[Goose]

Any thoughts regarding whether any of the discussed systems make it Ukraine with the F16's?

https://mil.in.ua/en/articles/weapons-fo...y%20radars.

Unfortunately I have no idea what weapons, if any, will be supplied to Ukraine for the F-16s. The Ukrainians are getting somewhat of a hodge-podge of relatively old aircraft. I dearly hope they were trained on something approximating what they will be flying, not the current US standard.
 
In the article it was suggested that the AMRAAM with a maximum range of 105 km was inadequate to target SU-34s and SU-35s dropping glide bombs with a range of 55-60 km. These are both maximum ranges and the "effective" range will be less. However, the SU-34s are not fighters, they are bombers and are not agile. I suspect the VKS pilots have no experience in missile avoidance. Early on, the F-16s will have an advantage. I expect Ukraine will try to take advantage of that.

My wild guess is that the US and the EU will provide AIM-120Cs and AIM9Ms. I hope the US also supplies HARMs and HARM pods. There are already AGM-154 JSOW in Ukraine I believe. For sure Ukraine has JDAMs. They also have small diameter bombs.

The primary missions for the F-16s are initially as air defense weapons. They will be tasked with shooting down all air-breathing relatively high speed cruise missiles. This would remove the requirement to use Patriots to attempt this task. The F-16s can also shoot down the slower Iranian drones and will do so as a "secondary" mission. Ukraine has other weapons that can take out the slower drones. The F-16s are really the only practical way to defend against cruise missiles of the KH-101 class and similar. They will not need to leave Ukrainian airspace to do this.  Hopefully the operation can be a GCI effort which makes it efficient and successful. We saw this type of effort succeed against the Iranian cruise missiles quite recently. You need AWACS or similar to do it, but I assume NATO is already feeding such data to Ukraine. If not, they need to start. This is a purely defensive operation. Ground radars don't see far enough to vector the F-16s to the targets.

The F-16s will also be expected to keep VKS aircraft from providing air support either "directly" or via glide bombs. This can be done mostly inside Ukrainian airspace but will require some operations near both sides of the FEBA. This operation isn't "safe" and there will be losses. The fact neither Russia nor Ukraine are (were?) using IFF makes this safer for Ukraine than it would otherwise be. Russian SAMs don't know who is who so if I was an SU-34 pilot I would demand weapons tight while I was in the area. Right now, that isn't a problem because there is no "yellow" air. When there is, things will get "interesting".

If the above works (or perhaps before that answer is known), Ukraine can use F-16s offensively to destroy fixed Russian assets, like fortifications and supply points. There is a conundrum for Ukraine. Ideally, Ukraine's F-16s could launch JDAMS mostly from a "safe" location inside Ukrainian air space. I am sure some of that will happen. However, as we know Russia has deployed many GPS jammers that significantly degrade the accuracy of JDAMS and other precision weapons. If you drop enough JDAMs, that won't matter. Probability will save you. Obviously, that is far from optimal. These jammers should be geolocated by Sigint forces and attacked in advance of the bombing strike by F-16s using HARMs in "preplanned" targeting mode.  That is the "school" solution. F-16s can do this. It is what they are "for".

There is discussion in the article about software mods to the F-16As to support more and better weapons. These are all good ideas and hopefully will be carried forth (at least some if them anyway). However, IMO it is more important to get larger numbers of F-16s and larger numbers of pilots flying as modern a group of F-16s as possible. The US has some F-16Cs they don't need. IMO Ukraine should have them. That would be the most effective and lowest risk upgrade possible.

[Goose]

Any thoughts regarding whether any of the discussed systems make it Ukraine with the F16's?

https://mil.in.ua/en/articles/weapons-fo...y%20radars.

Unfortunately I have no idea what weapons, if any, will be supplied to Ukraine for the F-16s. The Ukrainians are getting somewhat of a hodge-podge of relatively old aircraft. I dearly hope they were trained on something approximating what they will be flying, not the current US standard.
 
In the article it was suggested that the AMRAAM with a maximum range of 105 km was inadequate to target SU-34s and SU-35s dropping glide bombs with a range of 55-60 km. These are both maximum ranges and the "effective" range will be less. However, the SU-34s are not fighters, they are bombers and are not agile. I suspect the VKS pilots have no experience in missile avoidance. Early on, the F-16s will have an advantage. I expect Ukraine will try to take advantage of that.

My wild guess is that the US and the EU will provide AIM-120Cs and AIM9Ms. I hope the US also supplies HARMs and HARM pods. There are already AGM-154 JSOW in Ukraine I believe. For sure Ukraine has JDAMs. They also have small diameter bombs.

The primary missions for the F-16s are initially as air defense weapons. They will be tasked with shooting down all air-breathing relatively high speed cruise missiles. This would remove the requirement to use Patriots to attempt this task. The F-16s can also shoot down the slower Iranian drones and will do so as a "secondary" mission. Ukraine has other weapons that can take out the slower drones. The F-16s are really the only practical way to defend against cruise missiles of the KH-101 class and similar. They will not need to leave Ukrainian airspace to do this.  Hopefully the operation can be a GCI effort which makes it efficient and successful. We saw this type of effort succeed against the Iranian cruise missiles quite recently. You need AWACS or similar to do it, but I assume NATO is already feeding such data to Ukraine. If not, they need to start. This is a purely defensive operation. Ground radars don't see far enough to vector the F-16s to the targets.

The F-16s will also be expected to keep VKS aircraft from providing air support either "directly" or via glide bombs. This can be done mostly inside Ukrainian airspace but will require some operations near both sides of the FEBA. This operation isn't "safe" and there will be losses. The fact neither Russia nor Ukraine are (were?) using IFF makes this safer for Ukraine than it would otherwise be. Russian SAMs don't know who is who so if I was an SU-34 pilot I would demand weapons tight while I was in the area. Right now, that isn't a problem because there is no "yellow" air. When there is, things will get "interesting".

