[ColoradoTree]

OT warning.  We have strayed off track, and I am not about to help matters.

"Union apologists."  Wow.  Apparently a phrase that did not die out during Reconstruction. 

Oasis, I don't think anyone here is questioning Lee's prowess as a strategist--indeed, he outmaneuvered Union commanders repeatedly throughout 1862 as you note--or his near-mythical status to Confederate soldiers as a leader of men.  And I certainly don't claim that Meade was the better general, particularly since his failure to follow up the success at Gettysburg with an active pursuit of Lee was a monumental mistake.  But let's not pretend that Gettysburg was Lee's crowning moment of glory.  Setting aside the wisdom of lobbying Jefferson Davis to invade the North rather than fortify Vicksburg and other Confederate holdings, this was hardly his greatest battle. 

On the first day, Lee failed to have Ewell press forward, which allowed the Union to entrench on the heights.  (If you want to insulate Lee from blame in this, you can blame Ewell for not taking Cemetery Hill, but Lee's order was to take the hill "if practicable" and left wiggle room that proved crucial.  You can also credit Howard and Hancock for entrenching on Cemetery Hill, if you like, which fed Ewell's (likely erroneous) conclusion that an assault wasn't practicable.  Lee may have "anticipated the move" that the North would entrench on the heights, but anticipation without execution isn't terribly useful.  You can also credit Meade, Strong Vincent, and others for setting up the left flank all the way to Little Round Top.)  That failure set the stage for the rest of the failures to come. 

On the second day, Lee doubled down on that failure by attempting an assault up the heights--against Longstreet's advice to avoid any attack at all, let alone one up the heights--which was spectacularly costly to his army.  (Again, if you want to insulate Lee from blame in this, you can blame Jeb Stuart for poor intelligence on Union positions, or you can--as many Southerners did--blame Longstreet for daring question the great Robert E. Lee.  Or, you can credit Sickles for defending the Wheatfield to the last, effectively sacrificing the III Corps to preserve that position.  Or Strong Vincent for stretching the flank to cover Little Round Top.  Or Col. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain for ordering a downhill bayonet charge when the 20th Maine was effectively out of ammunition.)  At the same time, while the Confederates may have been on the "cusp" of winning when Anderson's division of Hill's corps nearly broke through the Union lines on Cemetery Ridge, but the key phrase there is "nearly."  (If you want to insulate Lee from blame in this, I suppose you could blame Cadmus Wilcox for not pressing his brigade of Alabamians harder at Plum Run.  That seems uncharitable, however, when the 1st Minnesota, one measly, already heavily damaged regiment of 262 men, charged Wilcox's men--an entire brigade --with bayonets fixed and held that line at the expense of their regiment.  That is not an exaggeration, as the 1st Minnesota suffered 82% casualties in an estimated 10 minutes of fighting.  You could also credit Hancock for filling that gap with the 1st Minnesota, and buying time for the Union to fortify the position.  As a native Minnesotan, however, I choose to honor Col. Colvill and his men, who knew they were marching to their deaths but marched anyway--and on the double-quick.) 

That leaves us with the third day, which means Porter Alexander's ineffective artillery barrage and the near-annihilation of an entire Confederate division in Pickett's Charge.  Again, instead of recognizing the tremendous risk in another attack and undertaking a strategic retreat to prepare for an attack on ground of Lee's own choosing (as urged by Longstreet), Lee chose again to attack, and the failure was catastrophic to the Confederacy's cause.  (I don't think you can insulate Lee from this decision.  It was decisive, it was disastrous, and it was entirely his.  If you like, you can blame faulty Confederate intelligence saying that the Union artillery was largely knocked out in the center, feeding the belief that Alexander's artillery barrage finished the job, or you can blame Alexander for often overshooting the Union lines. Or you can credit Union Brig. Gen. Henry Hunt for gradually letting his cannons cease fire to give the impression that they were being destroyed, only to bring them to bear in full force when Pickett's division led Longstreet's corps toward Cemetery Ridge.  Or you can credit Meade for fortifying the center of his lines, correctly anticipating that due to failed attacks on the flanks the day before, and how closely the Confederates came to breaking the center of the lines, Lee would charge, if at all, in the center.  You can call Longstreet's and Pickett's blame of Lee for ordering the charge Monday morning quarterbacking.  But you cannot reasonably argue that ordering that charge on that day under those circumstances was a good tactical decision.)

Lee was lucky that Meade failed to order an attack on July 4 or otherwise pursue the Confederates.  Had he done so, the war would have ended sooner.  Lee's reputation certainly fed into Meade's caution there, but so did the fact that Meade was disinclined to abandon the heights that had just proved so valuable.  Lee was certainly a brilliant tactician and a beloved leader of men.  But Gettysburg was not his finest hour.  The only arguable success he achieved at Gettysburg--keeping the Army of Northern Virginia from total destruction or surrender--was due less to his careful planning of the retreat and more due to Meade's hesitation.  Lincoln's assessment in the letter leftcoast cited was spot-on: the victory at Gettysburg was tremendous, and Meade's failure to complete that victory by pursuing the Confederates harder was a missed "golden opportunity" that had the consequence of extending the war for two more bloody years.  If we think of the successful retreat as a battle in and of itself, then Lee only won it because Meade gave it away. 

Ultimately, to say that we should venerate Lee because he "almost" won at Gettysburg fails to recognize the sound tactical decisions and individual acts of heroism that, to our country's great fortune, ensured that he didn't. 

