[TrumpCard]

Why is it so superior to transport supplies via rail than via roads?  Seems like the Russian air force should be able to knock out fixed rail infrastructure even more readily than it could attack vehicles traveling on roads and highways.  This is just my "common sense" observation, which I gather is incorrect, but I am not sure about the reasons.

[TrumpCard]

Why is it so superior to transport supplies via rail than via roads?  Seems like the Russian air force should be able to knock out fixed rail infrastructure even more readily than it could attack vehicles traveling on roads and highways.  This is just my "common sense" observation, which I gather is incorrect, but I am not sure about the reasons.

[Goose]

Why is it so superior to transport supplies via rail than via roads?  Seems like the Russian air force should be able to knock out fixed rail infrastructure even more readily than it could attack vehicles traveling on roads and highways.  This is just my "common sense" observation, which I gather is incorrect, but I am not sure about the reasons.

Your common sense is actually somewhat correct. Electrified railroads are very vulnerable to damage of the catenary and even more so to damage of the substations that supply power to the line. No volts, nothing moves. Self-generating locomotives don't have this problem and are therefore preferred in situations where power stability is an issue.

The preference for rail transport is actually "commercial". One freight train can carry as much ammunition (or anything else) as many trucks. The railroad delivered goods do then need to be transshipped to trucks to reach the "end user". That isn't as much of a problem as it seems because goods transported by trucks usually are unloaded at a supply point and then transshipped in the same manner. The big "over the road" trucks are not suitable for delivering things in a combat zone. Obviously running 500 or more truckloads to replace a trainload requires many more personnel. It also requires maintaining many prime movers (instead of one) and consumes much more fuel. The big advantage of trucks is that if one is destroyed the others can still get through. If a train is destroyed, none of it arrives.

While shooting up a train or truck convoy is useful (and sometimes spectacular) the most lucrative targets are road and rail bridges. You can shut down transit completely for a very long time that way. As far as blowing up the road or the railroad tracks themselves neither approach works real well. Both are easily repaired, although repairing railroad tracks is actually easier than repairing the road in most cases. Prefab rail sections are very common. Fill in the hole and put down the prefab section and you are done. Many times BDA of North Vietnamese railroads showed no damage at all because the line was repaired in less than an hour. The recon flights would take pictures of the repaired railroad.

[Goose]

Why is it so superior to transport supplies via rail than via roads?  Seems like the Russian air force should be able to knock out fixed rail infrastructure even more readily than it could attack vehicles traveling on roads and highways.  This is just my "common sense" observation, which I gather is incorrect, but I am not sure about the reasons.

Your common sense is actually somewhat correct. Electrified railroads are very vulnerable to damage of the catenary and even more so to damage of the substations that supply power to the line. No volts, nothing moves. Self-generating locomotives don't have this problem and are therefore preferred in situations where power stability is an issue.

The preference for rail transport is actually "commercial". One freight train can carry as much ammunition (or anything else) as many trucks. The railroad delivered goods do then need to be transshipped to trucks to reach the "end user". That isn't as much of a problem as it seems because goods transported by trucks usually are unloaded at a supply point and then transshipped in the same manner. The big "over the road" trucks are not suitable for delivering things in a combat zone. Obviously running 500 or more truckloads to replace a trainload requires many more personnel. It also requires maintaining many prime movers (instead of one) and consumes much more fuel. The big advantage of trucks is that if one is destroyed the others can still get through. If a train is destroyed, none of it arrives.

While shooting up a train or truck convoy is useful (and sometimes spectacular) the most lucrative targets are road and rail bridges. You can shut down transit completely for a very long time that way. As far as blowing up the road or the railroad tracks themselves neither approach works real well. Both are easily repaired, although repairing railroad tracks is actually easier than repairing the road in most cases. Prefab rail sections are very common. Fill in the hole and put down the prefab section and you are done. Many times BDA of North Vietnamese railroads showed no damage at all because the line was repaired in less than an hour. The recon flights would take pictures of the repaired railroad.

[GK3]

Why is it so superior to transport supplies via rail than via roads?  Seems like the Russian air force should be able to knock out fixed rail infrastructure even more readily than it could attack vehicles traveling on roads and highways.  This is just my "common sense" observation, which I gather is incorrect, but I am not sure about the reasons.

Your common sense is actually somewhat correct. Electrified railroads are very vulnerable to damage of the catenary and even more so to damage of the substations that supply power to the line. No volts, nothing moves. Self-generating locomotives don't have this problem and are therefore preferred in situations where power stability is an issue.

The preference for rail transport is actually "commercial". One freight train can carry as much ammunition (or anything else) as many trucks. The railroad delivered goods do then need to be transshipped to trucks to reach the "end user". That isn't as much of a problem as it seems because goods transported by trucks usually are unloaded at a supply point and then transshipped in the same manner. The big "over the road" trucks are not suitable for delivering things in a combat zone. Obviously running 500 or more truckloads to replace a trainload requires many more personnel. It also requires maintaining many prime movers (instead of one) and consumes much more fuel. The big advantage of trucks is that if one is destroyed the others can still get through. If a train is destroyed, none of it arrives.

While shooting up a train or truck convoy is useful (and sometimes spectacular) the most lucrative targets are road and rail bridges. You can shut down transit completely for a very long time that way. As far as blowing up the road or the railroad tracks themselves neither approach works real well. Both are easily repaired, although repairing railroad tracks is actually easier than repairing the road in most cases. Prefab rail sections are very common. Fill in the hole and put down the prefab section and you are done. Many times BDA of North Vietnamese railroads showed no damage at all because the line was repaired in less than an hour. The recon flights would take pictures of the repaired railroad.

Bridges and tunnels are about the only places you can really put a railroad out of business for any length of time.  We spent 4 years trying to destroy the Than Hoa bridge in North Vietnam.  Who knows how many aircraft and pilots we lost in our efforts to knock out that bridge.  Fortunately, weapons now are far more accurate and have a much high chance of success of hitting out the target. But if there are no bridges or tunnels then you are not left with many good options. On the other hand in this age of loitering munitions, can you park such a munition near a rail line where you expect a train to show up, then blow the train and the track up at the same time. That would, I think, take a little longer to fix.

