[Goose]

Thoughtful post, Goose. Thanks.

But I do have a different read. I think your post ascribes too much grand strategy to Shaw's offensive "successes," credits far too much of the causal story to the offense period (including any ball control aspects), underestimates the defenses (including the depth) of the best years, and confuses correlation with causation (for instance by thinking the way we ran the offensive railroad was pivotal to our success whereas I think a good case can be made that any number of offensive strategies would have worked given the defenses we had).

Here's the fundamental thing I think your post gets wrong: Shaw's glory years were mostly about defense. The 2012 Rose Bowl team, 2013 Rose Bowl team, 2014 Foster Farms Bowl team, and 2016 Sun Bowl team all had significantly better defenses than offenses. Only twice post-Luck have we won because of our offense rather than despite it (2015 and 2017). In 2012 we had the #52 offense and finished #6 in the AP poll. In 2013 we had the #30 offense and finished #10 in the AP poll. In 2014 we had the #45 offense and finished unranked but top 25 in computer polls. In 2016 we had the #78 offense and finished #12 in the AP poll.

The story of David Shaw at Stanford: the best years in Stanford history due to the best defenses in Stanford history and then, once the defense regressed, so did Shaw (the senior years of Luck and Hogan complicate this, which is why I tend to also focus on the ability of Shawfense to succeed when QB/OL seniority align). His offenses have been bad relative to talent the vast majority of the time (giving him 2011, 2015, and 2017). When he's had a sublime confluence of offensive talent and circumstances, the offense has been great....two and a half times (2017 once Costello in can count as a half) in 11 years. But I have trouble with narratives about what made Stanford succeed in its best years that suggest it had very much to do with offensive design when the vast majority of our successful years were despite the offense rather than because of it. Imagine the 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016 teams with top 25 offenses. Filthy.

I understand your point. However, both of us suffer from the fact Stanford had both an offense and a defense during the "better times". You argue the the success of these teams were due to the "best defenses in Stanford history". I argue that these defenses were the best in Stanford history largely because they didn't have to defend as many drives ("play a whole game") as previous defenses had to. You state that when the defense regressed, so did Shaw, except when he didn't.

I think your definition of "successful defense" is, understandably, based on the statistics they racked up. What else is there? However, I think if you looked at the personnel these defenses had, they were characterized by a few very successful players that arguably played "over their head" relative to what they did later. I don't recall many writers (FWIW) gushing over our defensive personnel and saying that the defense was the strength of the team. My argument is that their statistical success was possible because they didn't have to spend that much time on the field, and when they did, their results were not nearly as good. "Does Stanford have an Oregon problem". Yes, we did. And we changed both the defense and offense to address it. Obviously, the problem is what caused what. Correlation by itself does imply causation, but when their is a clear mechanism for said causation it is difficult to argue there is none. 

To your hypothetical of what would have happened if some of these statistically good defenses were paired with a "top 25 offense" (say a wide open one), I believe we would have seen defenses that did not grade out very well, particularly in the second half of games and the second half of the season. Shaw offenses didn't have the offensive statistics partly because if the defense turned in a couple of stops while we were ahead in the second half, it was turtle time. Why? Because that was the best way to win. Could Stanford's offenses under Shaw put up better numbers if they paid no attention to protecting our defense? Yes, probably. Would they have put up numbers that won more games? No way to know, but I don't think so.

Since there is no way to decouple the performance of the two units, there can never be a definitive answer to the question of which factor caused the most effects. It is always a synergy. One goal of good coaching is to maximize the sum of the parts, not each one individually. For sure Stanford's more successful years required a defense that had better talent and played "better" than most previous Stanford defenses. I admit that I am affected by the many years where Stanford had extremely dynamic and successful offenses and still lost many games late because the associated defenses couldn't stop anybody reliably. As Chip said, "Shane Skov is a very good football player". Stanford's defenses were better manned in those years than they are today. But, as was pointed out at the time, despite the fact Stanford led the country in rushing defense, their  two very talented ILBs were not considered fast enough. How much difference did it make that they didn't have to play as many snaps?

