[lex24]

CT Card nails it. Again. Good analysis.

On the season, Stanford threw 444 passes, the third-most in the Pac-12, and ran it 346 times, the second fewest.

Hat tip to RJ over at the Bootleg (I think the article is not paywalled)

While the exact numbers are slightly different, the ordinal rankings are the same as the year before: Stanford threw the third most passes (424) and the second fewest runs (384) - though in one more game.

Shawball is beautiful when executed properly (Oregon 2013).  When it is failing, it is the most disheartening spectacle in college football.

I agree that Shaw's offense is especially dependent on execution, and when the execution is not there, it falls especially flat.  That being said, to a lesser or greater extent, all schemes are like that.  I mean, no matter how great your scheme is, you still need the OL to block, the QB to deliver the ball to the receiver who needs to catch it, and the running back to hit the right hole and hold onto the ball.

BC

Yes, agree.  My point is that we clearly don't have the personnel right now to do what Shaw has been successful at in the past.  Out of desperation (evidently, pass-blocking is easier than well-choreographed run-blocking), we passed instead of running into futility.  A trade-off that probably made sense given the threadbare nature of the O-line.  For my part, I would love to see a Toby Gerhart reincarnation plow forward for 4 and 5 yards a pop relentlessly against an overmatched defensive front-line until one of the defenders threatens to "sub himself out".  That's the Intellectual Brutality this current roster simply doesn't have. 

I am very concerned that Stanford's offense has become ... nothing in particular.

By run/pass mix it seems Stanford is trying to become WSU, except without a passing game that is designed to cover all the things you want to do in an offense. WSU does attack downfield from time to time, but they have a ton of short, safe routes that essentially take the place of a typical run game. Stanford has a few, but its not a feature of the pass game.

An identity, some identity, is extremely helpful in building a program. I suspect particularly so at Stanford which will likely always have slower roster turnover and more issues of depth than most. One gets good at things by practicing them for years, i.e. working on your identity. A team is able to target the right type of talent if they know what they are going to try to do. A team is able to attract the right type of talent if they talent knows what the teams is trying to do. etc.

In past troubled years for the offense, like 2012, I could still see what Stanford was trying to do even if it wasn't succeeding at that.
In 2014 they tried to change up to a much higher volume, air raid-lite sort of offense and it didn't fit the personnel. They went back (with some stumbles, and switching to a more zone-based scheme) as McCaffrey made it abundantly clear he needed to be the feature.
In 2018 when we abandoned the run, it seemed to be the only option under the circumstances. We couldn't run block and Love was never healthy. Costello could throw and there were some good receivers (JJAW, Irwin, Smith). Unlike in 2014, it probably was the best option in the moment, but I had hoped it was a temporary adjustment until the foundation could be relaid.
2019 seems to have indicated no real intent to go back to the old foundation of a bruising, north-south run game. At least at times Stanford seemed to have some effectiveness in the run game, but outside of the UW game did not use it much. [Examples, versus UCF, UA and Colorado Stanford averaged over 5 yds/carry, but also only averaged 26 carries per game some of which were sacks and scrambles.] This despite the fact that we were suffering some significant QB issues.


Under the circumstances, I doubt that there was any scheme that would have made 2019 a very good offense. And perhaps it is true that when things are struggling it is hard to perceive an underlying plan even if there is one. Nonetheless, I am left to fear that there currently is no particular plan. Whatever-might-work-at-the-moment is not a long term building strategy.

[lex24]

CT Card nails it. Again. Good analysis.

On the season, Stanford threw 444 passes, the third-most in the Pac-12, and ran it 346 times, the second fewest.

Hat tip to RJ over at the Bootleg (I think the article is not paywalled)

While the exact numbers are slightly different, the ordinal rankings are the same as the year before: Stanford threw the third most passes (424) and the second fewest runs (384) - though in one more game.

Shawball is beautiful when executed properly (Oregon 2013).  When it is failing, it is the most disheartening spectacle in college football.

I agree that Shaw's offense is especially dependent on execution, and when the execution is not there, it falls especially flat.  That being said, to a lesser or greater extent, all schemes are like that.  I mean, no matter how great your scheme is, you still need the OL to block, the QB to deliver the ball to the receiver who needs to catch it, and the running back to hit the right hole and hold onto the ball.

BC

Yes, agree.  My point is that we clearly don't have the personnel right now to do what Shaw has been successful at in the past.  Out of desperation (evidently, pass-blocking is easier than well-choreographed run-blocking), we passed instead of running into futility.  A trade-off that probably made sense given the threadbare nature of the O-line.  For my part, I would love to see a Toby Gerhart reincarnation plow forward for 4 and 5 yards a pop relentlessly against an overmatched defensive front-line until one of the defenders threatens to "sub himself out".  That's the Intellectual Brutality this current roster simply doesn't have. 

I am very concerned that Stanford's offense has become ... nothing in particular.

By run/pass mix it seems Stanford is trying to become WSU, except without a passing game that is designed to cover all the things you want to do in an offense. WSU does attack downfield from time to time, but they have a ton of short, safe routes that essentially take the place of a typical run game. Stanford has a few, but its not a feature of the pass game.

An identity, some identity, is extremely helpful in building a program. I suspect particularly so at Stanford which will likely always have slower roster turnover and more issues of depth than most. One gets good at things by practicing them for years, i.e. working on your identity. A team is able to target the right type of talent if they know what they are going to try to do. A team is able to attract the right type of talent if they talent knows what the teams is trying to do. etc.

In past troubled years for the offense, like 2012, I could still see what Stanford was trying to do even if it wasn't succeeding at that.
In 2014 they tried to change up to a much higher volume, air raid-lite sort of offense and it didn't fit the personnel. They went back (with some stumbles, and switching to a more zone-based scheme) as McCaffrey made it abundantly clear he needed to be the feature.
In 2018 when we abandoned the run, it seemed to be the only option under the circumstances. We couldn't run block and Love was never healthy. Costello could throw and there were some good receivers (JJAW, Irwin, Smith). Unlike in 2014, it probably was the best option in the moment, but I had hoped it was a temporary adjustment until the foundation could be relaid.
2019 seems to have indicated no real intent to go back to the old foundation of a bruising, north-south run game. At least at times Stanford seemed to have some effectiveness in the run game, but outside of the UW game did not use it much. [Examples, versus UCF, UA and Colorado Stanford averaged over 5 yds/carry, but also only averaged 26 carries per game some of which were sacks and scrambles.] This despite the fact that we were suffering some significant QB issues.


Under the circumstances, I doubt that there was any scheme that would have made 2019 a very good offense. And perhaps it is true that when things are struggling it is hard to perceive an underlying plan even if there is one. Nonetheless, I am left to fear that there currently is no particular plan. Whatever-might-work-at-the-moment is not a long term building strategy.

[Goose]

"Shawball" also only works when you're not down two scores.

+1. You can keep running when down two scores only if your defense can play lights out and there is enough time left in the game. This year, the defense essentially never could do that, so passing was the only way to go.

---

Still a coaching issue. The players should, by the end of the season, be fluent enough with the scheme that those mix-ups shouldn’t happen.  While the scheme may have been sound, the athletes weren’t accurately prepared to execute it, and that’s on the coaches.

