[dabigv13]

This is a really cool video (watch it frame by frame especially seconds 3 thru 5), where you can see a likely Smart 155mm German arty round, which has submunitions on parachutes that float down and then fire a round straight down through the roof of enemy armor. Hope the Germans sent a lot!

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1543177005658685440?s=20&t=3mtBdS4PV6JHiWZjAa9g4Q[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

This is a really cool video (watch it frame by frame especially seconds 3 thru 5), where you can see a likely Smart 155mm German arty round, which has submunitions on parachutes that float down and then fire a round straight down through the roof of enemy armor. Hope the Germans sent a lot!

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1543177005658685440?s=20&t=3mtBdS4PV6JHiWZjAa9g4Q[/tweet]

[Goose]

I have been following the NASAMS promised to the Ukraine. https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-send-ukrai...11145.html states that the contracts to buy these systems will be finalized in the next "weeks or months". That by itself is very concerning, because if the systems are to be a "new build", it would be next year sometime (at best) they would be delivered. However, I have seen elsewhere that the systems are actually out of Norwegian stocks (unclear if stored old model 1 or if "current" model). If true, that would mean the contractual delay is a detail. Hopefully training is going on right now and these systems can be deployed "soon". https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/uk...m-transfer

I have also been looking as carefully as possible at the capabilities of these systems and have attempted to determine how much they could help defend the civilian population of particularly Odesa. Obviously, there are lots of technical information that is not public regarding both the NASAMS and the potential targets. An interesting document is https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/0...mpq_64.pdf. It gives a few "hard facts" that are useful.

Not wanting to bore people with the analysis I did, I have concluded that my initial take was somewhat pessimistic regarding the ability of this system to defeat Kalibr cruise missiles. The bottom line is that a NASAMS radar sitting on the dock in Odesa harbor can probably defend very well a strip of coastline about 50 km in length from Kalibr missiles. This is better than I expected. The Russians can bring their missiles feet dry outside that strip and attack from the "back side", but that is harder and has it's risks from other weapons.

The bad news is that the NASAMS operating autonomously is virtually useless against the KH-22 and similar high speed/high altitude missiles (which I already had conjectured but now I am pretty sure). Some major contributors to this conclusion are 1) the "donut hole" at above 55 degrees elevation, 2) the time and kinetic energy it takes an AMRAM to reach 27 km altitude, and 3) the very short time available to develop a firing solution even in "best case" conditions.

FWIW, this Russian reached similar conclusions

[tweet]https://twitter.com/KomissarWhipla/status/1542862992466972672?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1542862992466972672%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fukraine-situation-report-u-s-confirms-nasams-air-defense-system-transfer[/tweet]

If you read the full tweet, I think his statement that Russia will spare no effort to take out these systems ASAP for propaganda reasons is true. I think his belief that Ukraine would attempt to hide the system in urban areas is simply silly. The MPQ-64 needs a clear view in all directions and elevations to do it's job. You can't hide it in the city. That is in fact the problem. The Russians should have no problem at all geolocating these radars. Of course, that is also true of the radars used by the S-300 systems, which are still mostly operating it seems. Ukraine seems to know how to keep the pea moving. Let's hope that continues.

It is also true that a "recent" NASAMS can be controlled from "offboard sensors" (like possibly an AWACS flying over NATO territory) that could track the inbound high flyers and engage them remotely (if this were allowed). Just something to think about.

[Goose]

I have been following the NASAMS promised to the Ukraine. https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-send-ukrai...11145.html states that the contracts to buy these systems will be finalized in the next "weeks or months". That by itself is very concerning, because if the systems are to be a "new build", it would be next year sometime (at best) they would be delivered. However, I have seen elsewhere that the systems are actually out of Norwegian stocks (unclear if stored old model 1 or if "current" model). If true, that would mean the contractual delay is a detail. Hopefully training is going on right now and these systems can be deployed "soon". https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/uk...m-transfer

I have also been looking as carefully as possible at the capabilities of these systems and have attempted to determine how much they could help defend the civilian population of particularly Odesa. Obviously, there are lots of technical information that is not public regarding both the NASAMS and the potential targets. An interesting document is https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/0...mpq_64.pdf. It gives a few "hard facts" that are useful.

