[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/patriot-syste...00481.html

Not new news, posted for reference. The SU-34s were ostensibly dropping guided glide bombs. To get maximum range, the SU-34 would have to get up pretty high. However, the "normal" flight profile over "friendly" territory would be stay low as long as possible, climb to altitude as fast as possible, release the weapons, and then go low as fast as possible. The Patriot, located 100+ km distant, would have to get a lock as the SU-34 climbed to altitude and complete the intercept before the SU-34 was low enough the Patriot could no longer "see" it. This is assuming a PAC-2 missile which is SARH.

If the SU-34 was flown "correctly", it should be almost impossible for a Patriot to shoot it down. It takes a while to go from low to high, but not long at all in the other direction. The radar horizon for a patriot to detect an aircraft at a distance of 100 km is 522 meters, or 1,726 ft. Assume the SU-34 wants to lob it's bombs at 30,000 ft. Supposedly, the SU-34 climes at a rate of 45,275 feet / minute. That is undoubtedly a "clean" aircraft and may be a "marketing" number, but even if it is an exageration, the aircraft should reached altitude in about 37 seconds. The time the aircraft would be visible would be around a minute.  The SM-2 goes about 83 km per minute. It would not reach the SU-34 even if it were fired immediately. However, getting a firing "solution" isn't instantaneous and would just add to the time. Obviously, sometimes things go wrong and the jet just doesn't perform or the pilot is slow to release or whatever. All that aside, it would take an umbelieveable performance by the Patriot battery to take down a correctly flown mission.

On top of that, as soon as the Patriot search radar is detected by the aircraft RWR (which should be slightly before the Patriot can detect the SU-34), the pilot should know he could/will be detected and consider his options. One option is to dive away immediately and live to fight another day. Another is to continue with the mission (but be highly motivated to fly it very precisely). When the illuminator is detected, wait 5 seconds or so, then turn on your ECM. The Russians supposedly use DRFMs on the SU-34 to send back a modified (in amplitude) copy of the illuminator signal. At the very least, that will mess up the missile a bit. (If you loose the illuminator, the ECM is smart enough to stop jamming what it can't see) Then, after you drop the bombs and dive, fire off a bunch of chaff to confuse the issue even more. Dive like mad. If the illuminator still holds you after a few seconds, flatten out and find the missile with your own radar. If you can't see it, dive again. If you can see it, begin your missile evasion manuver sequence. Good luck.

So, how did 3 SU-34s get shot down? The missions weren't flown "professionally", first of all. It they had been, it would take a miracle for the Patriot to hit you. More importantly, either the RWR didn't work or the pilot didn't respond appropraitely. If you are in an area where there isn't supposed to be an MPQ-65 and your RWR sees one, I would get out of Dodge. Come back tomorrow when you hsve a plan and are prepared to react to the threat. If you feel you must continue, yell like hell to your buddies and fly like you mean it, because for sure the Patriot will.

So would you attribute this to a single poorly trained unit or is this possibly the state of the Russian Airforce as a whole?  Are there any NATO EW aircraft possibly flying within range of the SU 34's who could contribute target data?  From WLIK the NATO early warning aircraft have a detection range of around 600 kms and I assume this is at altitude.  

Your points about Ukraine's best chance is to attack South across the Dnipro is well taken.  Going North gives Russia all the benefits of short LOC.  It seems to me Russia is willing to almost bleed itself dry by constant attacks in the North, hopefully tying down those reserves Ukraine might be otherwise able to use in the South.  If the Ukrainians prove to be able F16 pilots, things might change to some extent.  It seems almost like Russian tactics have changed little since WWII, but technology has negated some of those advantages they had then.

On another, but related subject, if Iran did in fact launch anti ship rockets at a non Israeli flagged vessel in the Indian Ocean, how long is the rest of the world willing to allow Iran and its allies to totally screw up the worlds shipping with the resulting economic hit.  I would think Russia would prefer that Iran not pull the tail of the tiger for fear someone would take out the Iranian drone factories.

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/patriot-syste...00481.html

Not new news, posted for reference. The SU-34s were ostensibly dropping guided glide bombs. To get maximum range, the SU-34 would have to get up pretty high. However, the "normal" flight profile over "friendly" territory would be stay low as long as possible, climb to altitude as fast as possible, release the weapons, and then go low as fast as possible. The Patriot, located 100+ km distant, would have to get a lock as the SU-34 climbed to altitude and complete the intercept before the SU-34 was low enough the Patriot could no longer "see" it. This is assuming a PAC-2 missile which is SARH.

If the SU-34 was flown "correctly", it should be almost impossible for a Patriot to shoot it down. It takes a while to go from low to high, but not long at all in the other direction. The radar horizon for a patriot to detect an aircraft at a distance of 100 km is 522 meters, or 1,726 ft. Assume the SU-34 wants to lob it's bombs at 30,000 ft. Supposedly, the SU-34 climes at a rate of 45,275 feet / minute. That is undoubtedly a "clean" aircraft and may be a "marketing" number, but even if it is an exageration, the aircraft should reached altitude in about 37 seconds. The time the aircraft would be visible would be around a minute.  The SM-2 goes about 83 km per minute. It would not reach the SU-34 even if it were fired immediately. However, getting a firing "solution" isn't instantaneous and would just add to the time. Obviously, sometimes things go wrong and the jet just doesn't perform or the pilot is slow to release or whatever. All that aside, it would take an umbelieveable performance by the Patriot battery to take down a correctly flown mission.

On top of that, as soon as the Patriot search radar is detected by the aircraft RWR (which should be slightly before the Patriot can detect the SU-34), the pilot should know he could/will be detected and consider his options. One option is to dive away immediately and live to fight another day. Another is to continue with the mission (but be highly motivated to fly it very precisely). When the illuminator is detected, wait 5 seconds or so, then turn on your ECM. The Russians supposedly use DRFMs on the SU-34 to send back a modified (in amplitude) copy of the illuminator signal. At the very least, that will mess up the missile a bit. (If you loose the illuminator, the ECM is smart enough to stop jamming what it can't see) Then, after you drop the bombs and dive, fire off a bunch of chaff to confuse the issue even more. Dive like mad. If the illuminator still holds you after a few seconds, flatten out and find the missile with your own radar. If you can't see it, dive again. If you can see it, begin your missile evasion manuver sequence. Good luck.

So, how did 3 SU-34s get shot down? The missions weren't flown "professionally", first of all. It they had been, it would take a miracle for the Patriot to hit you. More importantly, either the RWR didn't work or the pilot didn't respond appropraitely. If you are in an area where there isn't supposed to be an MPQ-65 and your RWR sees one, I would get out of Dodge. Come back tomorrow when you hsve a plan and are prepared to react to the threat. If you feel you must continue, yell like hell to your buddies and fly like you mean it, because for sure the Patriot will.

So would you attribute this to a single poorly trained unit or is this possibly the state of the Russian Airforce as a whole?  Are there any NATO EW aircraft possibly flying within range of the SU 34's who could contribute target data?  From WLIK the NATO early warning aircraft have a detection range of around 600 kms and I assume this is at altitude.  

Your points about Ukraine's best chance is to attack South across the Dnipro is well taken.  Going North gives Russia all the benefits of short LOC.  It seems to me Russia is willing to almost bleed itself dry by constant attacks in the North, hopefully tying down those reserves Ukraine might be otherwise able to use in the South.  If the Ukrainians prove to be able F16 pilots, things might change to some extent.  It seems almost like Russian tactics have changed little since WWII, but technology has negated some of those advantages they had then.

On another, but related subject, if Iran did in fact launch anti ship rockets at a non Israeli flagged vessel in the Indian Ocean, how long is the rest of the world willing to allow Iran and its allies to totally screw up the worlds shipping with the resulting economic hit.  I would think Russia would prefer that Iran not pull the tail of the tiger for fear someone would take out the Iranian drone factories.

[Goose]

So would you attribute this to a single poorly trained unit or is this possibly the state of the Russian Airforce as a whole?

