[82lsju]

This election is over.  I would think it is not politics to describe what the President-elect or his team has said about the Russia invasion of Ukraine, to give some idea of the future of this conflict, and perhaps the effect that pending future on the current situation.  If the powers here feel this stretches too much into politics, then I guess they'll take it down.

BBC's "What Trump's win means for Ukraine, Middle East and China"

During the campaign, Trump repeatedly said he could end the war between Russia and Ukraine “in a day”. When asked how, he suggested overseeing a deal, but has declined to give specifics.
A research paper written by two of Trump’s former national security chiefs in May said the US should continue its weapons supply to Ukraine, but make the support conditional on Kyiv entering peace talks with Russia.
To entice Russia, the West would promise to delay Ukraine’s much-wanted entry into Nato. The former advisers said Ukraine should not give up its hopes of getting all of its territory back from Russian occupation, but that it should negotiate based on current front lines.
It’s not clear how far the former advisers’ paper represents Trump’s own thinking, but it’s likely to give us a guide to the kind of advice he’ll get.

The article doesn't indicate when that research paper was written.  Likely, a lot has happened since then:  Russia's advance in Donbas.  Extended strike capability by Ukraine;  The dwindling military stocks of Russia;  North Korean arms and soldiers; The conflicts in the Middle East.   I hope the US President-elect looks at the situation as of the time he takes office and takes all this into account.

Meanwhile, the current administration no longer has to include a looming election in its calculus.  I don't know how that might change things.

from the article on when it was written

A research paper written by two of Trump’s former national security chiefs in May said the US should continue its weapons supply to Ukraine, but make the support conditional on Kyiv entering peace talks with Russia.

[82lsju]

This election is over.  I would think it is not politics to describe what the President-elect or his team has said about the Russia invasion of Ukraine, to give some idea of the future of this conflict, and perhaps the effect that pending future on the current situation.  If the powers here feel this stretches too much into politics, then I guess they'll take it down.

BBC's "What Trump's win means for Ukraine, Middle East and China"

During the campaign, Trump repeatedly said he could end the war between Russia and Ukraine “in a day”. When asked how, he suggested overseeing a deal, but has declined to give specifics.
A research paper written by two of Trump’s former national security chiefs in May said the US should continue its weapons supply to Ukraine, but make the support conditional on Kyiv entering peace talks with Russia.
To entice Russia, the West would promise to delay Ukraine’s much-wanted entry into Nato. The former advisers said Ukraine should not give up its hopes of getting all of its territory back from Russian occupation, but that it should negotiate based on current front lines.
It’s not clear how far the former advisers’ paper represents Trump’s own thinking, but it’s likely to give us a guide to the kind of advice he’ll get.

The article doesn't indicate when that research paper was written.  Likely, a lot has happened since then:  Russia's advance in Donbas.  Extended strike capability by Ukraine;  The dwindling military stocks of Russia;  North Korean arms and soldiers; The conflicts in the Middle East.   I hope the US President-elect looks at the situation as of the time he takes office and takes all this into account.

Meanwhile, the current administration no longer has to include a looming election in its calculus.  I don't know how that might change things.

from the article on when it was written

A research paper written by two of Trump’s former national security chiefs in May said the US should continue its weapons supply to Ukraine, but make the support conditional on Kyiv entering peace talks with Russia.

[newguy]

i am much more concerned about Ukraine's fate than i was a couple days ago.  it would be nice if Biden could transfer more weapons there in the coming weeks, but that may be difficult.

It also won't matter all that much. Ukraine needs, at an absolute minimum, a steady supply of 155 mm shells that place them at no worse than a 3:1 daily usage disadvantage WRT Russia. Without that, they will lose. If the US is supplying shells along with the EU it is barely possible to maintain that ratio. Without the US, it is not. Ukraine also needs a reliable supply of Patriot missiles. Europe can supply some, but it seems improbable they can match current levels. Eventually Ukraine runs out. At that point Russia can pound away at will. Morale wise, that is a disaster. Ukraine also needs ATACMS and other missiles for their HIMARS. Lots of those need to come from the US.

There are lots of "other things", like HARMs and JDAMS that Ukraine needs. Ukraine probably has some stocks of various munitions, but as these stocks are depleted, Ukraine loses the ability to effectively resist. We saw this last spring and it would be no better this spring. The difference was that eventually the logjam was broken. It that had not happened, it is IMO unlikely Ukraine would still be fighting.

unfortunately, this is probably true.

[newguy]

i am much more concerned about Ukraine's fate than i was a couple days ago.  it would be nice if Biden could transfer more weapons there in the coming weeks, but that may be difficult.

It also won't matter all that much. Ukraine needs, at an absolute minimum, a steady supply of 155 mm shells that place them at no worse than a 3:1 daily usage disadvantage WRT Russia. Without that, they will lose. If the US is supplying shells along with the EU it is barely possible to maintain that ratio. Without the US, it is not. Ukraine also needs a reliable supply of Patriot missiles. Europe can supply some, but it seems improbable they can match current levels. Eventually Ukraine runs out. At that point Russia can pound away at will. Morale wise, that is a disaster. Ukraine also needs ATACMS and other missiles for their HIMARS. Lots of those need to come from the US.

There are lots of "other things", like HARMs and JDAMS that Ukraine needs. Ukraine probably has some stocks of various munitions, but as these stocks are depleted, Ukraine loses the ability to effectively resist. We saw this last spring and it would be no better this spring. The difference was that eventually the logjam was broken. It that had not happened, it is IMO unlikely Ukraine would still be fighting.

unfortunately, this is probably true.

[81alum]

I have not posted on this thread for a very long time, and I do so now with some trepidation about invoking American politics.

I teach a college class, and one of my best students is a Ukrainian refugee.  She has been here for some time--her family fled Crimea when it was conquered.  Her father, however, returned to fight for Ukraine and was killed in the fighting several months ago.  