Not wanting to bore people with the analysis I did, I have concluded that my initial take was somewhat pessimistic regarding the ability of this system to defeat Kalibr cruise missiles. The bottom line is that a NASAMS radar sitting on the dock in Odesa harbor can probably defend very well a strip of coastline about 50 km in length from Kalibr missiles. This is better than I expected. The Russians can bring their missiles feet dry outside that strip and attack from the "back side", but that is harder and has it's risks from other weapons.

The bad news is that the NASAMS operating autonomously is virtually useless against the KH-22 and similar high speed/high altitude missiles (which I already had conjectured but now I am pretty sure). Some major contributors to this conclusion are 1) the "donut hole" at above 55 degrees elevation, 2) the time and kinetic energy it takes an AMRAM to reach 27 km altitude, and 3) the very short time available to develop a firing solution even in "best case" conditions.

FWIW, this Russian reached similar conclusions

[tweet]https://twitter.com/KomissarWhipla/status/1542862992466972672?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1542862992466972672%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fukraine-situation-report-u-s-confirms-nasams-air-defense-system-transfer[/tweet]

If you read the full tweet, I think his statement that Russia will spare no effort to take out these systems ASAP for propaganda reasons is true. I think his belief that Ukraine would attempt to hide the system in urban areas is simply silly. The MPQ-64 needs a clear view in all directions and elevations to do it's job. You can't hide it in the city. That is in fact the problem. The Russians should have no problem at all geolocating these radars. Of course, that is also true of the radars used by the S-300 systems, which are still mostly operating it seems. Ukraine seems to know how to keep the pea moving. Let's hope that continues.

It is also true that a "recent" NASAMS can be controlled from "offboard sensors" (like possibly an AWACS flying over NATO territory) that could track the inbound high flyers and engage them remotely (if this were allowed). Just something to think about.

[BostonCard]

It looks like Lyshyshank has fallen, and with it, all of Luhansk.

https://www.npr.org/2022/07/03/110962535...bas-russia

I think it is a symbolically important victory for Russia.  Question is what happens next.

BC

[BostonCard]

It looks like Lyshyshank has fallen, and with it, all of Luhansk.

https://www.npr.org/2022/07/03/110962535...bas-russia

I think it is a symbolically important victory for Russia.  Question is what happens next.

BC

[Goose]

It looks like Lyshyshank has fallen, and with it, all of Luhansk.

https://www.npr.org/2022/07/03/110962535...bas-russia

I think it is a symbolically important victory for Russia.  Question is what happens next.

BC

Good question. The "answer" at one time seemed to be that once Luhansk Oblast was taken, switch to taking the Donetsk and tidy up the entire Donbas. The current Russian tactical system seems capable of doing that. How long it will take and at what cost is TBD. However, recent successes by Russia may have convinced them that an offensive deeper in the Northwest direction is feasible and that it would possibly cause the Ukraine to fold. They may try to take Izium and then Karkiv from the "back door". This is basically the wide envelopment but from the other direction. Or, being Russian, they may attempt both and reinforce the one that appears to be working. This third choice is IMHO most probable.

Russia will not sit still, but there may be a slight pause to redistribute forces. If they are going Northwest as a primary thrust, there will be much less of a pause because momentum is a consideration there. Russia will fight as hard as possible for at least the next two months. It isn't going to be an easy summer anywhere on the FEBA.

[Goose]

It looks like Lyshyshank has fallen, and with it, all of Luhansk.

https://www.npr.org/2022/07/03/110962535...bas-russia

I think it is a symbolically important victory for Russia.  Question is what happens next.

BC

Good question. The "answer" at one time seemed to be that once Luhansk Oblast was taken, switch to taking the Donetsk and tidy up the entire Donbas. The current Russian tactical system seems capable of doing that. How long it will take and at what cost is TBD. However, recent successes by Russia may have convinced them that an offensive deeper in the Northwest direction is feasible and that it would possibly cause the Ukraine to fold. They may try to take Izium and then Karkiv from the "back door". This is basically the wide envelopment but from the other direction. Or, being Russian, they may attempt both and reinforce the one that appears to be working. This third choice is IMHO most probable.

Russia will not sit still, but there may be a slight pause to redistribute forces. If they are going Northwest as a primary thrust, there will be much less of a pause because momentum is a consideration there. Russia will fight as hard as possible for at least the next two months. It isn't going to be an easy summer anywhere on the FEBA.

