[BostonCard]

That matches my thinking. I additionally think that it would have had very minimal effect on decision making at the national level, because the total number of cases detected from community spread would not, of themselves, been of such a large number that a national reaction could be politically justified.

I pulled the data from the Oxford Stringency Index comparing the US (teal) versus the German (red) response:



You can see that until mid-March, Germany was ahead of the US in terms of response (the stringency index was higher in Germany than the US until March 15).  But you can also see that during this time, we are talking about sub-lockdown levels of stringency (the index is under 30% for both countries) and that is what seems to have made a difference.  The numbers represent the number of cases and number of deaths on each day that the stringency index was increased.  Two things are pretty clear from the data: 1) Germany responded earlier and at an earlier stage in the pandemic than the United States and two, because of widespread testing, Germany saw its cases earlier (before deaths) in the course of the pandemic than the United States (they had identified 900+ cases before the first death), while at a similar number of cases, the United States had already recorded 28 deaths.

With testing as widespread as Germany had, we probably would have seen 5000 known cases by the middle of the first week in March, and I do think that our response might have been more vigorous.  Obviously, it is easy to look at this in retrospect, and it is possible that the German experience would not have translated to the US.  However, my view at this data (and also comparing New York and California, and even the Bay Area to Los Angeles), makes me think the key was not necessarily getting the shelter-in-place order in, but instituting lower intensity restrictions like limiting large gatherings (that prevent super-spreader events) from happening.  And I think that seeing hundreds, if not thousands of cases in that critical first week in March might have been enough to prompt Cuomo and De Blasio to be more aggressive in New York (a little prompting from Trump and [especially] Faucci might have nudged them as well).  Remember, on March 3 there were still only 2 diagnosed cases and no deaths in New York, even though there were almost certainly hundreds of cases walking around.

BC

[BostonCard]

That matches my thinking. I additionally think that it would have had very minimal effect on decision making at the national level, because the total number of cases detected from community spread would not, of themselves, been of such a large number that a national reaction could be politically justified.

I pulled the data from the Oxford Stringency Index comparing the US (teal) versus the German (red) response:



You can see that until mid-March, Germany was ahead of the US in terms of response (the stringency index was higher in Germany than the US until March 15).  But you can also see that during this time, we are talking about sub-lockdown levels of stringency (the index is under 30% for both countries) and that is what seems to have made a difference.  The numbers represent the number of cases and number of deaths on each day that the stringency index was increased.  Two things are pretty clear from the data: 1) Germany responded earlier and at an earlier stage in the pandemic than the United States and two, because of widespread testing, Germany saw its cases earlier (before deaths) in the course of the pandemic than the United States (they had identified 900+ cases before the first death), while at a similar number of cases, the United States had already recorded 28 deaths.

With testing as widespread as Germany had, we probably would have seen 5000 known cases by the middle of the first week in March, and I do think that our response might have been more vigorous.  Obviously, it is easy to look at this in retrospect, and it is possible that the German experience would not have translated to the US.  However, my view at this data (and also comparing New York and California, and even the Bay Area to Los Angeles), makes me think the key was not necessarily getting the shelter-in-place order in, but instituting lower intensity restrictions like limiting large gatherings (that prevent super-spreader events) from happening.  And I think that seeing hundreds, if not thousands of cases in that critical first week in March might have been enough to prompt Cuomo and De Blasio to be more aggressive in New York (a little prompting from Trump and [especially] Faucci might have nudged them as well).  Remember, on March 3 there were still only 2 diagnosed cases and no deaths in New York, even though there were almost certainly hundreds of cases walking around.

BC