[Leftcoast]

Isn't the problem that Ukraine now needs to unseat an entrenched foe with a sea to their back and no obvious way to flank them?  Their enemy can wait behind a defense prepared in depth and watch as they move into prepared kill zones and mine fields and still have the option to fall back into secondary (and tertiary) prepared positions when necessary.  Where's the opportunity for a war of movement in Ukraine?  It's not like they WANT to fight this way, correct?

[Leftcoast]

Isn't the problem that Ukraine now needs to unseat an entrenched foe with a sea to their back and no obvious way to flank them?  Their enemy can wait behind a defense prepared in depth and watch as they move into prepared kill zones and mine fields and still have the option to fall back into secondary (and tertiary) prepared positions when necessary.  Where's the opportunity for a war of movement in Ukraine?  It's not like they WANT to fight this way, correct?

[Goose]

Goose, this is a question about military history and the evolution of strategy.  Why would any major power adopt the military strategy of Russia and Ukraine given the historical examples of blitzkreig in WWII, Stormin Normin, etc.?  What general in his right mind would want to replay WWI, Iran/Iraq, etc. when there is an alternative strategy of movement?

A combined arms strategy only works if you can execute it. It takes highly skilled and highly trained troops to do that. It also takes equipment that is very costly and constant training to maintain the skills needed. If a country believes it will only be fighting defensive battles it may decide it doesn't need that capability because it will never use it. Finland for instance did just fine in WW II without any such capability. Eventually got swamped by Russians, but that wasn't a strategic defeat. It was a "too many Russians" defeat.

It is also wise to remember that the German "blitzkreig" and the US/Coalition in Iraq succeeded because 1) they had air superiority/supremacy and 2) their opponents were not prepared or motivated to deal with a war of movement and did not have enough combat power to defend everywhere. Combined arms breakthroughs are not a "given". They are often very expensive in terms of causalities. The Normandy breakout is a prime example. It was very costly, particularly to the British around Caen. The breakout only happened when the US used strategic air power to literally obliterate the Germans entrenched in front of the US Army. We accidentally obliterated one of our own divisions too, but "stuff happens".
 
Russia does have enough manpower to defend everywhere (at least to some degree), and they have had months to build fortifications in depth featuring interlocking fields of fire. ANYBODY assaulting such defenses is going to have trouble. The US army in 1990 could probably have done it. Today's army couldn't. The "strange" factor is that neither side has air capability anywhere near what was anticipated before the start of the war. Ukraine's attempt at combined arms was initially severely hindered by Russian air, both jets and Hokums. OTOH, Ukraine was never "all in" on the idea of a single massive assault. Probably a good thing. Too many things can go wrong when your troops are far from well trained and experienced.

Did the Soviets/Russians learn the wrong lessons from WWII?  Zhukov was not an "attack everywhere equally" kind of guy.  The Stalingrad trap involved a concentration of Soviet forces north and south of the city, no?

It is hard to actually categorize Zhukov, because for the last two year of the war he had such a numerical troop superiority and such massive artillery superiority he could pretty much do whatever he wanted. At Stalingrad, the Russians staged a massive attack all along the northern line defended by the Romanian troops. The Russians attacked every single Romanian division. It wasn't surgery. It was blunt force trauma. The Romanians were vastly under strength, had no anti-tank weapons that would work against the Russian tanks, and were defending a front much too long for them if they were at full strength. In the south, it was the same story. The Romanians were in an impossible position, but the Russians didn't pick a spot and concentrate their forces. They didn't have to. They attacked everywhere equally and succeeded everywhere equally. Not sure what one learns from that.

But even if the Soviet/Russians decided that their main advantage was with numbers and attrition, what in heaven's name is Ukraine doing?  They are a smaller, less populated nation that will inevitably lose a war of attrition with a much larger nation.  It does not take a Sun Tzu or a Clausewitz to realize that their greatest hope is with a fast war of movement, akin to Israel 1967, France 1940, Schwarzkopf 1991, etc.  A grind-it-out war over a period of years cannot be to Ukraine's advantage.  So why is Ukraine lapsing back into old Russian military doctrine after 32 years of independence?

The Ukrainians are not falling back to Russian military doctrine entirely. Importantly, they have many NCOs and young officers that are very good leaders of small infantry formations. They have lots of highly motivated and battle trained infantry. The "classic" Russian tactics emphasize bulk and numbers. As far as clearing minefields, that is what punishment battalions were for. Ukraine isn't doing this. They are fighting "smart" and keeping casualties as low as possible. This isn't the Russian approach. It remains to be seen if this methodical but well led approach will be able to succeed fast enough to prevent the Russians from bringing up reinforcements and holding on in the "land bridge".

The Ukrainians simply can't adopt mobile warfare because they are not well enough trained or practiced in it to be effective. They tried and proved they couldn't. It is also not "their way of war", which is harder to change than it seems. Military organizations have a corporate memory that influences greatly how they fight. The young learn from the old. Changing this culture is difficult, especially when the changes are inherently risky. It is like asking a wishbone team to go into the shotgun and run an air raid offense. On paper, it may be possible, but in reality it isn't.

Ukraine also does not have an air force that can rapidly arrive and "bail out" a combined arms attack that ran into a problem. The Russians can often muster up a bit of air support. This clearly "freaked out" the Ukrainians at the early parts of the offensive. The Ukrainians now appear to have adapted, but it was a problem at the start. Combined arms operations rely on timing. Things have to happen fast and in the right sequence. If somebody acts too soon or to late, or not at all, things go off the rails fast. Th threat of air attack, even if it never happens, can mess up the timing.

Isn't the problem that Ukraine now needs to unseat an entrenched foe with a sea to their back and no obvious way to flank them?  Their enemy can wait behind a defense prepared in depth and watch as they move into prepared kill zones and mine fields and still have the option to fall back into secondary (and tertiary) prepared positions when necessary.  Where's the opportunity for a war of movement in Ukraine?  It's not like they WANT to fight this way, correct?

Actually, a lot of them DO want to fight this way, given that they have to fight at all. They understand this type of war and have troops that can execute it. You are correct though. The Russians have created a very "hard" shell with multiple layers. The only way through it, given you have neither an air force nor sufficient artillery, is what Ukraine is now doing. You just need to avoid losing too many men while you do so.

[Goose]

Goose, this is a question about military history and the evolution of strategy.  Why would any major power adopt the military strategy of Russia and Ukraine given the historical examples of blitzkreig in WWII, Stormin Normin, etc.?  What general in his right mind would want to replay WWI, Iran/Iraq, etc. when there is an alternative strategy of movement?

A combined arms strategy only works if you can execute it. It takes highly skilled and highly trained troops to do that. It also takes equipment that is very costly and constant training to maintain the skills needed. If a country believes it will only be fighting defensive battles it may decide it doesn't need that capability because it will never use it. Finland for instance did just fine in WW II without any such capability. Eventually got swamped by Russians, but that wasn't a strategic defeat. It was a "too many Russians" defeat.

It is also wise to remember that the German "blitzkreig" and the US/Coalition in Iraq succeeded because 1) they had air superiority/supremacy and 2) their opponents were not prepared or motivated to deal with a war of movement and did not have enough combat power to defend everywhere. Combined arms breakthroughs are not a "given". They are often very expensive in terms of causalities. The Normandy breakout is a prime example. It was very costly, particularly to the British around Caen. The breakout only happened when the US used strategic air power to literally obliterate the Germans entrenched in front of the US Army. We accidentally obliterated one of our own divisions too, but "stuff happens".
 