[GK3]

Why is it so superior to transport supplies via rail than via roads?  Seems like the Russian air force should be able to knock out fixed rail infrastructure even more readily than it could attack vehicles traveling on roads and highways.  This is just my "common sense" observation, which I gather is incorrect, but I am not sure about the reasons.

Your common sense is actually somewhat correct. Electrified railroads are very vulnerable to damage of the catenary and even more so to damage of the substations that supply power to the line. No volts, nothing moves. Self-generating locomotives don't have this problem and are therefore preferred in situations where power stability is an issue.

The preference for rail transport is actually "commercial". One freight train can carry as much ammunition (or anything else) as many trucks. The railroad delivered goods do then need to be transshipped to trucks to reach the "end user". That isn't as much of a problem as it seems because goods transported by trucks usually are unloaded at a supply point and then transshipped in the same manner. The big "over the road" trucks are not suitable for delivering things in a combat zone. Obviously running 500 or more truckloads to replace a trainload requires many more personnel. It also requires maintaining many prime movers (instead of one) and consumes much more fuel. The big advantage of trucks is that if one is destroyed the others can still get through. If a train is destroyed, none of it arrives.

While shooting up a train or truck convoy is useful (and sometimes spectacular) the most lucrative targets are road and rail bridges. You can shut down transit completely for a very long time that way. As far as blowing up the road or the railroad tracks themselves neither approach works real well. Both are easily repaired, although repairing railroad tracks is actually easier than repairing the road in most cases. Prefab rail sections are very common. Fill in the hole and put down the prefab section and you are done. Many times BDA of North Vietnamese railroads showed no damage at all because the line was repaired in less than an hour. The recon flights would take pictures of the repaired railroad.

Bridges and tunnels are about the only places you can really put a railroad out of business for any length of time.  We spent 4 years trying to destroy the Than Hoa bridge in North Vietnam.  Who knows how many aircraft and pilots we lost in our efforts to knock out that bridge.  Fortunately, weapons now are far more accurate and have a much high chance of success of hitting out the target. But if there are no bridges or tunnels then you are not left with many good options. On the other hand in this age of loitering munitions, can you park such a munition near a rail line where you expect a train to show up, then blow the train and the track up at the same time. That would, I think, take a little longer to fix.

[Goose]

Bridges and tunnels are about the only places you can really put a railroad out of business for any length of time.  We spent 4 years trying to destroy the Than Hoa bridge in North Vietnam.  Who knows how many aircraft and pilots we lost in our efforts to knock out that bridge.  Fortunately, weapons now are far more accurate and have a much high chance of success of hitting out the target. But if there are no bridges or tunnels then you are not left with many good options. On the other hand in this age of loitering munitions, can you park such a munition near a rail line where you expect a train to show up, then blow the train and the track up at the same time. That would, I think, take a little longer to fix.

Exactly correct. In fact, one reason the new, more accurate munitions exist is a direct response to the failure to bring down that bridge. They would have eventually been developed anyway, but the immediate need certainly lit a fire under the Military and Industry. You are also correct that cleaning up a derailed train mess can take longer than fixing the track damage (if any).  Cars going crosswise are hard to move. Loitering munitions are one approach. Drone reconnaissance of the train departure point will allow either "conventional" drone (or aircraft) response. 

We are going to find out pretty quick how well Ukraine can supply its advance. Russia has finally used a little air power on the GLOC. Pathetically small given their supposed assets, but at least it is something. I really hope the UK can be persuaded to allow Ukraine to use Storm Shadows anywhere it wants, including launching them deep into Russia to disrupt troop movement toward Kursk. Ukraine needs all the help it can get. Putin has already said "NATO is fighting Russia using Ukrainian hands". If Putin believes that, we have no reason to tie one Ukrainian hand behind the back.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-senator-ca...46728.html

I think the idea of using retired F-16 pilots is a good one. The US hasn't prioritized training Ukrainian pilots for reasons I really don't understand. Even if they had, it wouldn't produce an "instant air force". The retired F-16 pilots can provide the missing experience factor in planning and "OJT training" even if they didn't fly. If they fly, some will be killed. There are already US volunteers fighting in Ukraine. The pilots would be no different. Similarly, many experienced F-16 maintenance people would be useful in Ukraine. They will be pretty safe, but not absolutely so.

 IMO if the USAF was really "serious" about this war, the equivalent of a modern "Flying Tigers" effort would already exist. Active duty USAF volunteers would resign from the USAF to serve in Ukraine. Ukraine would "buy" the requisite numbers of surplus F-16s on credit. That is an "instant air force". This force would augment the Ukrainian F-16 effort. The Flying Tigers were very effective but not decisive. There just weren't enough of them. The problem was that the Nationalists never succeeded in generating an air force of their own. Ukraine won't have that problem. The individuals that resigned from the USAF would be allowed to return under generous terms when their service in Ukraine ends.

[Goose]

Bridges and tunnels are about the only places you can really put a railroad out of business for any length of time.  We spent 4 years trying to destroy the Than Hoa bridge in North Vietnam.  Who knows how many aircraft and pilots we lost in our efforts to knock out that bridge.  Fortunately, weapons now are far more accurate and have a much high chance of success of hitting out the target. But if there are no bridges or tunnels then you are not left with many good options. On the other hand in this age of loitering munitions, can you park such a munition near a rail line where you expect a train to show up, then blow the train and the track up at the same time. That would, I think, take a little longer to fix.

Exactly correct. In fact, one reason the new, more accurate munitions exist is a direct response to the failure to bring down that bridge. They would have eventually been developed anyway, but the immediate need certainly lit a fire under the Military and Industry. You are also correct that cleaning up a derailed train mess can take longer than fixing the track damage (if any).  Cars going crosswise are hard to move. Loitering munitions are one approach. Drone reconnaissance of the train departure point will allow either "conventional" drone (or aircraft) response. 

