Thoughtful post, Goose. Thanks.
But I do have a different read. I think your post ascribes too much grand strategy to Shaw's offensive "successes," credits far too much of the causal story to the offense period (including any ball control aspects), underestimates the defenses (including the depth) of the best years, and confuses correlation with causation (for instance by thinking the way we ran the offensive railroad was pivotal to our success whereas I think a good case can be made that any number of offensive strategies would have worked given the defenses we had).
Here's the fundamental thing I think your post gets wrong: Shaw's glory years were mostly about defense. The 2012 Rose Bowl team, 2013 Rose Bowl team, 2014 Foster Farms Bowl team, and 2016 Sun Bowl team all had significantly better defenses than offenses. Only twice post-Luck have we won because of our offense rather than despite it (2015 and 2017). In 2012 we had the #52 offense and finished #6 in the AP poll. In 2013 we had the #30 offense and finished #10 in the AP poll. In 2014 we had the #45 offense and finished unranked but top 25 in computer polls. In 2016 we had the #78 offense and finished #12 in the AP poll.
The story of David Shaw at Stanford: the best years in Stanford history due to the best defenses in Stanford history and then, once the defense regressed, so did Shaw (the senior years of Luck and Hogan complicate this, which is why I tend to also focus on the ability of Shawfense to succeed when QB/OL seniority align). His offenses have been bad relative to talent the vast majority of the time (giving him 2011, 2015, and 2017). When he's had a sublime confluence of offensive talent and circumstances, the offense has been great....two and a half times (2017 once Costello in can count as a half) in 11 years. But I have trouble with narratives about what made Stanford succeed in its best years that suggest it had very much to do with offensive design when the vast majority of our successful years were despite the offense rather than because of it. Imagine the 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016 teams with top 25 offenses. Filthy.
But I do have a different read. I think your post ascribes too much grand strategy to Shaw's offensive "successes," credits far too much of the causal story to the offense period (including any ball control aspects), underestimates the defenses (including the depth) of the best years, and confuses correlation with causation (for instance by thinking the way we ran the offensive railroad was pivotal to our success whereas I think a good case can be made that any number of offensive strategies would have worked given the defenses we had).
Here's the fundamental thing I think your post gets wrong: Shaw's glory years were mostly about defense. The 2012 Rose Bowl team, 2013 Rose Bowl team, 2014 Foster Farms Bowl team, and 2016 Sun Bowl team all had significantly better defenses than offenses. Only twice post-Luck have we won because of our offense rather than despite it (2015 and 2017). In 2012 we had the #52 offense and finished #6 in the AP poll. In 2013 we had the #30 offense and finished #10 in the AP poll. In 2014 we had the #45 offense and finished unranked but top 25 in computer polls. In 2016 we had the #78 offense and finished #12 in the AP poll.
The story of David Shaw at Stanford: the best years in Stanford history due to the best defenses in Stanford history and then, once the defense regressed, so did Shaw (the senior years of Luck and Hogan complicate this, which is why I tend to also focus on the ability of Shawfense to succeed when QB/OL seniority align). His offenses have been bad relative to talent the vast majority of the time (giving him 2011, 2015, and 2017). When he's had a sublime confluence of offensive talent and circumstances, the offense has been great....two and a half times (2017 once Costello in can count as a half) in 11 years. But I have trouble with narratives about what made Stanford succeed in its best years that suggest it had very much to do with offensive design when the vast majority of our successful years were despite the offense rather than because of it. Imagine the 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016 teams with top 25 offenses. Filthy.