If the above works (or perhaps before that answer is known), Ukraine can use F-16s offensively to destroy fixed Russian assets, like fortifications and supply points. There is a conundrum for Ukraine. Ideally, Ukraine's F-16s could launch JDAMS mostly from a "safe" location inside Ukrainian air space. I am sure some of that will happen. However, as we know Russia has deployed many GPS jammers that significantly degrade the accuracy of JDAMS and other precision weapons. If you drop enough JDAMs, that won't matter. Probability will save you. Obviously, that is far from optimal. These jammers should be geolocated by Sigint forces and attacked in advance of the bombing strike by F-16s using HARMs in "preplanned" targeting mode.  That is the "school" solution. F-16s can do this. It is what they are "for".

There is discussion in the article about software mods to the F-16As to support more and better weapons. These are all good ideas and hopefully will be carried forth (at least some if them anyway). However, IMO it is more important to get larger numbers of F-16s and larger numbers of pilots flying as modern a group of F-16s as possible. The US has some F-16Cs they don't need. IMO Ukraine should have them. That would be the most effective and lowest risk upgrade possible.

[GK3]

Any thoughts regarding whether any of the discussed systems make it Ukraine with the F16's?

https://mil.in.ua/en/articles/weapons-fo...y%20radars.

Unfortunately I have no idea what weapons, if any, will be supplied to Ukraine for the F-16s. The Ukrainians are getting somewhat of a hodge-podge of relatively old aircraft. I dearly hope they were trained on something approximating what they will be flying, not the current US standard.
 
In the article it was suggested that the AMRAAM with a maximum range of 105 km was inadequate to target SU-34s and SU-35s dropping glide bombs with a range of 55-60 km. These are both maximum ranges and the "effective" range will be less. However, the SU-34s are not fighters, they are bombers and are not agile. I suspect the VKS pilots have no experience in missile avoidance. Early on, the F-16s will have an advantage. I expect Ukraine will try to take advantage of that.

My wild guess is that the US and the EU will provide AIM-120Cs and AIM9Ms. I hope the US also supplies HARMs and HARM pods. There are already AGM-154 JSOW in Ukraine I believe. For sure Ukraine has JDAMs. They also have small diameter bombs.

The primary missions for the F-16s are initially as air defense weapons. They will be tasked with shooting down all air-breathing relatively high speed cruise missiles. This would remove the requirement to use Patriots to attempt this task. The F-16s can also shoot down the slower Iranian drones and will do so as a "secondary" mission. Ukraine has other weapons that can take out the slower drones. The F-16s are really the only practical way to defend against cruise missiles of the KH-101 class and similar. They will not need to leave Ukrainian airspace to do this.  Hopefully the operation can be a GCI effort which makes it efficient and successful. We saw this type of effort succeed against the Iranian cruise missiles quite recently. You need AWACS or similar to do it, but I assume NATO is already feeding such data to Ukraine. If not, they need to start. This is a purely defensive operation. Ground radars don't see far enough to vector the F-16s to the targets.

The F-16s will also be expected to keep VKS aircraft from providing air support either "directly" or via glide bombs. This can be done mostly inside Ukrainian airspace but will require some operations near both sides of the FEBA. This operation isn't "safe" and there will be losses. The fact neither Russia nor Ukraine are (were?) using IFF makes this safer for Ukraine than it would otherwise be. Russian SAMs don't know who is who so if I was an SU-34 pilot I would demand weapons tight while I was in the area. Right now, that isn't a problem because there is no "yellow" air. When there is, things will get "interesting".

If the above works (or perhaps before that answer is known), Ukraine can use F-16s offensively to destroy fixed Russian assets, like fortifications and supply points. There is a conundrum for Ukraine. Ideally, Ukraine's F-16s could launch JDAMS mostly from a "safe" location inside Ukrainian air space. I am sure some of that will happen. However, as we know Russia has deployed many GPS jammers that significantly degrade the accuracy of JDAMS and other precision weapons. If you drop enough JDAMs, that won't matter. Probability will save you. Obviously, that is far from optimal. These jammers should be geolocated by Sigint forces and attacked in advance of the bombing strike by F-16s using HARMs in "preplanned" targeting mode.  That is the "school" solution. F-16s can do this. It is what they are "for".

There is discussion in the article about software mods to the F-16As to support more and better weapons. These are all good ideas and hopefully will be carried forth (at least some if them anyway). However, IMO it is more important to get larger numbers of F-16s and larger numbers of pilots flying as modern a group of F-16s as possible. The US has some F-16Cs they don't need. IMO Ukraine should have them. That would be the most effective and lowest risk upgrade possible.

Thanks for the information.  I have now been wondering where the F16's will be based.  I would assume fairly far from any border with Russia.  I assume the Russians will make every effort to hit those bases.  If the F16's and the Ukrainian drone teams can take out enough S-400s, could they create a little bubble around the border with Russia, say close by Crimea?  If so, then it would seem likely a fairly large part of Crimea would be reachable. They could then treat the Russian infantry manning all those trenches to their own day experiencing large JDAM bombing.  Defending Crimea would hard for Russia if the bridge gets taken out.
Have to see howit plays out.

[GK3]

Any thoughts regarding whether any of the discussed systems make it Ukraine with the F16's?

https://mil.in.ua/en/articles/weapons-fo...y%20radars.

Unfortunately I have no idea what weapons, if any, will be supplied to Ukraine for the F-16s. The Ukrainians are getting somewhat of a hodge-podge of relatively old aircraft. I dearly hope they were trained on something approximating what they will be flying, not the current US standard.
 
In the article it was suggested that the AMRAAM with a maximum range of 105 km was inadequate to target SU-34s and SU-35s dropping glide bombs with a range of 55-60 km. These are both maximum ranges and the "effective" range will be less. However, the SU-34s are not fighters, they are bombers and are not agile. I suspect the VKS pilots have no experience in missile avoidance. Early on, the F-16s will have an advantage. I expect Ukraine will try to take advantage of that.

My wild guess is that the US and the EU will provide AIM-120Cs and AIM9Ms. I hope the US also supplies HARMs and HARM pods. There are already AGM-154 JSOW in Ukraine I believe. For sure Ukraine has JDAMs. They also have small diameter bombs.