We are going to find out pretty quick how well Ukraine can supply its advance. Russia has finally used a little air power on the GLOC. Pathetically small given their supposed assets, but at least it is something. I really hope the UK can be persuaded to allow Ukraine to use Storm Shadows anywhere it wants, including launching them deep into Russia to disrupt troop movement toward Kursk. Ukraine needs all the help it can get. Putin has already said "NATO is fighting Russia using Ukrainian hands". If Putin believes that, we have no reason to tie one Ukrainian hand behind the back.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-senator-ca...46728.html

I think the idea of using retired F-16 pilots is a good one. The US hasn't prioritized training Ukrainian pilots for reasons I really don't understand. Even if they had, it wouldn't produce an "instant air force". The retired F-16 pilots can provide the missing experience factor in planning and "OJT training" even if they didn't fly. If they fly, some will be killed. There are already US volunteers fighting in Ukraine. The pilots would be no different. Similarly, many experienced F-16 maintenance people would be useful in Ukraine. They will be pretty safe, but not absolutely so.

 IMO if the USAF was really "serious" about this war, the equivalent of a modern "Flying Tigers" effort would already exist. Active duty USAF volunteers would resign from the USAF to serve in Ukraine. Ukraine would "buy" the requisite numbers of surplus F-16s on credit. That is an "instant air force". This force would augment the Ukrainian F-16 effort. The Flying Tigers were very effective but not decisive. There just weren't enough of them. The problem was that the Nationalists never succeeded in generating an air force of their own. Ukraine won't have that problem. The individuals that resigned from the USAF would be allowed to return under generous terms when their service in Ukraine ends.

[dabigv13]

https://x.com/CasualArtyFan/status/1823495041030946886

Ukraine captured some sort of Russian command post in Kursk.

Ukrainians also met a village drunk in Plekhovo, Kursk, who shouts "Glory to Ukraine!"

https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1823453576003461523

[dabigv13]

https://x.com/CasualArtyFan/status/1823495041030946886

Ukraine captured some sort of Russian command post in Kursk.

Ukrainians also met a village drunk in Plekhovo, Kursk, who shouts "Glory to Ukraine!"

https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1823453576003461523

[M T]

While the Ukrainian army continues its push into Russia, it seems Ukraine may get some negative publicity, especially in Europe.

BBC indicates unconfirmed rumors are that an arrest warrant has been issued for a Ukrainian diver for planting the explosives.that blew up the Russian Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea in 2022.   Assuming the rumors are true, it will be interesting to me to see how Ukraine reacts.  I suspect they will honor the warrant.

Other news items:  
BBC put up a good summary in maps of the war since 2022.
BBC reports  "Latvia's Foreign Minister Baiba Braze defended Ukraine's incursion into Russia, adding that Kyiv "has the right" to use weapons supplied by Nato."

[M T]

While the Ukrainian army continues its push into Russia, it seems Ukraine may get some negative publicity, especially in Europe.

BBC indicates unconfirmed rumors are that an arrest warrant has been issued for a Ukrainian diver for planting the explosives.that blew up the Russian Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea in 2022.   Assuming the rumors are true, it will be interesting to me to see how Ukraine reacts.  I suspect they will honor the warrant.

Other news items:  
BBC put up a good summary in maps of the war since 2022.
BBC reports  "Latvia's Foreign Minister Baiba Braze defended Ukraine's incursion into Russia, adding that Kyiv "has the right" to use weapons supplied by Nato."

[GK3]

While the Ukrainian army continues its push into Russia, it seems Ukraine may get some negative publicity, especially in Europe.

BBC indicates unconfirmed rumors are that an arrest warrant has been issued for a Ukrainian diver for planting the explosives.that blew up the Russian Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea in 2022.   Assuming the rumors are true, it will be interesting to me to see how Ukraine reacts.  I suspect they will honor the warrant.

Other news items:  
BBC put up a good summary in maps of the war since 2022.
BBC reports  "Latvia's Foreign Minister Baiba Braze defended Ukraine's incursion into Russia, adding that Kyiv "has the right" to use weapons supplied by Nato."

If you have spent any time in the Baltic States you would know that Latvia's position is almost certainly in agreement with that of Lithuania and Estonia, to say nothing of Poland.  Also, it appears that Ukraine has made no move to severe the gas line that runs through the part of Russia they are invading and into Hungary and other parts of Europe. I doubt Ukraine would ever support the prosecution of its personel who might have blown up that gas line.  They are in what I am sure they see as an existential conflict for their continued existence as an independent country.  As far as I am concerned, more power to them.

[GK3]

While the Ukrainian army continues its push into Russia, it seems Ukraine may get some negative publicity, especially in Europe.

BBC indicates unconfirmed rumors are that an arrest warrant has been issued for a Ukrainian diver for planting the explosives.that blew up the Russian Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea in 2022.   Assuming the rumors are true, it will be interesting to me to see how Ukraine reacts.  I suspect they will honor the warrant.

Other news items:  
BBC put up a good summary in maps of the war since 2022.
BBC reports  "Latvia's Foreign Minister Baiba Braze defended Ukraine's incursion into Russia, adding that Kyiv "has the right" to use weapons supplied by Nato."

If you have spent any time in the Baltic States you would know that Latvia's position is almost certainly in agreement with that of Lithuania and Estonia, to say nothing of Poland.  Also, it appears that Ukraine has made no move to severe the gas line that runs through the part of Russia they are invading and into Hungary and other parts of Europe. I doubt Ukraine would ever support the prosecution of its personel who might have blown up that gas line.  They are in what I am sure they see as an existential conflict for their continued existence as an independent country.  As far as I am concerned, more power to them.

[M T]

I suspect that the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage was not sanctioned by the Ukraine government.  It did cause a lot of issues for Europe.  Just as you say that Ukraine is not attacking gas supply lines to Europe, I think they would disavow any official involvement in the Nord Stream sabotage.  Their existential effort depends upon the support of Europe (& others).  The best way to disavow and help keep Europe's support is to honor the warrant.  They might not if the people that did the sabotage become national heroes first.

[M T]

I suspect that the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage was not sanctioned by the Ukraine government.  It did cause a lot of issues for Europe.  Just as you say that Ukraine is not attacking gas supply lines to Europe, I think they would disavow any official involvement in the Nord Stream sabotage.  Their existential effort depends upon the support of Europe (& others).  The best way to disavow and help keep Europe's support is to honor the warrant.  They might not if the people that did the sabotage become national heroes first.