Russia does have enough manpower to defend everywhere (at least to some degree), and they have had months to build fortifications in depth featuring interlocking fields of fire. ANYBODY assaulting such defenses is going to have trouble. The US army in 1990 could probably have done it. Today's army couldn't. The "strange" factor is that neither side has air capability anywhere near what was anticipated before the start of the war. Ukraine's attempt at combined arms was initially severely hindered by Russian air, both jets and Hokums. OTOH, Ukraine was never "all in" on the idea of a single massive assault. Probably a good thing. Too many things can go wrong when your troops are far from well trained and experienced.

Did the Soviets/Russians learn the wrong lessons from WWII?  Zhukov was not an "attack everywhere equally" kind of guy.  The Stalingrad trap involved a concentration of Soviet forces north and south of the city, no?

It is hard to actually categorize Zhukov, because for the last two year of the war he had such a numerical troop superiority and such massive artillery superiority he could pretty much do whatever he wanted. At Stalingrad, the Russians staged a massive attack all along the northern line defended by the Romanian troops. The Russians attacked every single Romanian division. It wasn't surgery. It was blunt force trauma. The Romanians were vastly under strength, had no anti-tank weapons that would work against the Russian tanks, and were defending a front much too long for them if they were at full strength. In the south, it was the same story. The Romanians were in an impossible position, but the Russians didn't pick a spot and concentrate their forces. They didn't have to. They attacked everywhere equally and succeeded everywhere equally. Not sure what one learns from that.

But even if the Soviet/Russians decided that their main advantage was with numbers and attrition, what in heaven's name is Ukraine doing?  They are a smaller, less populated nation that will inevitably lose a war of attrition with a much larger nation.  It does not take a Sun Tzu or a Clausewitz to realize that their greatest hope is with a fast war of movement, akin to Israel 1967, France 1940, Schwarzkopf 1991, etc.  A grind-it-out war over a period of years cannot be to Ukraine's advantage.  So why is Ukraine lapsing back into old Russian military doctrine after 32 years of independence?

The Ukrainians are not falling back to Russian military doctrine entirely. Importantly, they have many NCOs and young officers that are very good leaders of small infantry formations. They have lots of highly motivated and battle trained infantry. The "classic" Russian tactics emphasize bulk and numbers. As far as clearing minefields, that is what punishment battalions were for. Ukraine isn't doing this. They are fighting "smart" and keeping casualties as low as possible. This isn't the Russian approach. It remains to be seen if this methodical but well led approach will be able to succeed fast enough to prevent the Russians from bringing up reinforcements and holding on in the "land bridge".

The Ukrainians simply can't adopt mobile warfare because they are not well enough trained or practiced in it to be effective. They tried and proved they couldn't. It is also not "their way of war", which is harder to change than it seems. Military organizations have a corporate memory that influences greatly how they fight. The young learn from the old. Changing this culture is difficult, especially when the changes are inherently risky. It is like asking a wishbone team to go into the shotgun and run an air raid offense. On paper, it may be possible, but in reality it isn't.

Ukraine also does not have an air force that can rapidly arrive and "bail out" a combined arms attack that ran into a problem. The Russians can often muster up a bit of air support. This clearly "freaked out" the Ukrainians at the early parts of the offensive. The Ukrainians now appear to have adapted, but it was a problem at the start. Combined arms operations rely on timing. Things have to happen fast and in the right sequence. If somebody acts too soon or to late, or not at all, things go off the rails fast. Th threat of air attack, even if it never happens, can mess up the timing.

Isn't the problem that Ukraine now needs to unseat an entrenched foe with a sea to their back and no obvious way to flank them?  Their enemy can wait behind a defense prepared in depth and watch as they move into prepared kill zones and mine fields and still have the option to fall back into secondary (and tertiary) prepared positions when necessary.  Where's the opportunity for a war of movement in Ukraine?  It's not like they WANT to fight this way, correct?

Actually, a lot of them DO want to fight this way, given that they have to fight at all. They understand this type of war and have troops that can execute it. You are correct though. The Russians have created a very "hard" shell with multiple layers. The only way through it, given you have neither an air force nor sufficient artillery, is what Ukraine is now doing. You just need to avoid losing too many men while you do so.

[81alum]

 It is like asking a wishbone team to go into the shotgun and run an air raid offense.

What a great metaphor for a sport board!  But more seriously, thank you for the thoughtful and comprehensive reply.  1) Lack of the proper equipment (air power,) 2) doctrinal inertia, and 3) insufficient training seem to assure a war of attrition. 

My guess--Ukraine needs to make significant progress this year or early next, since if this drags into a third year the crushing weight of numbers will drag it down.  The longer it goes the worse for the smaller country. 

Makes me think negotiations should be starting sooner rather than later.

[81alum]

 It is like asking a wishbone team to go into the shotgun and run an air raid offense.

What a great metaphor for a sport board!  But more seriously, thank you for the thoughtful and comprehensive reply.  1) Lack of the proper equipment (air power,) 2) doctrinal inertia, and 3) insufficient training seem to assure a war of attrition. 

My guess--Ukraine needs to make significant progress this year or early next, since if this drags into a third year the crushing weight of numbers will drag it down.  The longer it goes the worse for the smaller country. 

Makes me think negotiations should be starting sooner rather than later.

[dabigv13]

I don't think there is any reason at this point to set a timeline for negotiations. Why would Ukraine trust any negotiated settlement with Putin anyway?

It takes a long time to bleed a large country out of a war. US was involved in Vietnam for at least 8 years depending on when you start counting. Russia was in Afghanistan for 9 years.

We should expect this war to go on for many more years as well. Western ammunition manufacturing is thankfully scaling up with just that expectation in mind. Ukraine is a smaller country than Russia but its still the second largest military in Europe, and they are actually on the offensive. Russia is using their own strategic reserves to shore up defenses where Ukraine is attacking. But both countries are being expectedly cautious with their troops because they know this will be a long conflict.

[dabigv13]

I don't think there is any reason at this point to set a timeline for negotiations. Why would Ukraine trust any negotiated settlement with Putin anyway?

It takes a long time to bleed a large country out of a war. US was involved in Vietnam for at least 8 years depending on when you start counting. Russia was in Afghanistan for 9 years.

We should expect this war to go on for many more years as well. Western ammunition manufacturing is thankfully scaling up with just that expectation in mind. Ukraine is a smaller country than Russia but its still the second largest military in Europe, and they are actually on the offensive. Russia is using their own strategic reserves to shore up defenses where Ukraine is attacking. But both countries are being expectedly cautious with their troops because they know this will be a long conflict.

[81alum]

I don't think there is any reason at this point to set a timeline for negotiations. Why would Ukraine trust any negotiated settlement with Putin anyway?

It takes a long time to bleed a large country out of a war. US was involved in Vietnam for at least 8 years depending on when you start counting. Russia was in Afghanistan for 9 years.

We should expect this war to go on for many more years as well. Western ammunition manufacturing is thankfully scaling up with just that expectation in mind. Ukraine is a smaller country than Russia but its still the second largest military in Europe, and they are actually on the offensive. Russia is using their own strategic reserves to shore up defenses where Ukraine is attacking. But both countries are being expectedly cautious with their troops because they know this will be a long conflict.

