6. Nonetheless, fans will want some insight into how he's done it. The picture is more complex (and encouraging) than the tale of offensive wizardry some tell. Sacramento State's rocket ship trajectory has been fueled by galactic improvements on both sides of the ball. On offense, in the eight years prior to Taylor Sacramento State averaged 28.35 points per game and the median season scoring offense averages were 24.3 and 27.2; in his three years his scoring offense average has been 36.3 and his median has been 35.7. On defense, in the eight years prior to Taylor Sacramento State averaged giving up 32.5 points per game and the median scoring defense averages were 33.2 and 33.5; in his three years both his scoring defense average and his median has been 22.5. In other words, he's been good for about a 20 point swing in median outcomes and, crucially, the improvement is about evenly divided between offense and defense. Relative to other teams in FCS, his median ranks have been #15 on offense and #27 on defense. In other words, defense has been a bigger part of the story than many understand. He really made the whole team much better.
7. PFF grades provide another way to assess what he's accomplished. The year before he arrived the Hornets had major weaknesses across the board (passing, pass blocking, receiving, run blocking, tackling, and pass rush all sub-60) and zero major strengths (nothing above 80). In his very first year he narrowed the number of weaknesses considerably (just coverage) and added some signature strengths (pass blocking and run defense). In his second season (post pandemic, so third year) he had removed weaknesses entirely from the equation and spread the strengths even further (passing, running, run defense, coverage). This past season running, run defense, and coverage all remained signature strengths and the Hornets continued to have no glaring weaknesses. The things that jump out are the quickness and totality of the turnaround and the consistent excellence of the running (last two years) and run defense (every year) grades. As I am especially desperate to see Stanford achieve better run defense than we've seen in recent years, that insight from PFF especially interests me. In 2022, Sacramento State is #45 in rush defense and #43 in yards per carry allowed. In 2021 they were #25 and #38 in those categories respectively. In 2019 it was #29 and #19. In other words, conventional stats back PFF up that run defense was a consistent strength.
8. Others have posted about style of play based on more extensive film analysis of Sacramento State than I've been able to do, so I don't have much to add on the way he runs a two quarterback offense (the last two years, with his first season being a sole superstar QB), schemes players open, etc. I'll just make some observations about balance and tempo. Over the three seasons, the run/pass balance went from 47.3/52.7 in 2019 to 50.5/49.5 in 2021 to 57.5/42.5 in 2022. A few things stand out here. First, he achieved remarkable balance in two of the three years. Second, the progression has been continuously toward more of an emphasis on run plays. This is definitely not an air raid offense in the sense many fans think about it. They run a lot. In fact, they run a lot more than Stanford does. Stanford just completed its fifth straight season of running 47.5 percent of the time or less. Sacramento State clearly runs a lot more than Stanford. Of course, a lot of that owes to Hornet dominance and Cardinal haplessness. Winning teams almost always get to run more given the scoring margins. The Hornets had six games this year they won by 20+ points. That's a lot of garbage time. If you compare the Hornets' balance to Stanford in the McCaffrey/Love days, Sacramento State passes more than we did (65.7 percent run in 2015, 63.1 percent in 2016, and 56.9 percent in 2017). My takeaway is that Taylor's inclination probably is more pass happy than Stanford in our glory years but less than Stanford 2018-2022 (potentially much less but want to recognize comparison is fraught because the Stanford teams have been so much worse).
9. The difference between Shaw and Taylor when it comes to tempo is night and day. In Taylor's three seasons he had more than 73.9 plays per game every year and 76.5 was the median. By comparison, Stanford this past season was 68.7 and Shaw's median over 12 years was 66. The slowest tempo offense Taylor has ever coached would be the fastest Shaw has ever coached. This coaching change amounts to Stanford fans being able to see approximately ten more plays of offense every game. This night and day disparity is all the more remarkable when you consider Sacramento State's dominance, which means garbage time and run plays that drain clock. Quite clear we aren't going to see the torpid pace of Shawfense any more. Praise the lord. I don't need to see no huddle offense every play, but I do want players to get rhythm and fans to be able to see football. All things being equal (and I don't think they are), I'd rather watch 77 plays than 66.
10. In important respects, this change in tempo is merely symptomatic of a larger issue: Taylor reportedly (even explicitly according to some quotes) disdains playbooks and complexity. He achieves his offensive greatness not by trying to out-complexify opponents. That should mean a lot less of the Shawfense signature larded up playcalls, comical Denny's menu playsheet, molasses-like sequences from the huddle to snap, and so forth. Just aesthetically this will be quite welcome, but this also appeals to me as somebody who has criticized needless, self-important, overly intellectual complexity in Stanford football. The proof will be in the pudding, but Taylor's pudding has been tastier than Shaw's too. Excited for this change.