The primary missions for the F-16s are initially as air defense weapons. They will be tasked with shooting down all air-breathing relatively high speed cruise missiles. This would remove the requirement to use Patriots to attempt this task. The F-16s can also shoot down the slower Iranian drones and will do so as a "secondary" mission. Ukraine has other weapons that can take out the slower drones. The F-16s are really the only practical way to defend against cruise missiles of the KH-101 class and similar. They will not need to leave Ukrainian airspace to do this.  Hopefully the operation can be a GCI effort which makes it efficient and successful. We saw this type of effort succeed against the Iranian cruise missiles quite recently. You need AWACS or similar to do it, but I assume NATO is already feeding such data to Ukraine. If not, they need to start. This is a purely defensive operation. Ground radars don't see far enough to vector the F-16s to the targets.

The F-16s will also be expected to keep VKS aircraft from providing air support either "directly" or via glide bombs. This can be done mostly inside Ukrainian airspace but will require some operations near both sides of the FEBA. This operation isn't "safe" and there will be losses. The fact neither Russia nor Ukraine are (were?) using IFF makes this safer for Ukraine than it would otherwise be. Russian SAMs don't know who is who so if I was an SU-34 pilot I would demand weapons tight while I was in the area. Right now, that isn't a problem because there is no "yellow" air. When there is, things will get "interesting".

If the above works (or perhaps before that answer is known), Ukraine can use F-16s offensively to destroy fixed Russian assets, like fortifications and supply points. There is a conundrum for Ukraine. Ideally, Ukraine's F-16s could launch JDAMS mostly from a "safe" location inside Ukrainian air space. I am sure some of that will happen. However, as we know Russia has deployed many GPS jammers that significantly degrade the accuracy of JDAMS and other precision weapons. If you drop enough JDAMs, that won't matter. Probability will save you. Obviously, that is far from optimal. These jammers should be geolocated by Sigint forces and attacked in advance of the bombing strike by F-16s using HARMs in "preplanned" targeting mode.  That is the "school" solution. F-16s can do this. It is what they are "for".

There is discussion in the article about software mods to the F-16As to support more and better weapons. These are all good ideas and hopefully will be carried forth (at least some if them anyway). However, IMO it is more important to get larger numbers of F-16s and larger numbers of pilots flying as modern a group of F-16s as possible. The US has some F-16Cs they don't need. IMO Ukraine should have them. That would be the most effective and lowest risk upgrade possible.

Thanks for the information.  I have now been wondering where the F16's will be based.  I would assume fairly far from any border with Russia.  I assume the Russians will make every effort to hit those bases.  If the F16's and the Ukrainian drone teams can take out enough S-400s, could they create a little bubble around the border with Russia, say close by Crimea?  If so, then it would seem likely a fairly large part of Crimea would be reachable. They could then treat the Russian infantry manning all those trenches to their own day experiencing large JDAM bombing.  Defending Crimea would hard for Russia if the bridge gets taken out.
Have to see howit plays out.

[Goose]

Thanks for the information.  I have now been wondering where the F16's will be based.  I would assume fairly far from any border with Russia.  I assume the Russians will make every effort to hit those bases.  If the F16's and the Ukrainian drone teams can take out enough S-400s, could they create a little bubble around the border with Russia, say close by Crimea?  If so, then it would seem likely a fairly large part of Crimea would be reachable. They could then treat the Russian infantry manning all those trenches to their own day experiencing large JDAM bombing.  Defending Crimea would hard for Russia if the bridge gets taken out.
Have to see howit plays out.

I suspect the F-16s will be dispersed as widely as possible and moved around as much as possible. The dispersal will help somewhat with the anti-drone operations. I have been intrigued with the Ukrainians continued targeting of S-400 assets and IADS radars in Crimea. It may be due to targets of opportunity, but right now S-400s aren't really an immediate threat. Why keep going after them? I can only assume Ukraine is trying to do exactly what you suggest, at least on some level.

Crimea contained the vast majority of the air defense assets (missiles) that the Soviet Union intended to use to defend their Black Sea assets. There were SA-xx and S-300s spread all over the area. They were distributed widely to make it difficult to kill them all with one air strike. The Soviets intended that part of southern Russia (Ukraine) to be a "no go" zone as much as possible. There were also lots of PVO installations. The USAF EORBAT maps of the area had designated missile sites all over the place. Ukraine inherited all that, but really didn't need it. NATO wasn't going to attack them. Unfortunately Ukraine lost all that when Crimea was lost in 2014, leaving the rest of Ukraine with relatively fewer air defense assets.

Some of the Crimea air defense system undoubtedly remains. How much of it "works" is difficult to determine, which makes it difficult to know exactly how well defended Crimea is from the air. All that infrastructure is old and pointing the wrong way. Russia so far hasn't been really using an "integrated" air defense system and "early warning" radars are not prominent. That may have to change if Ukraine really mounts an air threat. This is not something the VKS has really had to do "for real", so how good they are at it remains to be seen. IMO Ukraine intends to use air power to break through into the south. Exactly where is the question. It may be further up the river, as it was in 2023. It also may be in Crimea because the Russian land defenses are less formidable.

The PVO is gone, so the air defense of Crimea is all missiles. Russia has been using S-400 in the ground attack mode, for which they are ill suited. How many are still extant in Crimea? Indeed we will see what Ukraine attempts to do.

[Goose]

Thanks for the information.  I have now been wondering where the F16's will be based.  I would assume fairly far from any border with Russia.  I assume the Russians will make every effort to hit those bases.  If the F16's and the Ukrainian drone teams can take out enough S-400s, could they create a little bubble around the border with Russia, say close by Crimea?  If so, then it would seem likely a fairly large part of Crimea would be reachable. They could then treat the Russian infantry manning all those trenches to their own day experiencing large JDAM bombing.  Defending Crimea would hard for Russia if the bridge gets taken out.
Have to see howit plays out.