Yes, Vietnam and Afghanistan indicate that a large democracy driven by public opinion can be defeated by a smaller dictatorship/religious cult when the war drags out.  Losses do more to undermine a democracy than an autocracy.

Ukraine lacks that advantage.  I would think that it needs to win, quickly.  Of course, it is fighting for its homeland when the Unites States was not.  Perhaps this is enough to make up the difference.  Whose national morale will crumble first?  That is what a war of attrition turns on.

[81alum]

I don't think there is any reason at this point to set a timeline for negotiations. Why would Ukraine trust any negotiated settlement with Putin anyway?

It takes a long time to bleed a large country out of a war. US was involved in Vietnam for at least 8 years depending on when you start counting. Russia was in Afghanistan for 9 years.

We should expect this war to go on for many more years as well. Western ammunition manufacturing is thankfully scaling up with just that expectation in mind. Ukraine is a smaller country than Russia but its still the second largest military in Europe, and they are actually on the offensive. Russia is using their own strategic reserves to shore up defenses where Ukraine is attacking. But both countries are being expectedly cautious with their troops because they know this will be a long conflict.

Yes, Vietnam and Afghanistan indicate that a large democracy driven by public opinion can be defeated by a smaller dictatorship/religious cult when the war drags out.  Losses do more to undermine a democracy than an autocracy.

Ukraine lacks that advantage.  I would think that it needs to win, quickly.  Of course, it is fighting for its homeland when the Unites States was not.  Perhaps this is enough to make up the difference.  Whose national morale will crumble first?  That is what a war of attrition turns on.

[dabigv13]

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev was not a democracy.

But I think you are agreeing with my main point which is that Ukrainian public support for the war will dictate it's duration, and it remains overwhelmingly in support of continuing the war. The suburbs of the capital were the site of mass civilian murder at the outset of the war, and they have plenty of experience of Russian's reneging on treaties. I think the Ukrainians will keep fighting the Russians with sticks and stones if that's all they have.

[dabigv13]

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev was not a democracy.

But I think you are agreeing with my main point which is that Ukrainian public support for the war will dictate it's duration, and it remains overwhelmingly in support of continuing the war. The suburbs of the capital were the site of mass civilian murder at the outset of the war, and they have plenty of experience of Russian's reneging on treaties. I think the Ukrainians will keep fighting the Russians with sticks and stones if that's all they have.

[Goose]

IMO nobody can predict ho the morale of Russia and Ukraine will evolve. However, all of us "westerners" need to be reminded that both countries have a population that is historically fatalistic. The population is probably not going to have much say on how long the war continues. They will endure what they are told to endure. The war will end when one side or the other achieves it's military goals or can no longer physically continue fighting. Economic forces are important here to both sides.

I am not too disappointed at where Ukraine is in it's offensive. If Ukraine can cut the land bridge, even if it doesn't get to the sea of Azov, Crimea will be much more difficult to supply. All those troops in all those fortifications need food and water. If they have to fight, they also will need vast quantities of ammunition and casevac. Russia will be very, very hard put to do this on the required scale via the bridge. After the dam was blown (and actually before) the water supply to Crimea was cut off. It will be a long cold winter in South Kherson Oblast for lots of Russians if Ukraine can accomplish that mission. The bridge then becomes critical. If Ukraine can cut the rail link, Crimea is toast. There is no way Russia can support all those people by ferries, even if Ukraine doesn't interfere. The Taurus missiles, if supplied by Germany, could make Russians really, really nervous about that bridge. The long range of this missile opens up attack possibilities that do not cross Crimea proper. There are very strong air defenses in Crimea proper. Over the Black Sea, not so much.

[Goose]

IMO nobody can predict ho the morale of Russia and Ukraine will evolve. However, all of us "westerners" need to be reminded that both countries have a population that is historically fatalistic. The population is probably not going to have much say on how long the war continues. They will endure what they are told to endure. The war will end when one side or the other achieves it's military goals or can no longer physically continue fighting. Economic forces are important here to both sides.

I am not too disappointed at where Ukraine is in it's offensive. If Ukraine can cut the land bridge, even if it doesn't get to the sea of Azov, Crimea will be much more difficult to supply. All those troops in all those fortifications need food and water. If they have to fight, they also will need vast quantities of ammunition and casevac. Russia will be very, very hard put to do this on the required scale via the bridge. After the dam was blown (and actually before) the water supply to Crimea was cut off. It will be a long cold winter in South Kherson Oblast for lots of Russians if Ukraine can accomplish that mission. The bridge then becomes critical. If Ukraine can cut the rail link, Crimea is toast. There is no way Russia can support all those people by ferries, even if Ukraine doesn't interfere. The Taurus missiles, if supplied by Germany, could make Russians really, really nervous about that bridge. The long range of this missile opens up attack possibilities that do not cross Crimea proper. There are very strong air defenses in Crimea proper. Over the Black Sea, not so much.

[81alum]

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev was not a democracy.

I was thinking of the US involvement in Afghanistan and the tendency for American public opinion to turn negative on any war the longer it goes on.  But the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is an interesting case.  What did drive Soviet withdrawal, after 10 years?

[81alum]

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev was not a democracy.

I was thinking of the US involvement in Afghanistan and the tendency for American public opinion to turn negative on any war the longer it goes on.  But the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is an interesting case.  What did drive Soviet withdrawal, after 10 years?

[OutsiderFan]

It sure looks like Ukraine is soon to be in Tokmak. This is significant because it will put Melitopol and the supply route from mainland Russia to west of that city in HIMARS range. Ukraine isn't done with the Kerch Bridge either. So it seems like in about a week or two all of Crimea and all territory west of Melitopol could be cut off from supplies. It will just be a matter of time until Russian forces wear down to the point they can no longer fight. 

Another thing I picked up on is that the Ukraine landing on Crimea this week has inspired Ukraine partisans in Crimea to help out Ukrainian forces with either intelligence sharing or sabotage operations. One of the top priorities for Ukraine is to make Crimea feel vulnerable.

You can see why Russia is planning another mobilization in September. The problem for Russia that can't be overcome is equipment losses. They simply are running out of tanks and artillery. Ukraine may be outmanned, but it is much better supplied with better weapons, to say nothing of the morale discrepancy. 

If I were to guess, Ukraine will take a stalemate in the East for the time being in order to make gains in the South. Everyone knows Crimea is Putin's most coveted captured territory. If Ukraine takes it back, the humiliation for Putin will be staggering. Hard to see him surviving such a development. It also is my guess that in terms of any kind of negotiated settlement, Russia will be far more likely to withdraw from the East after losing Crimea, than withdraw from Crimea after losing the East.

[OutsiderFan]

It sure looks like Ukraine is soon to be in Tokmak. This is significant because it will put Melitopol and the supply route from mainland Russia to west of that city in HIMARS range. Ukraine isn't done with the Kerch Bridge either. So it seems like in about a week or two all of Crimea and all territory west of Melitopol could be cut off from supplies. It will just be a matter of time until Russian forces wear down to the point they can no longer fight. 

Another thing I picked up on is that the Ukraine landing on Crimea this week has inspired Ukraine partisans in Crimea to help out Ukrainian forces with either intelligence sharing or sabotage operations. One of the top priorities for Ukraine is to make Crimea feel vulnerable.