[TrumpCard]

The Kursk offensive seems to be slowing, as it inevitably must, and soon this front seems likely to turn into another grinding battle.  Can Ukraine force Russia to man that part of the front more robustly without Ukraine needing to maintain large elements of two brigades there?  Can Ukraine somehow replicate what it accomplished in Kursk by using those two brigades in a new offensive on some other portion of the front line, or is the element of surprise destroyed because Ukraine already played that card once?

[TrumpCard]

The Kursk offensive seems to be slowing, as it inevitably must, and soon this front seems likely to turn into another grinding battle.  Can Ukraine force Russia to man that part of the front more robustly without Ukraine needing to maintain large elements of two brigades there?  Can Ukraine somehow replicate what it accomplished in Kursk by using those two brigades in a new offensive on some other portion of the front line, or is the element of surprise destroyed because Ukraine already played that card once?

[Goose]

The Kursk offensive seems to be slowing, as it inevitably must, and soon this front seems likely to turn into another grinding battle.  Can Ukraine force Russia to man that part of the front more robustly without Ukraine needing to maintain large elements of two brigades there?

Yes, they can if they can free up infantry to do the job. Ukraine doesn't want their mobile striking forces fixed in place fighting a grinding defensive battle. They are ill equipped to do that. They will rotate these units out as quick as they can when they get "stopped". Obviously, it would be questionable to start such an offensive without plans to effect a passage of lines and pull the mobile force out. If you do that, you suffer casualties and then must of necessity surrender your gains. It may make sense to do that to force Russia to relocate troops they need in Donbas. We don't know Ukraine's intentions, but in so far as they intend to hold on to their gains, it won't be with their mobile units. ATM their rhetoric indicates they intend to defend (not "retain") in the Kursk Oblast. That means grunts instead of tracks.

Can Ukraine somehow replicate what it accomplished in Kursk by using those two brigades in a new offensive on some other portion of the front line, or is the element of surprise destroyed because Ukraine already played that card once?

Probably not exactly, but possibly similarly. Ukraine broke in through weakly defended areas. Other such areas undoubtedly exist that can be exploited. However, the last thing Ukraine wants is more and longer boundaries to defend. Moving the line of contact "forward" isn't good because you ave to defend that line but also the flanks the offensive created. A "bulge" is not a good thing unless 1) the area captured is in some way critical to your opponent, 2) you intend to advance out of that bulge (or threaten to do so) at a later date, or 3) stretching your opponents need to defend a longer line hurts him worse than it does you. Ukraine lacks troops, so holding this "bulge" is harder for them than it would be for Russia to contain them. OTOH if Russia wants to expel the invaders, the calculus may be different. Russia's need to advance and the 3:1 notional superiority required may be a good tradeoff. Ukraine slowly losing ground inside Russia is also much better than doing so inside Ukraine :-).

If Russia just settled for containing Ukraine, Russia can probably continue their offensive in Donbas (with perhaps a hiatus to redeploy troops). If Russia feels it must, for domestic political reasons, expel Ukraine ASAP Ukraine has seized the initiative. Russia is being forced to fight inside Russia in an area not of their choosing. This is great if Ukraine chose an area that is "good" for them to hold. I am not so sure they did. Taking advantage of any weak point in Russian defenses, while possible, may not be advantageous. It may not be well defended because your opponent WANTS to fight you there, or at a minimum figures no sane opponent would want to attack there because of inherent advantages the position has for you.

What Ukraine needs to show is the offensive capability to breach the Surovikin line. This line may contain weak spots that can be exploited, but so far Ukraine hasn't found ones they can exploit. The two brigades that broke into Kursk Oblast had to breach two defensive lines, but these lines were nothing like as strong as the Surovikin line. However, the breakthrough demonstrates that surprise is very useful. The previous offensive in the south definitely did not have that. Going forward, IMO those two brigades (plus several more) need to "do it again" in the southern Ukraine. We will see what actually happens going forward.

[Goose]

The Kursk offensive seems to be slowing, as it inevitably must, and soon this front seems likely to turn into another grinding battle.  Can Ukraine force Russia to man that part of the front more robustly without Ukraine needing to maintain large elements of two brigades there?

Yes, they can if they can free up infantry to do the job. Ukraine doesn't want their mobile striking forces fixed in place fighting a grinding defensive battle. They are ill equipped to do that. They will rotate these units out as quick as they can when they get "stopped". Obviously, it would be questionable to start such an offensive without plans to effect a passage of lines and pull the mobile force out. If you do that, you suffer casualties and then must of necessity surrender your gains. It may make sense to do that to force Russia to relocate troops they need in Donbas. We don't know Ukraine's intentions, but in so far as they intend to hold on to their gains, it won't be with their mobile units. ATM their rhetoric indicates they intend to defend (not "retain") in the Kursk Oblast. That means grunts instead of tracks.

Can Ukraine somehow replicate what it accomplished in Kursk by using those two brigades in a new offensive on some other portion of the front line, or is the element of surprise destroyed because Ukraine already played that card once?

Probably not exactly, but possibly similarly. Ukraine broke in through weakly defended areas. Other such areas undoubtedly exist that can be exploited. However, the last thing Ukraine wants is more and longer boundaries to defend. Moving the line of contact "forward" isn't good because you ave to defend that line but also the flanks the offensive created. A "bulge" is not a good thing unless 1) the area captured is in some way critical to your opponent, 2) you intend to advance out of that bulge (or threaten to do so) at a later date, or 3) stretching your opponents need to defend a longer line hurts him worse than it does you. Ukraine lacks troops, so holding this "bulge" is harder for them than it would be for Russia to contain them. OTOH if Russia wants to expel the invaders, the calculus may be different. Russia's need to advance and the 3:1 notional superiority required may be a good tradeoff. Ukraine slowly losing ground inside Russia is also much better than doing so inside Ukraine :-).

If Russia just settled for containing Ukraine, Russia can probably continue their offensive in Donbas (with perhaps a hiatus to redeploy troops). If Russia feels it must, for domestic political reasons, expel Ukraine ASAP Ukraine has seized the initiative. Russia is being forced to fight inside Russia in an area not of their choosing. This is great if Ukraine chose an area that is "good" for them to hold. I am not so sure they did. Taking advantage of any weak point in Russian defenses, while possible, may not be advantageous. It may not be well defended because your opponent WANTS to fight you there, or at a minimum figures no sane opponent would want to attack there because of inherent advantages the position has for you.