BC

No, those mix-ups shouldn't happen. I still can't see how you conclude it is for sure a coaching issue though. It may be, but it also could be the players are just not mentally tough enough and got confused. Again, one could say the coaches recruited the wrong guys, but that is like saying that by definition everything is the coach's fault because they are in "control". I would feel lots better about saying it is a "coaching issue" if I could had at least a vague idea about what the coach is doing wrong (or where the players screwed up, OTOH). I don't have enough insight to have that, and without that, I can only conclude it was messed up and I don't know why. If you have a more specific guess at what the defensive coaches are/are not doing incorrectly, I am all ears.

[Goose]

"Shawball" also only works when you're not down two scores.

+1. You can keep running when down two scores only if your defense can play lights out and there is enough time left in the game. This year, the defense essentially never could do that, so passing was the only way to go.

---

Still a coaching issue. The players should, by the end of the season, be fluent enough with the scheme that those mix-ups shouldn’t happen.  While the scheme may have been sound, the athletes weren’t accurately prepared to execute it, and that’s on the coaches.

BC

No, those mix-ups shouldn't happen. I still can't see how you conclude it is for sure a coaching issue though. It may be, but it also could be the players are just not mentally tough enough and got confused. Again, one could say the coaches recruited the wrong guys, but that is like saying that by definition everything is the coach's fault because they are in "control". I would feel lots better about saying it is a "coaching issue" if I could had at least a vague idea about what the coach is doing wrong (or where the players screwed up, OTOH). I don't have enough insight to have that, and without that, I can only conclude it was messed up and I don't know why. If you have a more specific guess at what the defensive coaches are/are not doing incorrectly, I am all ears.

[BostonCard]

But more fundamentally, I disagree with the precept that "Stanford should be a power running team."  That is so confining.  Stanford should be a multi-dimensional offense that is good at passing and running, with the ability to emphasize either if an opponent takes away one option.  I know this is simplistic and everyone (I expect) would agree with it, but the ideal offense should NOT be the Gaffney-esque pound and grind; but rather, the offenses under Willingham/Diedrick in the Rose Bowl and Seattle Bowl seasons.  Those were pro-style offenses that were prolific in both the passing and running games.  I'd dust off that playbook and start implementing it - of course, you need to have someone familiar with it who can help implement it.  Calling the man in the booth . . .

I too loved the 1999 (34.1 ppg) and 2001 (35.2 ppg) offenses.  At times, they seemed like they were not defensible. And they do seem like a good template for success for a Stanford team, with a few tweaks. For example, the 1999 didn’t make much use of the tight end as a receiver (12 total receptions); I would think an updated version of that offense would take advantage of our ability to recruit pass catching tight ends.  But still, an offense with a QB principally under center in an I formation handing off or throwing off of play action is fundamentally a sound way to run an offense. And a 50/50 mix of run and pass (1999 we ran 37 times a game, including sacks, and passed 35) makes sense, though the 2001 team was much more run heavy than you remember (we had 46 carries per game, including sacks and scrambles, versus 30 pass attempts per game, so about 60% runs).

Still the same offensive brain trust that produced those nice years, also produced the 2000 offense. That team, which went 5-6, averaged 23.7 ppg, worse than any Shaw year, bar this one.  Yeah, Fasani was injured for part of that year, but Chris Lewis was one of the top QB recruits in the country (and we never had a game with our third string QB looking like a deer in the headlights behind a duct tape and bailing wire offensive line that functioned as an ineffective turn style). My point is not to denigrate the scheme, which I liked then and I still like now (and which isn’t all that different from what Shaw ran with Hogan and Taylor/Gaffney). My point is that no scheme is bulletproof, and if you think the Willingham/Deitrick offense is the model, you will have to acknowledge that it is susceptible to bad seasons too.

BC

[BostonCard]

But more fundamentally, I disagree with the precept that "Stanford should be a power running team."  That is so confining.  Stanford should be a multi-dimensional offense that is good at passing and running, with the ability to emphasize either if an opponent takes away one option.  I know this is simplistic and everyone (I expect) would agree with it, but the ideal offense should NOT be the Gaffney-esque pound and grind; but rather, the offenses under Willingham/Diedrick in the Rose Bowl and Seattle Bowl seasons.  Those were pro-style offenses that were prolific in both the passing and running games.  I'd dust off that playbook and start implementing it - of course, you need to have someone familiar with it who can help implement it.  Calling the man in the booth . . .

I too loved the 1999 (34.1 ppg) and 2001 (35.2 ppg) offenses.  At times, they seemed like they were not defensible. And they do seem like a good template for success for a Stanford team, with a few tweaks. For example, the 1999 didn’t make much use of the tight end as a receiver (12 total receptions); I would think an updated version of that offense would take advantage of our ability to recruit pass catching tight ends.  But still, an offense with a QB principally under center in an I formation handing off or throwing off of play action is fundamentally a sound way to run an offense. And a 50/50 mix of run and pass (1999 we ran 37 times a game, including sacks, and passed 35) makes sense, though the 2001 team was much more run heavy than you remember (we had 46 carries per game, including sacks and scrambles, versus 30 pass attempts per game, so about 60% runs).

Still the same offensive brain trust that produced those nice years, also produced the 2000 offense. That team, which went 5-6, averaged 23.7 ppg, worse than any Shaw year, bar this one.  Yeah, Fasani was injured for part of that year, but Chris Lewis was one of the top QB recruits in the country (and we never had a game with our third string QB looking like a deer in the headlights behind a duct tape and bailing wire offensive line that functioned as an ineffective turn style). My point is not to denigrate the scheme, which I liked then and I still like now (and which isn’t all that different from what Shaw ran with Hogan and Taylor/Gaffney). My point is that no scheme is bulletproof, and if you think the Willingham/Deitrick offense is the model, you will have to acknowledge that it is susceptible to bad seasons too.

BC

[CTcard]

But more fundamentally, I disagree with the precept that "Stanford should be a power running team."  That is so confining.  Stanford should be a multi-dimensional offense that is good at passing and running, with the ability to emphasize either if an opponent takes away one option.  I know this is simplistic and everyone (I expect) would agree with it, but the ideal offense should NOT be the Gaffney-esque pound and grind; but rather, the offenses under Willingham/Diedrick in the Rose Bowl and Seattle Bowl seasons.  Those were pro-style offenses that were prolific in both the passing and running games.  I'd dust off that playbook and start implementing it - of course, you need to have someone familiar with it who can help implement it.  Calling the man in the booth . . .

I too loved the 1999 (34.1 ppg) and 2001 (35.2 ppg) offenses.  At times, they seemed like they were not defensible. And they do seem like a good template for success for a Stanford team, with a few tweaks. For example, the 1999 didn’t make much use of the tight end as a receiver (12 total receptions); I would think an updated version of that offense would take advantage of our ability to recruit pass catching tight ends.  But still, an offense with a QB principally under center in an I formation handing off or throwing off of play action is fundamentally a sound way to run an offense. And a 50/50 mix of run and pass (1999 we ran 37 times a game, including sacks, and passed 35) makes sense, though the 2001 team was much more run heavy than you remember (we had 46 carries per game, including sacks and scrambles, versus 30 pass attempts per game, so about 60% runs).