You can see why Russia is planning another mobilization in September. The problem for Russia that can't be overcome is equipment losses. They simply are running out of tanks and artillery. Ukraine may be outmanned, but it is much better supplied with better weapons, to say nothing of the morale discrepancy. 

If I were to guess, Ukraine will take a stalemate in the East for the time being in order to make gains in the South. Everyone knows Crimea is Putin's most coveted captured territory. If Ukraine takes it back, the humiliation for Putin will be staggering. Hard to see him surviving such a development. It also is my guess that in terms of any kind of negotiated settlement, Russia will be far more likely to withdraw from the East after losing Crimea, than withdraw from Crimea after losing the East.

[Goose]

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev was not a democracy.

I was thinking of the US involvement in Afghanistan and the tendency for American public opinion to turn negative on any war the longer it goes on.  But the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is an interesting case.  What did drive Soviet withdrawal, after 10 years?

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was triggered by the same thing that all successful insurgencies rely upon. As long as the insurgents refuse to quit, the controlling power must continue to spend blood and treasure to suppress them. Eventually the controlling power realizes that this process will never end. They then evaluate whether it is worth it to continue and decide it is not. Worked for the US against the UK back in the day too. As long as the controlling power has a plausible strategy to win, they will probably keep fighting. When they no longer have such a strategy, they (wisely) quit. Sometimes the strategy exists but it is just too politically hard to do and/or morally unacceptable. Same result.

[Goose]

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev was not a democracy.

I was thinking of the US involvement in Afghanistan and the tendency for American public opinion to turn negative on any war the longer it goes on.  But the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is an interesting case.  What did drive Soviet withdrawal, after 10 years?

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was triggered by the same thing that all successful insurgencies rely upon. As long as the insurgents refuse to quit, the controlling power must continue to spend blood and treasure to suppress them. Eventually the controlling power realizes that this process will never end. They then evaluate whether it is worth it to continue and decide it is not. Worked for the US against the UK back in the day too. As long as the controlling power has a plausible strategy to win, they will probably keep fighting. When they no longer have such a strategy, they (wisely) quit. Sometimes the strategy exists but it is just too politically hard to do and/or morally unacceptable. Same result.

[Goose]

It sure looks like Ukraine is soon to be in Tokmak. This is significant because it will put Melitopol and the supply route from mainland Russia to west of that city in HIMARS range. Ukraine isn't done with the Kerch Bridge either. So it seems like in about a week or two all of Crimea and all territory west of Melitopol could be cut off from supplies. It will just be a matter of time until Russian forces wear down to the point they can no longer fight.

Unfortunately having a GLOC under artillery fire is not sufficient to render it unusable. It can still be used but at a price. This was amply demonstrated by Ukraine in the defense of Bakhmut and by Russia in their long retention of Kherson even after the bridge was in HIMARS range.
Railroads are much more difficult to keep operating than roads, because repairing them requires material and enough time that a artillery response is likely. Roads just require filling the holes, or driving around them. Ukraine needs to get astride the road/rail link somewhere to really cut it off. Imposing a cost is useful, but actually denying the use is potentially fatal.

The bridge is indeed important and will be come more important if Ukraine cuts the land bridge. If the bridge's rail link can be cut for several months (at least), the civilian population of Crimea will probably have to be substantially reduced. The Russians can, with the expenditure of great effort, supply Crimea by sea, both via the Sea of Azov ferries and ships unloading in Sevastopol. They probably can't supply all the people living there, and possibly not even all the troops they have there. Whether Russia actually has the organizational skill to pull this off is IMHO a bit questionable. I hope we get to find out.

Another thing I picked up on is that the Ukraine landing on Crimea this week has inspired Ukraine partisans in Crimea to help out Ukrainian forces with either intelligence sharing or sabotage operations. One of the top priorities for Ukraine is to make Crimea feel vulnerable.

I agree here lots of Russian civilians self-evacuating will not be a good look.

You can see why Russia is planning another mobilization in September. The problem for Russia that can't be overcome is equipment losses. They simply are running out of tanks and artillery. Ukraine may be outmanned, but it is much better supplied with better weapons, to say nothing of the morale discrepancy.

Nope and nope. Russia has plenty of weapons, especially for the defense they are running. They have infantry in concrete strong points and they have artillery in protected emplacements. They manufacture enough artillery shells per year for the defense. If they were going on offense, they may be pushing the limits of their artillery supplies, but for defense, they have "enough". They can't outshoot Ukraine 10 to 1, like they did before, but they can do 1:1 easily. For defense, that is good enough. Oh, and by the way Russia has plenty of mines too.

What Russia does need is bodies to replace the ones that they are losing. Those bodies will be entirely untrained and have very poor morale. Their supply situation, even if the land bridge is still intact, will not be good. If it isn't intact, it could be critically bad, especially in spots. That won't be good for Russia. The purpose of Ukraine's probing tactics is to find those spots where there aren't enough Russians or there aren't enough shells. The more of these places there are, the better Ukraine will do. The goal of offense in war, as in football, is to achieve numerical superiority at the point of attack. The two sides may have similar numbers, but it is where they are concentrated that matters. Thus the dispute between the arm-chair generals in "the west" and the ones actually fighting. Both have the same goal but a different approach to achieving it.

Ukraine does have "better" weapons than Russuia but arguably not enough of them, particularly tube artillery. They are still well short of what Russia fields. Ukraine was also so close to running out of 155mm common shells that the US gave them DPICM. Even though in this case the "shortage" was somewhat an "excuse" to allow giving out DPICM, it is real. The US also has a very limited supply of DPICM, as we have deprecated it in US service (indeed we are dumb). The supposed "increases in production" are mostly future tense. All is not well in the Ukrainian supply chain.

If I were to guess, Ukraine will take a stalemate in the East for the time being in order to make gains in the South. Everyone knows Crimea is Putin's most coveted captured territory. If Ukraine takes it back, the humiliation for Putin will be staggering. Hard to see him surviving such a development. It also is my guess that in terms of any kind of negotiated settlement, Russia will be far more likely to withdraw from the East after losing Crimea, than withdraw from Crimea after losing the East.

Totally agree. Additionally, Ukraine needs Crimea back in order to be secure going forward. The only issue in the east is that Ukraine needs to protect the urban centers in the north east, like Kharkiv and especially Kupyansk. The bad news is that supplying the Donbas will always be easy for Russia, so driving them out of that area will always be difficult.

[Goose]

It sure looks like Ukraine is soon to be in Tokmak. This is significant because it will put Melitopol and the supply route from mainland Russia to west of that city in HIMARS range. Ukraine isn't done with the Kerch Bridge either. So it seems like in about a week or two all of Crimea and all territory west of Melitopol could be cut off from supplies. It will just be a matter of time until Russian forces wear down to the point they can no longer fight.

Unfortunately having a GLOC under artillery fire is not sufficient to render it unusable. It can still be used but at a price. This was amply demonstrated by Ukraine in the defense of Bakhmut and by Russia in their long retention of Kherson even after the bridge was in HIMARS range.
Railroads are much more difficult to keep operating than roads, because repairing them requires material and enough time that a artillery response is likely. Roads just require filling the holes, or driving around them. Ukraine needs to get astride the road/rail link somewhere to really cut it off. Imposing a cost is useful, but actually denying the use is potentially fatal.