Russian Air Force as a whole, but I wouldn't over-interpret this failure. I am guessing the Russians had been flying this type of mission for a while and were told the missile threat was nil. As a result they flew it sloppily because it was supposed to be a "milk run". That's where the RWR performance comes into question. If you are flying where there aren't supposed to be any missile acquisition radars and your RWR sees one, drastic action is called for. The game has changed. Even if you are a FD&H pilot (maybe especially if you are :-) the RWR detection should probably have aborted the mission. You are no longer in a "low threat" environment and need a new mission plan. You need a "strike package" that includes a SEAD group out in front of you to engage the Patriot. At the very least you can make the targeting problem much harder and if the SEAD group is "good" they may get enough credible anti-radiation missiles in the air to make the Patriot shut down. The Russians have longer range anti-radiation missiles than we do, up to 70 km. Russia used to have such groups, but they were never numerous. They may have none now. It does absolutely amaze me that 3 SU-34s were brought down like that. Obviously they never knew what was trying to hit them.

Are there any NATO EW aircraft possibly flying within range of the SU 34's who could contribute target data?  From WLIK the NATO early warning aircraft have a detection range of around 600 kms and I assume this is at altitude.

The NATO EW aircraft at 9144 meters (30,000 ft) altitude can "see" a target at 522 meters altitude (up to a range of 423 km) if the radar is "good enough" and the target is "bright" enough. An E-3 can certainly accomplish this. An SU-34 isn't very "stealthy" and the Digital Moving Target Indication would extract it from any ground clutter.  As the target gets higher, the range increases out toward the maximum radar range. However, I don't believe NATO is providing such information (even when it exists) in real-time to the Ukraine. Based on the Moskva sinking, NATO might answer a direct question, but doesn't have a "feed" into the Ukraine's "air defense system". It also appears that both Ukraine and Russia aren't running a theater-wide integrated air defense system anyway. Who does NATO tell?

Your points about Ukraine's best chance is to attack South across the Dnipro is well taken.  Going North gives Russia all the benefits of short LOC.  It seems to me Russia is willing to almost bleed itself dry by constant attacks in the North, hopefully tying down those reserves Ukraine might be otherwise able to use in the South.  If the Ukrainians prove to be able F16 pilots, things might change to some extent.  It seems almost like Russian tactics have changed little since WWII, but technology has negated some of those advantages they had then.

I hope so. Even in WWII the Germans demonstrated they could break through when they had local air superiority and adequate troop strength. For Ukraine, they haven't yet ever had even local air superiority. They are hoping that if they can obtain it they will still have enough troops to put the Russians in an untenable position in the south. Let's hope they can, because in an infantry slugging match, Ukraine loses eventually. 

On another, but related subject, if Iran did in fact launch anti ship rockets at a non Israeli flagged vessel in the Indian Ocean, how long is the rest of the world willing to allow Iran and its allies to totally screw up the worlds shipping with the resulting economic hit.  I would think Russia would prefer that Iran not pull the tail of the tiger for fear someone would take out the Iranian drone factories.

I think Russia has no control at all over what Iran does. I am not confident Iran actually has tight control over all elements of its own armed forces. I am positive Iran does not have absolute control over Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthi. These factors make the situation very dangerous for everybody. Iran can be dragged into a war it doesn't want because it can't disavow it's proxy forces and still retain it's influence in the middle east. It also has to keep the allegiance of the right wing military (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) because that force is needed to control the Iranian populace. Iran wants to keep the pot boiling but does not want it to boil over. If it does, Iran is in no position to reliably control the outcome and they know it. They don't want a war, but they may get one.

IMO the rest of the world is trying to tiptoe around the situation because they don't want a war either. The multinational naval force is an attempt to defeat the Houthi without actually landing troops. It might work, because the Houthi don't have "good" missiles, have no target acquisition capability,  and are vulnerable to missile attacks from the sea. This also isn't their fight. It doesn't make them stronger in Yemen.

The IO situation is different. That represents a higher level of technology. If Iran is doing the target acquisition for those missiles, I would expect prompt strikes to end that threat. It may be it was some over-zealous part of the military and will not be repeated. Lets hope so. If it is, it will require destroying the Iranian ability to do so. I hope a strong message has be delivered to that effect and that it "works".  Everybody should realize all hell can break lose very quickly here and back away. Let's hope Iran does.

[Goose]

So would you attribute this to a single poorly trained unit or is this possibly the state of the Russian Airforce as a whole?

Russian Air Force as a whole, but I wouldn't over-interpret this failure. I am guessing the Russians had been flying this type of mission for a while and were told the missile threat was nil. As a result they flew it sloppily because it was supposed to be a "milk run". That's where the RWR performance comes into question. If you are flying where there aren't supposed to be any missile acquisition radars and your RWR sees one, drastic action is called for. The game has changed. Even if you are a FD&H pilot (maybe especially if you are :-) the RWR detection should probably have aborted the mission. You are no longer in a "low threat" environment and need a new mission plan. You need a "strike package" that includes a SEAD group out in front of you to engage the Patriot. At the very least you can make the targeting problem much harder and if the SEAD group is "good" they may get enough credible anti-radiation missiles in the air to make the Patriot shut down. The Russians have longer range anti-radiation missiles than we do, up to 70 km. Russia used to have such groups, but they were never numerous. They may have none now. It does absolutely amaze me that 3 SU-34s were brought down like that. Obviously they never knew what was trying to hit them.

Are there any NATO EW aircraft possibly flying within range of the SU 34's who could contribute target data?  From WLIK the NATO early warning aircraft have a detection range of around 600 kms and I assume this is at altitude.

The NATO EW aircraft at 9144 meters (30,000 ft) altitude can "see" a target at 522 meters altitude (up to a range of 423 km) if the radar is "good enough" and the target is "bright" enough. An E-3 can certainly accomplish this. An SU-34 isn't very "stealthy" and the Digital Moving Target Indication would extract it from any ground clutter.  As the target gets higher, the range increases out toward the maximum radar range. However, I don't believe NATO is providing such information (even when it exists) in real-time to the Ukraine. Based on the Moskva sinking, NATO might answer a direct question, but doesn't have a "feed" into the Ukraine's "air defense system". It also appears that both Ukraine and Russia aren't running a theater-wide integrated air defense system anyway. Who does NATO tell?

Your points about Ukraine's best chance is to attack South across the Dnipro is well taken.  Going North gives Russia all the benefits of short LOC.  It seems to me Russia is willing to almost bleed itself dry by constant attacks in the North, hopefully tying down those reserves Ukraine might be otherwise able to use in the South.  If the Ukrainians prove to be able F16 pilots, things might change to some extent.  It seems almost like Russian tactics have changed little since WWII, but technology has negated some of those advantages they had then.

I hope so. Even in WWII the Germans demonstrated they could break through when they had local air superiority and adequate troop strength. For Ukraine, they haven't yet ever had even local air superiority. They are hoping that if they can obtain it they will still have enough troops to put the Russians in an untenable position in the south. Let's hope they can, because in an infantry slugging match, Ukraine loses eventually. 

On another, but related subject, if Iran did in fact launch anti ship rockets at a non Israeli flagged vessel in the Indian Ocean, how long is the rest of the world willing to allow Iran and its allies to totally screw up the worlds shipping with the resulting economic hit.  I would think Russia would prefer that Iran not pull the tail of the tiger for fear someone would take out the Iranian drone factories.

I think Russia has no control at all over what Iran does. I am not confident Iran actually has tight control over all elements of its own armed forces. I am positive Iran does not have absolute control over Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthi. These factors make the situation very dangerous for everybody. Iran can be dragged into a war it doesn't want because it can't disavow it's proxy forces and still retain it's influence in the middle east. It also has to keep the allegiance of the right wing military (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) because that force is needed to control the Iranian populace. Iran wants to keep the pot boiling but does not want it to boil over. If it does, Iran is in no position to reliably control the outcome and they know it. They don't want a war, but they may get one.

IMO the rest of the world is trying to tiptoe around the situation because they don't want a war either. The multinational naval force is an attempt to defeat the Houthi without actually landing troops. It might work, because the Houthi don't have "good" missiles, have no target acquisition capability,  and are vulnerable to missile attacks from the sea. This also isn't their fight. It doesn't make them stronger in Yemen.

The IO situation is different. That represents a higher level of technology. If Iran is doing the target acquisition for those missiles, I would expect prompt strikes to end that threat. It may be it was some over-zealous part of the military and will not be repeated. Lets hope so. If it is, it will require destroying the Iranian ability to do so. I hope a strong message has be delivered to that effect and that it "works".  Everybody should realize all hell can break lose very quickly here and back away. Let's hope Iran does.

