[GK3]

Whether or not the Ukrainian's "should" have won, they did. Could be russian crew incompetence, could be Russian equipment is not as good as advertised, could be the Ukrainians knew all that and acted aggressively. I don't think they just got lucky.

When this war started, no one gave Ukraine a chance, they were dead meat.  Lots of people assumed the Russian forces were at least competent and that their equipment was roughly equal to NATO's. Now it seems that the only reason they haven't lost is that Ukraine has no air force. They could still pull the rabbit out of the hat if the get the F16's soon enough and in enough quantity.

An interesting article covering this issue.  I presume we must have some people at least watching and learning from all of this.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/19/techn...gnals.html

I think it fair to say that nobody has been a bigger or earlier advocate of Ukraine getting F-16s than I. However, the idea that the only reasons the Russians haven't lost is because Ukraine has no air force goes a bit too far. At the very least it is a fact not yet in evidence. To be fair, Ukraine has done a lot of things "right" in this war. They have also demonstrated and continue to demonstrate serious strategic limitations. They are still a force that relies heavily on basically immobile infantry. It is hard to win a war that way, even with a good air force. Twice during the war Ukraine has tried to develop mobile striking forces. Both times, they came up short, first in front of Kherson and later in Zaporizhzhia. The first time it was probable they didn't have the troops or equipment to do the job. The second time, it is being said it was lack of air power. That is IMO a big factor, but not the only factor in that shortfall.

Ukraine has yet to demonstrate they can conduct mobile combined arms operations against Russian prepared defenses. Having no air cover and no way to suppress Russian defenses was a very large contributing factor but so too was the inability of Ukraine to coordinate the "moving parts" of the operation. The timing was off. Ukraine blames a lot of that on late arrival of promised equipment, but until we see "good execution" from Ukraine, it is not a given. FWIW coordinating air support with ground operations is yet another thing Ukraine will have to learn in order to use it's F-16 to good effect. This is a skill that is hard to learn, as many nations, including the US, have proven.

Russia has demonstrated that they too lack the ability to strike heavy blows with mobile ground forces. Part of the problem for both sides is that much of the ground is open and therefore difficult to achieve any force concentration in secret. The problem for Ukraine is they need to show the ability to drive the Russians back. They haven't done that yet. Ukraine's one big advance happened because the Russian's did something really stupid. You can't rely on the other sides mistakes to win. Ukraine has a path to victory, but it is a narrow one.

Ukraine has had lots of chances to observe Russian gear, tactics and leadership and may well figure it is a fight they can win with the Bradley's versus a T-90 crewed by a bunch of guys who perhaps have little training, having come to the tank from the Russian Navy.

If they figure that, they are wrong. We have already seen, and the Ukraine has stated many times that the Russians learn and adapt. Bad tactics are bad tactics, even when they work. They will eventually get Ukrainians killed and vehicles destroyed that are hard to replace. There is a "right way" and a well trained competent force always does it the "right way". It may not matter all the time, but when it does matter it can be war losing. Talk to the Russian commander who decided he didn't need defense in depth around Kupiansk because the Ukrainians won't attack.

Right now, Ukraine has a very serious problem in that Russian EW has rendered their GPS guided weapons inaccurate along the entire line of contact.  This is a "big deal" as F-16s dropping JDAMS that miss aren't very useful. This is an example of Russia learning. Ukraine hasn't yet countered this situation, which mystifies me. They have the expertise to do so and have not. This doesn't require anything more than the drones Ukraine already has.

The point is that Ukraine with the F-16s is going to have to fight well and fight smart to win. They have to drive the Russians out. All the Russians have to do is hold their ground and keep fighting. Ukraine will run out of troops before Russia does in a static war.

[GK3]

Whether or not the Ukrainian's "should" have won, they did. Could be russian crew incompetence, could be Russian equipment is not as good as advertised, could be the Ukrainians knew all that and acted aggressively. I don't think they just got lucky.

When this war started, no one gave Ukraine a chance, they were dead meat.  Lots of people assumed the Russian forces were at least competent and that their equipment was roughly equal to NATO's. Now it seems that the only reason they haven't lost is that Ukraine has no air force. They could still pull the rabbit out of the hat if the get the F16's soon enough and in enough quantity.

An interesting article covering this issue.  I presume we must have some people at least watching and learning from all of this.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/19/techn...gnals.html

I think it fair to say that nobody has been a bigger or earlier advocate of Ukraine getting F-16s than I. However, the idea that the only reasons the Russians haven't lost is because Ukraine has no air force goes a bit too far. At the very least it is a fact not yet in evidence. To be fair, Ukraine has done a lot of things "right" in this war. They have also demonstrated and continue to demonstrate serious strategic limitations. They are still a force that relies heavily on basically immobile infantry. It is hard to win a war that way, even with a good air force. Twice during the war Ukraine has tried to develop mobile striking forces. Both times, they came up short, first in front of Kherson and later in Zaporizhzhia. The first time it was probable they didn't have the troops or equipment to do the job. The second time, it is being said it was lack of air power. That is IMO a big factor, but not the only factor in that shortfall.

Ukraine has yet to demonstrate they can conduct mobile combined arms operations against Russian prepared defenses. Having no air cover and no way to suppress Russian defenses was a very large contributing factor but so too was the inability of Ukraine to coordinate the "moving parts" of the operation. The timing was off. Ukraine blames a lot of that on late arrival of promised equipment, but until we see "good execution" from Ukraine, it is not a given. FWIW coordinating air support with ground operations is yet another thing Ukraine will have to learn in order to use it's F-16 to good effect. This is a skill that is hard to learn, as many nations, including the US, have proven.

Russia has demonstrated that they too lack the ability to strike heavy blows with mobile ground forces. Part of the problem for both sides is that much of the ground is open and therefore difficult to achieve any force concentration in secret. The problem for Ukraine is they need to show the ability to drive the Russians back. They haven't done that yet. Ukraine's one big advance happened because the Russian's did something really stupid. You can't rely on the other sides mistakes to win. Ukraine has a path to victory, but it is a narrow one.

Ukraine has had lots of chances to observe Russian gear, tactics and leadership and may well figure it is a fight they can win with the Bradley's versus a T-90 crewed by a bunch of guys who perhaps have little training, having come to the tank from the Russian Navy.

If they figure that, they are wrong. We have already seen, and the Ukraine has stated many times that the Russians learn and adapt. Bad tactics are bad tactics, even when they work. They will eventually get Ukrainians killed and vehicles destroyed that are hard to replace. There is a "right way" and a well trained competent force always does it the "right way". It may not matter all the time, but when it does matter it can be war losing. Talk to the Russian commander who decided he didn't need defense in depth around Kupiansk because the Ukrainians won't attack.