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/samramani2/status/1543731518727659522?s=21&t=xLWXtNPlI3IVP0EHK4igkA[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/samramani2/status/1543731518727659522?s=21&t=xLWXtNPlI3IVP0EHK4igkA[/tweet]

BC

[Goose]

https://twitter.com/samramani2/status/15...P0EHK4igkA

BC

It is a total of 12 jets. While definitely very welcome, it probably just replaces some of the losses. It will however allow Ukraine to continue control it's airspace in the West, which is critical to it's weapons supply.

UPDATE:
https://www.aviacionline.com/2022/07/bre...o-ukraine/ says that these MIGS are "updated".

Slovakia owns a dozen MiG-29SD, which as of 2005 received an upgrade to standardize them to NATO norms. The work was carried out by the RAC MiG manufacturer and Western companies.
This version features Rockwell Collins navigation and communication systems, a BAE Systems identification friend-of-the-friend (IFF) system, a new glass cockpit with LCD multifunction displays and a new digital mission computer.
These modifications allow the ex-Soviet MiG-29 aircraft to be integrated into NATO’s air command and control structure. However, their armament was not modernized and still uses the same type of missiles, inherited from when Czechoslovakia was part of the USSR.

This probably makes these aircraft incompatible with the Ukrainian IFF and communication systems. That is very un-good. They might find themselves being shot at by both sides. I expect the Ukraine is using IFF at least around it's airfields. Not being compatible is going to make you a target.

[Goose]

https://twitter.com/samramani2/status/15...P0EHK4igkA

BC

It is a total of 12 jets. While definitely very welcome, it probably just replaces some of the losses. It will however allow Ukraine to continue control it's airspace in the West, which is critical to it's weapons supply.

UPDATE:
https://www.aviacionline.com/2022/07/bre...o-ukraine/ says that these MIGS are "updated".

Slovakia owns a dozen MiG-29SD, which as of 2005 received an upgrade to standardize them to NATO norms. The work was carried out by the RAC MiG manufacturer and Western companies.
This version features Rockwell Collins navigation and communication systems, a BAE Systems identification friend-of-the-friend (IFF) system, a new glass cockpit with LCD multifunction displays and a new digital mission computer.
These modifications allow the ex-Soviet MiG-29 aircraft to be integrated into NATO’s air command and control structure. However, their armament was not modernized and still uses the same type of missiles, inherited from when Czechoslovakia was part of the USSR.

This probably makes these aircraft incompatible with the Ukrainian IFF and communication systems. That is very un-good. They might find themselves being shot at by both sides. I expect the Ukraine is using IFF at least around it's airfields. Not being compatible is going to make you a target.

[BostonCard]

Shot:

[tweet]https://twitter.com/_venus1nfurs_/status/1542961391346323463?s=21&t=NLH1IYz5v-pjI5B1sUo0xg[/tweet]

Chaser:
[tweet]https://twitter.com/sithgaylavrov/status/1544224345198927873?s=21&t=NLH1IYz5v-pjI5B1sUo0xg[/tweet]

LOL.

BC

---

On a more serious note, this comes from Ukrainian sources, so take it with a grain of salt but…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/flash43191300/status/1543481276266684417?s=21&t=NLH1IYz5v-pjI5B1sUo0xg[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

Shot:

[tweet]https://twitter.com/_venus1nfurs_/status/1542961391346323463?s=21&t=NLH1IYz5v-pjI5B1sUo0xg[/tweet]

Chaser:
[tweet]https://twitter.com/sithgaylavrov/status/1544224345198927873?s=21&t=NLH1IYz5v-pjI5B1sUo0xg[/tweet]

LOL.

BC

---

On a more serious note, this comes from Ukrainian sources, so take it with a grain of salt but…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/flash43191300/status/1543481276266684417?s=21&t=NLH1IYz5v-pjI5B1sUo0xg[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

It’s happening.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/axios/status/1544284361771606017?s=21&t=NLH1IYz5v-pjI5B1sUo0xg[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

It’s happening.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/axios/status/1544284361771606017?s=21&t=NLH1IYz5v-pjI5B1sUo0xg[/tweet]

BC

[Goose]

It’s happening.

https://twitter.com/axios/status/1544284...I5B1sUo0xg

BC

It is in process. It will happen. Don't be surprised if the Hungarian parliament requires several votes and some massaging to finally agree. There is domestic political hay to be made and some members may want to do that first. There are lots of pro-Russian MPs that may want to demonstrate that fact before eventually falling into line. Turkey is potentially still a bit of an issue. If for some reason they decide they aren't getting enough action on their agreements with Sweden and Finland, they could also be a temporary problem. At this point Turkey is almost certain to vote yes, but possibly after some more to and fro.