I suspect the F-16s will be dispersed as widely as possible and moved around as much as possible. The dispersal will help somewhat with the anti-drone operations. I have been intrigued with the Ukrainians continued targeting of S-400 assets and IADS radars in Crimea. It may be due to targets of opportunity, but right now S-400s aren't really an immediate threat. Why keep going after them? I can only assume Ukraine is trying to do exactly what you suggest, at least on some level.

Crimea contained the vast majority of the air defense assets (missiles) that the Soviet Union intended to use to defend their Black Sea assets. There were SA-xx and S-300s spread all over the area. They were distributed widely to make it difficult to kill them all with one air strike. The Soviets intended that part of southern Russia (Ukraine) to be a "no go" zone as much as possible. There were also lots of PVO installations. The USAF EORBAT maps of the area had designated missile sites all over the place. Ukraine inherited all that, but really didn't need it. NATO wasn't going to attack them. Unfortunately Ukraine lost all that when Crimea was lost in 2014, leaving the rest of Ukraine with relatively fewer air defense assets.

Some of the Crimea air defense system undoubtedly remains. How much of it "works" is difficult to determine, which makes it difficult to know exactly how well defended Crimea is from the air. All that infrastructure is old and pointing the wrong way. Russia so far hasn't been really using an "integrated" air defense system and "early warning" radars are not prominent. That may have to change if Ukraine really mounts an air threat. This is not something the VKS has really had to do "for real", so how good they are at it remains to be seen. IMO Ukraine intends to use air power to break through into the south. Exactly where is the question. It may be further up the river, as it was in 2023. It also may be in Crimea because the Russian land defenses are less formidable.

The PVO is gone, so the air defense of Crimea is all missiles. Russia has been using S-400 in the ground attack mode, for which they are ill suited. How many are still extant in Crimea? Indeed we will see what Ukraine attempts to do.

[TrumpCard]

In a recent post here, Goose said that losing Crimea would force the Stans back into Russia’s control. Would Russia want the Stans?  As poor as Ukraine is, at least it has useful ports and farming land. What do the Stans offer?  Are the people sufficiently Russian in their culture to support Putin’s goal of reunifying the Russian people?  I was under the impression that the Stans are different because they’re decidedly non-European and because they’re all majority Muslim. The biggest areas of conflict - Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine - are not at all like the Stans. But maybe they are just the first step. Interested in your thoughts on this.

[TrumpCard]

In a recent post here, Goose said that losing Crimea would force the Stans back into Russia’s control. Would Russia want the Stans?  As poor as Ukraine is, at least it has useful ports and farming land. What do the Stans offer?  Are the people sufficiently Russian in their culture to support Putin’s goal of reunifying the Russian people?  I was under the impression that the Stans are different because they’re decidedly non-European and because they’re all majority Muslim. The biggest areas of conflict - Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine - are not at all like the Stans. But maybe they are just the first step. Interested in your thoughts on this.

[dabigv13]

Long range ATACMS are likely to be provided soon, in the pending aid package once the Ukraine aid bill passes.

https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/23/politics/...index.html
https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1782835293218845116

[dabigv13]

Long range ATACMS are likely to be provided soon, in the pending aid package once the Ukraine aid bill passes.

https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/23/politics/...index.html
https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1782835293218845116

[GK3]

Long range ATACMS are likely to be provided soon, in the pending aid package once the Ukraine aid bill passes.

https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/23/politics/...index.html
https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1782835293218845116

That is good news indeed.  I do not think Ukraine has forever to force Russia to end the war.  If they can't force it, they will simply be bled to death as Putin will just keep sending cannon fodder until they win.  I also think that whatever they do will have to be fairly significant on the world stage. What is the best way to do that?  From my viewpoint the only logical target would be Crimea. Take out the Kerch Bridge, force them to try and resupply by barge/ship subject to Ukraines sea drones and the long range missles we will provide. But to have any chance they have to be able to establish at least some level of airsuperiority maybe along Southern Crimea.  This would also enable them to hit Russian trenches and installations along E105 running down from Mauripol to Crimea.  Drones, longer range missles and F16's with standoff weapons can make further supply of Crimea very difficult. It would also enable Ukraine to hit Russian trenches, bunkers and other fortifications with much bigger and better warheads than in the past, giving them some chance of breaking through if they can get enough stuff across the river.
Quite possibly wishful thinking on my part, but they don't need to keep doing the same old stuff they have been doing.  Whatever they do, it won't be easy.

[GK3]

Long range ATACMS are likely to be provided soon, in the pending aid package once the Ukraine aid bill passes.

https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/23/politics/...index.html
https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1782835293218845116

That is good news indeed.  I do not think Ukraine has forever to force Russia to end the war.  If they can't force it, they will simply be bled to death as Putin will just keep sending cannon fodder until they win.  I also think that whatever they do will have to be fairly significant on the world stage. What is the best way to do that?  From my viewpoint the only logical target would be Crimea. Take out the Kerch Bridge, force them to try and resupply by barge/ship subject to Ukraines sea drones and the long range missles we will provide. But to have any chance they have to be able to establish at least some level of airsuperiority maybe along Southern Crimea.  This would also enable them to hit Russian trenches and installations along E105 running down from Mauripol to Crimea.  Drones, longer range missles and F16's with standoff weapons can make further supply of Crimea very difficult. It would also enable Ukraine to hit Russian trenches, bunkers and other fortifications with much bigger and better warheads than in the past, giving them some chance of breaking through if they can get enough stuff across the river.
Quite possibly wishful thinking on my part, but they don't need to keep doing the same old stuff they have been doing.  Whatever they do, it won't be easy.