Still the same offensive brain trust that produced those nice years, also produced the 2000 offense. That team, which went 5-6, averaged 23.7 ppg, worse than any Shaw year, bar this one.  Yeah, Fasani was injured for part of that year, but Chris Lewis was one of the top QB recruits in the country (and we never had a game with our third string QB looking like a deer in the headlights behind a duct tape and bailing wire offensive line that functioned as an ineffective turn style). My point is not to denigrate the scheme, which I liked then and I still like now (and which isn’t all that different from what Shaw ran with Hogan and Taylor/Gaffney). My point is that no scheme is bulletproof, and if you think the Willingham/Deitrick offense is the model, you will have to acknowledge that it is susceptible to bad seasons too.

BC

There are lots of ways to skin this cat to run a successful offense. I do have my own preferences for style, but mostly I care that Stanford runs something identifiable and logical.

Teejers regularly brings up the Diedrick/Willingham years as a gold standard and a style to return to.
Those were generally good offensive years, and as far as I am concerned perfectly good templates for more great Stanford offenses.
However, I do find the uniquely nostalgic view of those years a little weird because: 1) in many aspects the general offensive strategy was much like several of the earlier Shaw-HC offenses, and 2) while the offense then was fairly good, particularly for two years out of four, it was mainly great in the golden haze of memory and in comparison to the awfulness that surrounded it (Dana Bible led frustrating offenses before, the Teevens disaster afterwards).

Diedrick was coordinator for 1998-2001 seasons (then for three years at und).
The 1998 and 2000 offenses had some strengths, but some serious issues (couldn't run in 98, couldn't pass consistently in 2000).
1998 = 23.7 ppg, 395 ypg, 5.06 ypp. [75 yds rushing per game]
2000 = 23.7 ppg, 376 ypg, 4.94 ypp. [48% completions]

Then the good years
1999 = 34.8 ppg, 467 ypg, 6.48 ypp. 
2001 = 35.2 ppg, 451 ypg, 5.91 ypp.

As BC noted, 1999 was far more dependent on the passing game with a far more accurate QB (Husak) than was 2001 (Fasani/Lewis mix).
2001 was a power-run, man-blocking based team. Allen and Carter split time at tailback; Allen faster Carter stronger. Fasani and Lewis had strong arms but were not very accurate, so the team focussed on an attacking, downfield passing game meant to make big plays.
2001
Run/Pass 61/39
Run: 4.35 yds/rush
Pass: 15.7 yds/completion, 8.3 yds/attempt.

---
A key difference between 2001 and say ... 2013 (to pick the Gaffney year) was that by 2013 we were intentionally playing slow, running the play clock down most every play (which is the main reason that Stanford is always at the top of time of possession - somehow not mentioned above). But, otherwise there were a lot of similarities. Hogan worked on his downfield passing game after mostly throwing short stuff in his 1/2 season in 2012. This was the year Gaffney was the dominant RB.

2013 = 32.3 ppg, 405.4 ypg, 6.34 ypp,

Run/Pass 65/35
Run: 4.98 yds/rush
Pass: 14.6 yds/completions, 8.91 yds/att

Mostly 2001 and 2013 were very similar.
2013 was possibly a little less explosive but more efficient, and in addition in 2013 Stanford did the slow-the-game-down thing that drives many nuts (also sat on leads in the fourth quarter much more), but the overall offensive idea was a power run game, 60+% run plays, throw the ball downfield - particularly looking for big plays when the defense stacked the box.

[Note: 2013 was not a particularly great offense with respect to the Shaw HC years. 2011 and 2015 were much better, and a few others were similar. The issue for the post is strategy/style.]

----------
Another point I find interesting/weird is that at the time of Willingham's departure, Stanford fans were generally quite pleased with Diedrick and felt Kent Baer was an incompetent defensive coordinator ruining some all-time great Stanford offenses. At und, the fandom desperately wanted to run Diedrick out of town but felt Baer was the one competent coach they might keep on (Baer was named interim HC upon the firing of Willingham).

Presumably we really saw something more about circumstances than sudden changes in the basic competencies of the two guys.

[CTcard]

But more fundamentally, I disagree with the precept that "Stanford should be a power running team."  That is so confining.  Stanford should be a multi-dimensional offense that is good at passing and running, with the ability to emphasize either if an opponent takes away one option.  I know this is simplistic and everyone (I expect) would agree with it, but the ideal offense should NOT be the Gaffney-esque pound and grind; but rather, the offenses under Willingham/Diedrick in the Rose Bowl and Seattle Bowl seasons.  Those were pro-style offenses that were prolific in both the passing and running games.  I'd dust off that playbook and start implementing it - of course, you need to have someone familiar with it who can help implement it.  Calling the man in the booth . . .

I too loved the 1999 (34.1 ppg) and 2001 (35.2 ppg) offenses.  At times, they seemed like they were not defensible. And they do seem like a good template for success for a Stanford team, with a few tweaks. For example, the 1999 didn’t make much use of the tight end as a receiver (12 total receptions); I would think an updated version of that offense would take advantage of our ability to recruit pass catching tight ends.  But still, an offense with a QB principally under center in an I formation handing off or throwing off of play action is fundamentally a sound way to run an offense. And a 50/50 mix of run and pass (1999 we ran 37 times a game, including sacks, and passed 35) makes sense, though the 2001 team was much more run heavy than you remember (we had 46 carries per game, including sacks and scrambles, versus 30 pass attempts per game, so about 60% runs).

Still the same offensive brain trust that produced those nice years, also produced the 2000 offense. That team, which went 5-6, averaged 23.7 ppg, worse than any Shaw year, bar this one.  Yeah, Fasani was injured for part of that year, but Chris Lewis was one of the top QB recruits in the country (and we never had a game with our third string QB looking like a deer in the headlights behind a duct tape and bailing wire offensive line that functioned as an ineffective turn style). My point is not to denigrate the scheme, which I liked then and I still like now (and which isn’t all that different from what Shaw ran with Hogan and Taylor/Gaffney). My point is that no scheme is bulletproof, and if you think the Willingham/Deitrick offense is the model, you will have to acknowledge that it is susceptible to bad seasons too.

BC

There are lots of ways to skin this cat to run a successful offense. I do have my own preferences for style, but mostly I care that Stanford runs something identifiable and logical.

Teejers regularly brings up the Diedrick/Willingham years as a gold standard and a style to return to.
Those were generally good offensive years, and as far as I am concerned perfectly good templates for more great Stanford offenses.
However, I do find the uniquely nostalgic view of those years a little weird because: 1) in many aspects the general offensive strategy was much like several of the earlier Shaw-HC offenses, and 2) while the offense then was fairly good, particularly for two years out of four, it was mainly great in the golden haze of memory and in comparison to the awfulness that surrounded it (Dana Bible led frustrating offenses before, the Teevens disaster afterwards).