In the last few weeks we discussed how American foreign policy might change depending on the outcome of the election, and how this might affect her homeland.  And so I dreaded going to class and facing her today. 

She did come to class.  Many of my students, including some who are undocumented, confessed their own personal fears given the outcome of the election.  My Ukrainian student, with moist eyes, attempted to alleviate their concerns.  "It could be worse.  We could all be in Ukraine."

[81alum]

I have not posted on this thread for a very long time, and I do so now with some trepidation about invoking American politics.

I teach a college class, and one of my best students is a Ukrainian refugee.  She has been here for some time--her family fled Crimea when it was conquered.  Her father, however, returned to fight for Ukraine and was killed in the fighting several months ago.  

In the last few weeks we discussed how American foreign policy might change depending on the outcome of the election, and how this might affect her homeland.  And so I dreaded going to class and facing her today. 

She did come to class.  Many of my students, including some who are undocumented, confessed their own personal fears given the outcome of the election.  My Ukrainian student, with moist eyes, attempted to alleviate their concerns.  "It could be worse.  We could all be in Ukraine."

[Hurlburt88]

I have not posted on this thread for a very long time, and I do so now with some trepidation about invoking American politics.

I teach a college class, and one of my best students is a Ukrainian refugee.  She has been here for some time--her family fled Crimea when it was conquered.  Her father, however, returned to fight for Ukraine and was killed in the fighting several months ago.  

In the last few weeks we discussed how American foreign policy might change depending on the outcome of the election, and how this might affect her homeland.  And so I dreaded going to class and facing her today. 

She did come to class.  Many of my students, including some who are undocumented, confessed their own personal fears given the outcome of the election.  My Ukrainian student, with moist eyes, attempted to alleviate their concerns.  "It could be worse.  We could all be in Ukraine."

wow, makes it real.   I remember when Tara challenged all fans to donate a certain amount per point (or something) in the NCAA tournament to charitable relief causes for Ukraine.   Might be good for all of us to continue remembering the common citizens, and help where we can

[Hurlburt88]

I have not posted on this thread for a very long time, and I do so now with some trepidation about invoking American politics.

I teach a college class, and one of my best students is a Ukrainian refugee.  She has been here for some time--her family fled Crimea when it was conquered.  Her father, however, returned to fight for Ukraine and was killed in the fighting several months ago.  

In the last few weeks we discussed how American foreign policy might change depending on the outcome of the election, and how this might affect her homeland.  And so I dreaded going to class and facing her today. 

She did come to class.  Many of my students, including some who are undocumented, confessed their own personal fears given the outcome of the election.  My Ukrainian student, with moist eyes, attempted to alleviate their concerns.  "It could be worse.  We could all be in Ukraine."

wow, makes it real.   I remember when Tara challenged all fans to donate a certain amount per point (or something) in the NCAA tournament to charitable relief causes for Ukraine.   Might be good for all of us to continue remembering the common citizens, and help where we can

[newguy]

I have not posted on this thread for a very long time, and I do so now with some trepidation about invoking American politics.

I teach a college class, and one of my best students is a Ukrainian refugee.  She has been here for some time--her family fled Crimea when it was conquered.  Her father, however, returned to fight for Ukraine and was killed in the fighting several months ago.  

In the last few weeks we discussed how American foreign policy might change depending on the outcome of the election, and how this might affect her homeland.  And so I dreaded going to class and facing her today. 

She did come to class.  Many of my students, including some who are undocumented, confessed their own personal fears given the outcome of the election.  My Ukrainian student, with moist eyes, attempted to alleviate their concerns.  "It could be worse.  We could all be in Ukraine."

my latest foster kiddo is also a Ukrainian refugee.  also from Crimea, fled to Odesa in 2014.  his first language is Russian, but he hates Putin (as one might expect).  

i am deeply concerned about his classmates and relatives.

[newguy]

I have not posted on this thread for a very long time, and I do so now with some trepidation about invoking American politics.

I teach a college class, and one of my best students is a Ukrainian refugee.  She has been here for some time--her family fled Crimea when it was conquered.  Her father, however, returned to fight for Ukraine and was killed in the fighting several months ago.  

In the last few weeks we discussed how American foreign policy might change depending on the outcome of the election, and how this might affect her homeland.  And so I dreaded going to class and facing her today. 

She did come to class.  Many of my students, including some who are undocumented, confessed their own personal fears given the outcome of the election.  My Ukrainian student, with moist eyes, attempted to alleviate their concerns.  "It could be worse.  We could all be in Ukraine."

my latest foster kiddo is also a Ukrainian refugee.  also from Crimea, fled to Odesa in 2014.  his first language is Russian, but he hates Putin (as one might expect).  

i am deeply concerned about his classmates and relatives.

[dabigv13]

My guess is the peace plan will entail Ukraine ceding all territory presently held by Russia, returning any part of Kursk that is still occupied, a block on any accession to NATO (how relevant NATO will be is still very TBD, might become a Europe only thing soon). Doubt there will be appetite to send Ukraine any money or much more arms. Probably Russia will get sanctions relief and unfrozen assets as well.

Doubtful Europe will be able to influence anything, it will all be personalist negotiations.

It would be a recipe for renewed hostility after Russia can rearm, but Ukraine may not have a choice if the US stops aid.

‐------

One late, small bright spot- Biden administration now allowing US military contractors to go to Ukraine for repair and sustainment purposes. Will be away from the front lines. Will be helpful for maintenance of F16s for the next two months until the new administration makes their own decisions.

[dabigv13]

My guess is the peace plan will entail Ukraine ceding all territory presently held by Russia, returning any part of Kursk that is still occupied, a block on any accession to NATO (how relevant NATO will be is still very TBD, might become a Europe only thing soon). Doubt there will be appetite to send Ukraine any money or much more arms. Probably Russia will get sanctions relief and unfrozen assets as well.

Doubtful Europe will be able to influence anything, it will all be personalist negotiations.