[Goose]

Thoughtful post, Goose. Thanks.

But I do have a different read. I think your post ascribes too much grand strategy to Shaw's offensive "successes," credits far too much of the causal story to the offense period (including any ball control aspects), underestimates the defenses (including the depth) of the best years, and confuses correlation with causation (for instance by thinking the way we ran the offensive railroad was pivotal to our success whereas I think a good case can be made that any number of offensive strategies would have worked given the defenses we had).

Here's the fundamental thing I think your post gets wrong: Shaw's glory years were mostly about defense. The 2012 Rose Bowl team, 2013 Rose Bowl team, 2014 Foster Farms Bowl team, and 2016 Sun Bowl team all had significantly better defenses than offenses. Only twice post-Luck have we won because of our offense rather than despite it (2015 and 2017). In 2012 we had the #52 offense and finished #6 in the AP poll. In 2013 we had the #30 offense and finished #10 in the AP poll. In 2014 we had the #45 offense and finished unranked but top 25 in computer polls. In 2016 we had the #78 offense and finished #12 in the AP poll.

The story of David Shaw at Stanford: the best years in Stanford history due to the best defenses in Stanford history and then, once the defense regressed, so did Shaw (the senior years of Luck and Hogan complicate this, which is why I tend to also focus on the ability of Shawfense to succeed when QB/OL seniority align). His offenses have been bad relative to talent the vast majority of the time (giving him 2011, 2015, and 2017). When he's had a sublime confluence of offensive talent and circumstances, the offense has been great....two and a half times (2017 once Costello in can count as a half) in 11 years. But I have trouble with narratives about what made Stanford succeed in its best years that suggest it had very much to do with offensive design when the vast majority of our successful years were despite the offense rather than because of it. Imagine the 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016 teams with top 25 offenses. Filthy.

I understand your point. However, both of us suffer from the fact Stanford had both an offense and a defense during the "better times". You argue the the success of these teams were due to the "best defenses in Stanford history". I argue that these defenses were the best in Stanford history largely because they didn't have to defend as many drives ("play a whole game") as previous defenses had to. You state that when the defense regressed, so did Shaw, except when he didn't.

I think your definition of "successful defense" is, understandably, based on the statistics they racked up. What else is there? However, I think if you looked at the personnel these defenses had, they were characterized by a few very successful players that arguably played "over their head" relative to what they did later. I don't recall many writers (FWIW) gushing over our defensive personnel and saying that the defense was the strength of the team. My argument is that their statistical success was possible because they didn't have to spend that much time on the field, and when they did, their results were not nearly as good. "Does Stanford have an Oregon problem". Yes, we did. And we changed both the defense and offense to address it. Obviously, the problem is what caused what. Correlation by itself does imply causation, but when their is a clear mechanism for said causation it is difficult to argue there is none. 

To your hypothetical of what would have happened if some of these statistically good defenses were paired with a "top 25 offense" (say a wide open one), I believe we would have seen defenses that did not grade out very well, particularly in the second half of games and the second half of the season. Shaw offenses didn't have the offensive statistics partly because if the defense turned in a couple of stops while we were ahead in the second half, it was turtle time. Why? Because that was the best way to win. Could Stanford's offenses under Shaw put up better numbers if they paid no attention to protecting our defense? Yes, probably. Would they have put up numbers that won more games? No way to know, but I don't think so.

Since there is no way to decouple the performance of the two units, there can never be a definitive answer to the question of which factor caused the most effects. It is always a synergy. One goal of good coaching is to maximize the sum of the parts, not each one individually. For sure Stanford's more successful years required a defense that had better talent and played "better" than most previous Stanford defenses. I admit that I am affected by the many years where Stanford had extremely dynamic and successful offenses and still lost many games late because the associated defenses couldn't stop anybody reliably. As Chip said, "Shane Skov is a very good football player". Stanford's defenses were better manned in those years than they are today. But, as was pointed out at the time, despite the fact Stanford led the country in rushing defense, their  two very talented ILBs were not considered fast enough. How much difference did it make that they didn't have to play as many snaps?