Diedrick was coordinator for 1998-2001 seasons (then for three years at und).
The 1998 and 2000 offenses had some strengths, but some serious issues (couldn't run in 98, couldn't pass consistently in 2000).
1998 = 23.7 ppg, 395 ypg, 5.06 ypp. [75 yds rushing per game]
2000 = 23.7 ppg, 376 ypg, 4.94 ypp. [48% completions]

Then the good years
1999 = 34.8 ppg, 467 ypg, 6.48 ypp. 
2001 = 35.2 ppg, 451 ypg, 5.91 ypp.

As BC noted, 1999 was far more dependent on the passing game with a far more accurate QB (Husak) than was 2001 (Fasani/Lewis mix).
2001 was a power-run, man-blocking based team. Allen and Carter split time at tailback; Allen faster Carter stronger. Fasani and Lewis had strong arms but were not very accurate, so the team focussed on an attacking, downfield passing game meant to make big plays.
2001
Run/Pass 61/39
Run: 4.35 yds/rush
Pass: 15.7 yds/completion, 8.3 yds/attempt.

---
A key difference between 2001 and say ... 2013 (to pick the Gaffney year) was that by 2013 we were intentionally playing slow, running the play clock down most every play (which is the main reason that Stanford is always at the top of time of possession - somehow not mentioned above). But, otherwise there were a lot of similarities. Hogan worked on his downfield passing game after mostly throwing short stuff in his 1/2 season in 2012. This was the year Gaffney was the dominant RB.

2013 = 32.3 ppg, 405.4 ypg, 6.34 ypp,

Run/Pass 65/35
Run: 4.98 yds/rush
Pass: 14.6 yds/completions, 8.91 yds/att

Mostly 2001 and 2013 were very similar.
2013 was possibly a little less explosive but more efficient, and in addition in 2013 Stanford did the slow-the-game-down thing that drives many nuts (also sat on leads in the fourth quarter much more), but the overall offensive idea was a power run game, 60+% run plays, throw the ball downfield - particularly looking for big plays when the defense stacked the box.

[Note: 2013 was not a particularly great offense with respect to the Shaw HC years. 2011 and 2015 were much better, and a few others were similar. The issue for the post is strategy/style.]

----------
Another point I find interesting/weird is that at the time of Willingham's departure, Stanford fans were generally quite pleased with Diedrick and felt Kent Baer was an incompetent defensive coordinator ruining some all-time great Stanford offenses. At und, the fandom desperately wanted to run Diedrick out of town but felt Baer was the one competent coach they might keep on (Baer was named interim HC upon the firing of Willingham).

Presumably we really saw something more about circumstances than sudden changes in the basic competencies of the two guys.

[teejers1]

[Note: 2013 was not a particularly great offense with respect to the Shaw HC years. 2011 and 2015 were much better, and a few others were similar. The issue for the post is strategy/style.]

----------
Another point I find interesting/weird is that at the time of Willingham's departure, Stanford fans were generally quite pleased with Diedrick and felt Kent Baer was an incompetent defensive coordinator ruining some all-time great Stanford offenses. At und, the fandom desperately wanted to run Diedrick out of town but felt Baer was the one competent coach they might keep on (Baer was named interim HC upon the firing of Willingham).

Presumably we really saw something more about circumstances than sudden changes in the basic competencies of the two guys.

My faith in the 1999 and 2001 offenses is also based on my belief that the talent on those rosters does not compare favorably to what Shaw has recruited generally (though things have been shaky lately, including on position distribution, according to the recruitniks).  As for Willingham, there is little question that he fled when faced with his own empty cupboard at OL (and big $$ from ND), which should NEVER happen at Stanford.  And because of that, Buddy was WAY behind the 8-ball when he took over (and we all suffered the consequences).

My lack of faith in Shaw as OC is further animated by my belief that, with the exception of the Iowa Rose Bowl year - when Shaw had a fifth year senior QB (Harbaugh recruit) and an abundance of NFL talent - the offenses have not looked good.  Handing the ball off to Love and hoping he breaks a 65 yarder for a TD is not a good offensive "scheme."  Ditto for "throwing the ball to JJAW and hoping he comes down with it."  The offensive failures of Love's senior year and this past year were so predictable, based on the O's successes the prior year being based on superior individual play vs. a superior offensive scheme that can get the ball to "lesser" players in space.  And I'll ask it again: when is the last time you watched Stanford on O and said "what a brilliant call - way to scheme that guy open!"?  You'd like to see it at least once a game.  We maybe see it once a season.  That's a big problem - there is no creativity at all on the O side of the ball.  

Lastly, and as noted above, it all starts with a sound OL - which should never be a problem for Stanford.  When it is, it typically is the result of recruiting negligence/failure.  So if you start with the baseline of at least a good OL, then you ought to be able to build an offensive scheme at Stanford that allows it to compete in every game.  Just don't think we've seen that much under this regime, and certainly not lately.

[teejers1]

[Note: 2013 was not a particularly great offense with respect to the Shaw HC years. 2011 and 2015 were much better, and a few others were similar. The issue for the post is strategy/style.]

----------
Another point I find interesting/weird is that at the time of Willingham's departure, Stanford fans were generally quite pleased with Diedrick and felt Kent Baer was an incompetent defensive coordinator ruining some all-time great Stanford offenses. At und, the fandom desperately wanted to run Diedrick out of town but felt Baer was the one competent coach they might keep on (Baer was named interim HC upon the firing of Willingham).

Presumably we really saw something more about circumstances than sudden changes in the basic competencies of the two guys.

My faith in the 1999 and 2001 offenses is also based on my belief that the talent on those rosters does not compare favorably to what Shaw has recruited generally (though things have been shaky lately, including on position distribution, according to the recruitniks).  As for Willingham, there is little question that he fled when faced with his own empty cupboard at OL (and big $$ from ND), which should NEVER happen at Stanford.  And because of that, Buddy was WAY behind the 8-ball when he took over (and we all suffered the consequences).

My lack of faith in Shaw as OC is further animated by my belief that, with the exception of the Iowa Rose Bowl year - when Shaw had a fifth year senior QB (Harbaugh recruit) and an abundance of NFL talent - the offenses have not looked good.  Handing the ball off to Love and hoping he breaks a 65 yarder for a TD is not a good offensive "scheme."  Ditto for "throwing the ball to JJAW and hoping he comes down with it."  The offensive failures of Love's senior year and this past year were so predictable, based on the O's successes the prior year being based on superior individual play vs. a superior offensive scheme that can get the ball to "lesser" players in space.  And I'll ask it again: when is the last time you watched Stanford on O and said "what a brilliant call - way to scheme that guy open!"?  You'd like to see it at least once a game.  We maybe see it once a season.  That's a big problem - there is no creativity at all on the O side of the ball.  

Lastly, and as noted above, it all starts with a sound OL - which should never be a problem for Stanford.  When it is, it typically is the result of recruiting negligence/failure.  So if you start with the baseline of at least a good OL, then you ought to be able to build an offensive scheme at Stanford that allows it to compete in every game.  Just don't think we've seen that much under this regime, and certainly not lately.

[BostonCard]

 when is the last time you watched Stanford on O and said "what a brilliant call - way to scheme that guy open!"?

Big Game, Mills hits Donald Stewart for a 40 yard touchdown in which he was wide open.