Right now, Ukraine has a very serious problem in that Russian EW has rendered their GPS guided weapons inaccurate along the entire line of contact.  This is a "big deal" as F-16s dropping JDAMS that miss aren't very useful. This is an example of Russia learning. Ukraine hasn't yet countered this situation, which mystifies me. They have the expertise to do so and have not. This doesn't require anything more than the drones Ukraine already has.

The point is that Ukraine with the F-16s is going to have to fight well and fight smart to win. They have to drive the Russians out. All the Russians have to do is hold their ground and keep fighting. Ukraine will run out of troops before Russia does in a static war.

[Goose]

An interesting article covering this issue.  I presume we must have some people at least watching and learning from all of this.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/19/techn...gnals.html

We do indeed have people "watching" this, both in terms of overall analysis and direct, continuous real-time observation. The way the US goes about countering this type of EW is different than the way Ukraine must. The US has extensive airborne (and other) SIGINT capability. Ukraine does not, and nobody is going to give it to them, even if they ask nicely :-). Therefore, the way Ukraine must counter these GPS jammers is of necessity different. The means they use will of course be "interesting" to the rest of the world. 

My concern is that so far we don't see Ukraine doing much at all to counter Russian EA against GPS. Ukraine has spent considerable effort in developing and deploying EA against Russian cruise missiles and drones. This is understandably a high priority for them. However, destroying/defeating Russian GPA EA is obviously critical to Ukraine's future employment of Precision Guided Weapons. This force multiplier is pretty critical to them, so the lack of action on their part is very puzzling to me.

[Goose]

An interesting article covering this issue.  I presume we must have some people at least watching and learning from all of this.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/19/techn...gnals.html

We do indeed have people "watching" this, both in terms of overall analysis and direct, continuous real-time observation. The way the US goes about countering this type of EW is different than the way Ukraine must. The US has extensive airborne (and other) SIGINT capability. Ukraine does not, and nobody is going to give it to them, even if they ask nicely :-). Therefore, the way Ukraine must counter these GPS jammers is of necessity different. The means they use will of course be "interesting" to the rest of the world. 

My concern is that so far we don't see Ukraine doing much at all to counter Russian EA against GPS. Ukraine has spent considerable effort in developing and deploying EA against Russian cruise missiles and drones. This is understandably a high priority for them. However, destroying/defeating Russian GPA EA is obviously critical to Ukraine's future employment of Precision Guided Weapons. This force multiplier is pretty critical to them, so the lack of action on their part is very puzzling to me.

[Softball Fan]

I don't know what variant of F-16 will be given to Ukraine.  Some F-16s in inventory are pretty antiquated.  

Back in the day Lockheed Martin was refurbishing some F-16s for a NATO country.  There were three electrical connectors my company was asked to bid on because the original connector manufacturer stopped making these products.  The buyer was desperate because he couldn't get a bid to reverse engineer the connectors.    I no-bid many times because it was a one-time order which would take up engineering resources.   Finally I bid a ridiculous price with a ridiculous one-time engineering and tooling charge.  The LM buyer jumped at the bid and we made a nice profit.

The point being it might be a nightmare to keep the F-16s maintained depending on what variant is used.

[Softball Fan]

I don't know what variant of F-16 will be given to Ukraine.  Some F-16s in inventory are pretty antiquated.  

Back in the day Lockheed Martin was refurbishing some F-16s for a NATO country.  There were three electrical connectors my company was asked to bid on because the original connector manufacturer stopped making these products.  The buyer was desperate because he couldn't get a bid to reverse engineer the connectors.    I no-bid many times because it was a one-time order which would take up engineering resources.   Finally I bid a ridiculous price with a ridiculous one-time engineering and tooling charge.  The LM buyer jumped at the bid and we made a nice profit.

The point being it might be a nightmare to keep the F-16s maintained depending on what variant is used.

[GK3]

An interesting article covering this issue.  I presume we must have some people at least watching and learning from all of this.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/19/techn...gnals.html

We do indeed have people "watching" this, both in terms of overall analysis and direct, continuous real-time observation. The way the US goes about countering this type of EW is different than the way Ukraine must. The US has extensive airborne (and other) SIGINT capability. Ukraine does not, and nobody is going to give it to them, even if they ask nicely :-). Therefore, the way Ukraine must counter these GPS jammers is of necessity different. The means they use will of course be "interesting" to the rest of the world. 

My concern is that so far we don't see Ukraine doing much at all to counter Russian EA against GPS. Ukraine has spent considerable effort in developing and deploying EA against Russian cruise missiles and drones. This is understandably a high priority for them. However, destroying/defeating Russian GPA EA is obviously critical to Ukraine's future employment of Precision Guided Weapons. This force multiplier is pretty critical to them, so the lack of action on their part is very puzzling to me.

Is it possible, that their solution won't be lasting, so better to deploy it when the first JADAM laded F16 takes off.

[GK3]

An interesting article covering this issue.  I presume we must have some people at least watching and learning from all of this.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/19/techn...gnals.html

We do indeed have people "watching" this, both in terms of overall analysis and direct, continuous real-time observation. The way the US goes about countering this type of EW is different than the way Ukraine must. The US has extensive airborne (and other) SIGINT capability. Ukraine does not, and nobody is going to give it to them, even if they ask nicely :-). Therefore, the way Ukraine must counter these GPS jammers is of necessity different. The means they use will of course be "interesting" to the rest of the world. 

My concern is that so far we don't see Ukraine doing much at all to counter Russian EA against GPS. Ukraine has spent considerable effort in developing and deploying EA against Russian cruise missiles and drones. This is understandably a high priority for them. However, destroying/defeating Russian GPA EA is obviously critical to Ukraine's future employment of Precision Guided Weapons. This force multiplier is pretty critical to them, so the lack of action on their part is very puzzling to me.

Is it possible, that their solution won't be lasting, so better to deploy it when the first JADAM laded F16 takes off.

[Goose]

An interesting article covering this issue.  I presume we must have some people at least watching and learning from all of this.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/19/techn...gnals.html

We do indeed have people "watching" this, both in terms of overall analysis and direct, continuous real-time observation. The way the US goes about countering this type of EW is different than the way Ukraine must. The US has extensive airborne (and other) SIGINT capability. Ukraine does not, and nobody is going to give it to them, even if they ask nicely :-). Therefore, the way Ukraine must counter these GPS jammers is of necessity different. The means they use will of course be "interesting" to the rest of the world. 