What Ukraine needs to show is the offensive capability to breach the Surovikin line. This line may contain weak spots that can be exploited, but so far Ukraine hasn't found ones they can exploit. The two brigades that broke into Kursk Oblast had to breach two defensive lines, but these lines were nothing like as strong as the Surovikin line. However, the breakthrough demonstrates that surprise is very useful. The previous offensive in the south definitely did not have that. Going forward, IMO those two brigades (plus several more) need to "do it again" in the southern Ukraine. We will see what actually happens going forward.

[TrumpCard]

Thanks for the explanation.

FWIW, looking at a map, the Kursk offensive does not appear to have created much of a "bulge."  Depending on where you assume the line has moved, the offensive may have reduced a bulge that existed on the pre-conflict border and even adjusted the front line so that Ukraine gets the benefit of a couple of small rivers to assist in its defense.  If I'm reading that correctly on the map, then maybe the geography helps explain Ukraine's reasons for attacking in Kursk.

[TrumpCard]

Thanks for the explanation.

FWIW, looking at a map, the Kursk offensive does not appear to have created much of a "bulge."  Depending on where you assume the line has moved, the offensive may have reduced a bulge that existed on the pre-conflict border and even adjusted the front line so that Ukraine gets the benefit of a couple of small rivers to assist in its defense.  If I'm reading that correctly on the map, then maybe the geography helps explain Ukraine's reasons for attacking in Kursk.

[Goose]

Thanks for the explanation.

FWIW, looking at a map, the Kursk offensive does not appear to have created much of a "bulge."  Depending on where you assume the line has moved, the offensive may have reduced a bulge that existed on the pre-conflict border and even adjusted the front line so that Ukraine gets the benefit of a couple of small rivers to assist in its defense.  If I'm reading that correctly on the map, then maybe the geography helps explain Ukraine's reasons for attacking in Kursk.

Good points! In so far as it "straightened the line" it is indeed a good thing.

[Goose]

Thanks for the explanation.

FWIW, looking at a map, the Kursk offensive does not appear to have created much of a "bulge."  Depending on where you assume the line has moved, the offensive may have reduced a bulge that existed on the pre-conflict border and even adjusted the front line so that Ukraine gets the benefit of a couple of small rivers to assist in its defense.  If I'm reading that correctly on the map, then maybe the geography helps explain Ukraine's reasons for attacking in Kursk.

Good points! In so far as it "straightened the line" it is indeed a good thing.

[fullmetal]

The obvious results of the Kursk attack so far:

The incursion shakes the foundation of Putin's security-first brand and hammers at the vulnerability that the Wagner Group nearly exploited to full effect.  It should rattle the belief that Russians have in Putin's narrative of superiority.  It could give Ukraine limited ability to strike deeper into Russian territory, staging HIMARS or other artillery to target more infrastructure, airbases, or drone hubs.  It could force Russia to divert units from the eastern invasion to counter the incursion (this hasn't happened yet apparently).  I believe Russia is drawing up civil reserves and hastily assembled rearguard units to defend Kursk, and the predictable defeat of such units should bring the war home to more and more Russian families, causing dissatisfaction with Putin.  Russian media portrays Ukrainian control of Kursk as an attempt to strengthen the Ukrainian bargaining position ahead of any ceasefire negotiations with Russia (Kursk for Donbas?).

Most hopefully, I think the incursion should boost the morale of Ukrainian forces and show the West that Ukraine is not merely fighting a losing, defensive effort.  The AFU is competent, cunning, and still deserving of all the support we can give them.  What they've accomplished thus far should encourage the West to more fully support Ukraine with the aid and materiel needed to finish this fight before Russia fully adapts to reality and brings its (and Iran's and North Korea's) economic might to bear.

The Ukrainian attack into Kursk was launched 81 years (and one month) after the Germans did the same to Soviet Russia, a bit of a historical echo.

[fullmetal]

The obvious results of the Kursk attack so far:

The incursion shakes the foundation of Putin's security-first brand and hammers at the vulnerability that the Wagner Group nearly exploited to full effect.  It should rattle the belief that Russians have in Putin's narrative of superiority.  It could give Ukraine limited ability to strike deeper into Russian territory, staging HIMARS or other artillery to target more infrastructure, airbases, or drone hubs.  It could force Russia to divert units from the eastern invasion to counter the incursion (this hasn't happened yet apparently).  I believe Russia is drawing up civil reserves and hastily assembled rearguard units to defend Kursk, and the predictable defeat of such units should bring the war home to more and more Russian families, causing dissatisfaction with Putin.  Russian media portrays Ukrainian control of Kursk as an attempt to strengthen the Ukrainian bargaining position ahead of any ceasefire negotiations with Russia (Kursk for Donbas?).

Most hopefully, I think the incursion should boost the morale of Ukrainian forces and show the West that Ukraine is not merely fighting a losing, defensive effort.  The AFU is competent, cunning, and still deserving of all the support we can give them.  What they've accomplished thus far should encourage the West to more fully support Ukraine with the aid and materiel needed to finish this fight before Russia fully adapts to reality and brings its (and Iran's and North Korea's) economic might to bear.

The Ukrainian attack into Kursk was launched 81 years (and one month) after the Germans did the same to Soviet Russia, a bit of a historical echo.

[Goose]

The Ukrainian attack into Kursk was launched 81 years (and one month) after the Germans did the same to Soviet Russia, a bit of a historical echo.

Let's hope not! The Germans lost in the end, big time.

[Goose]

The Ukrainian attack into Kursk was launched 81 years (and one month) after the Germans did the same to Soviet Russia, a bit of a historical echo.

Let's hope not! The Germans lost in the end, big time.

[fullmetal]

The Ukrainian attack into Kursk was launched 81 years (and one month) after the Germans did the same to Soviet Russia, a bit of a historical echo.

Let's hope not! The Germans lost in the end, big time.

