(11-02-2023, 11:06 AM)81alum Wrote: For quite some time my gut has told me that changes in technology and the nature of the terrain and strategies in this conflict were producing a WWI war of attrition and stalemate. I know to a certainty that several of you who post in this thread are far more knowledgeable about military history, strategy, tactics, leadership, weapons systems etc. than am I, and so I have always voiced my concerns tentatively and with respect to the expertise that is frequently exhibited by others on this board.
However, when I read this in the NYT this morning I could not help but have my worst fears reinforced.
Quote:With the front line in Ukraine having barely shifted despite months of fierce fighting, Ukraine’s top commander has acknowledged that his forces are locked in a “stalemate” with Russia and that no significant breakthrough was imminent, the most candid assessment so far by a leading Ukrainian official of the military’s stalled counteroffensive.
“Just like in the First World War we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate,” the commander, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, told The Economist in an interview published on Wednesday. “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.”
It was the first time a top Ukrainian commander said the fighting had reached an impasse, although General Zaluzhny added that breaking the deadlock could require technological advances to achieve air superiority and increase the effectiveness of artillery fire. He added that Russian forces, too, are incapable of advancing.
The general said modern technology and precision weapons on both sides were preventing troops from breaching enemy lines, including the expansive use of drones, and the ability to jam drones. He called for advances in electronic warfare as a way to break the deadlock.
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/02/world...y-war.html
This is IMO an important topic. I think I understand the points made by the Ukrainian commander. In many respects he is clearly correct, but overall, history tells another tale, IMO. Discussing the evolution of defensive entrenchments is a subject that has produced many thousands of pages. I can't recap it all here. It would definitely be TL;DR :-).
However, a short version is that during WW I both sides had essentially the same weapons. Attacking across open ground against entrenched troops was suicidal, as the machine gun and aimed rifle fire could engage the attackers fairly far from the entrenchments and inflict devastating casualties. Artillery fire could (and did) greatly degrade the ability of the defense to do this. Obviously the defense could also use artillery to engage the attacking troops in the open. This was even more devastating. Both sides eventually mastered the ability to do this. However, so doing required massive supplies of artillery and even more so artillery shells. Concentrating these forces in a relatively small area to accomplish this took time and was easily observed by the defenders. They would then reinforce their own artillery and bring up reserve troops. The offensive would the occur, and it might even take a few trenches from the defense, at the cost of great casualties. The the reserves would attack and drive out the disorganized troops trying to occupy the newly taken trenches.
The "tank" was developed to allow a "mobile fortification" to approach enemy defended trenches and suppress their rifle and machine gun fire. It wasn't invulnerable but at the beginning the entrenched troops didn't have any weapons that could stop tanks. Artillery could, but generally required a pretty direct hit to do so. Statistically, most tanks would get through. However, during WWI the mechanical limitations of tanks restricted their use considerably, their tactical employment was not well understood, and they were not available in large numbers. The Germans developed "storm detachments" that became expert in infiltrating enemy positions. These detachments were armed with automatic weapons and could deliver a massive number of rounds into a trench they had surprised. However, the size of any such attack was necessarily limited and the "storm" troopers suffered an inordinate number of casualties. It "worked", but was not sustainable. The training took too long and not everyone was "good" at it.
None of these new innovations ended the war. What ended the war was mostly German exhaustion. They economically simply couldn't continue to fight. Even if Germany could have continued, the arrival of the US troops would have resulted in them being so vastly outnumbered that even a "conventional" assault by the Allies would have overwhelmed them, albeit at great cost in casualties to the attackers.
While WW II is often cited as making trench and fortification warfare obsolete, that is inaccurate. For instance, the Maginot line was never breached. It drove the German need to find a way around it. The attack through the Ardennes did run into troops entrenched on the riverbank. Where those troops stood and fought, they "won" (e.g. the Senegalese tirailleurs). The problem was other French units were not well-trained and basically ran away when attacked. The big difference in WW II was that if a "breakthrough" could be achieved, even at relatively high cost, the attacking combined arms units could move at much faster than a walking pace. The "blitzkreig" operated at a much faster pace and "leg" infantry (on both sides) were left behind. The combined arms units could cut off and outflank proportionally larger forces, even if these forces were entrenched and relatively invulnerable. These cut off forces were not a threat because they couldn't move fast enough to get in front of the attacking forces, let alone do so and entrench again. France was unable to fortify their entire border area. It was both economically and politically (Belgium was "neutral") impossible.
Obviously in WW II troops still dug entrenchments. However, the mobile nature of the warfare usually meant the entrenchments were not occupied for long. One example of this is the German defense in Normandy. Clearly, the beaches and nearby areas were fortified (long term), and it took a massive invasion force to "crack" this forward defense. Note that Normandy was chosen partly because it was relatively less fortified than the alternatives. Once again, exploiting success in one area allowed the attackers to outflank and surround areas where resistance had been more successful. Later, the terrain provided Germany with "natural" entrenchments in the hedgerows. By WW II, effective direct-fire anti-tank guns existed. These guns were deadly effective but still fairly large. The development of the "bazooka" finally provided the individual infantryman with the ability to engage tanks without requiring dedicated anti-tank forces. However, the thing that really changed the game was air power. In the interest of brevity, see
https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/articl...-breakout/
Which brings us back to Ukraine. As the General states, the sides are basically using the same/similar weapons. The usage of precision artillery fires is really not much different in theory from what the artillery did in WW I and WW II. The difference is that fewer guns are need to produce the same kinetic effect because they don't miss as often. The bazooka has been augmented by weapons that allow a single soldier to engage armor from a distance of several km. This is a very significant effect because tanks are no longer able to suppress fire from entrenched infantry with a high level of success. Anti-tank guns could always be a problem, but there were limited numbers of such weapons and they could be relatively easily seen. One man with a Javelin is very hard to see and kill before he kills the tank.
Drones major contribution is in the ability to actually "see" the entire battle space almost continually. It is almost impossible for the opposition to approach undetected. These drones can also fly further behind the lines and detect enemy concentrations and activities. Both sides have a very good idea of the opponent's potential actions based upon very good visual data collection. You can't hide, and if you are detected, precision fires can reach you and kill you. The kinetic ability of drones is useful in that the "kill chain" consists only of the drone operator. If the drone sees a target, the operator can attack and destroy it. This is a big advantage for "targets of opportunity". However, if the drone sees a concentration of many targets, the drone operator can (at least in theory) call down a very powerful strike on the targets. That is actually a much "bigger deal".
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