[Goose]

Long range ATACMS are likely to be provided soon, in the pending aid package once the Ukraine aid bill passes.

https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/23/politics/...index.html
https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1782835293218845116

That is good news indeed.  I do not think Ukraine has forever to force Russia to end the war.  If they can't force it, they will simply be bled to death as Putin will just keep sending cannon fodder until they win.  I also think that whatever they do will have to be fairly significant on the world stage. What is the best way to do that?  From my viewpoint the only logical target would be Crimea. Take out the Kerch Bridge, force them to try and resupply by barge/ship subject to Ukraines sea drones and the long range missles we will provide. But to have any chance they have to be able to establish at least some level of airsuperiority maybe along Southern Crimea.  This would also enable them to hit Russian trenches and installations along E105 running down from Mauripol to Crimea.  Drones, longer range missles and F16's with standoff weapons can make further supply of Crimea very difficult. It would also enable Ukraine to hit Russian trenches, bunkers and other fortifications with much bigger and better warheads than in the past, giving them some chance of breaking through if they can get enough stuff across the river.
Quite possibly wishful thinking on my part, but they don't need to keep doing the same old stuff they have been doing.  Whatever they do, it won't be easy.

Totally agree. The Mauripol route is the one Ukraine chose last summer. It has the added advantage that it directly cuts the the "land bridge" to Crimea supply along what is the shortest path. However, I think Ukraine has to consider taking what Russia gives them. The route from Kherson and/or Nova Kakhovka is longer, but from what we saw last year it is not as heavily fortified. There is just too much country for Russia to do there what they did in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. OTOH the open ground makes it impossible to hide anything there.

Ideally, Ukraine would put pressure on all 3 routes and reinforce success (OK, it is a Russian approach, but sometimes that is a good idea :-). I doubt Ukraine has the manpower to do that. Starting an offensive on one route and then shifting to another after Russia commits reserves is another approach. In any case, agree it won't be easy and lots of people will die. And for what? There is no "theory" of this war. It is just criminal stupidity (literally). Let's hope Ukraine prevails. It is possible.

[Goose]

Long range ATACMS are likely to be provided soon, in the pending aid package once the Ukraine aid bill passes.

https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/23/politics/...index.html
https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1782835293218845116

That is good news indeed.  I do not think Ukraine has forever to force Russia to end the war.  If they can't force it, they will simply be bled to death as Putin will just keep sending cannon fodder until they win.  I also think that whatever they do will have to be fairly significant on the world stage. What is the best way to do that?  From my viewpoint the only logical target would be Crimea. Take out the Kerch Bridge, force them to try and resupply by barge/ship subject to Ukraines sea drones and the long range missles we will provide. But to have any chance they have to be able to establish at least some level of airsuperiority maybe along Southern Crimea.  This would also enable them to hit Russian trenches and installations along E105 running down from Mauripol to Crimea.  Drones, longer range missles and F16's with standoff weapons can make further supply of Crimea very difficult. It would also enable Ukraine to hit Russian trenches, bunkers and other fortifications with much bigger and better warheads than in the past, giving them some chance of breaking through if they can get enough stuff across the river.
Quite possibly wishful thinking on my part, but they don't need to keep doing the same old stuff they have been doing.  Whatever they do, it won't be easy.

Totally agree. The Mauripol route is the one Ukraine chose last summer. It has the added advantage that it directly cuts the the "land bridge" to Crimea supply along what is the shortest path. However, I think Ukraine has to consider taking what Russia gives them. The route from Kherson and/or Nova Kakhovka is longer, but from what we saw last year it is not as heavily fortified. There is just too much country for Russia to do there what they did in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. OTOH the open ground makes it impossible to hide anything there.

Ideally, Ukraine would put pressure on all 3 routes and reinforce success (OK, it is a Russian approach, but sometimes that is a good idea :-). I doubt Ukraine has the manpower to do that. Starting an offensive on one route and then shifting to another after Russia commits reserves is another approach. In any case, agree it won't be easy and lots of people will die. And for what? There is no "theory" of this war. It is just criminal stupidity (literally). Let's hope Ukraine prevails. It is possible.

[dabigv13]

An interview with Ukrainian ambassador to US. Apparently Ukraine is in process of trying to get license to make some Patriot missile components themselves.

https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/inter...3/7184448/

A Spanish company just became a subcontractor for Patriots as well

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europ...-in-spain/

[dabigv13]

An interview with Ukrainian ambassador to US. Apparently Ukraine is in process of trying to get license to make some Patriot missile components themselves.

https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/inter...3/7184448/

A Spanish company just became a subcontractor for Patriots as well

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europ...-in-spain/

[GK3]

Now they are really getting creative in Ukraine, launching balloon after balloon of various types and purposes.  Some armed with moarter type warheads and roughly state of the art of electronics to keep them on track, other with radar reflecting arrays.  I presume they want to make the balloon look more sinister.  Hard not to root for a group that hasn't quite and has proven to be very creative with limited resources.

[GK3]

Now they are really getting creative in Ukraine, launching balloon after balloon of various types and purposes.  Some armed with moarter type warheads and roughly state of the art of electronics to keep them on track, other with radar reflecting arrays.  I presume they want to make the balloon look more sinister.  Hard not to root for a group that hasn't quite and has proven to be very creative with limited resources.

[Goose]

other with radar reflecting arrays.  I presume they want to make the balloon look more sinister.

They want to create false targets that may confuse Russian radars. Normally the DMTI would filter out quasi-stationary objects pretty well, but maybe Ukraine knows a few things about Russian gear that we (OK I)  do not.

[Goose]

other with radar reflecting arrays.  I presume they want to make the balloon look more sinister.

They want to create false targets that may confuse Russian radars. Normally the DMTI would filter out quasi-stationary objects pretty well, but maybe Ukraine knows a few things about Russian gear that we (OK I)  do not.

[dabigv13]

Aid bill signed. Here is the announcement of latest tranche of aid, the first of which will be arriving within hours.

https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1783154838601072916

[dabigv13]

Aid bill signed. Here is the announcement of latest tranche of aid, the first of which will be arriving within hours.

https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1783154838601072916

[Goose]

Aid bill signed. Here is the announcement of latest tranche of aid, the first of which will be arriving within hours.

https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1783154838601072916

Another source of the same data (https://insidedefense.com/insider/dod-an...ng-package) containing some additional context. Obviously the "most important" item in the list is the 155mm HE and DPICM ammunition. The small arms and 0.50 caliber rounds are also very important, as Ukrainian infantry was apparently running critically short of these as well.