[dabigv13]

Splash one more Su-34

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/statu...8079879503

The Ukrainian Air Force claims to have downed another Russian Su-34 earlier today in the Mariupol sector.

[dabigv13]

Splash one more Su-34

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/statu...8079879503

The Ukrainian Air Force claims to have downed another Russian Su-34 earlier today in the Mariupol sector.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/sweden-moves-...17721.html

Good news, but I expect the final vote to be withheld until the US Senate passes an approval of the F-16 upgrade program. Türkiye is not stupid enough to give up their veto until the US is fully committed.  Whether that vote in the US Senate can occur "soon" is dubious. Normally the administration has enough influence on such military matters that they can (sometimes assisted by a quid pro quo) get a favorable vote.  Right now, that is very improbable IMO. There are legitimate questions about Türkiye's behavior and commitment to NATO, democracy, and human rights. That said, they are in NATO and we need them to be there, even if they are far from perfect. The F-35 situation, coupled with the S-400s poor performance in Türkiye has sent a significant message. Withholding the F-16s does nobody any good and NATO lots of harm. The US does need to open a more serious dialog with Türkiye about many issues, but that is a different effort.

A much more serious problem (IMO) is Hungary. When this all started Hungary was considered as merely a bandit trying to get whatever it could. They even stated they would approve Sweden when Türkiye did. This is probably no longer the case. Hungary has decided to go it's own way on many issues and domestic political considerations have become deeply involved (perhaps governing) in their international relations. They can no longer simply be "bought off", as was previously assumed. IMO Swedish membership in NATO is in real trouble. Something needs to happen in Hungary to convince (dare I say "remind") their public that they are not strong enough economically or militarily to dictate to the rest of NATO and the EU. Unfortunately, Hungary has a long history of overplaying their hand to their own detriment. Hopefully that won't be the case here.

---

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukr...023-12-26/

I would dearly like to know how the SU-24s got close enough to do the deed and then made it home. It is a long haul through not very friendly airspace. Makes one wonder about the state of Russian early warning. I would think by now they should be super paranoid. Makes one also wonder about the feasibility of a similar attack on the Kerch bridge at mid-span.

It is also said the ship was transporting drones from Iran. Not clear why/how this would be so, but the secondary explosions indicated the ship was carrying something explosive. Artillery ammunition would do fine :-).

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/sweden-moves-...17721.html

Good news, but I expect the final vote to be withheld until the US Senate passes an approval of the F-16 upgrade program. Türkiye is not stupid enough to give up their veto until the US is fully committed.  Whether that vote in the US Senate can occur "soon" is dubious. Normally the administration has enough influence on such military matters that they can (sometimes assisted by a quid pro quo) get a favorable vote.  Right now, that is very improbable IMO. There are legitimate questions about Türkiye's behavior and commitment to NATO, democracy, and human rights. That said, they are in NATO and we need them to be there, even if they are far from perfect. The F-35 situation, coupled with the S-400s poor performance in Türkiye has sent a significant message. Withholding the F-16s does nobody any good and NATO lots of harm. The US does need to open a more serious dialog with Türkiye about many issues, but that is a different effort.

A much more serious problem (IMO) is Hungary. When this all started Hungary was considered as merely a bandit trying to get whatever it could. They even stated they would approve Sweden when Türkiye did. This is probably no longer the case. Hungary has decided to go it's own way on many issues and domestic political considerations have become deeply involved (perhaps governing) in their international relations. They can no longer simply be "bought off", as was previously assumed. IMO Swedish membership in NATO is in real trouble. Something needs to happen in Hungary to convince (dare I say "remind") their public that they are not strong enough economically or militarily to dictate to the rest of NATO and the EU. Unfortunately, Hungary has a long history of overplaying their hand to their own detriment. Hopefully that won't be the case here.

---

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukr...023-12-26/

I would dearly like to know how the SU-24s got close enough to do the deed and then made it home. It is a long haul through not very friendly airspace. Makes one wonder about the state of Russian early warning. I would think by now they should be super paranoid. Makes one also wonder about the feasibility of a similar attack on the Kerch bridge at mid-span.

It is also said the ship was transporting drones from Iran. Not clear why/how this would be so, but the secondary explosions indicated the ship was carrying something explosive. Artillery ammunition would do fine :-).

[TrumpCard]

The telling event is that while Ukraine drove the Russians back around Kherson city, they allowed the Russians to retain that city for MONTHS. The Russians then retreated in relatively good order. That should never have been allowed. Ukraine apparently just didn't have the combat power to prevent it. After that, the Ukrainians allowed the Russians to build the Surovikin Line. Probably the Ukraine didn't have the combat power to prevent that either, but it does seem Ukraine under-estimated how much of a problem it would cause them.

Goose, this part of your response suggests that Ukraine simply lacks the combat power to push Russian troops off of a well-fortified position.  The battle lines in the south of Ukraine are nothing if not well-fortified, so this seems ominous.  I don't think Ukraine can say that it lacks decent equipment anymore either since Ukraine now has a decent amount of tanks, de-mining equipment, APCs, ATACMS, Patriots, etc.  This leads me to some questions:

Have the deliveries of equipment and munitions from the West been so small in number as to prevent the Ukrainians from showing proof of concept on putting together a strike force?  

Is there a view that further training on the equipment the West is shipping will fundamentally alter Ukraine's ability to dislodge Russian troops from well-fortified positions?  

If these aren't the key, then the only remaining piece of the puzzle is the fighter jets.  Will the modest number of jets that the West has committed be enough to change anything or will they simply replace the Soviet era jets that the Russians have been trying to shoot down for the last 2 years?

I previously held the view that this war is "stalemated," and that Russia would settle for making this another one of its "frozen conflicts," but it sounds like you think that's a temporary equilibrium that will change as Ukraine's economy continues to falter and as Russia re-generates its forces.  I don't have enough information to provide a counterbalance to your ominous outlook, but I remain hopeful that Ukraine will muster the strength to continue its defense and that the West will be able to stay sufficiently united to fund and supply that effort.

[TrumpCard]

The telling event is that while Ukraine drove the Russians back around Kherson city, they allowed the Russians to retain that city for MONTHS. The Russians then retreated in relatively good order. That should never have been allowed. Ukraine apparently just didn't have the combat power to prevent it. After that, the Ukrainians allowed the Russians to build the Surovikin Line. Probably the Ukraine didn't have the combat power to prevent that either, but it does seem Ukraine under-estimated how much of a problem it would cause them.

Goose, this part of your response suggests that Ukraine simply lacks the combat power to push Russian troops off of a well-fortified position.  The battle lines in the south of Ukraine are nothing if not well-fortified, so this seems ominous.  I don't think Ukraine can say that it lacks decent equipment anymore either since Ukraine now has a decent amount of tanks, de-mining equipment, APCs, ATACMS, Patriots, etc.  This leads me to some questions:

Have the deliveries of equipment and munitions from the West been so small in number as to prevent the Ukrainians from showing proof of concept on putting together a strike force?  

Is there a view that further training on the equipment the West is shipping will fundamentally alter Ukraine's ability to dislodge Russian troops from well-fortified positions?  

If these aren't the key, then the only remaining piece of the puzzle is the fighter jets.  Will the modest number of jets that the West has committed be enough to change anything or will they simply replace the Soviet era jets that the Russians have been trying to shoot down for the last 2 years?

I previously held the view that this war is "stalemated," and that Russia would settle for making this another one of its "frozen conflicts," but it sounds like you think that's a temporary equilibrium that will change as Ukraine's economy continues to falter and as Russia re-generates its forces.  I don't have enough information to provide a counterbalance to your ominous outlook, but I remain hopeful that Ukraine will muster the strength to continue its defense and that the West will be able to stay sufficiently united to fund and supply that effort.

[Goose]

Goose, this part of your response suggests that Ukraine simply lacks the combat power to push Russian troops off of a well-fortified position.  The battle lines in the south of Ukraine are nothing if not well-fortified, so this seems ominous.  I don't think Ukraine can say that it lacks decent equipment anymore either since Ukraine now has a decent amount of tanks, de-mining equipment, APCs, ATACMS, Patriots, etc.  This leads me to some questions:

Have the deliveries of equipment and munitions from the West been so small in number as to prevent the Ukrainians from showing proof of concept on putting together a strike force?