It would be a recipe for renewed hostility after Russia can rearm, but Ukraine may not have a choice if the US stops aid.

‐------

One late, small bright spot- Biden administration now allowing US military contractors to go to Ukraine for repair and sustainment purposes. Will be away from the front lines. Will be helpful for maintenance of F16s for the next two months until the new administration makes their own decisions.

[Goose]

My guess is the peace plan will entail Ukraine ceding all territory presently held by Russia, returning any part of Kursk that is still occupied, a block on any accession to NATO (how relevant NATO will be is still very TBD, might become a Europe only thing soon). Doubt there will be appetite to send Ukraine any money or much more arms. Probably Russia will get sanctions relief and unfrozen assets as well.

Doubtful Europe will be able to influence anything, it will all be personalist negotiations.

It would be a recipe for renewed hostility after Russia can rearm, but Ukraine may not have a choice if the US stops aid.

That might be the optimistic view :-(. IMO Putin isn't going to accept even that. He doesn't have to. Ukraine without US support will collapse in short order if Russia keeps attacking. Putin knows that, so why give up anything? Take the whole works. He can make "the west", particularly the US grovel and then say "Nope". Zelenskyy isn't going to quit fighting, even if it is hopeless. He will have to either quit or be killed. His army is already over-matched in Donbas. When the infantry finds out they will no longer get artillery ammunition from the US, they will begin to melt away. They may do so anyway when it becomes clear negotiations will result in any more deaths being in vain.

Hopefully the US will be smart enough to continue full support to Ukraine while these negotiations play out. If we don't do that, it is indeed "game over". Russia firmly believes (with reason) it is negotiating from a position of overwhelming strength. If we confirm we believe that too we then have no negotiating position but surrender. Just maybe that argument will be accepted and be incorporated into our strategy.

One late, small bright spot- Biden administration now allowing US military contractors to go to Ukraine for repair and sustainment purposes. Will be away from the front lines. Will be helpful for maintenance of F16s for the next two months until the new administration makes their own decisions.

Perhaps a few of them might have to do some "test flights" and ensure the weapons systems work by repeated tests :-). One has to take solace where one can.

[Goose]

My guess is the peace plan will entail Ukraine ceding all territory presently held by Russia, returning any part of Kursk that is still occupied, a block on any accession to NATO (how relevant NATO will be is still very TBD, might become a Europe only thing soon). Doubt there will be appetite to send Ukraine any money or much more arms. Probably Russia will get sanctions relief and unfrozen assets as well.

Doubtful Europe will be able to influence anything, it will all be personalist negotiations.

It would be a recipe for renewed hostility after Russia can rearm, but Ukraine may not have a choice if the US stops aid.

That might be the optimistic view :-(. IMO Putin isn't going to accept even that. He doesn't have to. Ukraine without US support will collapse in short order if Russia keeps attacking. Putin knows that, so why give up anything? Take the whole works. He can make "the west", particularly the US grovel and then say "Nope". Zelenskyy isn't going to quit fighting, even if it is hopeless. He will have to either quit or be killed. His army is already over-matched in Donbas. When the infantry finds out they will no longer get artillery ammunition from the US, they will begin to melt away. They may do so anyway when it becomes clear negotiations will result in any more deaths being in vain.

Hopefully the US will be smart enough to continue full support to Ukraine while these negotiations play out. If we don't do that, it is indeed "game over". Russia firmly believes (with reason) it is negotiating from a position of overwhelming strength. If we confirm we believe that too we then have no negotiating position but surrender. Just maybe that argument will be accepted and be incorporated into our strategy.

One late, small bright spot- Biden administration now allowing US military contractors to go to Ukraine for repair and sustainment purposes. Will be away from the front lines. Will be helpful for maintenance of F16s for the next two months until the new administration makes their own decisions.

Perhaps a few of them might have to do some "test flights" and ensure the weapons systems work by repeated tests :-). One has to take solace where one can.

[fullmetal]

Is there a world in which the hawkish GOP leaders prevail upon the president-elect the urgency of Ukraine?  Surely any of Putin's leverage over executive-related people is gone now that the last election has been won.  I have been heartened by the continual cry to support Ukraine from some corners of the GOP.

[fullmetal]

Is there a world in which the hawkish GOP leaders prevail upon the president-elect the urgency of Ukraine?  Surely any of Putin's leverage over executive-related people is gone now that the last election has been won.  I have been heartened by the continual cry to support Ukraine from some corners of the GOP.

[dabigv13]

Generally people are policy so let's see who actually ends up appointed. There have been rumors of both pro and anti-Ukraine people for Defense, Intelligence, and State. But the only two people who we know for sure are NOT being appointed, because Trump "truth"ed it on his social media platform, are Pompeo and Haley.

I would take that as an ominous sign as someone who very much wants to see Ukraine succeed and Russia be punished for invading a sovereign nation, or at least not rewarded. The involvement of Musk in discussions with Zelensky in light of Musk's reported conversations with Putin is another ominous sign.

[dabigv13]

Generally people are policy so let's see who actually ends up appointed. There have been rumors of both pro and anti-Ukraine people for Defense, Intelligence, and State. But the only two people who we know for sure are NOT being appointed, because Trump "truth"ed it on his social media platform, are Pompeo and Haley.

I would take that as an ominous sign as someone who very much wants to see Ukraine succeed and Russia be punished for invading a sovereign nation, or at least not rewarded. The involvement of Musk in discussions with Zelensky in light of Musk's reported conversations with Putin is another ominous sign.

[Mick]

Generally people are policy so let's see who actually ends up appointed. There have been rumors of both pro and anti-Ukraine people for Defense, Intelligence, and State. But the only two people who we know for sure are NOT being appointed, because Trump "truth"ed it on his social media platform, are Pompeo and Haley.