There are some potentially eyebrow-raising items on the list, both offensively and defensively. Defensively, the Anti-armor mines and "Claymore anti-personnel munitions" are oriented toward holding ground while minimizing the number of troops needed to do so. As far as I recall, this hasn't previously been a priority. The RIM-7s are presumably to re-arm the BUK-M1 "Frankensams" which are somewhat useful against cruise missiles and possibly Iranian drones, as well as any VKS aircraft that is stupid enough to enter the BUK's effective range. The AIM-9Ms have previously been adapted by Ukraine to function something like a M48 Chaparral. IMO not very useful at the moment. That isn't the whole story on the AIM-9Ms though :-). One item missing from this "draw down" list is any Patriot missiles. I hope that is an oversight or that the EU is already going to promptly supply some.

Offensively, there are a lot of items to like, but the  eyebrow-raising items to me are Airfield support equipment and Precision aerial munitions. Why Airfield support equipment other than to support F-16s? Very little of what we have would help Ukraine fly however many MIG/SU aircraft they have remaining. While we have sent Precision aerial munitions before it never amounted to much that was effective. Why send more unless we see a way to make them effective, like putting them on F-16s? The F-16As Ukraine is receiving are able to use the AIM-9M, which might be the intended destination of the current shipments. Interesting possibilities. I wonder if F-16Cs are "Airfield support equipment"? Just kidding, but there are some interesting items in the list.

As for when the stuff actually will get to Ukraine, we still don't have a good read. The President said

"I'm making sure the shipments start right away,” he said. “In the next few hours -- literally in a few hours -- we are going to begin sending equipment to Ukraine for air defense munitions, artillery for rocket systems, and armored vehicles.”

Begin sending isn't exactly reassuring. It would have been nice if he has said these items would be arriving in Ukraine <today> <tomorrow> ... but we didn't get that. We do know that the administration used some residual unspent funds to preposition items for quick delivery. Hopefully the various forms of ammunition will arrive "very soon" and will be  packed in a way it is easy for Ukraine to get to the "front". Time matters, but at least thing are now able to move.

[Goose]

Aid bill signed. Here is the announcement of latest tranche of aid, the first of which will be arriving within hours.

https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1783154838601072916

Another source of the same data (https://insidedefense.com/insider/dod-an...ng-package) containing some additional context. Obviously the "most important" item in the list is the 155mm HE and DPICM ammunition. The small arms and 0.50 caliber rounds are also very important, as Ukrainian infantry was apparently running critically short of these as well.

There are some potentially eyebrow-raising items on the list, both offensively and defensively. Defensively, the Anti-armor mines and "Claymore anti-personnel munitions" are oriented toward holding ground while minimizing the number of troops needed to do so. As far as I recall, this hasn't previously been a priority. The RIM-7s are presumably to re-arm the BUK-M1 "Frankensams" which are somewhat useful against cruise missiles and possibly Iranian drones, as well as any VKS aircraft that is stupid enough to enter the BUK's effective range. The AIM-9Ms have previously been adapted by Ukraine to function something like a M48 Chaparral. IMO not very useful at the moment. That isn't the whole story on the AIM-9Ms though :-). One item missing from this "draw down" list is any Patriot missiles. I hope that is an oversight or that the EU is already going to promptly supply some.

Offensively, there are a lot of items to like, but the  eyebrow-raising items to me are Airfield support equipment and Precision aerial munitions. Why Airfield support equipment other than to support F-16s? Very little of what we have would help Ukraine fly however many MIG/SU aircraft they have remaining. While we have sent Precision aerial munitions before it never amounted to much that was effective. Why send more unless we see a way to make them effective, like putting them on F-16s? The F-16As Ukraine is receiving are able to use the AIM-9M, which might be the intended destination of the current shipments. Interesting possibilities. I wonder if F-16Cs are "Airfield support equipment"? Just kidding, but there are some interesting items in the list.

As for when the stuff actually will get to Ukraine, we still don't have a good read. The President said

"I'm making sure the shipments start right away,” he said. “In the next few hours -- literally in a few hours -- we are going to begin sending equipment to Ukraine for air defense munitions, artillery for rocket systems, and armored vehicles.”

Begin sending isn't exactly reassuring. It would have been nice if he has said these items would be arriving in Ukraine <today> <tomorrow> ... but we didn't get that. We do know that the administration used some residual unspent funds to preposition items for quick delivery. Hopefully the various forms of ammunition will arrive "very soon" and will be  packed in a way it is easy for Ukraine to get to the "front". Time matters, but at least thing are now able to move.

[dabigv13]

On long range ATACMS, bit of a headfake with the bill instructing POTUS to send them, in that Ukraine has already received and used some.

More will becoming with the latest aid.

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/24...e-00154110

[dabigv13]

On long range ATACMS, bit of a headfake with the bill instructing POTUS to send them, in that Ukraine has already received and used some.

More will becoming with the latest aid.

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/24...e-00154110

[dabigv13]

More on the ATACMS. Per this, Ukraine has received both unitary warhead and cluster munition long range versions of the ATACMS.

Unitary warhead version could perhaps be used on a Crimean bridge strike, though I am doubtful it would be used for that any time soon- would need to use a lot of the very finite and valuable missiles, and Ukraine in no position for the next year at least to mount any significant offensive that would take advantage of it.

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukrai...rcna148309

[dabigv13]

More on the ATACMS. Per this, Ukraine has received both unitary warhead and cluster munition long range versions of the ATACMS.

Unitary warhead version could perhaps be used on a Crimean bridge strike, though I am doubtful it would be used for that any time soon- would need to use a lot of the very finite and valuable missiles, and Ukraine in no position for the next year at least to mount any significant offensive that would take advantage of it.

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukrai...rcna148309

[M T]

Late, but Good News

[M T]

Late, but Good News

[Goose]

More on the ATACMS. Per this, Ukraine has received both unitary warhead and cluster munition long range versions of the ATACMS.