My concern is that so far we don't see Ukraine doing much at all to counter Russian EA against GPS. Ukraine has spent considerable effort in developing and deploying EA against Russian cruise missiles and drones. This is understandably a high priority for them. However, destroying/defeating Russian GPA EA is obviously critical to Ukraine's future employment of Precision Guided Weapons. This force multiplier is pretty critical to them, so the lack of action on their part is very puzzling to me.

Is it possible, that their solution won't be lasting, so better to deploy it when the first JADAM laded F16 takes off.

It is possible that Russia will develop countermeasures to the Ukrainian solution. More probably, the Russians will deploy "backup" jammers that will only be "activated" when the primary is destroyed. That will require manufacture of lots more jammers, something that probably isn't easy. Fortunately for Ukraine, it isn't practical for Russia to turn the jammers off and dynamically activate them when needed. There is really no way of knowing where Ukraine will attack or exactly when. Russia also has no infrastructure that can react quickly across unit boundaries, so dynamic response is out.

These jammers are also effective against HIMARS, Excaliber, and the European cruise missiles like Storm Shadow. Ukraine has plenty of reason to use any EA capability it has right now to keep the existing PGMs working. They may have "reasons" to hold back, but it is hard to imagine they are "good" reasons, given the above.

It is also very risky to develop and deploy a very large number of EA "platforms" (which will be required because the Russians have lots of jammers :-) without demonstrating their combat effectiveness. They may not work, and then you have wasted lots of time and money and have no time remaining to find and fix the issues.

[Goose]

An interesting article covering this issue.  I presume we must have some people at least watching and learning from all of this.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/19/techn...gnals.html

We do indeed have people "watching" this, both in terms of overall analysis and direct, continuous real-time observation. The way the US goes about countering this type of EW is different than the way Ukraine must. The US has extensive airborne (and other) SIGINT capability. Ukraine does not, and nobody is going to give it to them, even if they ask nicely :-). Therefore, the way Ukraine must counter these GPS jammers is of necessity different. The means they use will of course be "interesting" to the rest of the world. 

My concern is that so far we don't see Ukraine doing much at all to counter Russian EA against GPS. Ukraine has spent considerable effort in developing and deploying EA against Russian cruise missiles and drones. This is understandably a high priority for them. However, destroying/defeating Russian GPA EA is obviously critical to Ukraine's future employment of Precision Guided Weapons. This force multiplier is pretty critical to them, so the lack of action on their part is very puzzling to me.

Is it possible, that their solution won't be lasting, so better to deploy it when the first JADAM laded F16 takes off.

It is possible that Russia will develop countermeasures to the Ukrainian solution. More probably, the Russians will deploy "backup" jammers that will only be "activated" when the primary is destroyed. That will require manufacture of lots more jammers, something that probably isn't easy. Fortunately for Ukraine, it isn't practical for Russia to turn the jammers off and dynamically activate them when needed. There is really no way of knowing where Ukraine will attack or exactly when. Russia also has no infrastructure that can react quickly across unit boundaries, so dynamic response is out.

These jammers are also effective against HIMARS, Excaliber, and the European cruise missiles like Storm Shadow. Ukraine has plenty of reason to use any EA capability it has right now to keep the existing PGMs working. They may have "reasons" to hold back, but it is hard to imagine they are "good" reasons, given the above.

It is also very risky to develop and deploy a very large number of EA "platforms" (which will be required because the Russians have lots of jammers :-) without demonstrating their combat effectiveness. They may not work, and then you have wasted lots of time and money and have no time remaining to find and fix the issues.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/media-ukraine...08185.html

If this is true, it dwarfs any discussion about Bradleys vs T-90s :). It would IMO undoubtedly been a Patriot, because Ukraine's S-300 systems (if they have any left) probably are all deployed as point defense systems. The IL-22M being shot down as well is also a "big deal". The real question is why the A-50 didn't detect the Patriot search radar and then later the illuminator. It also should have detected the missile itself. Either way, a dive to the deck should have preserved it. That didn't happen. If Ukraine can keep the A-50s out of the area, Russia and Ukraine will remain equally blind to what is going on "over the horizon". That will allow F-16s to fly to their intended targets largely undetected (if they stay low until the "last minute"). The  A-50 can take away that advantage, so killing them helps a lot.

The IL-22M could have been doing ELINT or command and control operations. Either way, taking one down probably killed lots of "valuable" personnel, at a minimum. Russia undoubtedly needs info on the Ukrainian EORBAT. An ELINT IL-22 can provide that. Unfortunately, Ukraine does not have an equivalent capability. Denying it to Russia is an important equalizer.

Of course, we don't yet have "official" confirmation of this success, and therefore can't celebrate too much :-).

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/media-ukraine...08185.html

If this is true, it dwarfs any discussion about Bradleys vs T-90s :). It would IMO undoubtedly been a Patriot, because Ukraine's S-300 systems (if they have any left) probably are all deployed as point defense systems. The IL-22M being shot down as well is also a "big deal". The real question is why the A-50 didn't detect the Patriot search radar and then later the illuminator. It also should have detected the missile itself. Either way, a dive to the deck should have preserved it. That didn't happen. If Ukraine can keep the A-50s out of the area, Russia and Ukraine will remain equally blind to what is going on "over the horizon". That will allow F-16s to fly to their intended targets largely undetected (if they stay low until the "last minute"). The  A-50 can take away that advantage, so killing them helps a lot.

The IL-22M could have been doing ELINT or command and control operations. Either way, taking one down probably killed lots of "valuable" personnel, at a minimum. Russia undoubtedly needs info on the Ukrainian EORBAT. An ELINT IL-22 can provide that. Unfortunately, Ukraine does not have an equivalent capability. Denying it to Russia is an important equalizer.

Of course, we don't yet have "official" confirmation of this success, and therefore can't celebrate too much :-).

[dabigv13]

Yes lots of chatter from Ukrainian sources this morning  about an A50 being shot down with a Patriot over Sea of Azov. There have been russian sources on the IL-22 which supposedly was damaged but landed. Nothing about the A50 yet though from Russian sources.

Would be awesome if true, still pretty uncertain though IMHO.

[dabigv13]

Yes lots of chatter from Ukrainian sources this morning  about an A50 being shot down with a Patriot over Sea of Azov. There have been russian sources on the IL-22 which supposedly was damaged but landed. Nothing about the A50 yet though from Russian sources.

Would be awesome if true, still pretty uncertain though IMHO.

[Goose]

Yes lots of chatter from Ukrainian sources this morning  about an A50 being shot down with a Patriot over Sea of Azov. There have been russian sources on the IL-22 which supposedly was damaged but landed. Nothing about the A50 yet though from Russian sources.

Would be awesome if true, still pretty uncertain though IMHO.

