run the ball with 20-25 seconds left (you don’t even need to use a TO to do that).  If you don’t get a first down, then you take your FG try – no different than what you had before.  [A risk of OSU responding with a score of its own with 10-12 seconds left is just not that reasonable to merit consideration – indeed, only Stanford fans would consider even  30 seconds and no TOs a risk].

But if you DO get a first down, then you burn a TO and run the ball again.  And again.  Get as close as you can.  Then try the game-winner.  That is the scenario that gives you the best chance to win (again, even if you accept that a FG as time expired was the smart play).  And the way Stanford was playing on that last drive, I think Stanford would have come awfully close to scoring a TD by running 2-3 more times.  And I have no doubt that the FG try would have been a true chippy (or at worst, no worse off than what was actually attempted).

That is the debate.  No one is saying Shaw didn't prepare the team well.  No one is saying Stanford didn't play well.  They clearly outplayed OSU in that game.  All I'm saying is that Shaw misplayed the end game (it may have had absolutely zero impact on the final result, but I would have liked to have seen it unfold as above).

[teejers1]

Guys – and specifically Griff78 – you are not thinking this out.  I remain 100% convinced that Shaw – who admittedly prepped the team very well – blew it in the end game.  And it’s not close.
First of all, you need to recognize that Stanford was in TOTAL CONTROL of the clock.  Stanford was guaranteed the ability to attempt a FG as time expired, no matter what OSU did (or did not) do.  So, if that’s the goal – and it obviously was for Shaw – then it is only a question of where you want to be (or potentially be) when taking that final FG try.
Shaw opted to let 30+ seconds drain off the clock and attempt a 34 yarder with 3 seconds left.  That just wasn’t the best play, even assuming a FG was the best strategy (that is a separate issue, but one I won’t bother going into right now).  As a reminder, here is what happened on last handful of plays:

1st and 10 at OKST 25 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:52.
1st and 10 at OKST 25 Stepfan Taylor rush for 6 yards to the OKSt 19.
2nd and 4 at OKST 19 Stepfan Taylor rush for 2 yards to the OKSt 17.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout STANFORD, clock 00:03.
3rd and 2 at OKST 17 Timeout OKLAHOMA STATE, clock 00:03.

Stanford has first and 10 at 25 yard line and 52 seconds to go (OSU forced to use its second TO due to injury).  Stanford runs the ball and gains 6 yards.  Second and 4 with 40+ seconds left.  Third and 2 with 30+ seconds left.

Question:  Why not run the ball again and possibly get a first down?  (and more after that?).

Potential Answer 1:  we don’t want OSU using its final TO to assure that it has 25 seconds and the ball (whether or not Stanford makes the FG).  WRONG!  To the extent that is a real concern, Stanford can calculate exactly when it snaps the third down try (call a TO with 25 seconds left; or 20 seconds left or fewer if you’re really paranoid).

Potential Answer 2:  we want the FG try on third down so that if there is a bad snap, then Stanford can recover the ball, call a TO, and try again.  WRONG!  We waited until there were 3 seconds left to call our TO, so there was no ability to “try again” – clearly this was not a motivating factor.

Potential Answer 3:  we were close enough and didn’t want to risk another play.  WRONG!  If that were the case, then why do anything other than take a centered knee on second down?  Is a 36 yard FG versus a 34 yard FG really the magic dividing line?  Clearly not.  For some inexplicable reason, Shaw decided “this was good enough.”

That’s not a crazy decision, but it’s not the decision that gives you the best chance to win.  I think that is pretty clear, even if you accept the FG parameter.

Here is what Stanford should have done – again, assuming you rule out passing for a TD:  run the ball with 20-25 seconds left (you don’t even need to use a TO to do that).  If you don’t get a first down, then you take your FG try – no different than what you had before.  [A risk of OSU responding with a score of its own with 10-12 seconds left is just not that reasonable to merit consideration – indeed, only Stanford fans would consider even  30 seconds and no TOs a risk].

But if you DO get a first down, then you burn a TO and run the ball again.  And again.  Get as close as you can.  Then try the game-winner.  That is the scenario that gives you the best chance to win (again, even if you accept that a FG as time expired was the smart play).  And the way Stanford was playing on that last drive, I think Stanford would have come awfully close to scoring a TD by running 2-3 more times.  And I have no doubt that the FG try would have been a true chippy (or at worst, no worse off than what was actually attempted).

That is the debate.  No one is saying Shaw didn't prepare the team well.  No one is saying Stanford didn't play well.  They clearly outplayed OSU in that game.  All I'm saying is that Shaw misplayed the end game (it may have had absolutely zero impact on the final result, but I would have liked to have seen it unfold as above).