Unitary warhead version could perhaps be used on a Crimean bridge strike, though I am doubtful it would be used for that any time soon- would need to use a lot of the very finite and valuable missiles, and Ukraine in no position for the next year at least to mount any significant offensive that would take advantage of it.

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukrai...rcna148309

The ATACMS is just barely able to reach the bridge from the closest places in Ukrainian held territory, if one uses the published range figures. The bridge is also protected by GPS jamming which would make a precision attack difficult.  I would not put it beyond the realm of possibility that Ukraine could figure out a way to knock out the GPS jamming, distract the anti-missile defenses (such as they are), and hit the bridge. However, that would be a "bold" operation. IMO Ukraine wouldn't do it unless they were at least 80% sure it would work.

You are of course correct that Ukraine is not in any position to mount an offensive anywhere in the south at this time. However, destroying the bridge would be very worthwhile anytime they can pull it off. The Russian logistics for both civilian and military people in Crimea depends pretty heavily on that bridge. Having it gone would be a big plus anytime it is possible to do it. It will considerably weaken Russia in Crimea and South Kherson Oblast. Of course, this is only true if the bridge is put out of action to the point repairing it within the next two years is impossible.  IOW timing can be important but possibly not governing.

[Goose]

More on the ATACMS. Per this, Ukraine has received both unitary warhead and cluster munition long range versions of the ATACMS.

Unitary warhead version could perhaps be used on a Crimean bridge strike, though I am doubtful it would be used for that any time soon- would need to use a lot of the very finite and valuable missiles, and Ukraine in no position for the next year at least to mount any significant offensive that would take advantage of it.

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukrai...rcna148309

The ATACMS is just barely able to reach the bridge from the closest places in Ukrainian held territory, if one uses the published range figures. The bridge is also protected by GPS jamming which would make a precision attack difficult.  I would not put it beyond the realm of possibility that Ukraine could figure out a way to knock out the GPS jamming, distract the anti-missile defenses (such as they are), and hit the bridge. However, that would be a "bold" operation. IMO Ukraine wouldn't do it unless they were at least 80% sure it would work.

You are of course correct that Ukraine is not in any position to mount an offensive anywhere in the south at this time. However, destroying the bridge would be very worthwhile anytime they can pull it off. The Russian logistics for both civilian and military people in Crimea depends pretty heavily on that bridge. Having it gone would be a big plus anytime it is possible to do it. It will considerably weaken Russia in Crimea and South Kherson Oblast. Of course, this is only true if the bridge is put out of action to the point repairing it within the next two years is impossible.  IOW timing can be important but possibly not governing.

[TrumpCard]

Goose, I know you're all-in on Ukraine trying to retake the South and threaten Crimea.  How would your endgame look?  Russia cedes all of Kherson and Crimea to Ukraine, but keeps the Donbas?  In the map you've created, how would Ukraine hold Crimea in the long term without facing the same vulnerabilities with supply lines that Russia would face absent the Kerch Bridge?  Would Ukraine be substantially more secure if it also held Melitolpol and/or the entire left bank of the Dnipro including the NPP?  Wouldn't Ukraine still be in grave danger as long as Putin, or a similar successor, remains in power in Russia?

[TrumpCard]

Goose, I know you're all-in on Ukraine trying to retake the South and threaten Crimea.  How would your endgame look?  Russia cedes all of Kherson and Crimea to Ukraine, but keeps the Donbas?  In the map you've created, how would Ukraine hold Crimea in the long term without facing the same vulnerabilities with supply lines that Russia would face absent the Kerch Bridge?  Would Ukraine be substantially more secure if it also held Melitolpol and/or the entire left bank of the Dnipro including the NPP?  Wouldn't Ukraine still be in grave danger as long as Putin, or a similar successor, remains in power in Russia?

[Goose]

Goose, I know you're all-in on Ukraine trying to retake the South and threaten Crimea.  How would your endgame look?  Russia cedes all of Kherson and Crimea to Ukraine, but keeps the Donbas?  In the map you've created, how would Ukraine hold Crimea in the long term without facing the same vulnerabilities with supply lines that Russia would face absent the Kerch Bridge?  Would Ukraine be substantially more secure if it also held Melitolpol and/or the entire left bank of the Dnipro including the NPP?  Wouldn't Ukraine still be in grave danger as long as Putin, or a similar successor, remains in power in Russia?

My "end state" is that Ukraine gets back all of the Sea of Azov coast all the way to Marioupol and the original border, i.e. the status quo ante. Ukraine needs that to secure the port there and also Beryadans'k. This is vital to Ukrainian commercial (primarily) and military interests. How much of Luhansk/Donetsk Russia gets to keep (if any) would be a negotiation. Ukraine wants those areas obviously, but they are either agricultural or part of the "rust belt" that at one time was very important but not anymore, especially because it is mostly destroyed.

Ukraine also gets back Crimea. It can base its navy there and can therefore in case of war close the Kerch strait and deny Russia all the trade that transits the Sea of Azov. That will hurt. Also, Sevastopol is a much better port than Novorossiysk. That is why Russia wanted it so bad. Ukraine would not have nearly the same problem as Russia does defending Crimea. Russia has to supply the place by sea (or the infamous bridge). Ukraine has to cross a river. Granted, it is a big river but lots easier. Ukraine can also base aircraft and missiles in South Kherson which is close to Crimea. Russia has no nearby place to base similar forces and worse still would need to conduct an amphibious landing. That is why seizing Crimea by treachery was so necessary in 2014. If it were defended it is a tough nut to crack from the Black Sea, even if you land to the west and attack down the coast. Taking Crimea from the "land" side is orders of magnitude easier than doing so from the sea.

No matter what happens, Ukraine is always going to be in danger from Russia. That was true in 1991 and it is true today. Once again, it is the intent vs capability problem. As long as Russia has the capability, they are a problem, no matter what their "intent" may be. Unfortunately Ukraine hasn't had the financial strength to prepare accordingly. Somehow, they will have to do so if they survive the current calamity.