Agree.

[Goose]

Yes lots of chatter from Ukrainian sources this morning  about an A50 being shot down with a Patriot over Sea of Azov. There have been russian sources on the IL-22 which supposedly was damaged but landed. Nothing about the A50 yet though from Russian sources.

Would be awesome if true, still pretty uncertain though IMHO.

Agree.

[Leftcoast]

For those, like me, who might need to look up "A-50" I've done the work for you.  

An A-50 is the Russian comparable plane to the US AWAC.  Not as good and built using a 1970s transport airframe but meant to do a similar job.  If Ukraine can back them further away from Ukraine airspace this would effectively limit Russian visibility - how much damage that would do I'll leave to folks more informed than me.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beriev_A-50

[Leftcoast]

For those, like me, who might need to look up "A-50" I've done the work for you.  

An A-50 is the Russian comparable plane to the US AWAC.  Not as good and built using a 1970s transport airframe but meant to do a similar job.  If Ukraine can back them further away from Ukraine airspace this would effectively limit Russian visibility - how much damage that would do I'll leave to folks more informed than me.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beriev_A-50

[dabigv13]

With this post by the Russian "fighterbomber" telegram channel, it's looking more likely that the A-50 shoot down happened. It was a little late coming so I was skeptical at first but now I believe. They are pretty reliable even if they may sometimes fault Russian friendly fire rather than Ukrainian missiles for aircraft shoot downs.

https://x.com/COUPSURE/status/1746776168613744907?s=20

Really big deal as Goose has mentioned. Russia simply does not have many of these planes, every one Ukraine can destroy (and this is the first they have shot down, though Belarusian partisans damaged one on the ground with drones a while back) means a lot. They are likely already cannibalizing planes to keep the few they have operational.

A Russian channel suggests this is an A-50U (RF-50610), which was upgraded in 2019. Russia had 8 upgraded A-50U aircraft as of September and has been averaging upgrading one A-50 to the A-50U standard every two years.

https://x.com/RALee85/status/1746787440013050359?s=20

[dabigv13]

With this post by the Russian "fighterbomber" telegram channel, it's looking more likely that the A-50 shoot down happened. It was a little late coming so I was skeptical at first but now I believe. They are pretty reliable even if they may sometimes fault Russian friendly fire rather than Ukrainian missiles for aircraft shoot downs.

https://x.com/COUPSURE/status/1746776168613744907?s=20

Really big deal as Goose has mentioned. Russia simply does not have many of these planes, every one Ukraine can destroy (and this is the first they have shot down, though Belarusian partisans damaged one on the ground with drones a while back) means a lot. They are likely already cannibalizing planes to keep the few they have operational.

A Russian channel suggests this is an A-50U (RF-50610), which was upgraded in 2019. Russia had 8 upgraded A-50U aircraft as of September and has been averaging upgrading one A-50 to the A-50U standard every two years.

https://x.com/RALee85/status/1746787440013050359?s=20

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-russi...04732.html

The emergency landing of the IL-22 was a very nice piece of flying. At least one Russian pilot was on the job that night. The damage to the tail is significant but that is not to say there wasn't also damage in the tube itself. Calling for an ambulance indicates somebody was at least hurt. For Ukraine, too bad they didn't take this one down too. These planes usually carry people with either "special skills" or higher ranks involved in battle management. They too have special training and generally experience in the art. The plane can be fairly easily replaced but the people cannot.

The Mainstay is important at present because it can help target Ukrainian air force operating bases (which change frequently) and can warn of Ukrainian air strikes inbound, even when the Ukrainian aircraft fly low. Right now, the latter isn't all that important, as the Ukrainian air force cannot mount many sorties. When the F-16s arrive that will change. The A-50s will then be very important to warn Russian aircraft of the threat and to vector Russian air to attack the inbound strike. This is the original purpose of the Mainstay and it can definitely execute that task. It generally does not control a large number of aircraft (typically 8 or less), which differs from the US/NATO AWACS. This is part of the Russian approach to the IADS which puts the air controller deeply in the loop. It is said that the A-50 can control much larger forces, but AFAIK it hasn't been demonstrated doing this.

The A-50 can also warn of cruise missiles inbound and in theory can interface directly (via datalinks) to the Russian IADS (e.g. individual S-400 batteries) and directly launch and target the missiles. This capability has not been observed anywhere in the current set of Russian wars. In fact, in Ukraine, the Russian IADS hasn't operated in an "integrated" fashion, much to everyone's surprise. However, we really don't want the Russians to start living up to the advertised capabilities of the A-50. They may have just never felt it necessary in Syria and Ukraine to "get their act together". We don't want to give them the chance, so destroying the aircraft and crews "soon" would be important. With a small number of aircraft, there are also a small number of trained crews. They are almost more valuable than the aircraft.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-russi...04732.html

The emergency landing of the IL-22 was a very nice piece of flying. At least one Russian pilot was on the job that night. The damage to the tail is significant but that is not to say there wasn't also damage in the tube itself. Calling for an ambulance indicates somebody was at least hurt. For Ukraine, too bad they didn't take this one down too. These planes usually carry people with either "special skills" or higher ranks involved in battle management. They too have special training and generally experience in the art. The plane can be fairly easily replaced but the people cannot.

The Mainstay is important at present because it can help target Ukrainian air force operating bases (which change frequently) and can warn of Ukrainian air strikes inbound, even when the Ukrainian aircraft fly low. Right now, the latter isn't all that important, as the Ukrainian air force cannot mount many sorties. When the F-16s arrive that will change. The A-50s will then be very important to warn Russian aircraft of the threat and to vector Russian air to attack the inbound strike. This is the original purpose of the Mainstay and it can definitely execute that task. It generally does not control a large number of aircraft (typically 8 or less), which differs from the US/NATO AWACS. This is part of the Russian approach to the IADS which puts the air controller deeply in the loop. It is said that the A-50 can control much larger forces, but AFAIK it hasn't been demonstrated doing this.

The A-50 can also warn of cruise missiles inbound and in theory can interface directly (via datalinks) to the Russian IADS (e.g. individual S-400 batteries) and directly launch and target the missiles. This capability has not been observed anywhere in the current set of Russian wars. In fact, in Ukraine, the Russian IADS hasn't operated in an "integrated" fashion, much to everyone's surprise. However, we really don't want the Russians to start living up to the advertised capabilities of the A-50. They may have just never felt it necessary in Syria and Ukraine to "get their act together". We don't want to give them the chance, so destroying the aircraft and crews "soon" would be important. With a small number of aircraft, there are also a small number of trained crews. They are almost more valuable than the aircraft.