Agreed. I would take solace in two points: first, the fact that incoming politicians across the board have domestic priorities front and center and Ukraine is considerably down the list and will likely be subject to internal negotiations. Second, based upon their statements, the incoming politicians learned from experience how important those internal negotiations are in getting what they want.

None of that is dispositive. I certainly hope we continue to support Ukraine and am moderately hopeful that incoming politicians will be effective in bringing about an end to the war in a way that is least harmful.

[Mick]

Generally people are policy so let's see who actually ends up appointed. There have been rumors of both pro and anti-Ukraine people for Defense, Intelligence, and State. But the only two people who we know for sure are NOT being appointed, because Trump "truth"ed it on his social media platform, are Pompeo and Haley.

Agreed. I would take solace in two points: first, the fact that incoming politicians across the board have domestic priorities front and center and Ukraine is considerably down the list and will likely be subject to internal negotiations. Second, based upon their statements, the incoming politicians learned from experience how important those internal negotiations are in getting what they want.

None of that is dispositive. I certainly hope we continue to support Ukraine and am moderately hopeful that incoming politicians will be effective in bringing about an end to the war in a way that is least harmful.

[Goose]

Generally people are policy so let's see who actually ends up appointed. There have been rumors of both pro and anti-Ukraine people for Defense, Intelligence, and State. But the only two people who we know for sure are NOT being appointed, because Trump "truth"ed it on his social media platform, are Pompeo and Haley.

Agreed. I would take solace in two points: first, the fact that incoming politicians across the board have domestic priorities front and center and Ukraine is considerably down the list and will likely be subject to internal negotiations. Second, based upon their statements, the incoming politicians learned from experience how important those internal negotiations are in getting what they want.

None of that is dispositive. I certainly hope we continue to support Ukraine and am moderately hopeful that incoming politicians will be effective in bringing about an end to the war in a way that is least harmful.

If and when the US administration decides that we will not prosecute this war to an eventual Ukrainian "victory", we have very few cards left to play. Russia is "winning" right now, and they will "win" faster when the Ukrainian populace realizes they are going to lose (at a bare minimum) all the territory Russia occupies. We can tell Putin that if he doesn't agree to a cease fire we will keep supporting Ukraine at the "current" level (more or less) Putin will just say "Fine, I am winning, I will continue to win. You have no plan to win, so you can't win. See you on the Hungarian border. I hope you enjoy taking care of the millions of sub-human Ukrainians fleeing into the EU".

Why would he say otherwise? There is the possibility that the impact of this war on Russia has been so bad he needs to "stop" ASAP, but there is little evidence that is the case. The humanitarian argument also has no traction. If it did, this war would never have been fought. There are also many political reasons why Putin doesn't want to stop short of the total capture of Ukraine. This war has made life more difficult for the average Russian. Perhaps not a lot, but some. The aftermath of this war inside Russia may actually be worse than during the war. The government will quit pouring money into the economy and a severe recession is inevitable. Putin would have a hard time selling the idea that all this fighting was worth the cost to Russia in blood and treasure if the "Nazi" Ukrainian regime still exists. It is much easier to declare victory if you really have a victory, no asterisks attached.

It is always possible Putin will not behave as I have suggested. His reasoning is often hard to understand, possibly because we don't have his "perspective" (warped or otherwise). However, I bet heavily against such an outcome. Putin may temporize, negotiating while still advancing. IMO he will instead go "hard line" initially to see if the west folds immediately and gives him Ukraine either directly through negotiations or indirectly by stopping aid. He isn't worried that "the west" will massively step up aid and remove restrictions on weapons use because he is virtually certain we do not have the political will to do that. Succeeding in such an approach would also deliver him a badly needed international and domestic boost in prestige. This is for the US a "worst case" scenario, and it is within his grasp. It would also put him as the "alpha dog" with respect to the US administration, another significant "win". Hard to see him backing down now.

[Goose]

Generally people are policy so let's see who actually ends up appointed. There have been rumors of both pro and anti-Ukraine people for Defense, Intelligence, and State. But the only two people who we know for sure are NOT being appointed, because Trump "truth"ed it on his social media platform, are Pompeo and Haley.

Agreed. I would take solace in two points: first, the fact that incoming politicians across the board have domestic priorities front and center and Ukraine is considerably down the list and will likely be subject to internal negotiations. Second, based upon their statements, the incoming politicians learned from experience how important those internal negotiations are in getting what they want.

None of that is dispositive. I certainly hope we continue to support Ukraine and am moderately hopeful that incoming politicians will be effective in bringing about an end to the war in a way that is least harmful.

If and when the US administration decides that we will not prosecute this war to an eventual Ukrainian "victory", we have very few cards left to play. Russia is "winning" right now, and they will "win" faster when the Ukrainian populace realizes they are going to lose (at a bare minimum) all the territory Russia occupies. We can tell Putin that if he doesn't agree to a cease fire we will keep supporting Ukraine at the "current" level (more or less) Putin will just say "Fine, I am winning, I will continue to win. You have no plan to win, so you can't win. See you on the Hungarian border. I hope you enjoy taking care of the millions of sub-human Ukrainians fleeing into the EU".

Why would he say otherwise? There is the possibility that the impact of this war on Russia has been so bad he needs to "stop" ASAP, but there is little evidence that is the case. The humanitarian argument also has no traction. If it did, this war would never have been fought. There are also many political reasons why Putin doesn't want to stop short of the total capture of Ukraine. This war has made life more difficult for the average Russian. Perhaps not a lot, but some. The aftermath of this war inside Russia may actually be worse than during the war. The government will quit pouring money into the economy and a severe recession is inevitable. Putin would have a hard time selling the idea that all this fighting was worth the cost to Russia in blood and treasure if the "Nazi" Ukrainian regime still exists. It is much easier to declare victory if you really have a victory, no asterisks attached.