The first problem is that the West could not and did not supply  Ukraine with anywhere near enough de-mining equipment. We simply don't have it and weren't willing to part with the totality of what we have. The US and NATO aren't structured to directly attack heavily fortified positions. We are a "mobility warfare" force. There is good reason for that. We aren't intending to attack North Korea frontally, and nowhere else in the world do we see an enemy that defends with massive minefields and fortifications. There is no Surovikin Line protecting the Russian border, for example. If we were confronted with that, we would expect the USAF to blow a very wide lane through such fortifications. They can do that, and we pay lots of money to ensure they can. Ukraine didn't have that option.

Second, it takes more than a few months of training to generate an effective combined arms force. This is doubly true in Ukraine which has no tradition of fighting that way. They aren't good at it yet, especially in the higher command levels. As was reported in the beginning of the offensive units would often show up "late", after the initial area clearance had taken place and the Russians had time to recover. The US has plenty of examples of this too over the years, but our units are better trained and know how to improvise and deal with these problems. Ukraine isn't there yet.

A few years ago I spoke with a former commander of 11 ACR. He said commanding the unit was the highlight of his life and that it had the resources, training, and capability to overcome any opposition bar none. He also said it was unfortunately one of the most expensive military formations in the world to sustain and operate. Their training and manpower requirements were at best prodigious. The equipment maintenance alone cost as much as a typical infantry division. That doesn't sound like Ukraine to me, so there is an inherent problem with using NATO methods there.

Despite all this, after falling back to strictly infantry tactics, Ukraine manage to penetrate the Russian defenses. Unfortunately, the cost was so high Ukraine wasn't well equipped to exploit success. They didn't have the troop strength. On top of that, Russia started deploying air power to prevent Ukraine from exploiting local breakthroughs. Ukraine realized they had no answer for this air interdiction. The more they tried to advance, the worse it would get. Thus F-16s became the "big issue". It is IMO absolutely amazing that the West didn't anticipate this problem. Maybe we thought the Russian air force was a "spent force". Why, I don't know. Unfortunately, this pause is allowing Russia to fortify cities in Zaporizhzhia Oblast that Ukraine is going to need to capture. Very bad, repeating a mistake made last year. The price will be paid in blood.

Is there a view that further training on the equipment the West is shipping will fundamentally alter Ukraine's ability to dislodge Russian troops from well-fortified positions?

Yes, but not directly. They will be more capable. They do however need a way to avoid beating their head against well dug in Russians with artillery parity. Hopefully the Ukrainians will be better prepared to exploit a breach if they create one. The Russians aren't know as quick reactors. You can certainly get inside their decision cycle, but you have to be ready to act quickly.

If these aren't the key, then the only remaining piece of the puzzle is the fighter jets.  Will the modest number of jets that the West has committed be enough to change anything or will they simply replace the Soviet era jets that the Russians have been trying to shoot down for the last 2 years?

Ukraine is counting on it. They "sold" the idea as air defense, to keep the Russian air off their advancing formations. That was very "reasonably" arguable. It also appeared to be basically "defensive" in character, making it a bit more politically correct. I am however virtually certain they intend to use the F-16s to defeat Russian fortifications by dropping JDAMs and possibly other longer range air-to-surface weapons (JASSM). Makes sense. That is what we would do, but first we would obtain air superiority. Ukraine possibly can accomplish that locally. If they can, this approach can work well. If they can't, aircraft losses will become a significant problem. To what extent the US "powers that be" are aware of this intent is unknown to me. Hopefully it won't come as a surprise to them. If we ship JASSMs to Ukraine, we know it isn't a "surprise".

In most cases, Ukraine will be dropping JDAMs from inside their own territory. That is usually pretty safe, but as Russia found out recently, that isn't always true. Ukraine is (at least eventually) going to need some SEAD and a Mig Cap. That requires quite a few aircraft. They best be well enough trained to do these things. They have no "senior" leaders who have been there and done that with an F-16. I have no idea how through the F-16 training in the US will be. How much actual gunnery and weapons delivery will be included? How much air-to-air? It ain't simple, and just because you did it once in "real life" at a range or did it on a on a simulator doesn't mean you are operationally ready. In war, compromises are often necessary, but they cost lives. There aren't many "extra" F-16 pilots in Ukraine's air force. They need to have a low attrition rate.

We won't even talk about whether Ukraine will start using the IFF capability on the F-16s. Do the NATO supplied SAMs still have their IFF interrogators? Do the F-16s? We also won't talk about how all Ukrainian soviet-era aircraft will appear as threats on the F-16 RWR. I can see all kinds of "yellow on yellow" problems arising. We also won't talk about what ECM capability will be provided with the F-16s. I can just see somebody in the USAF shipping RWRs with no libraries for "security reasons". Ditto the jammer techniques generators.

I previously held the view that this war is "stalemated," and that Russia would settle for making this another one of its "frozen conflicts," but it sounds like you think that's a temporary equilibrium that will change as Ukraine's economy continues to falter and as Russia re-generates its forces.  I don't have enough information to provide a counterbalance to your ominous outlook, but I remain hopeful that Ukraine will muster the strength to continue its defense and that the West will be able to stay sufficiently united to fund and supply that effort.

Obviously I can't "prove" my assertion that Ukraine will be unable to continue after about another year either. I too hope that Ukraine will muster the strength to achieve it's ends in the South. Take Melitopol' and destroy the Kerch bridge. If Ukraine can, IMO Russia falls apart quickly, at least militarily. Once all those Russians in Crimea, South Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia realize the situation, they will head for the exits. They will know they can't be supplied with enough bread and bullets to retain their positions. Even if they tried to stay and fight, their supplies wouldn't last more than a couple of weeks in most cases. They also aren't motorized (in general) and can't really run away fast. Even when they are, they need fuel.

If, OTOH, Ukraine doesn't at least make substantial progress towards this outcome, IMO the bulk of population will look at the war as unwinnable. They need a plausible "end game" to keep fighting. Without one, they are only waiting on the inevitable. If there were reason to believe Russia was nearing the end of it's capabilities, that too would keep Ukraine in the fight. So far, we don't see that. I hope those F-16 pilots are good.

[Goose]

Goose, this part of your response suggests that Ukraine simply lacks the combat power to push Russian troops off of a well-fortified position.  The battle lines in the south of Ukraine are nothing if not well-fortified, so this seems ominous.  I don't think Ukraine can say that it lacks decent equipment anymore either since Ukraine now has a decent amount of tanks, de-mining equipment, APCs, ATACMS, Patriots, etc.  This leads me to some questions:

Have the deliveries of equipment and munitions from the West been so small in number as to prevent the Ukrainians from showing proof of concept on putting together a strike force?

The first problem is that the West could not and did not supply  Ukraine with anywhere near enough de-mining equipment. We simply don't have it and weren't willing to part with the totality of what we have. The US and NATO aren't structured to directly attack heavily fortified positions. We are a "mobility warfare" force. There is good reason for that. We aren't intending to attack North Korea frontally, and nowhere else in the world do we see an enemy that defends with massive minefields and fortifications. There is no Surovikin Line protecting the Russian border, for example. If we were confronted with that, we would expect the USAF to blow a very wide lane through such fortifications. They can do that, and we pay lots of money to ensure they can. Ukraine didn't have that option.

Second, it takes more than a few months of training to generate an effective combined arms force. This is doubly true in Ukraine which has no tradition of fighting that way. They aren't good at it yet, especially in the higher command levels. As was reported in the beginning of the offensive units would often show up "late", after the initial area clearance had taken place and the Russians had time to recover. The US has plenty of examples of this too over the years, but our units are better trained and know how to improvise and deal with these problems. Ukraine isn't there yet.

A few years ago I spoke with a former commander of 11 ACR. He said commanding the unit was the highlight of his life and that it had the resources, training, and capability to overcome any opposition bar none. He also said it was unfortunately one of the most expensive military formations in the world to sustain and operate. Their training and manpower requirements were at best prodigious. The equipment maintenance alone cost as much as a typical infantry division. That doesn't sound like Ukraine to me, so there is an inherent problem with using NATO methods there.

Despite all this, after falling back to strictly infantry tactics, Ukraine manage to penetrate the Russian defenses. Unfortunately, the cost was so high Ukraine wasn't well equipped to exploit success. They didn't have the troop strength. On top of that, Russia started deploying air power to prevent Ukraine from exploiting local breakthroughs. Ukraine realized they had no answer for this air interdiction. The more they tried to advance, the worse it would get. Thus F-16s became the "big issue". It is IMO absolutely amazing that the West didn't anticipate this problem. Maybe we thought the Russian air force was a "spent force". Why, I don't know. Unfortunately, this pause is allowing Russia to fortify cities in Zaporizhzhia Oblast that Ukraine is going to need to capture. Very bad, repeating a mistake made last year. The price will be paid in blood.