[TrumpCard]

I know folks are concerned that Russia has taken 20% of Ukraine's territory and that Ukraine may be unable to sustain itself as an independent nation without that land.  What if the bigger issue is the depletion of its population through the loss of life in the conflict, through emigration to Europe, and through "deportation" into Russia?  Would a negotiated resolution include a means for Ukraine to repatriate some of the thousands of people whom Russia "deported" to Russia?  If so, that seems like an important factor to consider.

[TrumpCard]

I know folks are concerned that Russia has taken 20% of Ukraine's territory and that Ukraine may be unable to sustain itself as an independent nation without that land.  What if the bigger issue is the depletion of its population through the loss of life in the conflict, through emigration to Europe, and through "deportation" into Russia?  Would a negotiated resolution include a means for Ukraine to repatriate some of the thousands of people whom Russia "deported" to Russia?  If so, that seems like an important factor to consider.

[Mick]

I know folks are concerned that Russia has taken 20% of Ukraine's territory and that Ukraine may be unable to sustain itself as an independent nation without that land.  What if the bigger issue is the depletion of its population through the loss of life in the conflict, through emigration to Europe, and through "deportation" into Russia?  Would a negotiated resolution include a means for Ukraine to repatriate some of the thousands of people whom Russia "deported" to Russia?  If so, that seems like an important factor to consider.

I think that's the bigger issue, particularly given Russia's demographic meltdown. This is by Putin's own admission. He keeps the Ukrainian population to repopulate his country, said population of which has been on the decline since 1992. They fell below the 2.1 child "replacement rate" in the mid-1980s. 





https://www.ft.com/content/8c576a9c-ba65...4fa5457c62

[Mick]

I know folks are concerned that Russia has taken 20% of Ukraine's territory and that Ukraine may be unable to sustain itself as an independent nation without that land.  What if the bigger issue is the depletion of its population through the loss of life in the conflict, through emigration to Europe, and through "deportation" into Russia?  Would a negotiated resolution include a means for Ukraine to repatriate some of the thousands of people whom Russia "deported" to Russia?  If so, that seems like an important factor to consider.

I think that's the bigger issue, particularly given Russia's demographic meltdown. This is by Putin's own admission. He keeps the Ukrainian population to repopulate his country, said population of which has been on the decline since 1992. They fell below the 2.1 child "replacement rate" in the mid-1980s. 





https://www.ft.com/content/8c576a9c-ba65...4fa5457c62

[Goose]

While Russia may want to incorporate Ukrainians into the Russian population, it must be remembered that there is still lots of racial prejudice in Russian society. Ukrainians will never be "equal" in the eyes of the ethnic Russians, and Ukrainians know that from hard experience. It is unlikely a forced absorption of Ukrainians into Russia will "work". Eventual genocide is a more probable outcome IMO. As a resident of the USA, one might wonder about why Ukrainians and Russians perceive themselves as "different", and how do they know what your background really is? Well, they do, as the lack of assimilation of the occupied Ukrainian territory shows.

Despite Russia's population problem, consider:
https://news.yahoo.com/hur-russia-mobili...35211.html

Putin is getting all the troops he needs. This is from a pro-Ukraine source which IMO means it is probably accurate. Nobody in western intelligence is disputing it AFAIK. This will keep the pressure on Ukraine for the foreseeable future. That is why Ukraine needs to take back the south in order to shorten the front and force Russia into offensive warfare everywhere else.  Offensive warfare is expensive (both men and money). Losing Crimea would be a big setback to Russia. Such an action would probably result in Russia re-thinking the war and possibly Putin's demise. Failing that, Ukraine doesn't have any reasonable options. The Russians will keep coming.

[Goose]

While Russia may want to incorporate Ukrainians into the Russian population, it must be remembered that there is still lots of racial prejudice in Russian society. Ukrainians will never be "equal" in the eyes of the ethnic Russians, and Ukrainians know that from hard experience. It is unlikely a forced absorption of Ukrainians into Russia will "work". Eventual genocide is a more probable outcome IMO. As a resident of the USA, one might wonder about why Ukrainians and Russians perceive themselves as "different", and how do they know what your background really is? Well, they do, as the lack of assimilation of the occupied Ukrainian territory shows.

Despite Russia's population problem, consider:
https://news.yahoo.com/hur-russia-mobili...35211.html

Putin is getting all the troops he needs. This is from a pro-Ukraine source which IMO means it is probably accurate. Nobody in western intelligence is disputing it AFAIK. This will keep the pressure on Ukraine for the foreseeable future. That is why Ukraine needs to take back the south in order to shorten the front and force Russia into offensive warfare everywhere else.  Offensive warfare is expensive (both men and money). Losing Crimea would be a big setback to Russia. Such an action would probably result in Russia re-thinking the war and possibly Putin's demise. Failing that, Ukraine doesn't have any reasonable options. The Russians will keep coming.

[TrumpCard]

I gather the answer to my question is "no" because a key reason that Putin invaded Ukraine in the first place was to attempt to re-populate Russia.  That's depressing, and even more so considering your unfortunately plausible prediction that those Ukrainians "deported" to Russia will end up being the victims of genocide.  In another world, an opportunity for Ukraine to give some of its land for the return of thousands of living Ukrainian people would be seem like the foundation of a difficult-to-accept but still plausible "peace treaty."

[TrumpCard]

I gather the answer to my question is "no" because a key reason that Putin invaded Ukraine in the first place was to attempt to re-populate Russia.  That's depressing, and even more so considering your unfortunately plausible prediction that those Ukrainians "deported" to Russia will end up being the victims of genocide.  In another world, an opportunity for Ukraine to give some of its land for the return of thousands of living Ukrainian people would be seem like the foundation of a difficult-to-accept but still plausible "peace treaty."

[Mick]

The Russians have a presidential election in March. Tempting fate by running against Putin, Boris Nadezhdin is the anti-war candidate. He's spoken out against the war and has publicly stated that Russia should court Western investment and should reopen dialogue with America and Europe again.

He's not technically on the ballot yet. He worked for Putin for years and knows him. Putin's best-known opponent, Alexei Nevalny, is serving multiple sentences amounting to more than 30 years at a remote penal colony in the Artic Circle.

I hope Mr. Nadezhdin is avoiding tall buildings with open windows.

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/the-ant...x-078a874c

[Mick]

The Russians have a presidential election in March. Tempting fate by running against Putin, Boris Nadezhdin is the anti-war candidate. He's spoken out against the war and has publicly stated that Russia should court Western investment and should reopen dialogue with America and Europe again.

He's not technically on the ballot yet. He worked for Putin for years and knows him. Putin's best-known opponent, Alexei Nevalny, is serving multiple sentences amounting to more than 30 years at a remote penal colony in the Artic Circle.