However, I think philosophically we disagree.  Taking advantage of a mismatch is great offensive scheming, whether it is throwing to a 6'4" receiver defended by a 5'10" DB, a 4.5" 40 TE being covered by a slower linebacker, or a 300 lb pulling guard plowing the playside linebacker, leaving your 220 lb RB one-on-one in space with safety, isn't that what you want?

I'm all for scheming players open when possible.  I am a firm believer in play action passing (and the data supports that play action passes are more efficient than almost any other pass play in the playbook, and, contrary to popular opinion, it doesn't seem to lose efficacy if you "overuse" it).  However, you don't want to have to rely on "scheme" to get you open.  Usually, if you have "schemed a guy open" what you really did is take advantage of a blown assignment by the defense.  And if you can get it, take it, but I don't think you can build your offense around that, or at least, not any more than you can build your offense around hoping that Love breaks a tackle at the line of scrimmage and then is gone 60 yards for a touchdown.  It will work against undisciplined and poorly coached teams (and teams that are pressing because you are dominating them, such as Va Tech in the Orange Bowl).  But it won't work against a team that is disciplined and well-coached, just as Love couldn't do his magic against teams that were well positioned and were sure tackling.

And when you have a team that can't execute, it doesn't matter what the hell you scheme.  Your receiver might be wide open down the sideline, but it is pointless if the QB is being chased down by a defensive end.  You might have a perfectly set up screen, but it does nothing if the QB throws it into the ground or the RB drops the ball because he looks upfield before catching it.  I still have nightmares of Caleb Bowman running wide open behind the defense as a perfectly thrown ball is heading his way, only to see him drop the damned thing.  You never answered the question of why if the answer is just putting together the right scheme, the Willingham/Didrich offense in 2000 was almost as bad as the Shaw/Pritchard offense in 2019.

But all of this does get me to a question I've been meaning to ask generally... what scheme would I want to implement if Shaw made me head coach.

BC

[BostonCard]

 when is the last time you watched Stanford on O and said "what a brilliant call - way to scheme that guy open!"?

Big Game, Mills hits Donald Stewart for a 40 yard touchdown in which he was wide open.

However, I think philosophically we disagree.  Taking advantage of a mismatch is great offensive scheming, whether it is throwing to a 6'4" receiver defended by a 5'10" DB, a 4.5" 40 TE being covered by a slower linebacker, or a 300 lb pulling guard plowing the playside linebacker, leaving your 220 lb RB one-on-one in space with safety, isn't that what you want?

I'm all for scheming players open when possible.  I am a firm believer in play action passing (and the data supports that play action passes are more efficient than almost any other pass play in the playbook, and, contrary to popular opinion, it doesn't seem to lose efficacy if you "overuse" it).  However, you don't want to have to rely on "scheme" to get you open.  Usually, if you have "schemed a guy open" what you really did is take advantage of a blown assignment by the defense.  And if you can get it, take it, but I don't think you can build your offense around that, or at least, not any more than you can build your offense around hoping that Love breaks a tackle at the line of scrimmage and then is gone 60 yards for a touchdown.  It will work against undisciplined and poorly coached teams (and teams that are pressing because you are dominating them, such as Va Tech in the Orange Bowl).  But it won't work against a team that is disciplined and well-coached, just as Love couldn't do his magic against teams that were well positioned and were sure tackling.

And when you have a team that can't execute, it doesn't matter what the hell you scheme.  Your receiver might be wide open down the sideline, but it is pointless if the QB is being chased down by a defensive end.  You might have a perfectly set up screen, but it does nothing if the QB throws it into the ground or the RB drops the ball because he looks upfield before catching it.  I still have nightmares of Caleb Bowman running wide open behind the defense as a perfectly thrown ball is heading his way, only to see him drop the damned thing.  You never answered the question of why if the answer is just putting together the right scheme, the Willingham/Didrich offense in 2000 was almost as bad as the Shaw/Pritchard offense in 2019.

But all of this does get me to a question I've been meaning to ask generally... what scheme would I want to implement if Shaw made me head coach.

BC

[cardcrimson]

As I mentioned in a post weeks ago, Shaw in his post Big Game presser mentioned he'd take the match up of Parkinson against the Pac-12 Defensive Player of the Year all day long. That mentality is a little like running between the tackles 4 straight times because it's what we do. Scheme or no scheme, seems to me one would try to get Parkinson on somebody a little less talented.

Interestingly, the alleged best defense in the NFL gave up 40+ points to the Saints. Why? According to the talking heads, because the Saints took advantage of a weakness in the Niners defense-the middle of the field-- they could exploit and attacked it relentlessly. Also, when one of the Niners went down, the Saints went right after the backup. Schemes change week to week, sometimes, play to play, in an attempt to exploit the weaknesses of the opposition. Our mentality has been to do what we do over and over, cause it's what we do.

[cardcrimson]

As I mentioned in a post weeks ago, Shaw in his post Big Game presser mentioned he'd take the match up of Parkinson against the Pac-12 Defensive Player of the Year all day long. That mentality is a little like running between the tackles 4 straight times because it's what we do. Scheme or no scheme, seems to me one would try to get Parkinson on somebody a little less talented.

Interestingly, the alleged best defense in the NFL gave up 40+ points to the Saints. Why? According to the talking heads, because the Saints took advantage of a weakness in the Niners defense-the middle of the field-- they could exploit and attacked it relentlessly. Also, when one of the Niners went down, the Saints went right after the backup. Schemes change week to week, sometimes, play to play, in an attempt to exploit the weaknesses of the opposition. Our mentality has been to do what we do over and over, cause it's what we do.

[Goose]

Our mentality has been to do what we do over and over, cause it's what we do.

Beg to differ. Pre 2015, we did what we did because we were good at it. With both Luck and Hogan, part of "what we did" was to have the QB read the defense at the LOS and exploit weakness in the defense. That was part of the long internship for Stanford QBs that people complained about. We could and did exploit choices the defense made in how to defend us. However, we had a definite basic core competence of running the football right at the defense. We could beat most teams in their "base defense" that way. It was a good match-up for us. If the opponent went to a "stop the run at all costs" defense, we did adjust and beat them over the top. So, yes, we "did what we do", but that wasn't just pound the ball.

The Saints and Niners both have teams that are athletically better than college teams, and much better prepared. They should be, this is their job. Most good NFL teams can execute their entire playbook pretty well. Even though certain plays are installed for a given game, if the QB reads a defense as susceptible to a particular approach, he can call that play and have a good chance the team can execute it. When Shaw said that Luck or Hogan had the entire playbook at his disposal, it indicated that the QB at least was able to run anything he wanted. The rest of the team, maybe not as much. College teams rely on core competence more than pro teams do, because they can't practice as much and don't have as much athletic ability generally.

However, pro teams do have a personality that rests on their core competence. The Rams lost their ability to run at the beginning of the year. Look what happened to them. No scheme they attempted could compensate for the loss of that ability. On the other hand, if the coaching staff of any team locates an area of the defense that they believe is exploitable, they will do so. The Saints thought they had an advantage in the middle of the field and attacked it. They had guys who could execute those plays. When that is true, you keep at it until your opponent fixes the problem or the game ends with you winning it. It does no good to find such an advantage if you can't execute the plays necessary to do so. It also does no good if the advantage isn't sufficient to produce a victory. Fortunately, last Sunday, it wasn't.