[Goose]

It’s happening.

https://twitter.com/axios/status/1544284...I5B1sUo0xg

BC

It is in process. It will happen. Don't be surprised if the Hungarian parliament requires several votes and some massaging to finally agree. There is domestic political hay to be made and some members may want to do that first. There are lots of pro-Russian MPs that may want to demonstrate that fact before eventually falling into line. Turkey is potentially still a bit of an issue. If for some reason they decide they aren't getting enough action on their agreements with Sweden and Finland, they could also be a temporary problem. At this point Turkey is almost certain to vote yes, but possibly after some more to and fro.

[BostonCard]

I don’t think that the Turkish and Hungarian NATO ambassadors vote in favor without endorsement of their respective prime ministers (Erdowan and Orban and Erdowan), and those guys would not allow their parliaments to vote against it, as it would demonstrate weakness.

BC

[BostonCard]

I don’t think that the Turkish and Hungarian NATO ambassadors vote in favor without endorsement of their respective prime ministers (Erdowan and Orban and Erdowan), and those guys would not allow their parliaments to vote against it, as it would demonstrate weakness.

BC

[Goose]

I don’t think that the Turkish and Hungarian NATO ambassadors vote in favor without endorsement of their respective prime ministers (Erdowan and Orban and Erdowan), and those guys would not allow their parliaments to vote against it, as it would demonstrate weakness.

BC

In the end the vote will be to admit. However, as far as demonstrating "weakness", I think quite the opposite. Orban would just say 'See, here in Hungary we have a democratic process and you can't take it for granted that we will go along. Our priorities are not necessarily your priorities".
If the parliamentary vote was supposed to be a "rubber stamp" for the government, why have it? The reason is to commit the populace, not just the current government, to the common defense of the new member. I can for sure see Orban postponing the vote to make this point. Hungary will undoubtedly go along in the end, but possibly with some delays.

Erdogan is a much more serious problem. He got what he thinks is a commitment from Sweden and Finland to do certain things. If he thinks he isn't getting what was agreed to, he is perfectly capable of raising a fuss, and that doesn't make him look weak at all. His people will lap it up. I wouldn't be amazed if the vote got "postponed" to "clear up some issues". Hopefully the vote happens quickly enough there won't be time to notice Sweden isn't extraditing anybody, or that Erdogan is willing to settle for lifting the arms embargo and tighter controls on the PKK.

[Goose]

I don’t think that the Turkish and Hungarian NATO ambassadors vote in favor without endorsement of their respective prime ministers (Erdowan and Orban and Erdowan), and those guys would not allow their parliaments to vote against it, as it would demonstrate weakness.

BC

In the end the vote will be to admit. However, as far as demonstrating "weakness", I think quite the opposite. Orban would just say 'See, here in Hungary we have a democratic process and you can't take it for granted that we will go along. Our priorities are not necessarily your priorities".
If the parliamentary vote was supposed to be a "rubber stamp" for the government, why have it? The reason is to commit the populace, not just the current government, to the common defense of the new member. I can for sure see Orban postponing the vote to make this point. Hungary will undoubtedly go along in the end, but possibly with some delays.

Erdogan is a much more serious problem. He got what he thinks is a commitment from Sweden and Finland to do certain things. If he thinks he isn't getting what was agreed to, he is perfectly capable of raising a fuss, and that doesn't make him look weak at all. His people will lap it up. I wouldn't be amazed if the vote got "postponed" to "clear up some issues". Hopefully the vote happens quickly enough there won't be time to notice Sweden isn't extraditing anybody, or that Erdogan is willing to settle for lifting the arms embargo and tighter controls on the PKK.

[BostonCard]

Hungary is a parliamentary system; Orban is the head of government and his party controls parliament. It is generally a problem in a parliamentary system if the government can’t get its agenda through.  Hell, the Israeli parliament dissolved because it couldn’t pass a routine bill.

Turkey is a presidential system, so in theory there is more independence between the parliament and Erdowan.  Technically, AKP doesn’t have a parliamentary majority, so he might be able to raise a fuss.