I hope Mr. Nadezhdin is avoiding tall buildings with open windows.

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/the-ant...x-078a874c

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/gods-...17189.html

This article, although in many respects a "fluff" piece, gives some idea what visibility an aircraft like an E-3 can provide. The Russian A-50 can do essentially the same thing for Russia, although it's technical capabilities are possibly (OK, probably) not as good. Both aircraft supply the ability to bring a powerful high resolution radar to 30K feet. The altitude creates the geometry for both cases. That allows a very wide field of view. It allows these aircraft to "look down" on aircraft moving at or below the platform's altitude, which means these contacts can't "sneak up" on friendly forces. It also allows the AWACS (the "control" part of the operation) to vector friendly fighters to intercept "important" hostile targets without these friendly fighters having to search for them.

For the AWACS to be fully useful, there must be adequate communications directly from the AWACS to the formations and assets that are possibly soon to be attacked by the hostile contacts. This communication network is hard to build. The US has one that is imperfect. Russia has one that is pretty bad and often does not even attempt to function. The US also incorporates other assets, like the former JSTARS aircraft, the electronic intelligence aircraft (Rivet Joint for example), and real-time intelligence from drones. These capabilities mean our air forces (and NATO air forces) are not ever "blind" to the threats and ground forces can often anticipate their arrival. This also allows ground based missile and gun systems to acquire the threats much more rapidly and engage them sooner.

Russia could, in theory, do the same type of things from their Mainstays, but the "vertical organization" of their military makes it difficult to impossible for them to pass information from the Mainstays to the affected aircraft and ground based targets under threat. It also needs to be remembered that Russia is not using IFF over their own territory, and they also don't in general coordinate  air operations with the Mainstay. The airborne operators have to figure out who is who, which is not easy. What Russia has done in Syria is assign flights of fighters to "work" with the Mainstays. In some cases this is done as a protective measure and the fighters are tasked with detecting the Mainstay. Obviously in the Syrian example, these planes have little to do. It is also common to have strike aircraft assigned to Mainstays with the idea the mainstay will control these aircraft and use them effectively. The number of aircraft so assigned is usually "small", like less than 8 or so. These fighters are not permanently "assigned" to this mode of operation. Therefore there is often a bit of a learning curve for both the Mainstay and the fighters. Russia can do this however, so the capability can't be ignored.

Ukraine will need something similar to use their relatively few F-16s effectively. Flying a combat air patrol relying only on the F-16s sensors is like searching for a parking space looking through a straw. You will succeed sometimes, but in most cases you will not. Ukraine is a big country and the line of contact is long. While the current state of the conflict may prioritize one area over another, Ukraine won't have enough aircraft to provide aircraft everywhere all the time. Yes, you can fight without an AWACS, but you really don't want to :-). This is why Russia places such a high priority on destroying them.

Ukraine isn't going to get any E-3s. We don't have enough as is, and our Wedgetails won't be available for a while. Perhaps the US or one of the others users can spare some E-2s. Not as good in some ways (particularly if one is using an older model :-) but MUCH better than nothing. As I have pointed out before, Sweden has some similar aircraft that perhaps they can "donate". Ukraine needs this capability to also "see" inbound cruise missiles that fly at low altitudes. For ground based air defense the engagement window is short. Knowing when and where the target will be when it enters the engagement envelope is a very big plus.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/gods-...17189.html

This article, although in many respects a "fluff" piece, gives some idea what visibility an aircraft like an E-3 can provide. The Russian A-50 can do essentially the same thing for Russia, although it's technical capabilities are possibly (OK, probably) not as good. Both aircraft supply the ability to bring a powerful high resolution radar to 30K feet. The altitude creates the geometry for both cases. That allows a very wide field of view. It allows these aircraft to "look down" on aircraft moving at or below the platform's altitude, which means these contacts can't "sneak up" on friendly forces. It also allows the AWACS (the "control" part of the operation) to vector friendly fighters to intercept "important" hostile targets without these friendly fighters having to search for them.

For the AWACS to be fully useful, there must be adequate communications directly from the AWACS to the formations and assets that are possibly soon to be attacked by the hostile contacts. This communication network is hard to build. The US has one that is imperfect. Russia has one that is pretty bad and often does not even attempt to function. The US also incorporates other assets, like the former JSTARS aircraft, the electronic intelligence aircraft (Rivet Joint for example), and real-time intelligence from drones. These capabilities mean our air forces (and NATO air forces) are not ever "blind" to the threats and ground forces can often anticipate their arrival. This also allows ground based missile and gun systems to acquire the threats much more rapidly and engage them sooner.

Russia could, in theory, do the same type of things from their Mainstays, but the "vertical organization" of their military makes it difficult to impossible for them to pass information from the Mainstays to the affected aircraft and ground based targets under threat. It also needs to be remembered that Russia is not using IFF over their own territory, and they also don't in general coordinate  air operations with the Mainstay. The airborne operators have to figure out who is who, which is not easy. What Russia has done in Syria is assign flights of fighters to "work" with the Mainstays. In some cases this is done as a protective measure and the fighters are tasked with detecting the Mainstay. Obviously in the Syrian example, these planes have little to do. It is also common to have strike aircraft assigned to Mainstays with the idea the mainstay will control these aircraft and use them effectively. The number of aircraft so assigned is usually "small", like less than 8 or so. These fighters are not permanently "assigned" to this mode of operation. Therefore there is often a bit of a learning curve for both the Mainstay and the fighters. Russia can do this however, so the capability can't be ignored.

Ukraine will need something similar to use their relatively few F-16s effectively. Flying a combat air patrol relying only on the F-16s sensors is like searching for a parking space looking through a straw. You will succeed sometimes, but in most cases you will not. Ukraine is a big country and the line of contact is long. While the current state of the conflict may prioritize one area over another, Ukraine won't have enough aircraft to provide aircraft everywhere all the time. Yes, you can fight without an AWACS, but you really don't want to :-). This is why Russia places such a high priority on destroying them.

Ukraine isn't going to get any E-3s. We don't have enough as is, and our Wedgetails won't be available for a while. Perhaps the US or one of the others users can spare some E-2s. Not as good in some ways (particularly if one is using an older model :-) but MUCH better than nothing. As I have pointed out before, Sweden has some similar aircraft that perhaps they can "donate". Ukraine needs this capability to also "see" inbound cruise missiles that fly at low altitudes. For ground based air defense the engagement window is short. Knowing when and where the target will be when it enters the engagement envelope is a very big plus.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/military-inte...32548.html

These are encouraging and useful activities. They increase the "friction" in the Russian transportation system. However, we must all keep in mind that rail transportation systems are inherently quite resilient. The WW II experience showed that Germany was able to keep the rail system mostly running until the end of the war. Fixing track is pretty easy. Most routes that have bridges on them have alternate routes available. This is necessary because even in peacetime bridges sometimes fail or require repairs.