[Goose]

Our mentality has been to do what we do over and over, cause it's what we do.

Beg to differ. Pre 2015, we did what we did because we were good at it. With both Luck and Hogan, part of "what we did" was to have the QB read the defense at the LOS and exploit weakness in the defense. That was part of the long internship for Stanford QBs that people complained about. We could and did exploit choices the defense made in how to defend us. However, we had a definite basic core competence of running the football right at the defense. We could beat most teams in their "base defense" that way. It was a good match-up for us. If the opponent went to a "stop the run at all costs" defense, we did adjust and beat them over the top. So, yes, we "did what we do", but that wasn't just pound the ball.

The Saints and Niners both have teams that are athletically better than college teams, and much better prepared. They should be, this is their job. Most good NFL teams can execute their entire playbook pretty well. Even though certain plays are installed for a given game, if the QB reads a defense as susceptible to a particular approach, he can call that play and have a good chance the team can execute it. When Shaw said that Luck or Hogan had the entire playbook at his disposal, it indicated that the QB at least was able to run anything he wanted. The rest of the team, maybe not as much. College teams rely on core competence more than pro teams do, because they can't practice as much and don't have as much athletic ability generally.

However, pro teams do have a personality that rests on their core competence. The Rams lost their ability to run at the beginning of the year. Look what happened to them. No scheme they attempted could compensate for the loss of that ability. On the other hand, if the coaching staff of any team locates an area of the defense that they believe is exploitable, they will do so. The Saints thought they had an advantage in the middle of the field and attacked it. They had guys who could execute those plays. When that is true, you keep at it until your opponent fixes the problem or the game ends with you winning it. It does no good to find such an advantage if you can't execute the plays necessary to do so. It also does no good if the advantage isn't sufficient to produce a victory. Fortunately, last Sunday, it wasn't.

[cardcrimson]

Fair points, but how do you explain Shaw's comment and our relying on curl routes to Parkinson? Seemed to be our go to bread and butter play.

As you mentioned, back in the day, our teams seemed to execute pretty well. They were very well prepared and could adapt as necessary. What's changed? I remember during the Notre Dame game (I think), on third down one of our receivers ran a drag route across the middle of the field. Unfortunately, he ran the pattern two yards short of the first down, one would think, especially at Stanford, our guys would be prepared well enough to not make that simple mistake.

Our mentality has been to do what we do over and over, cause it's what we do.

Beg to differ. Pre 2015, we did what we did because we were good at it. With both Luck and Hogan, part of "what we did" was to have the QB read the defense at the LOS and exploit weakness in the defense. That was part of the long internship for Stanford QBs that people complained about. We could and did exploit choices the defense made in how to defend us. However, we had a definite basic core competence of running the football right at the defense. We could beat most teams in their "base defense" that way. It was a good match-up for us. If the opponent went to a "stop the run at all costs" defense, we did adjust and beat them over the top. So, yes, we "did what we do", but that wasn't just pound the ball.

The Saints and Niners both have teams that are athletically better than college teams, and much better prepared. They should be, this is their job. Most good NFL teams can execute their entire playbook pretty well. Even though certain plays are installed for a given game, if the QB reads a defense as susceptible to a particular approach, he can call that play and have a good chance the team can execute it. When Shaw said that Luck or Hogan had the entire playbook at his disposal, it indicated that the QB at least was able to run anything he wanted. The rest of the team, maybe not as much. College teams rely on core competence more than pro teams do, because they can't practice as much and don't have as much athletic ability generally.

However, pro teams do have a personality that rests on their core competence. The Rams lost their ability to run at the beginning of the year. Look what happened to them. No scheme they attempted could compensate for the loss of that ability. On the other hand, if the coaching staff of any team locates an area of the defense that they believe is exploitable, they will do so. The Saints thought they had an advantage in the middle of the field and attacked it. They had guys who could execute those plays. When that is true, you keep at it until your opponent fixes the problem or the game ends with you winning it. It does no good to find such an advantage if you can't execute the plays necessary to do so. It also does no good if the advantage isn't sufficient to produce a victory. Fortunately, last Sunday, it wasn't.

[cardcrimson]

Fair points, but how do you explain Shaw's comment and our relying on curl routes to Parkinson? Seemed to be our go to bread and butter play.

As you mentioned, back in the day, our teams seemed to execute pretty well. They were very well prepared and could adapt as necessary. What's changed? I remember during the Notre Dame game (I think), on third down one of our receivers ran a drag route across the middle of the field. Unfortunately, he ran the pattern two yards short of the first down, one would think, especially at Stanford, our guys would be prepared well enough to not make that simple mistake.

Our mentality has been to do what we do over and over, cause it's what we do.

Beg to differ. Pre 2015, we did what we did because we were good at it. With both Luck and Hogan, part of "what we did" was to have the QB read the defense at the LOS and exploit weakness in the defense. That was part of the long internship for Stanford QBs that people complained about. We could and did exploit choices the defense made in how to defend us. However, we had a definite basic core competence of running the football right at the defense. We could beat most teams in their "base defense" that way. It was a good match-up for us. If the opponent went to a "stop the run at all costs" defense, we did adjust and beat them over the top. So, yes, we "did what we do", but that wasn't just pound the ball.

The Saints and Niners both have teams that are athletically better than college teams, and much better prepared. They should be, this is their job. Most good NFL teams can execute their entire playbook pretty well. Even though certain plays are installed for a given game, if the QB reads a defense as susceptible to a particular approach, he can call that play and have a good chance the team can execute it. When Shaw said that Luck or Hogan had the entire playbook at his disposal, it indicated that the QB at least was able to run anything he wanted. The rest of the team, maybe not as much. College teams rely on core competence more than pro teams do, because they can't practice as much and don't have as much athletic ability generally.

However, pro teams do have a personality that rests on their core competence. The Rams lost their ability to run at the beginning of the year. Look what happened to them. No scheme they attempted could compensate for the loss of that ability. On the other hand, if the coaching staff of any team locates an area of the defense that they believe is exploitable, they will do so. The Saints thought they had an advantage in the middle of the field and attacked it. They had guys who could execute those plays. When that is true, you keep at it until your opponent fixes the problem or the game ends with you winning it. It does no good to find such an advantage if you can't execute the plays necessary to do so. It also does no good if the advantage isn't sufficient to produce a victory. Fortunately, last Sunday, it wasn't.

[SamuelMcF]

Fair points, but how do you explain Shaw's comment and our relying on curl routes to Parkinson? Seemed to be our go to bread and butter play.

As you mentioned, back in the day, our teams seemed to execute pretty well. They were very well prepared and could adapt as necessary. What's changed? I remember during the Notre Dame game (I think), on third down one of our receivers ran a drag route across the middle of the field. Unfortunately, he ran the pattern two yards short of the first down, one would think, especially at Stanford, our guys would be prepared well enough to not make that simple mistake.

Osiris St. Brown. He ran the route just short of the marker, I believe. But he actually went backwards trying to evade the defender instead of simply turning upfield and getting another half yard of forward progress.