The bridge is indeed important and will be come more important if Ukraine cuts the land bridge. If the bridge's rail link can be cut for several months (at least), the civilian population of Crimea will probably have to be substantially reduced. The Russians can, with the expenditure of great effort, supply Crimea by sea, both via the Sea of Azov ferries and ships unloading in Sevastopol. They probably can't supply all the people living there, and possibly not even all the troops they have there. Whether Russia actually has the organizational skill to pull this off is IMHO a bit questionable. I hope we get to find out.

Another thing I picked up on is that the Ukraine landing on Crimea this week has inspired Ukraine partisans in Crimea to help out Ukrainian forces with either intelligence sharing or sabotage operations. One of the top priorities for Ukraine is to make Crimea feel vulnerable.

I agree here lots of Russian civilians self-evacuating will not be a good look.

You can see why Russia is planning another mobilization in September. The problem for Russia that can't be overcome is equipment losses. They simply are running out of tanks and artillery. Ukraine may be outmanned, but it is much better supplied with better weapons, to say nothing of the morale discrepancy.

Nope and nope. Russia has plenty of weapons, especially for the defense they are running. They have infantry in concrete strong points and they have artillery in protected emplacements. They manufacture enough artillery shells per year for the defense. If they were going on offense, they may be pushing the limits of their artillery supplies, but for defense, they have "enough". They can't outshoot Ukraine 10 to 1, like they did before, but they can do 1:1 easily. For defense, that is good enough. Oh, and by the way Russia has plenty of mines too.

What Russia does need is bodies to replace the ones that they are losing. Those bodies will be entirely untrained and have very poor morale. Their supply situation, even if the land bridge is still intact, will not be good. If it isn't intact, it could be critically bad, especially in spots. That won't be good for Russia. The purpose of Ukraine's probing tactics is to find those spots where there aren't enough Russians or there aren't enough shells. The more of these places there are, the better Ukraine will do. The goal of offense in war, as in football, is to achieve numerical superiority at the point of attack. The two sides may have similar numbers, but it is where they are concentrated that matters. Thus the dispute between the arm-chair generals in "the west" and the ones actually fighting. Both have the same goal but a different approach to achieving it.

Ukraine does have "better" weapons than Russuia but arguably not enough of them, particularly tube artillery. They are still well short of what Russia fields. Ukraine was also so close to running out of 155mm common shells that the US gave them DPICM. Even though in this case the "shortage" was somewhat an "excuse" to allow giving out DPICM, it is real. The US also has a very limited supply of DPICM, as we have deprecated it in US service (indeed we are dumb). The supposed "increases in production" are mostly future tense. All is not well in the Ukrainian supply chain.

If I were to guess, Ukraine will take a stalemate in the East for the time being in order to make gains in the South. Everyone knows Crimea is Putin's most coveted captured territory. If Ukraine takes it back, the humiliation for Putin will be staggering. Hard to see him surviving such a development. It also is my guess that in terms of any kind of negotiated settlement, Russia will be far more likely to withdraw from the East after losing Crimea, than withdraw from Crimea after losing the East.

Totally agree. Additionally, Ukraine needs Crimea back in order to be secure going forward. The only issue in the east is that Ukraine needs to protect the urban centers in the north east, like Kharkiv and especially Kupyansk. The bad news is that supplying the Donbas will always be easy for Russia, so driving them out of that area will always be difficult.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-shows...45884.html

The Ukrainians, being no dummies, have realized that their surface drones are going to have real problems sinking a ship. Damaging a ship, yes. Immobilizing it? Maybe if you hit a vulnerable spot. Sink it? Not unless there is no damage control at all going on. Modern torpedoes are actually set to pass UNDER the ship. They don't actually hit it, normally. The warhead explodes under the keel, creating a "water hammer". Water is incompressible. The water hammer literally shatters the keel of the ship when the shock wave hits. The damage is massive. That is how you sink ships.

Ukraine could also be looking to use a water hammer against a support pillar of the Kerch bridge. That could actually take down the rail bridge in a way that would take a very long time to repair. Russia has good air defense against attacks on the bridge. I would wonder about how good their undersea defenses are. It might be easily possible to sneak through by traveling along underneath a commercial vessel to mask the signature. Worked for the Russians in the GIUK gap. Why not for Ukraine now?

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-shows...45884.html

The Ukrainians, being no dummies, have realized that their surface drones are going to have real problems sinking a ship. Damaging a ship, yes. Immobilizing it? Maybe if you hit a vulnerable spot. Sink it? Not unless there is no damage control at all going on. Modern torpedoes are actually set to pass UNDER the ship. They don't actually hit it, normally. The warhead explodes under the keel, creating a "water hammer". Water is incompressible. The water hammer literally shatters the keel of the ship when the shock wave hits. The damage is massive. That is how you sink ships.

Ukraine could also be looking to use a water hammer against a support pillar of the Kerch bridge. That could actually take down the rail bridge in a way that would take a very long time to repair. Russia has good air defense against attacks on the bridge. I would wonder about how good their undersea defenses are. It might be easily possible to sneak through by traveling along underneath a commercial vessel to mask the signature. Worked for the Russians in the GIUK gap. Why not for Ukraine now?

[Treefence]

Rumors are ATACMS are finally going to be approved for Ukraine, but just like Turkey approving Sweden's NATO bid, I'll believe it when I see it.  I wouldn't be surprised if the rumored approval is an effort by someone trying to put pressure on Biden to finally approve them, as he seems to be the biggest holdup.  This is no shot at Biden in general, but just about this issue.  I'd like the US to change their focus from preventing Ukraine from losing, to giving everything Ukraine needs to win.

[Treefence]

Rumors are ATACMS are finally going to be approved for Ukraine, but just like Turkey approving Sweden's NATO bid, I'll believe it when I see it.  I wouldn't be surprised if the rumored approval is an effort by someone trying to put pressure on Biden to finally approve them, as he seems to be the biggest holdup.  This is no shot at Biden in general, but just about this issue.  I'd like the US to change their focus from preventing Ukraine from losing, to giving everything Ukraine needs to win.

[Goose]

Rumors are ATACMS are finally going to be approved for Ukraine, but just like Turkey approving Sweden's NATO bid, I'll believe it when I see it.  I wouldn't be surprised if the rumored approval is an effort by someone trying to put pressure on Biden to finally approve them, as he seems to be the biggest holdup.  This is no shot at Biden in general, but just about this issue.  I'd like the US to change their focus from preventing Ukraine from losing, to giving everything Ukraine needs to win.

The problem here is that there is no combination of weapons we could give Ukraine that will allow them to "win". Even if we gave them tactical nuclear weapons, they would have to be trained and practiced in using them. That takes time, and despite all the attempts by Ukraine to minimize that time, the requirement exists.

A recent cogent example is the infantry training given to Ukrainian troops in Europe and the UK. The problem is that 30 days training does not make a qualified combat infantryman. This is especially true when the rest of the troops in the unit are equally inexperienced. Ukraine has been standing up new units that don't posses even a "core" of experienced troops. It is unavoidable, but as we see from the complaints made by Ukrainian troops, they are not prepared for what they face. Some have complained that the NATO training doesn't match the fight they are now experiencing. One Ukrainian complained that "NATO troops go into battle knowing they will probably survive". Well, no they don't. They know they might very well be in some desperate fights where not many come back. That is part of the process of understanding your MOS. NATO infantry gets probably 3 times the training and then join units that already exist and have a cadre of "old heads" that can lead them.  Most of the new Ukrainian units involved in the offensive have none of this. By now however, the ones that survived are "old heads". Lets hope there are enough of them. At this point, it isn't about weapons. Ukraine has those. It is about courage and skill. Ukraine has plenty of courage. A lot of the troops lack skill because they are inexperienced. We can't give them that.