What is most necessary to shut down rail lines is persistence. Destroying the line once is a nuisance but easily overcome, or at worst requires lots of effort but can be fixed pretty fast. However, if the crews doing the fixing can be attacked, doing the repairs become really hard. Then, when repairs are almost complete, do it again. That is the only way that works "permanently". Ukraine in general doesn't have the ability to deliver this persistence of effort. Therefore their sabotage  efforts, while sometimes spectacular, won't really stop traffic on the line for long.

Strangely enough, blowing up the signaling equipment brings more "bang for the buck" than most other simple actions. The long single track sections of the Russian "Transcon" rely on electronic train control to maximize the flow of traffic. If part of the line "goes dark", trains back up because nobody knows if the way ahead is clear. Blowing up a few boxes in widely separated areas can gridlock the line. The good news is there are lots of signal boxes to blow up. The Russians can't guard them all :-).

---

I gather the answer to my question is "no" because a key reason that Putin invaded Ukraine in the first place was to attempt to re-populate Russia.  That's depressing, and even more so considering your unfortunately plausible prediction that those Ukrainians "deported" to Russia will end up being the victims of genocide.  In another world, an opportunity for Ukraine to give some of its land for the return of thousands of living Ukrainian people would be seem like the foundation of a difficult-to-accept but still plausible "peace treaty."

I doubt that Putin invaded Ukraine to re-populate Russia. It wouldn't do that. Ukraine is not crowded and the citizens of Ukraine are not Russians. They are "second class citizens" at best in Russian eyes. Putin may have wanted a bunch of new "subjects" for his version of the Russian empire, but in no way would that make up for decline in the ethnic Russian population. Ukrainians are one step above Georgians and two steps above Chechens. Not candidates to be "Russians".

Putin may have been moved by nostalgia for a Ukraine that was part of the Soviet Union and was ruled by Russians. Gorbachev himself spent his early years in Ukraine, and his mother and wife were both "Russians of Ukrainian origin". However, Gorbachev did not see Ukraine as an independent state and would rule it as a fiefdom. That is probably how Putin wants to see it too, IMO.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/military-inte...32548.html

These are encouraging and useful activities. They increase the "friction" in the Russian transportation system. However, we must all keep in mind that rail transportation systems are inherently quite resilient. The WW II experience showed that Germany was able to keep the rail system mostly running until the end of the war. Fixing track is pretty easy. Most routes that have bridges on them have alternate routes available. This is necessary because even in peacetime bridges sometimes fail or require repairs.

What is most necessary to shut down rail lines is persistence. Destroying the line once is a nuisance but easily overcome, or at worst requires lots of effort but can be fixed pretty fast. However, if the crews doing the fixing can be attacked, doing the repairs become really hard. Then, when repairs are almost complete, do it again. That is the only way that works "permanently". Ukraine in general doesn't have the ability to deliver this persistence of effort. Therefore their sabotage  efforts, while sometimes spectacular, won't really stop traffic on the line for long.

Strangely enough, blowing up the signaling equipment brings more "bang for the buck" than most other simple actions. The long single track sections of the Russian "Transcon" rely on electronic train control to maximize the flow of traffic. If part of the line "goes dark", trains back up because nobody knows if the way ahead is clear. Blowing up a few boxes in widely separated areas can gridlock the line. The good news is there are lots of signal boxes to blow up. The Russians can't guard them all :-).

---

I gather the answer to my question is "no" because a key reason that Putin invaded Ukraine in the first place was to attempt to re-populate Russia.  That's depressing, and even more so considering your unfortunately plausible prediction that those Ukrainians "deported" to Russia will end up being the victims of genocide.  In another world, an opportunity for Ukraine to give some of its land for the return of thousands of living Ukrainian people would be seem like the foundation of a difficult-to-accept but still plausible "peace treaty."

I doubt that Putin invaded Ukraine to re-populate Russia. It wouldn't do that. Ukraine is not crowded and the citizens of Ukraine are not Russians. They are "second class citizens" at best in Russian eyes. Putin may have wanted a bunch of new "subjects" for his version of the Russian empire, but in no way would that make up for decline in the ethnic Russian population. Ukrainians are one step above Georgians and two steps above Chechens. Not candidates to be "Russians".

Putin may have been moved by nostalgia for a Ukraine that was part of the Soviet Union and was ruled by Russians. Gorbachev himself spent his early years in Ukraine, and his mother and wife were both "Russians of Ukrainian origin". However, Gorbachev did not see Ukraine as an independent state and would rule it as a fiefdom. That is probably how Putin wants to see it too, IMO.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/head-russian-...02481.html

While this unrest probably will not lead to any major disruption of the Russian war effort in Ukraine, it does show that Russia has a "minorities" problem and it isn't minor. While racism/tribalism exists in almost all nations, in Russia it has often been acknowledged by the ruling class and actually embraced as a "good thing". Certainly under the Tsars being "Russian" was a big thing and the Tsars often cloaked their aggressive wars as "spreading Russian civilization" to "uncivilized natives". It has also been universally true that for advancement in Russia ethnic minority people had to become "honorary Russians". It is also true that Russians sent to administer "uncivilized" people sometimes intermarried and created "hybrid Russians" who went to school in Russia proper. These people were often sent to government jobs in areas that were ethnically different than their own origins because they would be loyal to the state and not the inhabitants.

To it's credit, the Soviet Union on paper condemned racism. It openly accepted leaders that were minorities (Stalin). However, the reality was that the Soviet Union inflicted even worse depredations on uncooperative minority areas than the Tsars ever did. Of course, they sometimes did the same to ethnic Russians. The oppression was now both ethnically based and politically based.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia "spun off" much of it's Muslim minority. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin considered this a "good thing" as they were more trouble than they were worth.  Chechnya was considered important enough to keep. The leadership firmly believed the ethnic minority republics of Ukraine and Belarus would vote to remain as part of the Russian Federation. For reasons that were partially (but not primarily) ethnically based, that didn't happen. The political class in these countries saw an opportunity to get out from under "the Center", which appealed to them. The population as a whole (as well as the politicians) also thought they were going to get financial aid from the west proportionally to what Poland had/would get. This looked like a great windfall. Bush's "Chicken Kiev" speech was designed and intended to disabuse them of that notion. The US didn't have the money and Bush didn't have the political clout to spend it even if we had it. It didn't work. The enthusiasm for independence was too great in the general population. Their politicians simply didn't believe the US wouldn't help them. They also wanted to benefit from their positions not being "gifts" of the Russian Federation. Wishful thinking was rampant at all levels.

