[Goose]

As an interesting counterpoint to this discussion, I recall watching the Oregon-Nebraska game in Helfrich's final season.  Maybe some of this decision-making led to his demise at the end of 2016.  Oregon and Nebraska each scored five TDs.  Helfrich went for two after each TD, while Nebraska always kicked the extra point.  Oregon converted 1 out of 5 (very poor percentage conversion), while Nebraska made all their kicks.  The logical result: Nebraska 35 -- Oregon 32.  Oregon needed a FG to tie, but could not get into range in the final 2:29 of the game.

I agree this is an interesting example. It shows that "the right thing to do" cannot always be classified as aggressive or as conservative. As I recall, Oregon had real kicking issues that year. The PAT was not by any means a "sure thing". Helfrich decided that the "expected value" of a two-point conversion was greater than the "expected value" of attempting a kick. Was he wrong? Possibly, but also possibly not. One problem with probability is that it "works" over a large number of attempts, but not necessarily over a small number, like 5. If Oregon converts on 3 out of 5, Helfrich is a genius. It may be that NOT kicking was more "conservative" if you can't kick worth a darn.
Similarly, Leach continuing to pass when he has the lead may not be "aggressive". It may just be that those are the plays they execute well. Running the ball just isn't in their skill set (at least in the past.). The coach will do what he feels is the "safest" course of action, even if that appears to be aggressive. That is the "conservative bias" we see in most "successful" coaches. It doesn't always work, but that is what most "successful" coaches do.

[Goose]

As an interesting counterpoint to this discussion, I recall watching the Oregon-Nebraska game in Helfrich's final season.  Maybe some of this decision-making led to his demise at the end of 2016.  Oregon and Nebraska each scored five TDs.  Helfrich went for two after each TD, while Nebraska always kicked the extra point.  Oregon converted 1 out of 5 (very poor percentage conversion), while Nebraska made all their kicks.  The logical result: Nebraska 35 -- Oregon 32.  Oregon needed a FG to tie, but could not get into range in the final 2:29 of the game.

I agree this is an interesting example. It shows that "the right thing to do" cannot always be classified as aggressive or as conservative. As I recall, Oregon had real kicking issues that year. The PAT was not by any means a "sure thing". Helfrich decided that the "expected value" of a two-point conversion was greater than the "expected value" of attempting a kick. Was he wrong? Possibly, but also possibly not. One problem with probability is that it "works" over a large number of attempts, but not necessarily over a small number, like 5. If Oregon converts on 3 out of 5, Helfrich is a genius. It may be that NOT kicking was more "conservative" if you can't kick worth a darn.
Similarly, Leach continuing to pass when he has the lead may not be "aggressive". It may just be that those are the plays they execute well. Running the ball just isn't in their skill set (at least in the past.). The coach will do what he feels is the "safest" course of action, even if that appears to be aggressive. That is the "conservative bias" we see in most "successful" coaches. It doesn't always work, but that is what most "successful" coaches do.