All that said, weapons can help. Ukraine does need the F-16s or equivalent to keep Russian air off their troops. Part of this is psychosomatic. Russian air hasn't been all that effective, but if you are the one it kills, you won't see it that way. Having no air defense at all makes infantry feel naked and helpless. That needs to change. The F-16s would do that, even if they did nothing else. However, this will take time. You can't generate a fighter squadron from nothing in a few months. Does Ukraine have time? The Unforgiving Minute is always in play. We don't know.

Getting ATACMS would make it even more difficult for Russia to supply their troops, but, IMO, we have to be aware that the first target Ukraine wants ATACMS to hit is the Kerch bridge. Ukraine is expending lots of lives to cut the supply route to Crimea via the "land bridge". There is reason to believe they will succeed. They clearly see the best and quickest way to win the war is to take back Crimea. They need to do this anyway to have any chance of surviving as a country. If they can destroy the bridge, there is every reason to believe that Russia simply can't supply the population of Crimea plus all their troops in South Kherson and Crimea by sea. That debacle is the best bet for Ukraine to win the war. Ukraine knows it. Russia knows it.  We are seeing this play out. ATACMS can, in one or two attacks, take out the bridge. Does the US have the courage to let Ukraine have the missiles? My guess is no, unfortunately.

[Goose]

Rumors are ATACMS are finally going to be approved for Ukraine, but just like Turkey approving Sweden's NATO bid, I'll believe it when I see it.  I wouldn't be surprised if the rumored approval is an effort by someone trying to put pressure on Biden to finally approve them, as he seems to be the biggest holdup.  This is no shot at Biden in general, but just about this issue.  I'd like the US to change their focus from preventing Ukraine from losing, to giving everything Ukraine needs to win.

The problem here is that there is no combination of weapons we could give Ukraine that will allow them to "win". Even if we gave them tactical nuclear weapons, they would have to be trained and practiced in using them. That takes time, and despite all the attempts by Ukraine to minimize that time, the requirement exists.

A recent cogent example is the infantry training given to Ukrainian troops in Europe and the UK. The problem is that 30 days training does not make a qualified combat infantryman. This is especially true when the rest of the troops in the unit are equally inexperienced. Ukraine has been standing up new units that don't posses even a "core" of experienced troops. It is unavoidable, but as we see from the complaints made by Ukrainian troops, they are not prepared for what they face. Some have complained that the NATO training doesn't match the fight they are now experiencing. One Ukrainian complained that "NATO troops go into battle knowing they will probably survive". Well, no they don't. They know they might very well be in some desperate fights where not many come back. That is part of the process of understanding your MOS. NATO infantry gets probably 3 times the training and then join units that already exist and have a cadre of "old heads" that can lead them.  Most of the new Ukrainian units involved in the offensive have none of this. By now however, the ones that survived are "old heads". Lets hope there are enough of them. At this point, it isn't about weapons. Ukraine has those. It is about courage and skill. Ukraine has plenty of courage. A lot of the troops lack skill because they are inexperienced. We can't give them that.

All that said, weapons can help. Ukraine does need the F-16s or equivalent to keep Russian air off their troops. Part of this is psychosomatic. Russian air hasn't been all that effective, but if you are the one it kills, you won't see it that way. Having no air defense at all makes infantry feel naked and helpless. That needs to change. The F-16s would do that, even if they did nothing else. However, this will take time. You can't generate a fighter squadron from nothing in a few months. Does Ukraine have time? The Unforgiving Minute is always in play. We don't know.

Getting ATACMS would make it even more difficult for Russia to supply their troops, but, IMO, we have to be aware that the first target Ukraine wants ATACMS to hit is the Kerch bridge. Ukraine is expending lots of lives to cut the supply route to Crimea via the "land bridge". There is reason to believe they will succeed. They clearly see the best and quickest way to win the war is to take back Crimea. They need to do this anyway to have any chance of surviving as a country. If they can destroy the bridge, there is every reason to believe that Russia simply can't supply the population of Crimea plus all their troops in South Kherson and Crimea by sea. That debacle is the best bet for Ukraine to win the war. Ukraine knows it. Russia knows it.  We are seeing this play out. ATACMS can, in one or two attacks, take out the bridge. Does the US have the courage to let Ukraine have the missiles? My guess is no, unfortunately.

[OutsiderFan]

What do y'all make of NATO exercises in the Black Sea planned for this week? Apparently it's all about combined mine removal operations between several NATO countries, as part of effort to keep grain moving out of Black Sea.

It was also announced that the Royal Air Force is escorting Ukrainian ships carrying grain, in an attempt to prevent any Russian interference.

Think Russia will do anything stupid to interfere with either of these operations?

In other news, Russia's armed forces are shelling their own troops if they retreat from attacking Ukrainian forces kicking their asses. Sounds like a good opportunity for mass surrender, and a great way to destroy morale of Russians told to fight.

It's also being reported Russia is gearing up for another mobilization of 200,000 more sacrificial lambs this month.

Russia lost the most people in WW2, and they only defeated Germany by sheer number of lives sacrificed to do it. It seems Russia has no problem sending their people to die in order to protect the ruling regime.

NATO countries are going to have to finance the killing of hundreds of thousands of Russians forced to fight a war they probably don't want to fight, and many of them are going to be younger than 18. 


There has to be a better way forward than this.

[OutsiderFan]

What do y'all make of NATO exercises in the Black Sea planned for this week? Apparently it's all about combined mine removal operations between several NATO countries, as part of effort to keep grain moving out of Black Sea.

It was also announced that the Royal Air Force is escorting Ukrainian ships carrying grain, in an attempt to prevent any Russian interference.

Think Russia will do anything stupid to interfere with either of these operations?

In other news, Russia's armed forces are shelling their own troops if they retreat from attacking Ukrainian forces kicking their asses. Sounds like a good opportunity for mass surrender, and a great way to destroy morale of Russians told to fight.

It's also being reported Russia is gearing up for another mobilization of 200,000 more sacrificial lambs this month.

Russia lost the most people in WW2, and they only defeated Germany by sheer number of lives sacrificed to do it. It seems Russia has no problem sending their people to die in order to protect the ruling regime.

NATO countries are going to have to finance the killing of hundreds of thousands of Russians forced to fight a war they probably don't want to fight, and many of them are going to be younger than 18. 


There has to be a better way forward than this.

[Goose]

What do y'all make of NATO exercises in the Black Sea planned for this week? Apparently it's all about combined mine removal operations between several NATO countries, as part of effort to keep grain moving out of Black Sea.

It was also announced that the Royal Air Force is escorting Ukrainian ships carrying grain, in an attempt to prevent any Russian interference.

Think Russia will do anything stupid to interfere with either of these operations?

The aircraft "escorting" ships carrying Ukrainian exports (not just grain, and not primarily Ukrainian flagged ships) are doing so over Romanian and international waters. It is unknown under what ROE they are operating. I don't think we will see them shoot at Russians (or even Russian UAVs), but the Russians may chose not to test the issue.