It is always possible Putin will not behave as I have suggested. His reasoning is often hard to understand, possibly because we don't have his "perspective" (warped or otherwise). However, I bet heavily against such an outcome. Putin may temporize, negotiating while still advancing. IMO he will instead go "hard line" initially to see if the west folds immediately and gives him Ukraine either directly through negotiations or indirectly by stopping aid. He isn't worried that "the west" will massively step up aid and remove restrictions on weapons use because he is virtually certain we do not have the political will to do that. Succeeding in such an approach would also deliver him a badly needed international and domestic boost in prestige. This is for the US a "worst case" scenario, and it is within his grasp. It would also put him as the "alpha dog" with respect to the US administration, another significant "win". Hard to see him backing down now.

[TrumpCard]

I have doubts about the incoming administration's will to devote tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine.  I am more optimistic that the incoming administration will remove restrictions on use of American military equipment and munitions.  "Take the gloves off" seems to be the mantra.  On a related note, I've read that Russia has 50,000 troops amassed near Kursk.  I wonder whether Ukraine would be able to inflict significant damage on that troop concentration if the U.S. quietly removed that restriction now.

[TrumpCard]

I have doubts about the incoming administration's will to devote tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine.  I am more optimistic that the incoming administration will remove restrictions on use of American military equipment and munitions.  "Take the gloves off" seems to be the mantra.  On a related note, I've read that Russia has 50,000 troops amassed near Kursk.  I wonder whether Ukraine would be able to inflict significant damage on that troop concentration if the U.S. quietly removed that restriction now.

[Goose]

I have doubts about the incoming administration's will to devote tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine.  I am more optimistic that the incoming administration will remove restrictions on use of American military equipment and munitions.  "Take the gloves off" seems to be the mantra.  On a related note, I've read that Russia has 50,000 troops amassed near Kursk.  I wonder whether Ukraine would be able to inflict significant damage on that troop concentration if the U.S. quietly removed that restriction now.

Not unless a very large number of cluster munitions were involved. The US and "the west" in general have not provided any cluster munitions with adequate range to reach the city of Kursk. Systems like Storm Shadow and ATACMS are "precision strike" weapons designed to destroy "high value" point targets. Their warheads are not suited to anti-personnel operation and there are far too few of them to compensate for the mismatch with sheer numbers. A real "air strike" could fatally degrade such a troop concentration because a very large number of munitions could be delivered almost simultaneously against an "area target". Ukraine can't do that. HIMARS firing cluster munitions was designed to do exactly this kind of mission, but not at long ranges. Artillery firing DPICM can do the same, but again, the range is too short.

"Taking the gloves off" would allow Ukraine to hit targets like ammunition dumps and other logistics concentrations where a single missile/a few missiles can do a lot of damage. It can really make things more difficult for Russia. Of course, after a month or so when Ukraine runs out of missiles, it becomes irrelevant.

[Goose]

I have doubts about the incoming administration's will to devote tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine.  I am more optimistic that the incoming administration will remove restrictions on use of American military equipment and munitions.  "Take the gloves off" seems to be the mantra.  On a related note, I've read that Russia has 50,000 troops amassed near Kursk.  I wonder whether Ukraine would be able to inflict significant damage on that troop concentration if the U.S. quietly removed that restriction now.

Not unless a very large number of cluster munitions were involved. The US and "the west" in general have not provided any cluster munitions with adequate range to reach the city of Kursk. Systems like Storm Shadow and ATACMS are "precision strike" weapons designed to destroy "high value" point targets. Their warheads are not suited to anti-personnel operation and there are far too few of them to compensate for the mismatch with sheer numbers. A real "air strike" could fatally degrade such a troop concentration because a very large number of munitions could be delivered almost simultaneously against an "area target". Ukraine can't do that. HIMARS firing cluster munitions was designed to do exactly this kind of mission, but not at long ranges. Artillery firing DPICM can do the same, but again, the range is too short.

"Taking the gloves off" would allow Ukraine to hit targets like ammunition dumps and other logistics concentrations where a single missile/a few missiles can do a lot of damage. It can really make things more difficult for Russia. Of course, after a month or so when Ukraine runs out of missiles, it becomes irrelevant.

[TrumpCard]

I was holding out hope that the U.S. would continue to fund Ukraine's military and send equipment and munitions during the pendency of settlement negotiations at least.  I'm not sure that's warranted though.

[TrumpCard]

I was holding out hope that the U.S. would continue to fund Ukraine's military and send equipment and munitions during the pendency of settlement negotiations at least.  I'm not sure that's warranted though.

[Goose]

I was holding out hope that the U.S. would continue to fund Ukraine's military and send equipment and munitions during the pendency of settlement negotiations at least.  I'm not sure that's warranted though.

It would make sense to do that. If we don't the "negotiations" will be very short because Russia will simply overrun Ukraine and there will be nothing to "negotiate". The unfortunate truth is that Putin "knows" that the US wants to stop supplying Ukraine. So does Ukraine. As long as that is true all he has to do is wait the US out. IMO he will do that. No reason not to do so if you don't care how many Russians die in the interim.  There is no evidence Putin does.

It is much like the situation in Vietnam, Iraq, and most especially Afghanistan. Once the "Taliban" knows the US is fully committed to leaving the conflict, it is only necessary for them to wait until the US does. Perhaps it is a trend?

[Goose]

I was holding out hope that the U.S. would continue to fund Ukraine's military and send equipment and munitions during the pendency of settlement negotiations at least.  I'm not sure that's warranted though.

It would make sense to do that. If we don't the "negotiations" will be very short because Russia will simply overrun Ukraine and there will be nothing to "negotiate". The unfortunate truth is that Putin "knows" that the US wants to stop supplying Ukraine. So does Ukraine. As long as that is true all he has to do is wait the US out. IMO he will do that. No reason not to do so if you don't care how many Russians die in the interim.  There is no evidence Putin does.

It is much like the situation in Vietnam, Iraq, and most especially Afghanistan. Once the "Taliban" knows the US is fully committed to leaving the conflict, it is only necessary for them to wait until the US does. Perhaps it is a trend?