IMO there seemed to be more instances of players trying to "be a hero"/do too much this season, and I'm not sure why it seems that way.

[SamuelMcF]

Fair points, but how do you explain Shaw's comment and our relying on curl routes to Parkinson? Seemed to be our go to bread and butter play.

As you mentioned, back in the day, our teams seemed to execute pretty well. They were very well prepared and could adapt as necessary. What's changed? I remember during the Notre Dame game (I think), on third down one of our receivers ran a drag route across the middle of the field. Unfortunately, he ran the pattern two yards short of the first down, one would think, especially at Stanford, our guys would be prepared well enough to not make that simple mistake.

Osiris St. Brown. He ran the route just short of the marker, I believe. But he actually went backwards trying to evade the defender instead of simply turning upfield and getting another half yard of forward progress.

IMO there seemed to be more instances of players trying to "be a hero"/do too much this season, and I'm not sure why it seems that way.

[BostonCard]

Fair points, but how do you explain Shaw's comment and our relying on curl routes to Parkinson? Seemed to be our go to bread and butter play.

As you mentioned, back in the day, our teams seemed to execute pretty well. They were very well prepared and could adapt as necessary. What's changed? I remember during the Notre Dame game (I think), on third down one of our receivers ran a drag route across the middle of the field. Unfortunately, he ran the pattern two yards short of the first down, one would think, especially at Stanford, our guys would be prepared well enough to not make that simple mistake.

Osiris St. Brown. He ran the route just short of the marker, I believe. But he actually went backwards trying to evade the defender instead of simply turning upfield and getting another half yard of forward progress.

IMO there seemed to be more instances of players trying to "be a hero"/do too much this season, and I'm not sure why it seems that way.

That's pretty common on a team that's struggling.  Players take it upon themselves to try to compensate, and alas it is a recipe for a blown assignment on defense, or a missed block on offense, or a QB that will try to force a throw to a covered receiver, or, in this case, a receiver who gambles for a big run and misses the chance to get a first down.

It is human nature for some people to try to do too much, so it is up to the coaches to overcome it.  I think it is a legitimate criticism of the coaches that "don't be a hero; focus on executing your job and trust your teammates to do theirs" was not emphasized enough to this team.  

BC

[BostonCard]

Fair points, but how do you explain Shaw's comment and our relying on curl routes to Parkinson? Seemed to be our go to bread and butter play.

As you mentioned, back in the day, our teams seemed to execute pretty well. They were very well prepared and could adapt as necessary. What's changed? I remember during the Notre Dame game (I think), on third down one of our receivers ran a drag route across the middle of the field. Unfortunately, he ran the pattern two yards short of the first down, one would think, especially at Stanford, our guys would be prepared well enough to not make that simple mistake.

Osiris St. Brown. He ran the route just short of the marker, I believe. But he actually went backwards trying to evade the defender instead of simply turning upfield and getting another half yard of forward progress.

IMO there seemed to be more instances of players trying to "be a hero"/do too much this season, and I'm not sure why it seems that way.

That's pretty common on a team that's struggling.  Players take it upon themselves to try to compensate, and alas it is a recipe for a blown assignment on defense, or a missed block on offense, or a QB that will try to force a throw to a covered receiver, or, in this case, a receiver who gambles for a big run and misses the chance to get a first down.

It is human nature for some people to try to do too much, so it is up to the coaches to overcome it.  I think it is a legitimate criticism of the coaches that "don't be a hero; focus on executing your job and trust your teammates to do theirs" was not emphasized enough to this team.  

BC

[cardcrimson]

Fair points, but how do you explain Shaw's comment and our relying on curl routes to Parkinson? Seemed to be our go to bread and butter play.

As you mentioned, back in the day, our teams seemed to execute pretty well. They were very well prepared and could adapt as necessary. What's changed? I remember during the Notre Dame game (I think), on third down one of our receivers ran a drag route across the middle of the field. Unfortunately, he ran the pattern two yards short of the first down, one would think, especially at Stanford, our guys would be prepared well enough to not make that simple mistake.

Osiris St. Brown. He ran the route just short of the marker, I believe. But he actually went backwards trying to evade the defender instead of simply turning upfield and getting another half yard of forward progress.

IMO there seemed to be more instances of players trying to "be a hero"/do too much this season, and I'm not sure why it seems that way.

Think that was a second play, but I could be mistaken--wasn't that one against Cal?

[cardcrimson]

Fair points, but how do you explain Shaw's comment and our relying on curl routes to Parkinson? Seemed to be our go to bread and butter play.

As you mentioned, back in the day, our teams seemed to execute pretty well. They were very well prepared and could adapt as necessary. What's changed? I remember during the Notre Dame game (I think), on third down one of our receivers ran a drag route across the middle of the field. Unfortunately, he ran the pattern two yards short of the first down, one would think, especially at Stanford, our guys would be prepared well enough to not make that simple mistake.

Osiris St. Brown. He ran the route just short of the marker, I believe. But he actually went backwards trying to evade the defender instead of simply turning upfield and getting another half yard of forward progress.

IMO there seemed to be more instances of players trying to "be a hero"/do too much this season, and I'm not sure why it seems that way.

Think that was a second play, but I could be mistaken--wasn't that one against Cal?

[SamuelMcF]

Fair points, but how do you explain Shaw's comment and our relying on curl routes to Parkinson? Seemed to be our go to bread and butter play.

As you mentioned, back in the day, our teams seemed to execute pretty well. They were very well prepared and could adapt as necessary. What's changed? I remember during the Notre Dame game (I think), on third down one of our receivers ran a drag route across the middle of the field. Unfortunately, he ran the pattern two yards short of the first down, one would think, especially at Stanford, our guys would be prepared well enough to not make that simple mistake.

Osiris St. Brown. He ran the route just short of the marker, I believe. But he actually went backwards trying to evade the defender instead of simply turning upfield and getting another half yard of forward progress.

IMO there seemed to be more instances of players trying to "be a hero"/do too much this season, and I'm not sure why it seems that way.

Think that was a second play, but I could be mistaken--wasn't that one against Cal?

You know what, you're right - I remember being there in person for that play. I was at Big Game and barely watched the ND game at all.

[SamuelMcF]

Fair points, but how do you explain Shaw's comment and our relying on curl routes to Parkinson? Seemed to be our go to bread and butter play.

As you mentioned, back in the day, our teams seemed to execute pretty well. They were very well prepared and could adapt as necessary. What's changed? I remember during the Notre Dame game (I think), on third down one of our receivers ran a drag route across the middle of the field. Unfortunately, he ran the pattern two yards short of the first down, one would think, especially at Stanford, our guys would be prepared well enough to not make that simple mistake.

Osiris St. Brown. He ran the route just short of the marker, I believe. But he actually went backwards trying to evade the defender instead of simply turning upfield and getting another half yard of forward progress.

IMO there seemed to be more instances of players trying to "be a hero"/do too much this season, and I'm not sure why it seems that way.

Think that was a second play, but I could be mistaken--wasn't that one against Cal?

You know what, you're right - I remember being there in person for that play. I was at Big Game and barely watched the ND game at all.