[Goose]

Goose, I know you're all-in on Ukraine trying to retake the South and threaten Crimea.  How would your endgame look?  Russia cedes all of Kherson and Crimea to Ukraine, but keeps the Donbas?  In the map you've created, how would Ukraine hold Crimea in the long term without facing the same vulnerabilities with supply lines that Russia would face absent the Kerch Bridge?  Would Ukraine be substantially more secure if it also held Melitolpol and/or the entire left bank of the Dnipro including the NPP?  Wouldn't Ukraine still be in grave danger as long as Putin, or a similar successor, remains in power in Russia?

My "end state" is that Ukraine gets back all of the Sea of Azov coast all the way to Marioupol and the original border, i.e. the status quo ante. Ukraine needs that to secure the port there and also Beryadans'k. This is vital to Ukrainian commercial (primarily) and military interests. How much of Luhansk/Donetsk Russia gets to keep (if any) would be a negotiation. Ukraine wants those areas obviously, but they are either agricultural or part of the "rust belt" that at one time was very important but not anymore, especially because it is mostly destroyed.

Ukraine also gets back Crimea. It can base its navy there and can therefore in case of war close the Kerch strait and deny Russia all the trade that transits the Sea of Azov. That will hurt. Also, Sevastopol is a much better port than Novorossiysk. That is why Russia wanted it so bad. Ukraine would not have nearly the same problem as Russia does defending Crimea. Russia has to supply the place by sea (or the infamous bridge). Ukraine has to cross a river. Granted, it is a big river but lots easier. Ukraine can also base aircraft and missiles in South Kherson which is close to Crimea. Russia has no nearby place to base similar forces and worse still would need to conduct an amphibious landing. That is why seizing Crimea by treachery was so necessary in 2014. If it were defended it is a tough nut to crack from the Black Sea, even if you land to the west and attack down the coast. Taking Crimea from the "land" side is orders of magnitude easier than doing so from the sea.

No matter what happens, Ukraine is always going to be in danger from Russia. That was true in 1991 and it is true today. Once again, it is the intent vs capability problem. As long as Russia has the capability, they are a problem, no matter what their "intent" may be. Unfortunately Ukraine hasn't had the financial strength to prepare accordingly. Somehow, they will have to do so if they survive the current calamity.

[GK3]

Goose, I know you're all-in on Ukraine trying to retake the South and threaten Crimea.  How would your endgame look?  Russia cedes all of Kherson and Crimea to Ukraine, but keeps the Donbas?  In the map you've created, how would Ukraine hold Crimea in the long term without facing the same vulnerabilities with supply lines that Russia would face absent the Kerch Bridge?  Would Ukraine be substantially more secure if it also held Melitolpol and/or the entire left bank of the Dnipro including the NPP?  Wouldn't Ukraine still be in grave danger as long as Putin, or a similar successor, remains in power in Russia?

Here are some articles from the last year or so discussing this issue directly.

https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ukraines-co...ake-crimea
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2...e-00083857
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/202...ht-be.html
This link which is in one of the above articles is also well worth a read and some thought
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2...y-00083683

[GK3]

Goose, I know you're all-in on Ukraine trying to retake the South and threaten Crimea.  How would your endgame look?  Russia cedes all of Kherson and Crimea to Ukraine, but keeps the Donbas?  In the map you've created, how would Ukraine hold Crimea in the long term without facing the same vulnerabilities with supply lines that Russia would face absent the Kerch Bridge?  Would Ukraine be substantially more secure if it also held Melitolpol and/or the entire left bank of the Dnipro including the NPP?  Wouldn't Ukraine still be in grave danger as long as Putin, or a similar successor, remains in power in Russia?

Here are some articles from the last year or so discussing this issue directly.

https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ukraines-co...ake-crimea
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2...e-00083857
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/202...ht-be.html
This link which is in one of the above articles is also well worth a read and some thought
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2...y-00083683

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-getti...39453.html

This makes no sense at all unless Ukraine is getting/has  the laser designators. Troops in contact can designate targets and get a bomb right on it. More commonly, another aircraft designates the target and the bomb homes in on the reflected laser energy. There weapons were used in the attack on Qaddafi's compound during the Regan administration. They don't require GPS so GPS jamming is not an issue. They do require the target remain designated, which requires the designating aircraft to remain potentially in harm's way for a long time. Hard to do in today's world.

What I dearly hope has happened is that Ukraine has fitted (or will fit) many of their ubiquitous drones not with ordinance but rather with laser designators. This would be relatively easy to do. These drones can locate and designate important targets without endangering another aircraft or requiring Ukrainian troops/agents being present. The challenges here would be the usual problems with jamming the drone uplink/downlink. Drones can be flown "VFR" without GPS. This doesn't work at all for precision guided weapons that use GPS coordinates. Both the drone and the weapons need GPS in that case. The Paveways don't need GPS. In fact, this may be a good way to take out GPS jammers and Russian EW assets in general.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-getti...39453.html

This makes no sense at all unless Ukraine is getting/has  the laser designators. Troops in contact can designate targets and get a bomb right on it. More commonly, another aircraft designates the target and the bomb homes in on the reflected laser energy. There weapons were used in the attack on Qaddafi's compound during the Regan administration. They don't require GPS so GPS jamming is not an issue. They do require the target remain designated, which requires the designating aircraft to remain potentially in harm's way for a long time. Hard to do in today's world.

What I dearly hope has happened is that Ukraine has fitted (or will fit) many of their ubiquitous drones not with ordinance but rather with laser designators. This would be relatively easy to do. These drones can locate and designate important targets without endangering another aircraft or requiring Ukrainian troops/agents being present. The challenges here would be the usual problems with jamming the drone uplink/downlink. Drones can be flown "VFR" without GPS. This doesn't work at all for precision guided weapons that use GPS coordinates. Both the drone and the weapons need GPS in that case. The Paveways don't need GPS. In fact, this may be a good way to take out GPS jammers and Russian EW assets in general.