BC

[BostonCard]

Hungary is a parliamentary system; Orban is the head of government and his party controls parliament. It is generally a problem in a parliamentary system if the government can’t get its agenda through.  Hell, the Israeli parliament dissolved because it couldn’t pass a routine bill.

Turkey is a presidential system, so in theory there is more independence between the parliament and Erdowan.  Technically, AKP doesn’t have a parliamentary majority, so he might be able to raise a fuss.

BC

[Goose]

Hungary is a parliamentary system; Orban is the head of government and his party controls parliament. It is generally a problem in a parliamentary system if the government can’t get its agenda through.  Hell, the Israeli parliament dissolved because it couldn’t pass a routine bill.

If it is a "real" failure, that would be true. Symbolic failures are another thing. Orban would be in no danger of losing a confidence vote. If he and his party wants to make a point, they can just delay the vote saying they don't yet have a majority. Make people take notice of their "issues", let their pro-Russian MPs pontificate, then pass the membership. I point this out mostly to prevent people from being too concerned if it happens.

Turkey is a presidential system, so in theory there is more independence between the parliament and Erdowan.  Technically, AKP doesn’t have a parliamentary majority, so he might be able to raise a fuss.

BC

Erdoğan can make a fuss, as is clearly demonstrated by the fact he did exactly that initially. It really has little to do with the parliamentary majority. He can hold that vote hostage if he wishes. Hopefully, he won't decide he isn't getting what was "promised". The vote, when it happens, will be positive. Erdoğan can be more of a problem because right now he is pretty much an autocrat. The theoretical structure of his government doesn't mean much. Obviously over this issue that control won't be tested, but the fact it is there is a big reason why it won't be.

[Goose]

Hungary is a parliamentary system; Orban is the head of government and his party controls parliament. It is generally a problem in a parliamentary system if the government can’t get its agenda through.  Hell, the Israeli parliament dissolved because it couldn’t pass a routine bill.

If it is a "real" failure, that would be true. Symbolic failures are another thing. Orban would be in no danger of losing a confidence vote. If he and his party wants to make a point, they can just delay the vote saying they don't yet have a majority. Make people take notice of their "issues", let their pro-Russian MPs pontificate, then pass the membership. I point this out mostly to prevent people from being too concerned if it happens.

Turkey is a presidential system, so in theory there is more independence between the parliament and Erdowan.  Technically, AKP doesn’t have a parliamentary majority, so he might be able to raise a fuss.

BC

Erdoğan can make a fuss, as is clearly demonstrated by the fact he did exactly that initially. It really has little to do with the parliamentary majority. He can hold that vote hostage if he wishes. Hopefully, he won't decide he isn't getting what was "promised". The vote, when it happens, will be positive. Erdoğan can be more of a problem because right now he is pretty much an autocrat. The theoretical structure of his government doesn't mean much. Obviously over this issue that control won't be tested, but the fact it is there is a big reason why it won't be.

[Goose]

In fact, it does continue. This list of 73 that were "promised" is a big deal. Before, Erdoğan could claim victory because his "demands" were amorphous. Now they are concrete. He either does or does not get these folks. Not good at all. Frankly, I didn't expect he would allow himself to be tied to such a specific result, because I am virtually certain this he does not get. Sweden isn't going to ignore it's legal system because Erdoğan says so.
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/turkey-th...36139.html

[Goose]

In fact, it does continue. This list of 73 that were "promised" is a big deal. Before, Erdoğan could claim victory because his "demands" were amorphous. Now they are concrete. He either does or does not get these folks. Not good at all. Frankly, I didn't expect he would allow himself to be tied to such a specific result, because I am virtually certain this he does not get. Sweden isn't going to ignore it's legal system because Erdoğan says so.
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/turkey-th...36139.html

[TrumpCard]

Something is fishy here. The promise is a document that has words in it. Those words are not the same as the words in Erdogan’s purported statement today. The two sets of words are not synonymous or close to it. I wonder whether there’s an issue with the translation of today’s statement.

[TrumpCard]

Something is fishy here. The promise is a document that has words in it. Those words are not the same as the words in Erdogan’s purported statement today. The two sets of words are not synonymous or close to it. I wonder whether there’s an issue with the translation of today’s statement.