[Mick]

I was holding out hope that the U.S. would continue to fund Ukraine's military and send equipment and munitions during the pendency of settlement negotiations at least.  I'm not sure that's warranted though.

It would make sense to do that. If we don't the "negotiations" will be very short because Russia will simply overrun Ukraine and there will be nothing to "negotiate". The unfortunate truth is that Putin "knows" that the US wants to stop supplying Ukraine. So does Ukraine. As long as that is true all he has to do is wait the US out. IMO he will do that. No reason not to do so if you don't care how many Russians die in the interim.  There is no evidence Putin does.

It is much like the situation in Vietnam, Iraq, and most especially Afghanistan. Once the "Taliban" knows the US is fully committed to leaving the conflict, it is only necessary for them to wait until the US does. Perhaps it is a trend?

Only as long as isolationists are in power.

[Mick]

I was holding out hope that the U.S. would continue to fund Ukraine's military and send equipment and munitions during the pendency of settlement negotiations at least.  I'm not sure that's warranted though.

It would make sense to do that. If we don't the "negotiations" will be very short because Russia will simply overrun Ukraine and there will be nothing to "negotiate". The unfortunate truth is that Putin "knows" that the US wants to stop supplying Ukraine. So does Ukraine. As long as that is true all he has to do is wait the US out. IMO he will do that. No reason not to do so if you don't care how many Russians die in the interim.  There is no evidence Putin does.

It is much like the situation in Vietnam, Iraq, and most especially Afghanistan. Once the "Taliban" knows the US is fully committed to leaving the conflict, it is only necessary for them to wait until the US does. Perhaps it is a trend?

Only as long as isolationists are in power.

[GK3]

I was holding out hope that the U.S. would continue to fund Ukraine's military and send equipment and munitions during the pendency of settlement negotiations at least.  I'm not sure that's warranted though.

It would make sense to do that. If we don't the "negotiations" will be very short because Russia will simply overrun Ukraine and there will be nothing to "negotiate". The unfortunate truth is that Putin "knows" that the US wants to stop supplying Ukraine. So does Ukraine. As long as that is true all he has to do is wait the US out. IMO he will do that. No reason not to do so if you don't care how many Russians die in the interim.  There is no evidence Putin does.

It is much like the situation in Vietnam, Iraq, and most especially Afghanistan. Once the "Taliban" knows the US is fully committed to leaving the conflict, it is only necessary for them to wait until the US does. Perhaps it is a trend?

A very good point.  We are very good at getting involved and very poor at prosecuting the resulting conflict until we achieve our original objectives. Once the costs in terms of dollars and bodies is added up we start looking for a way to get out.  We end up getting out having achieved little if anything. Plus out military has slowly shrunk as you have pointed earlier to the point we probably could not prosecute two conflicts on opposite sides of the world. 
The Taliban is back in control of Afghanistan and Iraq is a mess.  
And now there is the possibility we will get dragged into the Israeli - Iran mess.  How will the Saudi's gradual reproachment with  Iran play out?  
There are lots of very complex issues the new administration will have to deal with.  It will NOT be easy.

[GK3]

I was holding out hope that the U.S. would continue to fund Ukraine's military and send equipment and munitions during the pendency of settlement negotiations at least.  I'm not sure that's warranted though.

It would make sense to do that. If we don't the "negotiations" will be very short because Russia will simply overrun Ukraine and there will be nothing to "negotiate". The unfortunate truth is that Putin "knows" that the US wants to stop supplying Ukraine. So does Ukraine. As long as that is true all he has to do is wait the US out. IMO he will do that. No reason not to do so if you don't care how many Russians die in the interim.  There is no evidence Putin does.

It is much like the situation in Vietnam, Iraq, and most especially Afghanistan. Once the "Taliban" knows the US is fully committed to leaving the conflict, it is only necessary for them to wait until the US does. Perhaps it is a trend?

A very good point.  We are very good at getting involved and very poor at prosecuting the resulting conflict until we achieve our original objectives. Once the costs in terms of dollars and bodies is added up we start looking for a way to get out.  We end up getting out having achieved little if anything. Plus out military has slowly shrunk as you have pointed earlier to the point we probably could not prosecute two conflicts on opposite sides of the world. 
The Taliban is back in control of Afghanistan and Iraq is a mess.  
And now there is the possibility we will get dragged into the Israeli - Iran mess.  How will the Saudi's gradual reproachment with  Iran play out?  
There are lots of very complex issues the new administration will have to deal with.  It will NOT be easy.

[Goose]

We are very good at getting involved and very poor at prosecuting the resulting conflict until we achieve our original objectives. Once the costs in terms of dollars and bodies is added up we start looking for a way to get out.  We end up getting out having achieved little if anything. Plus out military has slowly shrunk as you have pointed earlier to the point we probably could not prosecute two conflicts on opposite sides of the world. 
The Taliban is back in control of Afghanistan and Iraq is a mess.

Unfortunately it is even worse than that. We do a very poor job (in general) of defining our "original objectives". We then fail to determine if military force alone can deliver those objectives. Often it cannot, and a moment of examining the situation would make that obvious. Generally the additional necessary events are simply considered as inevitable or not considered at all. When the military reaches its desired objectives everyone is surprised that the overall objective is not met.

We then change our objective, often to something that is more ambitious than the original but make no actionable plan to achieve those new objectives. Additionally, there is often ongoing confusion and disagreement within the administration about what the "new" objectives are. The military is stuck there trying to accomplish some ill-defined goal that they are not resourced or trained for. They are used because they are there and nobody else has any idea what else to do.

This type of poor planning often accompanies "diplomatic offensives" as well. The "original objective" often is ill suited to a diplomatic resolution. When it becomes clear that diplomatic "success" hasn't and won't reach the objective, we re-define the objective. That often means removing the whole original objective and replacing it with something achievable, even though that new objective is totally useless.