Is there a view that further training on the equipment the West is shipping will fundamentally alter Ukraine's ability to dislodge Russian troops from well-fortified positions?

Yes, but not directly. They will be more capable. They do however need a way to avoid beating their head against well dug in Russians with artillery parity. Hopefully the Ukrainians will be better prepared to exploit a breach if they create one. The Russians aren't know as quick reactors. You can certainly get inside their decision cycle, but you have to be ready to act quickly.

If these aren't the key, then the only remaining piece of the puzzle is the fighter jets.  Will the modest number of jets that the West has committed be enough to change anything or will they simply replace the Soviet era jets that the Russians have been trying to shoot down for the last 2 years?

Ukraine is counting on it. They "sold" the idea as air defense, to keep the Russian air off their advancing formations. That was very "reasonably" arguable. It also appeared to be basically "defensive" in character, making it a bit more politically correct. I am however virtually certain they intend to use the F-16s to defeat Russian fortifications by dropping JDAMs and possibly other longer range air-to-surface weapons (JASSM). Makes sense. That is what we would do, but first we would obtain air superiority. Ukraine possibly can accomplish that locally. If they can, this approach can work well. If they can't, aircraft losses will become a significant problem. To what extent the US "powers that be" are aware of this intent is unknown to me. Hopefully it won't come as a surprise to them. If we ship JASSMs to Ukraine, we know it isn't a "surprise".

In most cases, Ukraine will be dropping JDAMs from inside their own territory. That is usually pretty safe, but as Russia found out recently, that isn't always true. Ukraine is (at least eventually) going to need some SEAD and a Mig Cap. That requires quite a few aircraft. They best be well enough trained to do these things. They have no "senior" leaders who have been there and done that with an F-16. I have no idea how through the F-16 training in the US will be. How much actual gunnery and weapons delivery will be included? How much air-to-air? It ain't simple, and just because you did it once in "real life" at a range or did it on a on a simulator doesn't mean you are operationally ready. In war, compromises are often necessary, but they cost lives. There aren't many "extra" F-16 pilots in Ukraine's air force. They need to have a low attrition rate.

We won't even talk about whether Ukraine will start using the IFF capability on the F-16s. Do the NATO supplied SAMs still have their IFF interrogators? Do the F-16s? We also won't talk about how all Ukrainian soviet-era aircraft will appear as threats on the F-16 RWR. I can see all kinds of "yellow on yellow" problems arising. We also won't talk about what ECM capability will be provided with the F-16s. I can just see somebody in the USAF shipping RWRs with no libraries for "security reasons". Ditto the jammer techniques generators.

I previously held the view that this war is "stalemated," and that Russia would settle for making this another one of its "frozen conflicts," but it sounds like you think that's a temporary equilibrium that will change as Ukraine's economy continues to falter and as Russia re-generates its forces.  I don't have enough information to provide a counterbalance to your ominous outlook, but I remain hopeful that Ukraine will muster the strength to continue its defense and that the West will be able to stay sufficiently united to fund and supply that effort.

Obviously I can't "prove" my assertion that Ukraine will be unable to continue after about another year either. I too hope that Ukraine will muster the strength to achieve it's ends in the South. Take Melitopol' and destroy the Kerch bridge. If Ukraine can, IMO Russia falls apart quickly, at least militarily. Once all those Russians in Crimea, South Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia realize the situation, they will head for the exits. They will know they can't be supplied with enough bread and bullets to retain their positions. Even if they tried to stay and fight, their supplies wouldn't last more than a couple of weeks in most cases. They also aren't motorized (in general) and can't really run away fast. Even when they are, they need fuel.

If, OTOH, Ukraine doesn't at least make substantial progress towards this outcome, IMO the bulk of population will look at the war as unwinnable. They need a plausible "end game" to keep fighting. Without one, they are only waiting on the inevitable. If there were reason to believe Russia was nearing the end of it's capabilities, that too would keep Ukraine in the fight. So far, we don't see that. I hope those F-16 pilots are good.

[Mick]

Another (presumably former) Putin ally wandered too close to an upper-story window. Vladimir Egorov (46) was a politician in western Siberia. Russian media points to heart problems, though he clearly fell out of a third story window.

https://metro.co.uk/2023/12/28/putin-cro...-20034985/

[Mick]

Another (presumably former) Putin ally wandered too close to an upper-story window. Vladimir Egorov (46) was a politician in western Siberia. Russian media points to heart problems, though he clearly fell out of a third story window.

https://metro.co.uk/2023/12/28/putin-cro...-20034985/

[Leftcoast]

Another (presumably former) Putin ally wandered too close to an upper-story window. Vladimir Egorov (46) was a politician in western Siberia. Russian media points to heart problems, though he clearly fell out of a third story window.

https://metro.co.uk/2023/12/28/putin-cro...-20034985/

Heart problems in the same way that getting a shot multiple times in the chest causes "heart problems", I suppose.

[Leftcoast]

Another (presumably former) Putin ally wandered too close to an upper-story window. Vladimir Egorov (46) was a politician in western Siberia. Russian media points to heart problems, though he clearly fell out of a third story window.

https://metro.co.uk/2023/12/28/putin-cro...-20034985/

Heart problems in the same way that getting a shot multiple times in the chest causes "heart problems", I suppose.

[Goose]

Another (presumably former) Putin ally wandered too close to an upper-story window. Vladimir Egorov (46) was a politician in western Siberia. Russian media points to heart problems, though he clearly fell out of a third story window.

https://metro.co.uk/2023/12/28/putin-cro...-20034985/

Heart problems in the same way that getting a shot multiple times in the chest causes "heart problems", I suppose.

Doesn't that simply lead to death by lead poisoning?

[Goose]

Another (presumably former) Putin ally wandered too close to an upper-story window. Vladimir Egorov (46) was a politician in western Siberia. Russian media points to heart problems, though he clearly fell out of a third story window.

https://metro.co.uk/2023/12/28/putin-cro...-20034985/

Heart problems in the same way that getting a shot multiple times in the chest causes "heart problems", I suppose.

Doesn't that simply lead to death by lead poisoning?

[TrumpCard]

In the Ukraine war to retain independence, are the laws of war enforceable at all?  Russia obviously targeting civilians.  Not just civilian infrastructure, but actually trying to kill civilians, and succeeding.  Filtration, kidnapping, rape, etc.  It seems there are no limits on what Russia will do to try to defeat Ukraine's spirit.  For much of the war, Ukraine claimed the high ground.  Is Ukraine now deciding that the moral high ground is not sufficient incentive to refrain from retaliating in kind?  The strikes on Belgorod over the holiday surprised me, but maybe they should not have.  Curious for your takes on this.

[TrumpCard]

In the Ukraine war to retain independence, are the laws of war enforceable at all?  Russia obviously targeting civilians.  Not just civilian infrastructure, but actually trying to kill civilians, and succeeding.  Filtration, kidnapping, rape, etc.  It seems there are no limits on what Russia will do to try to defeat Ukraine's spirit.  For much of the war, Ukraine claimed the high ground.  Is Ukraine now deciding that the moral high ground is not sufficient incentive to refrain from retaliating in kind?  The strikes on Belgorod over the holiday surprised me, but maybe they should not have.  Curious for your takes on this.

[Goose]

In the Ukraine war to retain independence, are the laws of war enforceable at all?  Russia obviously targeting civilians.  Not just civilian infrastructure, but actually trying to kill civilians, and succeeding.  Filtration, kidnapping, rape, etc.  It seems there are no limits on what Russia will do to try to defeat Ukraine's spirit.  For much of the war, Ukraine claimed the high ground.  Is Ukraine now deciding that the moral high ground is not sufficient incentive to refrain from retaliating in kind?  The strikes on Belgorod over the holiday surprised me, but maybe they should not have.  Curious for your takes on this.

Russia of course claims they are targeting "military" targets. Railroad infrastructure and electrical infrastructure are legitimate military targets. They are part of the "means to make war". Ukraine claims the same. Obviously, in many cases the attempt to hit legitimate targets is not "real", but neither side will admit it. While it is true that both Russia and Ukraine are using some weapons with a very large CEP, and while it is true these weapons "sometimes" malfunction, too many civilian targets are being hit to make it credible as "collateral damage".