In other news, Russia's armed forces are shelling their own troops if they retreat from attacking Ukrainian forces kicking their asses. Sounds like a good opportunity for mass surrender, and a great way to destroy morale of Russians told to fight.

It is pretty probable the Russians are shelling troops that they think are Ukrainian. There command and control isn't all that great so they often do not know where their own people are. It is improbable they would waste artillery shells and expose the position of the battery shooting at their own troops. These days getting enough shells forward is a problem for Russia, so they would "be careful".

It's also being reported Russia is gearing up for another mobilization of 200,000 more sacrificial lambs this month.

Russia lost the most people in WW2, and they only defeated Germany by sheer number of lives sacrificed to do it. It seems Russia has no problem sending their people to die in order to protect the ruling regime.

One reason why Ukraine is trying to put themselves in a good position in the next few months. It is unclear how much training the new conscripts will get, but even if it is two months worth, they won't be available for a while. Ukraine wants to complete the current offensive before the mud sets in and/or Russian numbers greatly increase.

NATO countries are going to have to finance the killing of hundreds of thousands of Russians forced to fight a war they probably don't want to fight, and many of them are going to be younger than 18.

There has to be a better way forward than this.

Amen, but until Russia realizes this or Ukraine collapses, it must go on. Human stupidity has never been in short supply.

[Goose]

What do y'all make of NATO exercises in the Black Sea planned for this week? Apparently it's all about combined mine removal operations between several NATO countries, as part of effort to keep grain moving out of Black Sea.

It was also announced that the Royal Air Force is escorting Ukrainian ships carrying grain, in an attempt to prevent any Russian interference.

Think Russia will do anything stupid to interfere with either of these operations?

The aircraft "escorting" ships carrying Ukrainian exports (not just grain, and not primarily Ukrainian flagged ships) are doing so over Romanian and international waters. It is unknown under what ROE they are operating. I don't think we will see them shoot at Russians (or even Russian UAVs), but the Russians may chose not to test the issue.

In other news, Russia's armed forces are shelling their own troops if they retreat from attacking Ukrainian forces kicking their asses. Sounds like a good opportunity for mass surrender, and a great way to destroy morale of Russians told to fight.

It is pretty probable the Russians are shelling troops that they think are Ukrainian. There command and control isn't all that great so they often do not know where their own people are. It is improbable they would waste artillery shells and expose the position of the battery shooting at their own troops. These days getting enough shells forward is a problem for Russia, so they would "be careful".

It's also being reported Russia is gearing up for another mobilization of 200,000 more sacrificial lambs this month.

Russia lost the most people in WW2, and they only defeated Germany by sheer number of lives sacrificed to do it. It seems Russia has no problem sending their people to die in order to protect the ruling regime.

One reason why Ukraine is trying to put themselves in a good position in the next few months. It is unclear how much training the new conscripts will get, but even if it is two months worth, they won't be available for a while. Ukraine wants to complete the current offensive before the mud sets in and/or Russian numbers greatly increase.

NATO countries are going to have to finance the killing of hundreds of thousands of Russians forced to fight a war they probably don't want to fight, and many of them are going to be younger than 18.

There has to be a better way forward than this.

Amen, but until Russia realizes this or Ukraine collapses, it must go on. Human stupidity has never been in short supply.

[gocard14]

1694282092[/url]']

1694278906[/url]']
Rumors are ATACMS are finally going to be approved for Ukraine, but just like Turkey approving Sweden's NATO bid, I'll believe it when I see it.  I wouldn't be surprised if the rumored approval is an effort by someone trying to put pressure on Biden to finally approve them, as he seems to be the biggest holdup.  This is no shot at Biden in general, but just about this issue.  I'd like the US to change their focus from preventing Ukraine from losing, to giving everything Ukraine needs to win.

The problem here is that there is no combination of weapons we could give Ukraine that will allow them to "win". Even if we gave them tactical nuclear weapons, they would have to be trained and practiced in using them. That takes time, and despite all the attempts by Ukraine to minimize that time, the requirement exists.

A recent cogent example is the infantry training given to Ukrainian troops in Europe and the UK. The problem is that 30 days training does not make a qualified combat infantryman. This is especially true when the rest of the troops in the unit are equally inexperienced. Ukraine has been standing up new units that don't posses even a "core" of experienced troops. It is unavoidable, but as we see from the complaints made by Ukrainian troops, they are not prepared for what they face. Some have complained that the NATO training doesn't match the fight they are now experiencing. One Ukrainian complained that "NATO troops go into battle knowing they will probably survive". Well, no they don't. They know they might very well be in some desperate fights where not many come back. That is part of the process of understanding your MOS. NATO infantry gets probably 3 times the training and then join units that already exist and have a cadre of "old heads" that can lead them.  Most of the new Ukrainian units involved in the offensive have none of this. By now however, the ones that survived are "old heads". Lets hope there are enough of them. At this point, it isn't about weapons. Ukraine has those. It is about courage and skill. Ukraine has plenty of courage. A lot of the troops lack skill because they are inexperienced. We can't give them that.

All that said, weapons can help. Ukraine does need the F-16s or equivalent to keep Russian air off their troops. Part of this is psychosomatic. Russian air hasn't been all that effective, but if you are the one it kills, you won't see it that way. Having no air defense at all makes infantry feel naked and helpless. That needs to change. The F-16s would do that, even if they did nothing else. However, this will take time. You can't generate a fighter squadron from nothing in a few months. Does Ukraine have time? The Unforgiving Minute is always in play. We don't know.

Getting ATACMS would make it even more difficult for Russia to supply their troops, but, IMO, we have to be aware that the first target Ukraine wants ATACMS to hit is the Kerch bridge. Ukraine is expending lots of lives to cut the supply route to Crimea via the "land bridge". There is reason to believe they will succeed. They clearly see the best and quickest way to win the war is to take back Crimea. They need to do this anyway to have any chance of surviving as a country. If they can destroy the bridge, there is every reason to believe that Russia simply can't supply the population of Crimea plus all their troops in South Kherson and Crimea by sea. That debacle is the best bet for Ukraine to win the war. Ukraine knows it. Russia knows it.  We are seeing this play out. ATACMS can, in one or two attacks, take out the bridge. Does the US have the courage to let Ukraine have the missiles? My guess is no, unfortunately.

Any particular reason to think ATACMS can destroy the bridge when current armaments like storm shadow have not? I'd assumed the combo of jamming and air defense, combined with limited ammo to waste in an unsuccessful attack with storm shadow  was the reason it is still standing. Is it a difference in capability or simply of numbers?

[gocard14]

1694282092[/url]']

1694278906[/url]']
Rumors are ATACMS are finally going to be approved for Ukraine, but just like Turkey approving Sweden's NATO bid, I'll believe it when I see it.  I wouldn't be surprised if the rumored approval is an effort by someone trying to put pressure on Biden to finally approve them, as he seems to be the biggest holdup.  This is no shot at Biden in general, but just about this issue.  I'd like the US to change their focus from preventing Ukraine from losing, to giving everything Ukraine needs to win.

The problem here is that there is no combination of weapons we could give Ukraine that will allow them to "win". Even if we gave them tactical nuclear weapons, they would have to be trained and practiced in using them. That takes time, and despite all the attempts by Ukraine to minimize that time, the requirement exists.