This history makes Ukraine and Belarus more "Russian" than many of the smaller republics in Russia. They both have many more people that are ethnically Russian and speak Russian "at home". This is particularly true in the Donbas. Putin has reverted to the Tsarist approach of "colonization"  and "Russification". He is also, as a bonus, killing off a lot of the ethnic minorities already in Russia. He expects he can win the war in Ukraine before he generates enough unrest in Russia to become a big problem. There are some cracks forming, but Putin is probably able to suppress this dissent. This dissent will only be a big problem if it spreads to ethnic Russians. Lets hope that happens, and soon.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/head-russian-...02481.html

While this unrest probably will not lead to any major disruption of the Russian war effort in Ukraine, it does show that Russia has a "minorities" problem and it isn't minor. While racism/tribalism exists in almost all nations, in Russia it has often been acknowledged by the ruling class and actually embraced as a "good thing". Certainly under the Tsars being "Russian" was a big thing and the Tsars often cloaked their aggressive wars as "spreading Russian civilization" to "uncivilized natives". It has also been universally true that for advancement in Russia ethnic minority people had to become "honorary Russians". It is also true that Russians sent to administer "uncivilized" people sometimes intermarried and created "hybrid Russians" who went to school in Russia proper. These people were often sent to government jobs in areas that were ethnically different than their own origins because they would be loyal to the state and not the inhabitants.

To it's credit, the Soviet Union on paper condemned racism. It openly accepted leaders that were minorities (Stalin). However, the reality was that the Soviet Union inflicted even worse depredations on uncooperative minority areas than the Tsars ever did. Of course, they sometimes did the same to ethnic Russians. The oppression was now both ethnically based and politically based.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia "spun off" much of it's Muslim minority. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin considered this a "good thing" as they were more trouble than they were worth.  Chechnya was considered important enough to keep. The leadership firmly believed the ethnic minority republics of Ukraine and Belarus would vote to remain as part of the Russian Federation. For reasons that were partially (but not primarily) ethnically based, that didn't happen. The political class in these countries saw an opportunity to get out from under "the Center", which appealed to them. The population as a whole (as well as the politicians) also thought they were going to get financial aid from the west proportionally to what Poland had/would get. This looked like a great windfall. Bush's "Chicken Kiev" speech was designed and intended to disabuse them of that notion. The US didn't have the money and Bush didn't have the political clout to spend it even if we had it. It didn't work. The enthusiasm for independence was too great in the general population. Their politicians simply didn't believe the US wouldn't help them. They also wanted to benefit from their positions not being "gifts" of the Russian Federation. Wishful thinking was rampant at all levels.

This history makes Ukraine and Belarus more "Russian" than many of the smaller republics in Russia. They both have many more people that are ethnically Russian and speak Russian "at home". This is particularly true in the Donbas. Putin has reverted to the Tsarist approach of "colonization"  and "Russification". He is also, as a bonus, killing off a lot of the ethnic minorities already in Russia. He expects he can win the war in Ukraine before he generates enough unrest in Russia to become a big problem. There are some cracks forming, but Putin is probably able to suppress this dissent. This dissent will only be a big problem if it spreads to ethnic Russians. Lets hope that happens, and soon.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-air...00629.html

Not a surprise. These aircraft perform important functions that are becoming more important with the potential F-16 introduction into the war. Russia is actually doing something smart. They are increasing their AWACS operational tempo to train for the day they really need it on-station all the time. Hopefully they will discover they don't have enough airplanes and also don't have enough trained crews.

The Sea of Azov is a moderately big place. We don't know if the Russians are trying a different concept of operations that avoids areas where Ukrainian air defense missiles can reach them. Obviously that would be a smart thing to try. The other possibility is that Russia is putting up a juicy target with the idea their Elint folks can geolocate the Patriot battery before/when it fires. The Russians can then use PGMs to destroy the radar of the battery. They also probably believe the Mainstay can evade the missile if it gets early warning of the launch. If the aircraft is at nearly the maximum range of the Patriot, going low and running away will probably work. I am not sure Russia can pull this off, but they may think they can :-).

UPDATE: https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-silen...00493.html
Seems to confirm the idea Russia has changed their CONOPS. It appears for now they aren't even operating over the Sea of Azov but instead known "friendly" territory. This will certainly reduce their visibility into Ukraine, possibly enough to make them functionally ineffective. They won't get shot down though :-). FWIW the radar horizon to the ground at 30,000 ft is 184 miles. The direct distance from Krasnodar to Melitopol is 215 miles. This means the A-50 can't see low flying F-16s in one area where Ukraine is trying to advance. Keep in mind however that the range (as published) of a Patriot is about 100 miles. The A-50 can get lots closer to Ukraine over the Sea of Azov and still be perfectly "safe".
Better Article: https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-says-...49400.html

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-air...00629.html

Not a surprise. These aircraft perform important functions that are becoming more important with the potential F-16 introduction into the war. Russia is actually doing something smart. They are increasing their AWACS operational tempo to train for the day they really need it on-station all the time. Hopefully they will discover they don't have enough airplanes and also don't have enough trained crews.

The Sea of Azov is a moderately big place. We don't know if the Russians are trying a different concept of operations that avoids areas where Ukrainian air defense missiles can reach them. Obviously that would be a smart thing to try. The other possibility is that Russia is putting up a juicy target with the idea their Elint folks can geolocate the Patriot battery before/when it fires. The Russians can then use PGMs to destroy the radar of the battery. They also probably believe the Mainstay can evade the missile if it gets early warning of the launch. If the aircraft is at nearly the maximum range of the Patriot, going low and running away will probably work. I am not sure Russia can pull this off, but they may think they can :-).

UPDATE: https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-silen...00493.html
Seems to confirm the idea Russia has changed their CONOPS. It appears for now they aren't even operating over the Sea of Azov but instead known "friendly" territory. This will certainly reduce their visibility into Ukraine, possibly enough to make them functionally ineffective. They won't get shot down though :-). FWIW the radar horizon to the ground at 30,000 ft is 184 miles. The direct distance from Krasnodar to Melitopol is 215 miles. This means the A-50 can't see low flying F-16s in one area where Ukraine is trying to advance. Keep in mind however that the range (as published) of a Patriot is about 100 miles. The A-50 can get lots closer to Ukraine over the Sea of Azov and still be perfectly "safe".
Better Article: https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-says-...49400.html