[ColoradoTree]

OT warning.  We have strayed off track, and I am not about to help matters.

"Union apologists."  Wow.  Apparently a phrase that did not die out during Reconstruction. 

Oasis, I don't think anyone here is questioning Lee's prowess as a strategist--indeed, he outmaneuvered Union commanders repeatedly throughout 1862 as you note--or his near-mythical status to Confederate soldiers as a leader of men.  And I certainly don't claim that Meade was the better general, particularly since his failure to follow up the success at Gettysburg with an active pursuit of Lee was a monumental mistake.  But let's not pretend that Gettysburg was Lee's crowning moment of glory.  Setting aside the wisdom of lobbying Jefferson Davis to invade the North rather than fortify Vicksburg and other Confederate holdings, this was hardly his greatest battle. 

On the first day, Lee failed to have Ewell press forward, which allowed the Union to entrench on the heights.  (If you want to insulate Lee from blame in this, you can blame Ewell for not taking Cemetery Hill, but Lee's order was to take the hill "if practicable" and left wiggle room that proved crucial.  You can also credit Howard and Hancock for entrenching on Cemetery Hill, if you like, which fed Ewell's (likely erroneous) conclusion that an assault wasn't practicable.  Lee may have "anticipated the move" that the North would entrench on the heights, but anticipation without execution isn't terribly useful.  You can also credit Meade, Strong Vincent, and others for setting up the left flank all the way to Little Round Top.)  That failure set the stage for the rest of the failures to come. 

On the second day, Lee doubled down on that failure by attempting an assault up the heights--against Longstreet's advice to avoid any attack at all, let alone one up the heights--which was spectacularly costly to his army.  (Again, if you want to insulate Lee from blame in this, you can blame Jeb Stuart for poor intelligence on Union positions, or you can--as many Southerners did--blame Longstreet for daring question the great Robert E. Lee.  Or, you can credit Sickles for defending the Wheatfield to the last, effectively sacrificing the III Corps to preserve that position.  Or Strong Vincent for stretching the flank to cover Little Round Top.  Or Col. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain for ordering a downhill bayonet charge when the 20th Maine was effectively out of ammunition.)  At the same time, while the Confederates may have been on the "cusp" of winning when Anderson's division of Hill's corps nearly broke through the Union lines on Cemetery Ridge, but the key phrase there is "nearly."  (If you want to insulate Lee from blame in this, I suppose you could blame Cadmus Wilcox for not pressing his brigade of Alabamians harder at Plum Run.  That seems uncharitable, however, when the 1st Minnesota, one measly, already heavily damaged regiment of 262 men, charged Wilcox's men--an entire brigade --with bayonets fixed and held that line at the expense of their regiment.  That is not an exaggeration, as the 1st Minnesota suffered 82% casualties in an estimated 10 minutes of fighting.  You could also credit Hancock for filling that gap with the 1st Minnesota, and buying time for the Union to fortify the position.  As a native Minnesotan, however, I choose to honor Col. Colvill and his men, who knew they were marching to their deaths but marched anyway--and on the double-quick.) 

That leaves us with the third day, which means Porter Alexander's ineffective artillery barrage and the near-annihilation of an entire Confederate division in Pickett's Charge.  Again, instead of recognizing the tremendous risk in another attack and undertaking a strategic retreat to prepare for an attack on ground of Lee's own choosing (as urged by Longstreet), Lee chose again to attack, and the failure was catastrophic to the Confederacy's cause.  (I don't think you can insulate Lee from this decision.  It was decisive, it was disastrous, and it was entirely his.  If you like, you can blame faulty Confederate intelligence saying that the Union artillery was largely knocked out in the center, feeding the belief that Alexander's artillery barrage finished the job, or you can blame Alexander for often overshooting the Union lines. Or you can credit Union Brig. Gen. Henry Hunt for gradually letting his cannons cease fire to give the impression that they were being destroyed, only to bring them to bear in full force when Pickett's division led Longstreet's corps toward Cemetery Ridge.  Or you can credit Meade for fortifying the center of his lines, correctly anticipating that due to failed attacks on the flanks the day before, and how closely the Confederates came to breaking the center of the lines, Lee would charge, if at all, in the center.  You can call Longstreet's and Pickett's blame of Lee for ordering the charge Monday morning quarterbacking.  But you cannot reasonably argue that ordering that charge on that day under those circumstances was a good tactical decision.)

Lee was lucky that Meade failed to order an attack on July 4 or otherwise pursue the Confederates.  Had he done so, the war would have ended sooner.  Lee's reputation certainly fed into Meade's caution there, but so did the fact that Meade was disinclined to abandon the heights that had just proved so valuable.  Lee was certainly a brilliant tactician and a beloved leader of men.  But Gettysburg was not his finest hour.  The only arguable success he achieved at Gettysburg--keeping the Army of Northern Virginia from total destruction or surrender--was due less to his careful planning of the retreat and more due to Meade's hesitation.  Lincoln's assessment in the letter leftcoast cited was spot-on: the victory at Gettysburg was tremendous, and Meade's failure to complete that victory by pursuing the Confederates harder was a missed "golden opportunity" that had the consequence of extending the war for two more bloody years.  If we think of the successful retreat as a battle in and of itself, then Lee only won it because Meade gave it away. 

Ultimately, to say that we should venerate Lee because he "almost" won at Gettysburg fails to recognize the sound tactical decisions and individual acts of heroism that, to our country's great fortune, ensured that he didn't.