A recent cogent example is the infantry training given to Ukrainian troops in Europe and the UK. The problem is that 30 days training does not make a qualified combat infantryman. This is especially true when the rest of the troops in the unit are equally inexperienced. Ukraine has been standing up new units that don't posses even a "core" of experienced troops. It is unavoidable, but as we see from the complaints made by Ukrainian troops, they are not prepared for what they face. Some have complained that the NATO training doesn't match the fight they are now experiencing. One Ukrainian complained that "NATO troops go into battle knowing they will probably survive". Well, no they don't. They know they might very well be in some desperate fights where not many come back. That is part of the process of understanding your MOS. NATO infantry gets probably 3 times the training and then join units that already exist and have a cadre of "old heads" that can lead them.  Most of the new Ukrainian units involved in the offensive have none of this. By now however, the ones that survived are "old heads". Lets hope there are enough of them. At this point, it isn't about weapons. Ukraine has those. It is about courage and skill. Ukraine has plenty of courage. A lot of the troops lack skill because they are inexperienced. We can't give them that.

All that said, weapons can help. Ukraine does need the F-16s or equivalent to keep Russian air off their troops. Part of this is psychosomatic. Russian air hasn't been all that effective, but if you are the one it kills, you won't see it that way. Having no air defense at all makes infantry feel naked and helpless. That needs to change. The F-16s would do that, even if they did nothing else. However, this will take time. You can't generate a fighter squadron from nothing in a few months. Does Ukraine have time? The Unforgiving Minute is always in play. We don't know.

Getting ATACMS would make it even more difficult for Russia to supply their troops, but, IMO, we have to be aware that the first target Ukraine wants ATACMS to hit is the Kerch bridge. Ukraine is expending lots of lives to cut the supply route to Crimea via the "land bridge". There is reason to believe they will succeed. They clearly see the best and quickest way to win the war is to take back Crimea. They need to do this anyway to have any chance of surviving as a country. If they can destroy the bridge, there is every reason to believe that Russia simply can't supply the population of Crimea plus all their troops in South Kherson and Crimea by sea. That debacle is the best bet for Ukraine to win the war. Ukraine knows it. Russia knows it.  We are seeing this play out. ATACMS can, in one or two attacks, take out the bridge. Does the US have the courage to let Ukraine have the missiles? My guess is no, unfortunately.

Any particular reason to think ATACMS can destroy the bridge when current armaments like storm shadow have not? I'd assumed the combo of jamming and air defense, combined with limited ammo to waste in an unsuccessful attack with storm shadow  was the reason it is still standing. Is it a difference in capability or simply of numbers?

[Goose]

Any particular reason to think ATACMS can destroy the bridge when current armaments like storm shadow have not? I'd assumed the combo of jamming and air defense, combined with limited ammo to waste in an unsuccessful attack with storm shadow  was the reason it is still standing. Is it a difference in capability or simply of numbers?

The ATACMS is a ballistic missile with a speed of Mach 3 while the Storm Shadow is a cruise missile. That means it takes the Storm Shadow a significantly longer time in flight which can make it easier to detect. Russia has LOTS of air defense in south Kherson and in Crimea. They have some experience in shooting down cruise missiles. They are like low-flying airplanes but they can't execute a missile avoidance maneuvers. The jamming can also affect cruise missiles more because their INS has to navigate longer, increasing it's error. ATACMS can rely on it's INS to a much greater degree because it's speed will reduce the time for errors to accumulate.

The interception of a ballistic missile is just harder than a cruise missile (if you have adequate resources to detect either). I am assuming the Russian forces defending the bridge have little if any experience against ballistic targets. If done "right", Ukraine can give them difficult geometry to deal with. It can also be a complete surprise if the launch happens before the delivery to Ukraine is announced. The Russians make lots of claims regarding their capabilities that often turn out to be vast overstatements. I am betting that is the case here.

[Goose]

Any particular reason to think ATACMS can destroy the bridge when current armaments like storm shadow have not? I'd assumed the combo of jamming and air defense, combined with limited ammo to waste in an unsuccessful attack with storm shadow  was the reason it is still standing. Is it a difference in capability or simply of numbers?

The ATACMS is a ballistic missile with a speed of Mach 3 while the Storm Shadow is a cruise missile. That means it takes the Storm Shadow a significantly longer time in flight which can make it easier to detect. Russia has LOTS of air defense in south Kherson and in Crimea. They have some experience in shooting down cruise missiles. They are like low-flying airplanes but they can't execute a missile avoidance maneuvers. The jamming can also affect cruise missiles more because their INS has to navigate longer, increasing it's error. ATACMS can rely on it's INS to a much greater degree because it's speed will reduce the time for errors to accumulate.

The interception of a ballistic missile is just harder than a cruise missile (if you have adequate resources to detect either). I am assuming the Russian forces defending the bridge have little if any experience against ballistic targets. If done "right", Ukraine can give them difficult geometry to deal with. It can also be a complete surprise if the launch happens before the delivery to Ukraine is announced. The Russians make lots of claims regarding their capabilities that often turn out to be vast overstatements. I am betting that is the case here.

[Treefence]

Some massive explosions going on in the occupied port of Sevastopol.  Early indications are that the dry dock was hit, containing a Kilo-class sub and a Ropucha landing ship as of this morning based on satellite footage.  Too early to tell, but definitely some continual fires, and possibly the sub on fire can be seen in footage.  This would be a significant attack if those ships are hit.  The last tweet seems to record a missile hitting (if not a secondary explosion), any way of identifying what it is?  Is this the ground attack Neptunes striking again, or possibly a surprise ATACMS attack, before an official announcement?  

[tweet]=https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1701759774700835275?s=20]https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1701759774700835275?s=20[/tweet]

[tweet]=https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1701778120460652862?s=20]https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1701778120460652862?s=20[/tweet]

[tweet]=https://twitter.com/igorsushko/status/1701787449259917735?s=20]https://twitter.com/igorsushko/status/1701787449259917735?s=20[/tweet]

[Treefence]

Some massive explosions going on in the occupied port of Sevastopol.  Early indications are that the dry dock was hit, containing a Kilo-class sub and a Ropucha landing ship as of this morning based on satellite footage.  Too early to tell, but definitely some continual fires, and possibly the sub on fire can be seen in footage.  This would be a significant attack if those ships are hit.  The last tweet seems to record a missile hitting (if not a secondary explosion), any way of identifying what it is?  Is this the ground attack Neptunes striking again, or possibly a surprise ATACMS attack, before an official announcement?  

[tweet]=https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1701759774700835275?s=20]https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1701759774700835275?s=20[/tweet]

[tweet]=https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1701778120460652862?s=20]https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1701778120460652862?s=20[/tweet]

[tweet]=https://twitter.com/igorsushko/status/1701787449259917735?s=20]https://twitter.com/igorsushko/status/1701787449259917735?s=20[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

From video that had film from before impact, it sounded like a cruise missile. Guessing Storm Shadow but could be a Ukrainian Neptune perhaps. There has been talk of more upgraded ground attack versions being produced.

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1701791873562517826?s=20[/tweet]
[Tweet]https://twitter.com/jabuttee/status/1701784683694993899?s=20[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

From video that had film from before impact, it sounded like a cruise missile. Guessing Storm Shadow but could be a Ukrainian Neptune perhaps. There has been talk of more upgraded ground attack versions being produced.

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1701791873562517826?s=20[/tweet]
[Tweet]https://twitter.com/jabuttee/status/1701784683694993899?s=20[/tweet]