Russia is indeed trying to break Ukraine's spirit. Ukraine has virtually no chance to do the same to Russia. Their attempts at it are targeting the home front. Striking back always raises morale. The problem is when/if the populations decides their retaliations are futile. It would be really great if the US could speak loudly to the World and encourage the Ukrainian population to believe they can win. Unfortunately we aren't and probably can't at this point. It isn't for certain Ukraine can get through this winter without morale cracking. If they do, they need to make lots of real progress during the fighting season and shake Russia's hold on the south. IMO Ukraine can't withstand next winter being like this winter is.

[Goose]

In the Ukraine war to retain independence, are the laws of war enforceable at all?  Russia obviously targeting civilians.  Not just civilian infrastructure, but actually trying to kill civilians, and succeeding.  Filtration, kidnapping, rape, etc.  It seems there are no limits on what Russia will do to try to defeat Ukraine's spirit.  For much of the war, Ukraine claimed the high ground.  Is Ukraine now deciding that the moral high ground is not sufficient incentive to refrain from retaliating in kind?  The strikes on Belgorod over the holiday surprised me, but maybe they should not have.  Curious for your takes on this.

Russia of course claims they are targeting "military" targets. Railroad infrastructure and electrical infrastructure are legitimate military targets. They are part of the "means to make war". Ukraine claims the same. Obviously, in many cases the attempt to hit legitimate targets is not "real", but neither side will admit it. While it is true that both Russia and Ukraine are using some weapons with a very large CEP, and while it is true these weapons "sometimes" malfunction, too many civilian targets are being hit to make it credible as "collateral damage".

Russia is indeed trying to break Ukraine's spirit. Ukraine has virtually no chance to do the same to Russia. Their attempts at it are targeting the home front. Striking back always raises morale. The problem is when/if the populations decides their retaliations are futile. It would be really great if the US could speak loudly to the World and encourage the Ukrainian population to believe they can win. Unfortunately we aren't and probably can't at this point. It isn't for certain Ukraine can get through this winter without morale cracking. If they do, they need to make lots of real progress during the fighting season and shake Russia's hold on the south. IMO Ukraine can't withstand next winter being like this winter is.

[TrumpCard]

Russia is indeed trying to break Ukraine's spirit. Ukraine has virtually no chance to do the same to Russia. Their attempts at it are targeting the home front. Striking back always raises morale. The problem is when/if the populations decides their retaliations are futile. 

You seem to take it as given, but is it true that Ukraine's illegal guerilla warfare tactics have no chance to make Russia want a negotiated settlement?  (Granted, it was long ago under different leadership, but Russia did leave a quagmire in Afghanistan that it "could not lose.")  If you answered "yes," then why did Ukraine just launch an attack that wasn't really plausibly targeting a military target?  Do you think it was an anomaly and/or a "trial balloon," as the kids are calling it these days?

Anyway, the bigger part of my question is whether there is any mechanism to enforce the laws of war against Russia.  You and I and everyone else knows that Russia has engaged in, and is continuing to engage in, mass crimes against humanity.  It seems there isn't a great way for anyone to enforce the laws of war without risking an escalation of the conflict to unacceptable levels.  Does that mean Russia and similarly situated world powers are effectively immune from the laws of war under all circumstances?  Do you think there will there be accountability at some point in the future?

[TrumpCard]

Russia is indeed trying to break Ukraine's spirit. Ukraine has virtually no chance to do the same to Russia. Their attempts at it are targeting the home front. Striking back always raises morale. The problem is when/if the populations decides their retaliations are futile. 

You seem to take it as given, but is it true that Ukraine's illegal guerilla warfare tactics have no chance to make Russia want a negotiated settlement?  (Granted, it was long ago under different leadership, but Russia did leave a quagmire in Afghanistan that it "could not lose.")  If you answered "yes," then why did Ukraine just launch an attack that wasn't really plausibly targeting a military target?  Do you think it was an anomaly and/or a "trial balloon," as the kids are calling it these days?

Anyway, the bigger part of my question is whether there is any mechanism to enforce the laws of war against Russia.  You and I and everyone else knows that Russia has engaged in, and is continuing to engage in, mass crimes against humanity.  It seems there isn't a great way for anyone to enforce the laws of war without risking an escalation of the conflict to unacceptable levels.  Does that mean Russia and similarly situated world powers are effectively immune from the laws of war under all circumstances?  Do you think there will there be accountability at some point in the future?

[Goose]

Russia is indeed trying to break Ukraine's spirit. Ukraine has virtually no chance to do the same to Russia. Their attempts at it are targeting the home front. Striking back always raises morale. The problem is when/if the populations decides their retaliations are futile. 

You seem to take it as given, but is it true that Ukraine's illegal guerilla warfare tactics have no chance to make Russia want a negotiated settlement?  (Granted, it was long ago under different leadership, but Russia did leave a quagmire in Afghanistan that it "could not lose.")

Ukraine's drone attacks into Russia proper will never be large enough to inflict significant damage on Russia proper. It might be enough to piss off the Russian public (against Ukraine), but not near enough for them to want to quit. A guerilla war in Ukraine (not Russia proper) OTOH could possibly succeed and make Russia decide to leave. However, one must remember that it took 10 YEARS to make that happen in Afghanistan. The country of Afghanistan and Afghan society is much better suited to a long insurgency than Ukraine is. The religious factor was certainly key to continued resistance, as well as the fact that mountainous tribal Afghanistan is an ideal place to do it. IMO Ukraine will not be able to continue resistance at scale if their entire country is occupied. That isn't the case we are discussing however.

If you answered "yes," then why did Ukraine just launch an attack that wasn't really plausibly targeting a military target?  Do you think it was an anomaly and/or a "trial balloon," as the kids are calling it these days?

IMO it was done, as I said, mostly for the consumption of the Ukrainian public. Right now, the Ukrainian populace has to sit there and absorb these Russian strikes. They undoubtedly don't like that, and it may appear to them that nothing can be done to stop these strikes (other than air defense efforts). The Ukraine delivering a similar attack on Russia proper sends the message to the Ukrainian public that Ukraine is striking back. "We aren't helpless". That is great as long as the Ukrainian public morale increases because of the action. My fear is that it will quickly become obvious there is a massive difference of scale. That will ruin the morale factor.

Anyway, the bigger part of my question is whether there is any mechanism to enforce the laws of war against Russia.  You and I and everyone else knows that Russia has engaged in, and is continuing to engage in, mass crimes against humanity.  It seems there isn't a great way for anyone to enforce the laws of war without risking an escalation of the conflict to unacceptable levels.  Does that mean Russia and similarly situated world powers are effectively immune from the laws of war under all circumstances?

Unfortunately, yes. It has always been thus.  Once a war starts, force becomes the only arbiter of behavior. The "force" can stop short of "traditional" war, e.g. economic sanctions. If that doesn't work, the only option is more force, like say a blockade ("quarantine" if you think that sounds better :-).  Eventually however, one must realize the purpose of war is compulsion. If you aren't ultimately willing to go to war to enforce "the rules of war", they won't be. Simple as that.

Do you think there will there be accountability at some point in the future?

Only when it doesn't matter anymore :-). If Russia has a change of government at some time in the future, they may allow the rest of the world to  hold those who ordered (and committed, if you can find them) "war crimes". These people will at that point no longer be in power so what happens to them has little practical benefit. They will be sent to the 21st century version of Spandau where they will write books. It will have about the same effect going forward as the ones in 1946 did. Sad but true IMO.

[Goose]

Russia is indeed trying to break Ukraine's spirit. Ukraine has virtually no chance to do the same to Russia. Their attempts at it are targeting the home front. Striking back always raises morale. The problem is when/if the populations decides their retaliations are futile. 

You seem to take it as given, but is it true that Ukraine's illegal guerilla warfare tactics have no chance to make Russia want a negotiated settlement?  (Granted, it was long ago under different leadership, but Russia did leave a quagmire in Afghanistan that it "could not lose.")