They did, largely due to a diversion of resources from the Soviet front to combat the Allied advance in Italy.  And of course, the Ukrainians are not the sort of aggressors that Germany was in 1943, though Putin is trying to say otherwise.

[fullmetal]

The Ukrainian attack into Kursk was launched 81 years (and one month) after the Germans did the same to Soviet Russia, a bit of a historical echo.

Let's hope not! The Germans lost in the end, big time.

They did, largely due to a diversion of resources from the Soviet front to combat the Allied advance in Italy.  And of course, the Ukrainians are not the sort of aggressors that Germany was in 1943, though Putin is trying to say otherwise.

[GK3]

I think Ukraine's most important objective now is to keep their most mobile units from getting tied down in one for place for any length of time where Russia may have the ability to hit them with the glide bombs and artillery.  I think the units they committed to this operation are among their best.  I think they will try and keep their recon drones up 24/7 and try and find Russian reinforcements still underway that they can hit with drones and possibly HIMARS.  As long as Russia is feeding lesser units into the fight, they have the chance to inflict more casualties and take fewer in return. Maps indicate a very rural area, few roads. If you are willing to play around with the data on this website, you can get a better idea of the terrain (http://www.maphill.com/russia/central/br...sical-map/)
The Ukrainian C2 has seemed much superior to that demonstrated by Russia.  I see no reason why the C2 of these reserve units thrown into the breach is going to be anything but even worse.  I think if they can just continue to roam around blow **** up, use their drones to attack any units chasing them and keep from getting tied down, they will continue to put pressure on Putin in the bad news department.  Some reports indicate that Russia is building a new MLR much deeper in Kursk.  I can't find the article I read at this point so it may be a bad rumor. 
They claim they do not intend to hold the land they have taken, but I would guess they will hold as long as they reasonbly can. They seem to be able to find enough fuel from Russian gas stations and their own resupply units and their were clips showing the Ukrainians resupply from Russian markets.  They must be able to keep their munitions supplies up or they would have slowed down long ago. I just hope their leadership is good  enough to keep these units from getting tied down in fixed place battles.
If you are interested in this kind of stuff, the ISW article is worth a read: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...porary-war

[GK3]

I think Ukraine's most important objective now is to keep their most mobile units from getting tied down in one for place for any length of time where Russia may have the ability to hit them with the glide bombs and artillery.  I think the units they committed to this operation are among their best.  I think they will try and keep their recon drones up 24/7 and try and find Russian reinforcements still underway that they can hit with drones and possibly HIMARS.  As long as Russia is feeding lesser units into the fight, they have the chance to inflict more casualties and take fewer in return. Maps indicate a very rural area, few roads. If you are willing to play around with the data on this website, you can get a better idea of the terrain (http://www.maphill.com/russia/central/br...sical-map/)
The Ukrainian C2 has seemed much superior to that demonstrated by Russia.  I see no reason why the C2 of these reserve units thrown into the breach is going to be anything but even worse.  I think if they can just continue to roam around blow **** up, use their drones to attack any units chasing them and keep from getting tied down, they will continue to put pressure on Putin in the bad news department.  Some reports indicate that Russia is building a new MLR much deeper in Kursk.  I can't find the article I read at this point so it may be a bad rumor. 
They claim they do not intend to hold the land they have taken, but I would guess they will hold as long as they reasonbly can. They seem to be able to find enough fuel from Russian gas stations and their own resupply units and their were clips showing the Ukrainians resupply from Russian markets.  They must be able to keep their munitions supplies up or they would have slowed down long ago. I just hope their leadership is good  enough to keep these units from getting tied down in fixed place battles.
If you are interested in this kind of stuff, the ISW article is worth a read: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...porary-war

[Goose]

I think Ukraine's most important objective now is to keep their most mobile units from getting tied down in one for place for any length of time where Russia may have the ability to hit them with the glide bombs and artillery.  I think the units they committed to this operation are among their best.  I think they will try and keep their recon drones up 24/7 and try and find Russian reinforcements still underway that they can hit with drones and possibly HIMARS.  As long as Russia is feeding lesser units into the fight, they have the chance to inflict more casualties and take fewer in return. Maps indicate a very rural area, few roads. If you are willing to play around with the data on this website, you can get a better idea of the terrain (http://www.maphill.com/russia/central/br...sical-map/)

IMO you are absolutely correct. The desire to inflict large casualties on the Russian units as they are being transported into the operational area is why Ukraine is pushing so hard to use HIMARS, Storm Shadow etc. deeper into Russia. Ukraine has yet to receive that permission, which is just crazy. A Russian formation at a railhead 200 km behind the lines is a vulnerable target that can't spread out to minimize casualties. If Ukraine can render that formation combat ineffective before it even gets close enough to be a threat that is a big "win". It is one of the aims of all "major" offensives. Getting into lightly defensed rear areas is an advantage because 1) you can kill lots of the enemy while they are not in a position to hit back, and 2) you can disrupt and deny your opponents ability to move troops to a (even hastily improvised) second line of defense. The second goal is CRITICAL, or you offensive will be "contained". Russia was allowed to build two strong defensive lines in the south and east. Ukraine had no means to stop them. Russia did not do that in the north. Ukraine is exploiting that now. Care to guess what Russia will do this winter?

The Ukrainian C2 has seemed much superior to that demonstrated by Russia.  I see no reason why the C2 of these reserve units thrown into the breach is going to be anything but even worse.  I think if they can just continue to roam around blow **** up, use their drones to attack any units chasing them and keep from getting tied down, they will continue to put pressure on Putin in the bad news department.  Some reports indicate that Russia is building a new MLR much deeper in Kursk.  I can't find the article I read at this point so it may be a bad rumor.

Doubt it is a bad rumor. If Russia isn't already doing it, they soon will. It is in their DNA. Russia's C2 indeed sucks, but once they get their horde of troops into even earth trenches and form a new MLR, they don't need much C2.

They claim they do not intend to hold the land they have taken, but I would guess they will hold as long as they reasonbly can. They seem to be able to find enough fuel from Russian gas stations and their own resupply units and their were clips showing the Ukrainians resupply from Russian markets.  They must be able to keep their munitions supplies up or they would have slowed down long ago. I just hope their leadership is good  enough to keep these units from getting tied down in fixed place battles.