There are also cases where the US is unable to reach its military objective due to constraints accepted at the beginning of the conflict. Oftentimes the military "red-team" review reveals this fact, but the civilian command chain simply ignores this and proceeds anyway. In a few cases the red-team review never happens (Iran hostage rescue). After many casualties the civilian leadership often removes constraints one at a time. Of course, by the time this process is complete many more casualties have been suffered and the correlation of forces may be so different it is no longer enough.

It must also be remembered that even if we have a well-reasoned and thoughtful plan, no plan survives the first contact with the enemy. It is therefore imperative that all the implicit and explicit assumptions that went into the original plan are well documented. When reality deviates from the plan the NCA can look at the assumptions and say "Which one(s) of these are wrong, what can we do to compensate, and is the resulting new plan viable?". There are also the "unknown unknowns" that crop up along the way. That is why military action is ALWAYS to be avoided if possible. There are too many unknowns.

There are many published critiques of all the recent military actions by the US in the last 34 or so years. In virtually all cases the criticism centers around the idea that the US didn't define a "desired end state". While I agree with this analysis in large part IMO there is a lot more to it than that. Unfortunately the Terry rule makes discussing those aspects impossible on this board. Suffice it to say we haven't got it right yet. Of course, others have the problem too. I guarantee you Putin never considered how he would be fighting in Ukraine three years after the invasion :-).

Diplomatic offensives have the same type of issues, but are less public. Diplomatic defeats do not leave behind them an immediate trail of bodies. The general public may not even be aware of them. However they too can create situations where military action at a great disadvantage becomes necessary. Our current involvement in Ukraine is diplomatic, not military. However, a failure to reach our desired objective (whatever that actually is)  can be just as damaging as losing a war. IMO it is too bad it has not been and continues not to be regarded that way.

And now there is the possibility we will get dragged into the Israeli - Iran mess.  How will the Saudi's gradual reproachment with  Iran play out?  
There are lots of very complex issues the new administration will have to deal with.  It will NOT be easy.

Yep.

[Goose]

We are very good at getting involved and very poor at prosecuting the resulting conflict until we achieve our original objectives. Once the costs in terms of dollars and bodies is added up we start looking for a way to get out.  We end up getting out having achieved little if anything. Plus out military has slowly shrunk as you have pointed earlier to the point we probably could not prosecute two conflicts on opposite sides of the world. 
The Taliban is back in control of Afghanistan and Iraq is a mess.

Unfortunately it is even worse than that. We do a very poor job (in general) of defining our "original objectives". We then fail to determine if military force alone can deliver those objectives. Often it cannot, and a moment of examining the situation would make that obvious. Generally the additional necessary events are simply considered as inevitable or not considered at all. When the military reaches its desired objectives everyone is surprised that the overall objective is not met.

We then change our objective, often to something that is more ambitious than the original but make no actionable plan to achieve those new objectives. Additionally, there is often ongoing confusion and disagreement within the administration about what the "new" objectives are. The military is stuck there trying to accomplish some ill-defined goal that they are not resourced or trained for. They are used because they are there and nobody else has any idea what else to do.

This type of poor planning often accompanies "diplomatic offensives" as well. The "original objective" often is ill suited to a diplomatic resolution. When it becomes clear that diplomatic "success" hasn't and won't reach the objective, we re-define the objective. That often means removing the whole original objective and replacing it with something achievable, even though that new objective is totally useless.

There are also cases where the US is unable to reach its military objective due to constraints accepted at the beginning of the conflict. Oftentimes the military "red-team" review reveals this fact, but the civilian command chain simply ignores this and proceeds anyway. In a few cases the red-team review never happens (Iran hostage rescue). After many casualties the civilian leadership often removes constraints one at a time. Of course, by the time this process is complete many more casualties have been suffered and the correlation of forces may be so different it is no longer enough.

It must also be remembered that even if we have a well-reasoned and thoughtful plan, no plan survives the first contact with the enemy. It is therefore imperative that all the implicit and explicit assumptions that went into the original plan are well documented. When reality deviates from the plan the NCA can look at the assumptions and say "Which one(s) of these are wrong, what can we do to compensate, and is the resulting new plan viable?". There are also the "unknown unknowns" that crop up along the way. That is why military action is ALWAYS to be avoided if possible. There are too many unknowns.

There are many published critiques of all the recent military actions by the US in the last 34 or so years. In virtually all cases the criticism centers around the idea that the US didn't define a "desired end state". While I agree with this analysis in large part IMO there is a lot more to it than that. Unfortunately the Terry rule makes discussing those aspects impossible on this board. Suffice it to say we haven't got it right yet. Of course, others have the problem too. I guarantee you Putin never considered how he would be fighting in Ukraine three years after the invasion :-).

Diplomatic offensives have the same type of issues, but are less public. Diplomatic defeats do not leave behind them an immediate trail of bodies. The general public may not even be aware of them. However they too can create situations where military action at a great disadvantage becomes necessary. Our current involvement in Ukraine is diplomatic, not military. However, a failure to reach our desired objective (whatever that actually is)  can be just as damaging as losing a war. IMO it is too bad it has not been and continues not to be regarded that way.

And now there is the possibility we will get dragged into the Israeli - Iran mess.  How will the Saudi's gradual reproachment with  Iran play out?  
There are lots of very complex issues the new administration will have to deal with.  It will NOT be easy.

Yep.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/opinion-biden...00383.html

Not sure what real "insight" based on actual facts (direct access) the book contains. The description given seems consistent with the observed external behavior. IMO giving Ukraine missiles that can reach well into Russia would be a prerequisite to Ukraine "winning". However, that would be far from sufficient. Several years ago the correlation of forces was such that the US could have provided Ukraine with the necessary equipment to defeat Russia. Russia was a mess militarily and was not reforming its military nor building up its military-industrial complex. They were flat-footed. The failure to win a quick, low-cost victory was not expected and there was no "Plan B".