[Goose]

Something is fishy here. The promise is a document that has words in it. Those words are not the same as the words in Erdogan’s purported statement today. The two sets of words are not synonymous or close to it. I wonder whether there’s an issue with the translation of today’s statement.

Possible, but I think the reference to a specific number would be hard to explain as a translation error. I suspect it is more probable that this is something that Erdoğan brought up in the discussion but that was never explicitly agreed to or present in the documents that were signed. He may THINK he has such a promise, but actually never got it. IMHO it is more probable he knows full well Sweden didn't agree to that and is trying to force another concession because he believes he has the power to do so. I don't think he does have that power. The Swedes simply aren't going to ignore their laws. That is why this worries me so much. He is making it hard for himself to back down and I don't think Sweden will either.

[Goose]

Something is fishy here. The promise is a document that has words in it. Those words are not the same as the words in Erdogan’s purported statement today. The two sets of words are not synonymous or close to it. I wonder whether there’s an issue with the translation of today’s statement.

Possible, but I think the reference to a specific number would be hard to explain as a translation error. I suspect it is more probable that this is something that Erdoğan brought up in the discussion but that was never explicitly agreed to or present in the documents that were signed. He may THINK he has such a promise, but actually never got it. IMHO it is more probable he knows full well Sweden didn't agree to that and is trying to force another concession because he believes he has the power to do so. I don't think he does have that power. The Swedes simply aren't going to ignore their laws. That is why this worries me so much. He is making it hard for himself to back down and I don't think Sweden will either.

[BostonCard]

This may be a bit too tangential to merit much further discussion, but two members of Boris Johnson’s cabinet resigned, and most punters don’t give his premiership much longer to survive. Johnson has been one of the biggest supporters of Ukraine, and a useful counterbalance to some of the more tepid supporters (I’m looking at you, Germany). While I don’t think British policy would change much, it’s still not good.

Ditto the fact that Macron’s party in France failed to win a Parliamentary majority and that opposition parties from the far left and far right, both somewhat hostile to NATO, if not outright supportive of Russia, made big gains.

BC

[BostonCard]

This may be a bit too tangential to merit much further discussion, but two members of Boris Johnson’s cabinet resigned, and most punters don’t give his premiership much longer to survive. Johnson has been one of the biggest supporters of Ukraine, and a useful counterbalance to some of the more tepid supporters (I’m looking at you, Germany). While I don’t think British policy would change much, it’s still not good.

Ditto the fact that Macron’s party in France failed to win a Parliamentary majority and that opposition parties from the far left and far right, both somewhat hostile to NATO, if not outright supportive of Russia, made big gains.

BC

[TrumpCard]

Is the Conservative Party in danger in the UK, or just Johnson?  Given that Johnson effectuated Brexit, is he really that much of an internationalist?  Also, is Labour strong enough to mount a challenge, are elections soon, and is Starmer anti-NATO?  I don’t know much about current UK politics, but it seems implausible to me that the country would back down on helping Ukraine in the current environment.

[TrumpCard]

Is the Conservative Party in danger in the UK, or just Johnson?  Given that Johnson effectuated Brexit, is he really that much of an internationalist?  Also, is Labour strong enough to mount a challenge, are elections soon, and is Starmer anti-NATO?  I don’t know much about current UK politics, but it seems implausible to me that the country would back down on helping Ukraine in the current environment.

[BostonCard]

Defenestrating Johnson has no effect on conservative rule in the UK.  They had an election in 2019 that gave the conservatives a substantial majority.  The next election isn’t due until 2024, unless the parliament calls an early election by a 2/3 majority or has a no confidence vote for the PM (by simple majority).  I don’t think the current parliament would do so.

Despite Brexit, the UK is pretty internationalist, and one of the arguments for Brexit was that it would enable the UK to have a more global presence. It’s somewhat BS, but I don’t think the Torries or the moderate labour party (that is, the non-Corbin wing) would be a problem via a vis Ukraine.  I think it’s more that the turmoil caused by internal conservative politics might have the government take its eye off the ball, so to speak.

BC

[BostonCard]

Defenestrating Johnson has no effect on conservative rule in the UK.  They had an election in 2019 that gave the conservatives a substantial majority.  The next election isn’t due until 2024, unless the parliament calls an early election by a 2/3 majority or has a no confidence vote for the PM (by simple majority).  I don’t think the current parliament would do so.