11. In terms of defensive scheme, the participation reports in the 2022 box scores indicate a 4-2-5 base defense. There was one game that started in a 3-3-5 defense. 4-2-5 is a popular defense in college football and in many respects what Stanford shifted to in 2022, so I don't see this being a discontinuity for Stanford's scheme/personnel. But the big question with regard to defensive scheme, of course, is who actually coaches the 2023 Stanford defense. More on that later.
7. PFF grades provide another way to assess what he's accomplished. The year before he arrived the Hornets had major weaknesses across the board (passing, pass blocking, receiving, run blocking, tackling, and pass rush all sub-60) and zero major strengths (nothing above 80). In his very first year he narrowed the number of weaknesses considerably (just coverage) and added some signature strengths (pass blocking and run defense). In his second season (post pandemic, so third year) he had removed weaknesses entirely from the equation and spread the strengths even further (passing, running, run defense, coverage). This past season running, run defense, and coverage all remained signature strengths and the Hornets continued to have no glaring weaknesses. The things that jump out are the quickness and totality of the turnaround and the consistent excellence of the running (last two years) and run defense (every year) grades. As I am especially desperate to see Stanford achieve better run defense than we've seen in recent years, that insight from PFF especially interests me. In 2022, Sacramento State is #45 in rush defense and #43 in yards per carry allowed. In 2021 they were #25 and #38 in those categories respectively. In 2019 it was #29 and #19. In other words, conventional stats back PFF up that run defense was a consistent strength.
8. Others have posted about style of play based on more extensive film analysis of Sacramento State than I've been able to do, so I don't have much to add on the way he runs a two quarterback offense (the last two years, with his first season being a sole superstar QB), schemes players open, etc. I'll just make some observations about balance and tempo. Over the three seasons, the run/pass balance went from 47.3/52.7 in 2019 to 50.5/49.5 in 2021 to 57.5/42.5 in 2022. A few things stand out here. First, he achieved remarkable balance in two of the three years. Second, the progression has been continuously toward more of an emphasis on run plays. This is definitely not an air raid offense in the sense many fans think about it. They run a lot. In fact, they run a lot more than Stanford does. Stanford just completed its fifth straight season of running 47.5 percent of the time or less. Sacramento State clearly runs a lot more than Stanford. Of course, a lot of that owes to Hornet dominance and Cardinal haplessness. Winning teams almost always get to run more given the scoring margins. The Hornets had six games this year they won by 20+ points. That's a lot of garbage time. If you compare the Hornets' balance to Stanford in the McCaffrey/Love days, Sacramento State passes more than we did (65.7 percent run in 2015, 63.1 percent in 2016, and 56.9 percent in 2017). My takeaway is that Taylor's inclination probably is more pass happy than Stanford in our glory years but less than Stanford 2018-2022 (potentially much less but want to recognize comparison is fraught because the Stanford teams have been so much worse).
9. The difference between Shaw and Taylor when it comes to tempo is night and day. In Taylor's three seasons he had more than 73.9 plays per game every year and 76.5 was the median. By comparison, Stanford this past season was 68.7 and Shaw's median over 12 years was 66. The slowest tempo offense Taylor has ever coached would be the fastest Shaw has ever coached. This coaching change amounts to Stanford fans being able to see approximately ten more plays of offense every game. This night and day disparity is all the more remarkable when you consider Sacramento State's dominance, which means garbage time and run plays that drain clock. Quite clear we aren't going to see the torpid pace of Shawfense any more. Praise the lord. I don't need to see no huddle offense every play, but I do want players to get rhythm and fans to be able to see football. All things being equal (and I don't think they are), I'd rather watch 77 plays than 66.
10. In important respects, this change in tempo is merely symptomatic of a larger issue: Taylor reportedly (even explicitly according to some quotes) disdains playbooks and complexity. He achieves his offensive greatness not by trying to out-complexify opponents. That should mean a lot less of the Shawfense signature larded up playcalls, comical Denny's menu playsheet, molasses-like sequences from the huddle to snap, and so forth. Just aesthetically this will be quite welcome, but this also appeals to me as somebody who has criticized needless, self-important, overly intellectual complexity in Stanford football. The proof will be in the pudding, but Taylor's pudding has been tastier than Shaw's too. Excited for this change.
11. In terms of defensive scheme, the participation reports in the 2022 box scores indicate a 4-2-5 base defense. There was one game that started in a 3-3-5 defense. 4-2-5 is a popular defense in college football and in many respects what Stanford shifted to in 2022, so I don't see this being a discontinuity for Stanford's scheme/personnel. But the big question with regard to defensive scheme, of course, is who actually coaches the 2023 Stanford defense. More on that later.