(12-10-2019, 12:35 AM)BostonCard Wrote:(12-09-2019, 04:53 PM)teejers1 Wrote: But more fundamentally, I disagree with the precept that "Stanford should be a power running team." That is so confining. Stanford should be a multi-dimensional offense that is good at passing and running, with the ability to emphasize either if an opponent takes away one option. I know this is simplistic and everyone (I expect) would agree with it, but the ideal offense should NOT be the Gaffney-esque pound and grind; but rather, the offenses under Willingham/Diedrick in the Rose Bowl and Seattle Bowl seasons. Those were pro-style offenses that were prolific in both the passing and running games. I'd dust off that playbook and start implementing it - of course, you need to have someone familiar with it who can help implement it. Calling the man in the booth . . .
I too loved the 1999 (34.1 ppg) and 2001 (35.2 ppg) offenses. At times, they seemed like they were not defensible. And they do seem like a good template for success for a Stanford team, with a few tweaks. For example, the 1999 didn’t make much use of the tight end as a receiver (12 total receptions); I would think an updated version of that offense would take advantage of our ability to recruit pass catching tight ends. But still, an offense with a QB principally under center in an I formation handing off or throwing off of play action is fundamentally a sound way to run an offense. And a 50/50 mix of run and pass (1999 we ran 37 times a game, including sacks, and passed 35) makes sense, though the 2001 team was much more run heavy than you remember (we had 46 carries per game, including sacks and scrambles, versus 30 pass attempts per game, so about 60% runs).
Still the same offensive brain trust that produced those nice years, also produced the 2000 offense. That team, which went 5-6, averaged 23.7 ppg, worse than any Shaw year, bar this one. Yeah, Fasani was injured for part of that year, but Chris Lewis was one of the top QB recruits in the country (and we never had a game with our third string QB looking like a deer in the headlights behind a duct tape and bailing wire offensive line that functioned as an ineffective turn style). My point is not to denigrate the scheme, which I liked then and I still like now (and which isn’t all that different from what Shaw ran with Hogan and Taylor/Gaffney). My point is that no scheme is bulletproof, and if you think the Willingham/Deitrick offense is the model, you will have to acknowledge that it is susceptible to bad seasons too.
BC
There are lots of ways to skin this cat to run a successful offense. I do have my own preferences for style, but mostly I care that Stanford runs something identifiable and logical.
Teejers regularly brings up the Diedrick/Willingham years as a gold standard and a style to return to.
Those were generally good offensive years, and as far as I am concerned perfectly good templates for more great Stanford offenses.
However, I do find the uniquely nostalgic view of those years a little weird because: 1) in many aspects the general offensive strategy was much like several of the earlier Shaw-HC offenses, and 2) while the offense then was fairly good, particularly for two years out of four, it was mainly great in the golden haze of memory and in comparison to the awfulness that surrounded it (Dana Bible led frustrating offenses before, the Teevens disaster afterwards).
Diedrick was coordinator for 1998-2001 seasons (then for three years at und).
The 1998 and 2000 offenses had some strengths, but some serious issues (couldn't run in 98, couldn't pass consistently in 2000).
1998 = 23.7 ppg, 395 ypg, 5.06 ypp. [75 yds rushing per game]
2000 = 23.7 ppg, 376 ypg, 4.94 ypp. [48% completions]
Then the good years
1999 = 34.8 ppg, 467 ypg, 6.48 ypp.
2001 = 35.2 ppg, 451 ypg, 5.91 ypp.
As BC noted, 1999 was far more dependent on the passing game with a far more accurate QB (Husak) than was 2001 (Fasani/Lewis mix).
2001 was a power-run, man-blocking based team. Allen and Carter split time at tailback; Allen faster Carter stronger. Fasani and Lewis had strong arms but were not very accurate, so the team focussed on an attacking, downfield passing game meant to make big plays.
2001
Run/Pass 61/39
Run: 4.35 yds/rush
Pass: 15.7 yds/completion, 8.3 yds/attempt.
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A key difference between 2001 and say ... 2013 (to pick the Gaffney year) was that by 2013 we were intentionally playing slow, running the play clock down most every play (which is the main reason that Stanford is always at the top of time of possession - somehow not mentioned above). But, otherwise there were a lot of similarities. Hogan worked on his downfield passing game after mostly throwing short stuff in his 1/2 season in 2012. This was the year Gaffney was the dominant RB.
2013 = 32.3 ppg, 405.4 ypg, 6.34 ypp,
Run/Pass 65/35
Run: 4.98 yds/rush
Pass: 14.6 yds/completions, 8.91 yds/att
Mostly 2001 and 2013 were very similar.
2013 was possibly a little less explosive but more efficient, and in addition in 2013 Stanford did the slow-the-game-down thing that drives many nuts (also sat on leads in the fourth quarter much more), but the overall offensive idea was a power run game, 60+% run plays, throw the ball downfield - particularly looking for big plays when the defense stacked the box.
[Note: 2013 was not a particularly great offense with respect to the Shaw HC years. 2011 and 2015 were much better, and a few others were similar. The issue for the post is strategy/style.]
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Another point I find interesting/weird is that at the time of Willingham's departure, Stanford fans were generally quite pleased with Diedrick and felt Kent Baer was an incompetent defensive coordinator ruining some all-time great Stanford offenses. At und, the fandom desperately wanted to run Diedrick out of town but felt Baer was the one competent coach they might keep on (Baer was named interim HC upon the firing of Willingham).
Presumably we really saw something more about circumstances than sudden changes in the basic competencies of the two guys.