[Goose]

Fair points, but how do you explain Shaw's comment and our relying on curl routes to Parkinson? Seemed to be our go to bread and butter play.

I believe that Shaw intended that Scarlett running behind an improved offensive line with two all-world tackles would be our bread and butter, but that didn't work out. Plan "B" was to exploit the coverage problem presented by Parkinson. To be exactly correct, we run curls to Parkinson, but we also run basic stop routes and "bend" routes where Parkinson breaks the route diagonally across the field. All these routes are oriented toward getting  Parkinson single covered by a linebacker. If the coverage is behind Parkinson, the stop or the curl should be completed 100% of the time (unless a lineman is in the throwing lane with his hands up). The ball should be right on the numbers, and Parkinson is big enough he should be able to absorb the hit without dropping it. If we add in the "bend" version, he  is actually running away from the linebacker. He should be opening  ground on the slower linebacker. That pass is harder to throw, because you want to lead the receiver, but if you throw it on time it can go a long way. It should still be a high percentage play. If the linebacker is playing in front of Parkinson, you go JJ and throw it where the 6'7" Parkinson can get it and the 6'2" (or so) linebacker can't. This is also a harder pass to throw, but it can be done, as we proved in 2018. Thus, our "bread and butter" should be a very successful play. Naturally, defenses have schemed against this play, and we saw lots of double coverage with a Safety behind and a linebacker in front. In this case, we should have single coverage elsewhere that will allow a high probability of a completed pass. It as also true, as we proved more often than we should have, Parkinson can often go up and get the ball even when double covered. Not what should happen however.

This play genre worked for us quite often. What  made this not work as well as one might hope? First, Parkinson dropped quite a few balls that were right there. Granted, he also made some catches that were not easy, but if this is your bread and butter, you MUST catch the easy ones.  Second, KJ was so messed up this year that we didn't get many "jump ball" opportunities, and when we did, they weren't on target much of the time. Mills OTOH hasn't had as much experience with these passes. He would "lock on" to Parkinson when he was double covered and throw it there when he had better options elsewhere. Mills also didn't show the ability to lead Parkinson when he was running the "bend" patterns toward the middle of the field. He would also often throw late, when Parkinson had run into coverage by other defensive backs, or just miss the throw.

As you mentioned, back in the day, our teams seemed to execute pretty well. They were very well prepared and could adapt as necessary. What's changed? I remember during the Notre Dame game (I think), on third down one of our receivers ran a drag route across the middle of the field. Unfortunately, he ran the pattern two yards short of the first down, one would think, especially at Stanford, our guys would be prepared well enough to not make that simple mistake.

I wish I really knew. It is different guys. I am quite sure that the coaches have stressed the "trust each other, just do you job" aspect of the game. The players know. However, in the heat of the moment, they make bad decisions. It may be that a more autocratic approach is necessary. Shaw seems to stress good decision making. It may be better if the rules were "run to the sticks and catch the damn ball, no thinking required". However, I look at the problems USC has with penalties. Despite Helton bringing in refs to all practices, and despite yanking players who commit penalties, they still had tons of them this year. The coaches can prepare you, but you still have to do it. The Jessies and Joes have to respond better to the in game situations. In my very limited athletic career, I can remember absolutely blanking on what to do in a given situation, even though I had done it a thousand times. Thus I have some empathy for the offensive lineman that blocks nobody on a given play.

One thing we do seem to lack is anybody who is the Trent Irwin type. We don't seem to have any precise route runners. You can get away with that to a degree if you have blazing speed or are particularly elusive. We don't seem to fit that category, although Fehoko may qualify. OSB could ideally be a faster Irwin, but so far, I haven't seen it.

[Goose]

Fair points, but how do you explain Shaw's comment and our relying on curl routes to Parkinson? Seemed to be our go to bread and butter play.

I believe that Shaw intended that Scarlett running behind an improved offensive line with two all-world tackles would be our bread and butter, but that didn't work out. Plan "B" was to exploit the coverage problem presented by Parkinson. To be exactly correct, we run curls to Parkinson, but we also run basic stop routes and "bend" routes where Parkinson breaks the route diagonally across the field. All these routes are oriented toward getting  Parkinson single covered by a linebacker. If the coverage is behind Parkinson, the stop or the curl should be completed 100% of the time (unless a lineman is in the throwing lane with his hands up). The ball should be right on the numbers, and Parkinson is big enough he should be able to absorb the hit without dropping it. If we add in the "bend" version, he  is actually running away from the linebacker. He should be opening  ground on the slower linebacker. That pass is harder to throw, because you want to lead the receiver, but if you throw it on time it can go a long way. It should still be a high percentage play. If the linebacker is playing in front of Parkinson, you go JJ and throw it where the 6'7" Parkinson can get it and the 6'2" (or so) linebacker can't. This is also a harder pass to throw, but it can be done, as we proved in 2018. Thus, our "bread and butter" should be a very successful play. Naturally, defenses have schemed against this play, and we saw lots of double coverage with a Safety behind and a linebacker in front. In this case, we should have single coverage elsewhere that will allow a high probability of a completed pass. It as also true, as we proved more often than we should have, Parkinson can often go up and get the ball even when double covered. Not what should happen however.

This play genre worked for us quite often. What  made this not work as well as one might hope? First, Parkinson dropped quite a few balls that were right there. Granted, he also made some catches that were not easy, but if this is your bread and butter, you MUST catch the easy ones.  Second, KJ was so messed up this year that we didn't get many "jump ball" opportunities, and when we did, they weren't on target much of the time. Mills OTOH hasn't had as much experience with these passes. He would "lock on" to Parkinson when he was double covered and throw it there when he had better options elsewhere. Mills also didn't show the ability to lead Parkinson when he was running the "bend" patterns toward the middle of the field. He would also often throw late, when Parkinson had run into coverage by other defensive backs, or just miss the throw.

As you mentioned, back in the day, our teams seemed to execute pretty well. They were very well prepared and could adapt as necessary. What's changed? I remember during the Notre Dame game (I think), on third down one of our receivers ran a drag route across the middle of the field. Unfortunately, he ran the pattern two yards short of the first down, one would think, especially at Stanford, our guys would be prepared well enough to not make that simple mistake.

I wish I really knew. It is different guys. I am quite sure that the coaches have stressed the "trust each other, just do you job" aspect of the game. The players know. However, in the heat of the moment, they make bad decisions. It may be that a more autocratic approach is necessary. Shaw seems to stress good decision making. It may be better if the rules were "run to the sticks and catch the damn ball, no thinking required". However, I look at the problems USC has with penalties. Despite Helton bringing in refs to all practices, and despite yanking players who commit penalties, they still had tons of them this year. The coaches can prepare you, but you still have to do it. The Jessies and Joes have to respond better to the in game situations. In my very limited athletic career, I can remember absolutely blanking on what to do in a given situation, even though I had done it a thousand times. Thus I have some empathy for the offensive lineman that blocks nobody on a given play.

One thing we do seem to lack is anybody who is the Trent Irwin type. We don't seem to have any precise route runners. You can get away with that to a degree if you have blazing speed or are particularly elusive. We don't seem to fit that category, although Fehoko may qualify. OSB could ideally be a faster Irwin, but so far, I haven't seen it.