[hayaka]

This is covered in another thread, but it's an interesting sequence of events. I think the decision tree is as follows:

On 4th and 1 the options were a 50 yard FG attempt (which Shaw perceived a being highly makeable) or going for it. If Stanford goes for it and makes it we are still probably 30 yards from the end zone, meaning the most likely outcome of the drive is another FG attempt (although as it turns out the drive resulted in a TD).

Once it's 4th and 6 the 55 yard FG is presumably off the table if Shaw perceived it to be outside Toner's range. If Stanford goes for it and makes it they are back in high probability FG range with a chance at a TD. If they punt then on average they will only net 20-25 yards. Given how UCLA/Rosen was moving the ball the urgency to put more points on the board outweighed a marginal gain in field position.

The sequence is unusual but if you assign probabilities to each outcome at each stage I think the logic is sound.

It is only sound if you accept the initial premise that Toner is likely to make a 50 yard FG.  He has never kicked one that far, at least not at Stanford.  I frankly thought the decision was bizarre.  It is very hard for me to believe that the probabilities of Toner kicking a 50 yarder were higher than converting a 4th and one, especially given how well we were moving the ball (with Scarlett on short yardage plays) and how poor is UCLA's run defense. There is also the advantage of keeping the drive alive and continuing to wear down UCLA's D.

The decision made no sense to me, all the way around, but then, kicking the FG against SDSU made no sense to me either.  At least that one was a chip shot FG however, well within Toner's range. 

[hayaka]

This is covered in another thread, but it's an interesting sequence of events. I think the decision tree is as follows:

On 4th and 1 the options were a 50 yard FG attempt (which Shaw perceived a being highly makeable) or going for it. If Stanford goes for it and makes it we are still probably 30 yards from the end zone, meaning the most likely outcome of the drive is another FG attempt (although as it turns out the drive resulted in a TD).

Once it's 4th and 6 the 55 yard FG is presumably off the table if Shaw perceived it to be outside Toner's range. If Stanford goes for it and makes it they are back in high probability FG range with a chance at a TD. If they punt then on average they will only net 20-25 yards. Given how UCLA/Rosen was moving the ball the urgency to put more points on the board outweighed a marginal gain in field position.

The sequence is unusual but if you assign probabilities to each outcome at each stage I think the logic is sound.

It is only sound if you accept the initial premise that Toner is likely to make a 50 yard FG.  He has never kicked one that far, at least not at Stanford.  I frankly thought the decision was bizarre.  It is very hard for me to believe that the probabilities of Toner kicking a 50 yarder were higher than converting a 4th and one, especially given how well we were moving the ball (with Scarlett on short yardage plays) and how poor is UCLA's run defense. There is also the advantage of keeping the drive alive and continuing to wear down UCLA's D.

The decision made no sense to me, all the way around, but then, kicking the FG against SDSU made no sense to me either.  At least that one was a chip shot FG however, well within Toner's range.