Ukraine's drone attacks into Russia proper will never be large enough to inflict significant damage on Russia proper. It might be enough to piss off the Russian public (against Ukraine), but not near enough for them to want to quit. A guerilla war in Ukraine (not Russia proper) OTOH could possibly succeed and make Russia decide to leave. However, one must remember that it took 10 YEARS to make that happen in Afghanistan. The country of Afghanistan and Afghan society is much better suited to a long insurgency than Ukraine is. The religious factor was certainly key to continued resistance, as well as the fact that mountainous tribal Afghanistan is an ideal place to do it. IMO Ukraine will not be able to continue resistance at scale if their entire country is occupied. That isn't the case we are discussing however.

If you answered "yes," then why did Ukraine just launch an attack that wasn't really plausibly targeting a military target?  Do you think it was an anomaly and/or a "trial balloon," as the kids are calling it these days?

IMO it was done, as I said, mostly for the consumption of the Ukrainian public. Right now, the Ukrainian populace has to sit there and absorb these Russian strikes. They undoubtedly don't like that, and it may appear to them that nothing can be done to stop these strikes (other than air defense efforts). The Ukraine delivering a similar attack on Russia proper sends the message to the Ukrainian public that Ukraine is striking back. "We aren't helpless". That is great as long as the Ukrainian public morale increases because of the action. My fear is that it will quickly become obvious there is a massive difference of scale. That will ruin the morale factor.

Anyway, the bigger part of my question is whether there is any mechanism to enforce the laws of war against Russia.  You and I and everyone else knows that Russia has engaged in, and is continuing to engage in, mass crimes against humanity.  It seems there isn't a great way for anyone to enforce the laws of war without risking an escalation of the conflict to unacceptable levels.  Does that mean Russia and similarly situated world powers are effectively immune from the laws of war under all circumstances?

Unfortunately, yes. It has always been thus.  Once a war starts, force becomes the only arbiter of behavior. The "force" can stop short of "traditional" war, e.g. economic sanctions. If that doesn't work, the only option is more force, like say a blockade ("quarantine" if you think that sounds better :-).  Eventually however, one must realize the purpose of war is compulsion. If you aren't ultimately willing to go to war to enforce "the rules of war", they won't be. Simple as that.

Do you think there will there be accountability at some point in the future?

Only when it doesn't matter anymore :-). If Russia has a change of government at some time in the future, they may allow the rest of the world to  hold those who ordered (and committed, if you can find them) "war crimes". These people will at that point no longer be in power so what happens to them has little practical benefit. They will be sent to the 21st century version of Spandau where they will write books. It will have about the same effect going forward as the ones in 1946 did. Sad but true IMO.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-russi...34110.html

This is a fine announcement, but nowhere does it discuss timelines. I have no idea what the present manufacturing capability for Patriot is in the EU, but I suspect it is 0. It has probably been a while since anybody bought Patriot missiles in Europe. Poland got some recently, but they were US made (I am pretty sure as they came with newly delivered systems). The capability to manufacture such missiles in the EU existed, and can undoubtedly be reconstituted. How long that will take I have no idea, but it won't be soon. The previous capability also didn't need to make a lot of missiles real fast, so it's scale was inadequate to build 1000 missiles rapidly. It will undoubtedly be too late to matter for Ukraine.

The NATO Support and Procurement Agency said the new contract would see a missile production facility set up in Germany by a joint venture between Germany's MBDA and Raytheon, part of the US group RTX.

says it all.

The political class as a rule wants to make announcements that will appear to "solve" problems. Whether the problem is actually going to be solved, or even actually addressed, doesn't matter to them. That might work OK with social problems or economic problems, at least in the short term.  In war, it never does. Too bad the politicians and the public seem to be unaware of that fact.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-russi...34110.html

This is a fine announcement, but nowhere does it discuss timelines. I have no idea what the present manufacturing capability for Patriot is in the EU, but I suspect it is 0. It has probably been a while since anybody bought Patriot missiles in Europe. Poland got some recently, but they were US made (I am pretty sure as they came with newly delivered systems). The capability to manufacture such missiles in the EU existed, and can undoubtedly be reconstituted. How long that will take I have no idea, but it won't be soon. The previous capability also didn't need to make a lot of missiles real fast, so it's scale was inadequate to build 1000 missiles rapidly. It will undoubtedly be too late to matter for Ukraine.

The NATO Support and Procurement Agency said the new contract would see a missile production facility set up in Germany by a joint venture between Germany's MBDA and Raytheon, part of the US group RTX.

says it all.

The political class as a rule wants to make announcements that will appear to "solve" problems. Whether the problem is actually going to be solved, or even actually addressed, doesn't matter to them. That might work OK with social problems or economic problems, at least in the short term.  In war, it never does. Too bad the politicians and the public seem to be unaware of that fact.

[M T]

My view of the 1000 Patriot missile production article is a little more upbeat.

Knowing more are to be made available (& esp. when the timeline is known) might loosen up hand-me-downs to Ukraine.
Knowing more are to be made available may ease concerns by the countries at most risk of further land&people grabs by Russia.  That, in turn, may make other diplomatic bartering within NATO easier.

It is interesting that this announcement came so quickly on the heels of Patriot successes.  I'd suspect it was in the works for some time, but got fast-tracked.

My concern is the use of Patriots against drones.  That's the wrong weapon.

[M T]

My view of the 1000 Patriot missile production article is a little more upbeat.

Knowing more are to be made available (& esp. when the timeline is known) might loosen up hand-me-downs to Ukraine.
Knowing more are to be made available may ease concerns by the countries at most risk of further land&people grabs by Russia.  That, in turn, may make other diplomatic bartering within NATO easier.

It is interesting that this announcement came so quickly on the heels of Patriot successes.  I'd suspect it was in the works for some time, but got fast-tracked.

My concern is the use of Patriots against drones.  That's the wrong weapon.

[Goose]

My view of the 1000 Patriot missile production article is a little more upbeat.

Knowing more are to be made available (& esp. when the timeline is known) might loosen up hand-me-downs to Ukraine.

To some degree this is true (IMO). However, the way this works is the military has a "minimum realistic inventory" below which they will scream. The assurance that dipping below the minimum levels is OK because replacements are on the way is unacceptable to the military, because they have to always be ready to "fight tonight". They are sometimes overruled in this, but IMO doing so is very risky. It sends the message to the military that their concerns about readiness are not taken seriously. This has been done in the EU so often it is beyond a joke, and as a result e.g. "the Bundeswehr stands before you naked".  I think in the current climate the European public will revolt if it is "leaked" that the military is against sending more missiles below the number they consider prudent.

Knowing more are to be made available may ease concerns by the countries at most risk of further land&people grabs by Russia.  That, in turn, may make other diplomatic bartering within NATO easier.

Not sure that it will (or should) ease concerns. If Russia decides to continue such aggression, these countries will need everything they can lay their hands on and more.

It is interesting that this announcement came so quickly on the heels of Patriot successes.  I'd suspect it was in the works for some time, but got fast-tracked.

Raytheon and MBDA have been working on this type of effort for a while.
https://www.rtx.com/news/news-center/202...t-missiles
So you are correct. This has been in the works for years. MBDA does the maintenance for European Patriots.

My concern is the use of Patriots against drones.  That's the wrong weapon.

Totally true. Also not the right weapon for slow and/or small cruise missiles. Patriots are expensive.

One thing that would GREATLY benefit Ukraine would be some kind of "AWACS". The slower cruise missiles are "easy meat" for many simple air defense systems IF they can be detected early enough. An airborne platform can "see" much further than ground based radars can. It can allow systems like NASAMS to fire at targets that they actually never detect. The AMRAAM gets sent to the right place and acquires in autonomous mode.  It also can allow moving things like Gepards/truck mounted AAA short distances to hit slow-moving Iranian drones/cruise missiles. It would be a "force multiplier". Saab makes such a system, GlobalEye. Perhaps Ukraine could "buy" one? Saab can use the business and these are in production. Sweden also has some older S100D systems that they may be willing to give them away. Not sure what shape they are actually in.

[Goose]

My view of the 1000 Patriot missile production article is a little more upbeat.

Knowing more are to be made available (& esp. when the timeline is known) might loosen up hand-me-downs to Ukraine.

To some degree this is true (IMO). However, the way this works is the military has a "minimum realistic inventory" below which they will scream. The assurance that dipping below the minimum levels is OK because replacements are on the way is unacceptable to the military, because they have to always be ready to "fight tonight". They are sometimes overruled in this, but IMO doing so is very risky. It sends the message to the military that their concerns about readiness are not taken seriously. This has been done in the EU so often it is beyond a joke, and as a result e.g. "the Bundeswehr stands before you naked".  I think in the current climate the European public will revolt if it is "leaked" that the military is against sending more missiles below the number they consider prudent.

