09-24-2017, 12:28 PM
This is covered in another thread, but it's an interesting sequence of events. I think the decision tree is as follows:
On 4th and 1 the options were a 50 yard FG attempt (which Shaw perceived a being highly makeable) or going for it. If Stanford goes for it and makes it we are still probably 30 yards from the end zone, meaning the most likely outcome of the drive is another FG attempt (although as it turns out the drive resulted in a TD).
Once it's 4th and 6 the 55 yard FG is presumably off the table if Shaw perceived it to be outside Toner's range. If Stanford goes for it and makes it they are back in high probability FG range with a chance at a TD. If they punt then on average they will only net 20-25 yards. Given how UCLA/Rosen was moving the ball the urgency to put more points on the board outweighed a marginal gain in field position.
The sequence is unusual but if you assign probabilities to each outcome at each stage I think the logic is sound.
On 4th and 1 the options were a 50 yard FG attempt (which Shaw perceived a being highly makeable) or going for it. If Stanford goes for it and makes it we are still probably 30 yards from the end zone, meaning the most likely outcome of the drive is another FG attempt (although as it turns out the drive resulted in a TD).
Once it's 4th and 6 the 55 yard FG is presumably off the table if Shaw perceived it to be outside Toner's range. If Stanford goes for it and makes it they are back in high probability FG range with a chance at a TD. If they punt then on average they will only net 20-25 yards. Given how UCLA/Rosen was moving the ball the urgency to put more points on the board outweighed a marginal gain in field position.
The sequence is unusual but if you assign probabilities to each outcome at each stage I think the logic is sound.