Our failure to help Ukraine to build up quickly to win the war quickly has allowed the Russians to "wake up" and correct many of their deficiencies. They have allied themself with and received meaningful support from Iran and North Korea. This would have been unthinkable in 2022. The leadership of the Russian military has been replaced with one that is at least minimally competent. That was not the case in 2022. Russia is losing over 1,000 troops per day. It appears they are in a position where they can do that indefinitely.

Ukraine OTOH has also suffered very large personnel losses from an initial population that was much smaller than Russia. Ukraine still does not have a meaningful Air Force. Ukraine still lacks the ability to train troops in adequate quantities to increase their Army to the point they can "win" the war. Ukraine also cannot defend itself from the increasing Russian drone and missile attacks. Worse still, the VKS is finally playing a meaningful role in the war. This will only get worse as Ukraine has no answer.

The situation in Ukraine today is IMO a caricature of the situation between Germany and the USSR after the failure of Citadel (battle of Kursk). Of course, the current war involves a very tiny fraction of the forces used by both sides in the aftermath of Kursk. Ukraine, like Germany, has "lost" air superiority. Unlike Germany in 1943 Ukraine never had it. That is a major reason the Ukrainian offensive in 2023 failed. Russia can now strike Ukraine from the air and via missiles with Ukraine being unable to stop them. Like the Luftwaffe, Ukraine can defend and fight back, but it is a battle of attrition. Another critical difference is that neither side has a large effective mechanized force. In 2023 Russia did not have the 2.6 million men used in 1943. They didn't have 5 tank armies ready to exploit Ukraine's defeat in Zaporizhia. It is an infantry war unlike the WW II situation. Everything happens in "slow motion".

Some of the quotes from German sources in the aftermath of Citadel (by Robin Cross) sound exactly like what Ukrainian sources are saying today. The reason this is important is that we know how things went for the Ostheer going forward. If that is to be avoided, attention has to be paid to the precedent. Apparently (if one believes the above link) decisions were made that ignores this correlation of forces. It may be unlikely that the new administration will do better, but if it does not, the worst-case scenario will almost certainly ensue.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/opinion-biden...00383.html

Not sure what real "insight" based on actual facts (direct access) the book contains. The description given seems consistent with the observed external behavior. IMO giving Ukraine missiles that can reach well into Russia would be a prerequisite to Ukraine "winning". However, that would be far from sufficient. Several years ago the correlation of forces was such that the US could have provided Ukraine with the necessary equipment to defeat Russia. Russia was a mess militarily and was not reforming its military nor building up its military-industrial complex. They were flat-footed. The failure to win a quick, low-cost victory was not expected and there was no "Plan B".

Our failure to help Ukraine to build up quickly to win the war quickly has allowed the Russians to "wake up" and correct many of their deficiencies. They have allied themself with and received meaningful support from Iran and North Korea. This would have been unthinkable in 2022. The leadership of the Russian military has been replaced with one that is at least minimally competent. That was not the case in 2022. Russia is losing over 1,000 troops per day. It appears they are in a position where they can do that indefinitely.

Ukraine OTOH has also suffered very large personnel losses from an initial population that was much smaller than Russia. Ukraine still does not have a meaningful Air Force. Ukraine still lacks the ability to train troops in adequate quantities to increase their Army to the point they can "win" the war. Ukraine also cannot defend itself from the increasing Russian drone and missile attacks. Worse still, the VKS is finally playing a meaningful role in the war. This will only get worse as Ukraine has no answer.

The situation in Ukraine today is IMO a caricature of the situation between Germany and the USSR after the failure of Citadel (battle of Kursk). Of course, the current war involves a very tiny fraction of the forces used by both sides in the aftermath of Kursk. Ukraine, like Germany, has "lost" air superiority. Unlike Germany in 1943 Ukraine never had it. That is a major reason the Ukrainian offensive in 2023 failed. Russia can now strike Ukraine from the air and via missiles with Ukraine being unable to stop them. Like the Luftwaffe, Ukraine can defend and fight back, but it is a battle of attrition. Another critical difference is that neither side has a large effective mechanized force. In 2023 Russia did not have the 2.6 million men used in 1943. They didn't have 5 tank armies ready to exploit Ukraine's defeat in Zaporizhia. It is an infantry war unlike the WW II situation. Everything happens in "slow motion".

Some of the quotes from German sources in the aftermath of Citadel (by Robin Cross) sound exactly like what Ukrainian sources are saying today. The reason this is important is that we know how things went for the Ostheer going forward. If that is to be avoided, attention has to be paid to the precedent. Apparently (if one believes the above link) decisions were made that ignores this correlation of forces. It may be unlikely that the new administration will do better, but if it does not, the worst-case scenario will almost certainly ensue.

[BostonCard]

Looking back 20 years ago, Russia had about 4000 births per day, which you would expect would be about half male and half female.  If they are losing 1000 soldiers a day, that is basically half the male population coming of age every year killed or wounded, plus however many Russians leave so as to avoid the war.  So, mathematically, yes, they can continue the fight indefinitely, though it will leave a brobdingnagian demographic hole.

Of course, the effect is even more substantial for Ukraine; their fighting age male population (18 to 40) is about 1/4 that of Russia, so unless they are able to inflict a 4:1 casualty ratio, their prospects are worse than Russia's.

BC

[BostonCard]

Looking back 20 years ago, Russia had about 4000 births per day, which you would expect would be about half male and half female.  If they are losing 1000 soldiers a day, that is basically half the male population coming of age every year killed or wounded, plus however many Russians leave so as to avoid the war.  So, mathematically, yes, they can continue the fight indefinitely, though it will leave a brobdingnagian demographic hole.

Of course, the effect is even more substantial for Ukraine; their fighting age male population (18 to 40) is about 1/4 that of Russia, so unless they are able to inflict a 4:1 casualty ratio, their prospects are worse than Russia's.

BC