Knowing more are to be made available may ease concerns by the countries at most risk of further land&people grabs by Russia.  That, in turn, may make other diplomatic bartering within NATO easier.

Not sure that it will (or should) ease concerns. If Russia decides to continue such aggression, these countries will need everything they can lay their hands on and more.

It is interesting that this announcement came so quickly on the heels of Patriot successes.  I'd suspect it was in the works for some time, but got fast-tracked.

Raytheon and MBDA have been working on this type of effort for a while.
https://www.rtx.com/news/news-center/202...t-missiles
So you are correct. This has been in the works for years. MBDA does the maintenance for European Patriots.

My concern is the use of Patriots against drones.  That's the wrong weapon.

Totally true. Also not the right weapon for slow and/or small cruise missiles. Patriots are expensive.

One thing that would GREATLY benefit Ukraine would be some kind of "AWACS". The slower cruise missiles are "easy meat" for many simple air defense systems IF they can be detected early enough. An airborne platform can "see" much further than ground based radars can. It can allow systems like NASAMS to fire at targets that they actually never detect. The AMRAAM gets sent to the right place and acquires in autonomous mode.  It also can allow moving things like Gepards/truck mounted AAA short distances to hit slow-moving Iranian drones/cruise missiles. It would be a "force multiplier". Saab makes such a system, GlobalEye. Perhaps Ukraine could "buy" one? Saab can use the business and these are in production. Sweden also has some older S100D systems that they may be willing to give them away. Not sure what shape they are actually in.

[M T]

A BBC article has these tidbits:

Analysis carried out by Ukrainian media suggests the attack on 29 December cost $1.273bn (£1.01bn) alone - while the attack on 2 January cost an extra $620 million (£491m), according to Forbes magazine.

Analysis published in Le Monde quotes Ukrainian officials who said Russia still has in its stockpile around 1,000 ballistic or cruise missiles, and is able to make around 100 more per month - such as Kalibrs and Kh-101s.

Ukraine uses German-made Gepard anti-aircraft guns to tackle incoming drones, while Soviet-era Buk systems are used against cruise missiles and US-made Patriots against hypersonic Kinzhal missiles.

BBC also reported

Russia has used ballistic missiles and launchers supplied by North Korea in its war on Ukraine, the US has said.
Hours after the White House made the accusations, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called for missile launch vehicle production to be expanded in the country.

I guess the destruction of the railway far to the east wasn't enough to stop this.

[M T]

A BBC article has these tidbits:

Analysis carried out by Ukrainian media suggests the attack on 29 December cost $1.273bn (£1.01bn) alone - while the attack on 2 January cost an extra $620 million (£491m), according to Forbes magazine.

Analysis published in Le Monde quotes Ukrainian officials who said Russia still has in its stockpile around 1,000 ballistic or cruise missiles, and is able to make around 100 more per month - such as Kalibrs and Kh-101s.

Ukraine uses German-made Gepard anti-aircraft guns to tackle incoming drones, while Soviet-era Buk systems are used against cruise missiles and US-made Patriots against hypersonic Kinzhal missiles.

BBC also reported

Russia has used ballistic missiles and launchers supplied by North Korea in its war on Ukraine, the US has said.
Hours after the White House made the accusations, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called for missile launch vehicle production to be expanded in the country.

I guess the destruction of the railway far to the east wasn't enough to stop this.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-just-...25064.html

Sounds great, until you read the "fine print".

The guns are equipped with tracking radars, TV and infrared cameras, and laser range finders, hitting targets up to about 2.5 miles away.

In other words it is a less mobile and and vastly more complex version of a Gepard, possibly with shorter range. It is clear the concept of operation is to surround an important target with many of these gun systems and have them all controlled by a central radar system. It is a very expensive point defense system. I believe they are going to Ukraine because nobody else wants them.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-just-...25064.html

Sounds great, until you read the "fine print".

The guns are equipped with tracking radars, TV and infrared cameras, and laser range finders, hitting targets up to about 2.5 miles away.

In other words it is a less mobile and and vastly more complex version of a Gepard, possibly with shorter range. It is clear the concept of operation is to surround an important target with many of these gun systems and have them all controlled by a central radar system. It is a very expensive point defense system. I believe they are going to Ukraine because nobody else wants them.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/media-denmark...37164.html

Another "reality check". Denmark probably has all kinds of problems providing these aircraft. One probably is late (and getting later) deliveries of F-35s. Lockheed really does need some consequences for their really poor performance on deliveries. I am sure there are plenty of "good" reasons but as the prime contractor it is their responsibility to avoid these issues. I detect a distinct lack of urgency fueled by lack of interest in the congress and the pentagon. The Danish order isn't directly a "US" problem, but there are plenty of late deliveries to the US military to be "addressed".

I also suspect the state of maintenance of the Danish F-16s may not be all it was cracked up to be. Aircraft going to the boneyard in a few months probably go the the tail of the queue and stay there, no matter what the paperwork says. Be prepared for more of this from other EU suppliers. There may be more to it than just aircraft supply. Some of these nations may have realized the state of training of the F-16 pilots may not be the greatest and are using delayed supply of aircraft as a way to allow training to continue. No way to know this, but it makes sense (perversely).

The US should simply supply the aircraft. We have them. We can part with them without debilitating our air force. Ukraine is relying on having an air force to push the Russians back during the spring/summer fighting season. Without them, Ukraine is toast IMO. The F-16 isn't a wonder weapon. It won't win the war all by itself. However, it has become a symbol of Ukraine's potential victory. Take that away and I am sure civilian morale (probably already depressed after 3-4 months of Russian missile swarms) will drop like a rock. If the US doesn't understand this problem, shame on us.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/media-denmark...37164.html

Another "reality check". Denmark probably has all kinds of problems providing these aircraft. One probably is late (and getting later) deliveries of F-35s. Lockheed really does need some consequences for their really poor performance on deliveries. I am sure there are plenty of "good" reasons but as the prime contractor it is their responsibility to avoid these issues. I detect a distinct lack of urgency fueled by lack of interest in the congress and the pentagon. The Danish order isn't directly a "US" problem, but there are plenty of late deliveries to the US military to be "addressed".

I also suspect the state of maintenance of the Danish F-16s may not be all it was cracked up to be. Aircraft going to the boneyard in a few months probably go the the tail of the queue and stay there, no matter what the paperwork says. Be prepared for more of this from other EU suppliers. There may be more to it than just aircraft supply. Some of these nations may have realized the state of training of the F-16 pilots may not be the greatest and are using delayed supply of aircraft as a way to allow training to continue. No way to know this, but it makes sense (perversely).

The US should simply supply the aircraft. We have them. We can part with them without debilitating our air force. Ukraine is relying on having an air force to push the Russians back during the spring/summer fighting season. Without them, Ukraine is toast IMO. The F-16 isn't a wonder weapon. It won't win the war all by itself. However, it has become a symbol of Ukraine's potential victory. Take that away and I am sure civilian morale (probably already depressed after 3-4 months of Russian missile swarms) will drop like a rock. If the US doesn't understand this problem, shame on us.

[M T]

How about a different take?  

If the training of the pilots hasn't progressed to the point of their being effective (which I believe Goose has suggested), what would happen if Ukraine had the aircraft now?  They'd be under strong internal pressure to put them in the air, even if the pilots aren't ready.  If Russia picked off those 6 aircraft in short time, the effect on morale, as well as the combat effect, would be bad for Ukraine.

So, maybe, an external delay on the delivery of the aircraft may be what the top military people in Ukraine want.  Have the aircraft and the better trained pilots when the mud dries and Ukraine again tries to regain ground.

[M T]

How about a different take?  

If the training of the pilots hasn't progressed to the point of their being effective (which I believe Goose has suggested), what would happen if Ukraine had the aircraft now?  They'd be under strong internal pressure to put them in the air, even if the pilots aren't ready.  If Russia picked off those 6 aircraft in short time, the effect on morale, as well as the combat effect, would be bad for Ukraine.

So, maybe, an external delay on the delivery of the aircraft may be what the top military people in Ukraine want.  Have the aircraft and the better trained pilots when the mud dries and Ukraine again tries to regain ground.