Totally agree with all this. If Russia elects not to eject Ukraine immediately (because they realize they can't) but rather fortifies a MLR well behind where Ukraine is now, Ukraine will certainly try to hold the territory. The continued logistics challenges will then be the deciding factor. So far, so good, but we don't really know much about the current supply situation in Kursk. We only know Ukraine is still there and still advancing, albeit slower. 

If you are interested in this kind of stuff, the ISW article is worth a read: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...porary-war

I very much agree it is worth a read. I am not all the way through it yet. I think one needs to read it somewhat critically though. Lots of food for thought.

[Goose]

I think Ukraine's most important objective now is to keep their most mobile units from getting tied down in one for place for any length of time where Russia may have the ability to hit them with the glide bombs and artillery.  I think the units they committed to this operation are among their best.  I think they will try and keep their recon drones up 24/7 and try and find Russian reinforcements still underway that they can hit with drones and possibly HIMARS.  As long as Russia is feeding lesser units into the fight, they have the chance to inflict more casualties and take fewer in return. Maps indicate a very rural area, few roads. If you are willing to play around with the data on this website, you can get a better idea of the terrain (http://www.maphill.com/russia/central/br...sical-map/)

IMO you are absolutely correct. The desire to inflict large casualties on the Russian units as they are being transported into the operational area is why Ukraine is pushing so hard to use HIMARS, Storm Shadow etc. deeper into Russia. Ukraine has yet to receive that permission, which is just crazy. A Russian formation at a railhead 200 km behind the lines is a vulnerable target that can't spread out to minimize casualties. If Ukraine can render that formation combat ineffective before it even gets close enough to be a threat that is a big "win". It is one of the aims of all "major" offensives. Getting into lightly defensed rear areas is an advantage because 1) you can kill lots of the enemy while they are not in a position to hit back, and 2) you can disrupt and deny your opponents ability to move troops to a (even hastily improvised) second line of defense. The second goal is CRITICAL, or you offensive will be "contained". Russia was allowed to build two strong defensive lines in the south and east. Ukraine had no means to stop them. Russia did not do that in the north. Ukraine is exploiting that now. Care to guess what Russia will do this winter?

The Ukrainian C2 has seemed much superior to that demonstrated by Russia.  I see no reason why the C2 of these reserve units thrown into the breach is going to be anything but even worse.  I think if they can just continue to roam around blow **** up, use their drones to attack any units chasing them and keep from getting tied down, they will continue to put pressure on Putin in the bad news department.  Some reports indicate that Russia is building a new MLR much deeper in Kursk.  I can't find the article I read at this point so it may be a bad rumor.

Doubt it is a bad rumor. If Russia isn't already doing it, they soon will. It is in their DNA. Russia's C2 indeed sucks, but once they get their horde of troops into even earth trenches and form a new MLR, they don't need much C2.

They claim they do not intend to hold the land they have taken, but I would guess they will hold as long as they reasonbly can. They seem to be able to find enough fuel from Russian gas stations and their own resupply units and their were clips showing the Ukrainians resupply from Russian markets.  They must be able to keep their munitions supplies up or they would have slowed down long ago. I just hope their leadership is good  enough to keep these units from getting tied down in fixed place battles.

Totally agree with all this. If Russia elects not to eject Ukraine immediately (because they realize they can't) but rather fortifies a MLR well behind where Ukraine is now, Ukraine will certainly try to hold the territory. The continued logistics challenges will then be the deciding factor. So far, so good, but we don't really know much about the current supply situation in Kursk. We only know Ukraine is still there and still advancing, albeit slower. 

If you are interested in this kind of stuff, the ISW article is worth a read: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...porary-war

I very much agree it is worth a read. I am not all the way through it yet. I think one needs to read it somewhat critically though. Lots of food for thought.

[dabigv13]

News today that US "open" to supplying JASSM long range cruise missiles. 

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/15...a-00174147

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1824108239421669599

The F16s Ukraine has should have the capability to fire these, or be easily upgradeable for it. Equiping their Soviet era planes could be tougher but probably pretty feasible considering their previous successful kludges for western weapons like Storm Shadow and HARM.

This would be pretty great, but for them to really make a difference the US would need to take off the leash and let them be used against targets in Russia. Storm Shadow is a similar capability that Ukraine already possesses, but the US is preventing Ukraine from using them in Russian territory (UK and France, the suppliers of the missiles, don't seem to have a problem it).

[dabigv13]

News today that US "open" to supplying JASSM long range cruise missiles. 

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/15...a-00174147

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1824108239421669599

The F16s Ukraine has should have the capability to fire these, or be easily upgradeable for it. Equiping their Soviet era planes could be tougher but probably pretty feasible considering their previous successful kludges for western weapons like Storm Shadow and HARM.

This would be pretty great, but for them to really make a difference the US would need to take off the leash and let them be used against targets in Russia. Storm Shadow is a similar capability that Ukraine already possesses, but the US is preventing Ukraine from using them in Russian territory (UK and France, the suppliers of the missiles, don't seem to have a problem it).

[Goose]

News today that US "open" to supplying JASSM long range cruise missiles. 

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/15...a-00174147

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1824108239421669599

The F16s Ukraine has should have the capability to fire these, or be easily upgradeable for it. Equiping their Soviet era planes could be tougher but probably pretty feasible considering their previous successful kludges for western weapons like Storm Shadow and HARM.

Even if the software isn't already present I expect the F-16s can be easily upgraded to fire the missile. I would agree that the upgrade of the Ukraine's Soviet era planes to fire the Storm Shadow has been successful. IMO this is largely because 1) the Storm Shadow has autonomous terminal guidance  using its IR camera and 2) the Storm Shadow has both GPS and terrain mapping capability. If GPS is jammed, the terrain mapping can get the Storm Shadow "close enough" for the terminal guidance to work. None of these depends on the launching aircraft for anything more than the "launch" command.

