[BostonCard]

I agree that for a solid first round pick, the current incentive structure strongly pushes players to enter the NBA draft.  I certainly can't blame a potential lottery pick or even a mid-first-round pick for going pro, and it's why I think it makes sense to be cautious with clear one-and-done players.  That doesn't mean you don't recruit them, but rather that you recruit them selectively (for example, if you have a strong core and you think a one-and-done can take the team to the next level).  It does not seem to be prudent to try to build your team around one-and-dones.

The calculus is different for marginal first round picks or second round picks.  These are players who might be able to improve their draft stock by staying and developing as college players.  Maybe they improve their mid-range jumper, or their range or address a perceived weakness and go from marginal first round picks to mid-first round picks, which is not insubstantial.  The 30th pick in the draft gets an average of $1.7 million a year.  The 15th pick in the draft gets close to $3 million a year.  And of course, a second round pick doesn't get a guaranteed contract. 

So, as a coach, you have to be able to convince a player that the value of moving up in the draft exceeds the risk and opportunity cost.  So far, our coach has not been able to make the case that guys like Okpala and Terry would have benefited from staying at Stanford another year, even though they were in that marginal area (late first round, early second) where there was the greatest potential to move up.  To me, that is a failing.

My model for all of this is the 2018 Villanova national championship team.  Four of its players were drafted to the NBA, but none of them were first year players; in fact Mikal Bridges, who was eventually picked 10th, was a redshirt junior (fourth year player).

BC

[BostonCard]

I agree that for a solid first round pick, the current incentive structure strongly pushes players to enter the NBA draft.  I certainly can't blame a potential lottery pick or even a mid-first-round pick for going pro, and it's why I think it makes sense to be cautious with clear one-and-done players.  That doesn't mean you don't recruit them, but rather that you recruit them selectively (for example, if you have a strong core and you think a one-and-done can take the team to the next level).  It does not seem to be prudent to try to build your team around one-and-dones.

The calculus is different for marginal first round picks or second round picks.  These are players who might be able to improve their draft stock by staying and developing as college players.  Maybe they improve their mid-range jumper, or their range or address a perceived weakness and go from marginal first round picks to mid-first round picks, which is not insubstantial.  The 30th pick in the draft gets an average of $1.7 million a year.  The 15th pick in the draft gets close to $3 million a year.  And of course, a second round pick doesn't get a guaranteed contract. 

So, as a coach, you have to be able to convince a player that the value of moving up in the draft exceeds the risk and opportunity cost.  So far, our coach has not been able to make the case that guys like Okpala and Terry would have benefited from staying at Stanford another year, even though they were in that marginal area (late first round, early second) where there was the greatest potential to move up.  To me, that is a failing.

My model for all of this is the 2018 Villanova national championship team.  Four of its players were drafted to the NBA, but none of them were first year players; in fact Mikal Bridges, who was eventually picked 10th, was a redshirt junior (fourth year player).

BC