HARM is a different case. It benefits greatly from its interface to the launch aircraft. It seems pretty clear that the HARM missile has not lived up to expectations in Ukraine. It has not provided Ukraine with the ability to operate in contested air space to any noticeable extent. This is undoubtedly somewhat due to the fact that the HARM can only be used in one of its three modes. It is not interfaced to the Soviet era RWRs AFAIK and it is improbable that can be done. Those RWRs are also of limited capability even if such an interface was possible. The fact that Ukraine can launch them at all is an achievement. However, it apparently doesn't work all that well. The F-16s  with HARMs should fare much better, even without targeting pods.

The JASSM actual range depends on the model delivered. The JASSM also has IR terminal guidance in some configurations, so it will still "work" in GPS denied environments. Of course, at 900 km ranges it becomes much less probable the targets will be jammer protected. One important point about the JASSM (and much more so the JDAM) is the "GPS handoff" given by the launch platform to the weapon. US aircraft immediately precedes  the launch command with an exact GPS vector including exact heading and speed. It also contains the exact satellites used for the "fix" and a "delay estimate" for the code. This allows the weapon to obtain a GPS "lock" almost immediately, without having to search the entire constellation for it. More importantly, it provides the weapon's INS an initial position that is as accurate as possible. The INS "initial solution" therefore starts out accurate and does not add to the INS error. This is very important in missions that are in some part GPS denied. Doing this from a Soviet era fighter, while not impossible, is undoubtedly pretty difficult. One can launch the missile without this feature, but it does negatively affect its accuracy.

This would be pretty great, but for them to really make a difference the US would need to take off the leash and let them be used against targets in Russia. Storm Shadow is a similar capability that Ukraine already possesses, but the US is preventing Ukraine from using them in Russian territory (UK and France, the suppliers of the missiles, don't seem to have a problem it).

IMO you are absolutely correct that this position by the US makes no sense. To be clear, the US allows Ukraine to fire US ordinance into Russia in response from an attack from that location. However, if the Russian troops are drinking beer 100 km behind the front and not attacking anyone (yet), US ordinance can't be used. That is just crazy IMO. What is the point of a very long range weapon whose long range cannot be used because pf such constraints?

[Goose]

News today that US "open" to supplying JASSM long range cruise missiles. 

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/15...a-00174147

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1824108239421669599

The F16s Ukraine has should have the capability to fire these, or be easily upgradeable for it. Equiping their Soviet era planes could be tougher but probably pretty feasible considering their previous successful kludges for western weapons like Storm Shadow and HARM.

Even if the software isn't already present I expect the F-16s can be easily upgraded to fire the missile. I would agree that the upgrade of the Ukraine's Soviet era planes to fire the Storm Shadow has been successful. IMO this is largely because 1) the Storm Shadow has autonomous terminal guidance  using its IR camera and 2) the Storm Shadow has both GPS and terrain mapping capability. If GPS is jammed, the terrain mapping can get the Storm Shadow "close enough" for the terminal guidance to work. None of these depends on the launching aircraft for anything more than the "launch" command.

HARM is a different case. It benefits greatly from its interface to the launch aircraft. It seems pretty clear that the HARM missile has not lived up to expectations in Ukraine. It has not provided Ukraine with the ability to operate in contested air space to any noticeable extent. This is undoubtedly somewhat due to the fact that the HARM can only be used in one of its three modes. It is not interfaced to the Soviet era RWRs AFAIK and it is improbable that can be done. Those RWRs are also of limited capability even if such an interface was possible. The fact that Ukraine can launch them at all is an achievement. However, it apparently doesn't work all that well. The F-16s  with HARMs should fare much better, even without targeting pods.

The JASSM actual range depends on the model delivered. The JASSM also has IR terminal guidance in some configurations, so it will still "work" in GPS denied environments. Of course, at 900 km ranges it becomes much less probable the targets will be jammer protected. One important point about the JASSM (and much more so the JDAM) is the "GPS handoff" given by the launch platform to the weapon. US aircraft immediately precedes  the launch command with an exact GPS vector including exact heading and speed. It also contains the exact satellites used for the "fix" and a "delay estimate" for the code. This allows the weapon to obtain a GPS "lock" almost immediately, without having to search the entire constellation for it. More importantly, it provides the weapon's INS an initial position that is as accurate as possible. The INS "initial solution" therefore starts out accurate and does not add to the INS error. This is very important in missions that are in some part GPS denied. Doing this from a Soviet era fighter, while not impossible, is undoubtedly pretty difficult. One can launch the missile without this feature, but it does negatively affect its accuracy.

This would be pretty great, but for them to really make a difference the US would need to take off the leash and let them be used against targets in Russia. Storm Shadow is a similar capability that Ukraine already possesses, but the US is preventing Ukraine from using them in Russian territory (UK and France, the suppliers of the missiles, don't seem to have a problem it).

IMO you are absolutely correct that this position by the US makes no sense. To be clear, the US allows Ukraine to fire US ordinance into Russia in response from an attack from that location. However, if the Russian troops are drinking beer 100 km behind the front and not attacking anyone (yet), US ordinance can't be used. That is just crazy IMO. What is the point of a very long range weapon whose long range cannot be used because pf such constraints?

[fullmetal]

Apparently Ukraine is setting up an administrative center in occupied Kursk...not sure what to make of that.  Ploy?  

Reports from the Ukrainian Donbas front indicate that they've been receiving fewer resources (due to resources going to Kursk) and consequently not doing as well against the Russian advance.  Zero-sum game :(

Here's a *very* optimistic, high-level analysis.  It mentions that Ukraine is cutting off one of the major rail lines supplying the eastern front Russian advance and potentially interdicting another.  I don't think we'll see Russian military units marching on Moscow, however lol.
https://realcontextnews.com/kursk-belgor...ts-sleeve/

[fullmetal]

Apparently Ukraine is setting up an administrative center in occupied Kursk...not sure what to make of that.  Ploy?  

Reports from the Ukrainian Donbas front indicate that they've been receiving fewer resources (due to resources going to Kursk) and consequently not doing as well against the Russian advance.  Zero-sum game :(

Here's a *very* optimistic, high-level analysis.  It mentions that Ukraine is cutting off one of the major rail lines supplying the eastern front Russian advance and potentially interdicting another.  I don't think we'll see Russian military units marching on Moscow, however lol.
https://realcontextnews.com/kursk-belgor...ts-sleeve/