Despite Brexit, the UK is pretty internationalist, and one of the arguments for Brexit was that it would enable the UK to have a more global presence. It’s somewhat BS, but I don’t think the Torries or the moderate labour party (that is, the non-Corbin wing) would be a problem via a vis Ukraine.  I think it’s more that the turmoil caused by internal conservative politics might have the government take its eye off the ball, so to speak.

BC

[Goose]

Amateurs talk strategy; professionals talk logistics.  Great thread about logistics:

https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1544...1FAt6m4n-g

BC

True, but if one is to talk logistics, they need to get the numbers right. This tweet does that in some areas but not others. The main problem is that he is using artillery ranges assuming the artillery is sitting right on the forward edge of the line of contact. If they do that, they won't last long, so they don't do that. The self-propelled units can dash forward, fire, then move. However, they aren't going to get so far forward that they are in range of direct fire (like tanks). If that happened, somebody messed up badly. This range error affects his logic, because it doesn't push the Russian dumps so far back they are beyond his notional truck range. For some reason he also ignored the M777 and Paladins, which fire exactly the same shells with the same accuracy. The reason that matters is that the number of self-propelled systems available in Ukraine that he does cite make their total effect relatively small. Not zero, but relatively small. When the rest of the Polish order arrives that will be much less so and will more than double (triple?) the available self-propelled tubes. However, they had over a hundred tubes including the M777, and that didn't do the trick. Lots of reasons for that, including the large area to be covered, but slightly inadequate range is also a big factor. The Russians can do the math and know how far back they have to put their dumps.

The HIMARS also isn't going to deploy all the way to the front lines, but there he has some "extra" range to play with. The HIMARS can indeed force the Russians to move their depots back away from their troops to the point logistics becomes very difficult. That is why Ukraine needed them months ago. The problem right now is that Ukraine has four of them, soon to become eight. With these small numbers, the Russians can indeed play "Russian Roulette" with their depots. They lose a few, but not so many they can't tolerate it. Different story if Ukraine had 50-100 HIMARS or equivalent.

If the Ukraine had HIMARS that was equipped with ATACMS they could fire on Russian logistics/ammunition rail trains while they were in transit. Kill it when it is maximally concentrated. IMHO it is crazy that we will give them systems that go 80 km but not ones that go 300 km. They can hit Russian territory just fine with either. We trust they won't do it with the short range ones but fear they will do it with the long range ones?

[Goose]

Amateurs talk strategy; professionals talk logistics.  Great thread about logistics:

https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1544...1FAt6m4n-g

BC

True, but if one is to talk logistics, they need to get the numbers right. This tweet does that in some areas but not others. The main problem is that he is using artillery ranges assuming the artillery is sitting right on the forward edge of the line of contact. If they do that, they won't last long, so they don't do that. The self-propelled units can dash forward, fire, then move. However, they aren't going to get so far forward that they are in range of direct fire (like tanks). If that happened, somebody messed up badly. This range error affects his logic, because it doesn't push the Russian dumps so far back they are beyond his notional truck range. For some reason he also ignored the M777 and Paladins, which fire exactly the same shells with the same accuracy. The reason that matters is that the number of self-propelled systems available in Ukraine that he does cite make their total effect relatively small. Not zero, but relatively small. When the rest of the Polish order arrives that will be much less so and will more than double (triple?) the available self-propelled tubes. However, they had over a hundred tubes including the M777, and that didn't do the trick. Lots of reasons for that, including the large area to be covered, but slightly inadequate range is also a big factor. The Russians can do the math and know how far back they have to put their dumps.

The HIMARS also isn't going to deploy all the way to the front lines, but there he has some "extra" range to play with. The HIMARS can indeed force the Russians to move their depots back away from their troops to the point logistics becomes very difficult. That is why Ukraine needed them months ago. The problem right now is that Ukraine has four of them, soon to become eight. With these small numbers, the Russians can indeed play "Russian Roulette" with their depots. They lose a few, but not so many they can't tolerate it. Different story if Ukraine had 50-100 HIMARS or equivalent.

If the Ukraine had HIMARS that was equipped with ATACMS they could fire on Russian logistics/ammunition rail trains while they were in transit. Kill it when it is maximally concentrated. IMHO it is crazy that we will give them systems that go 80 km but not ones that go 300 km. They can hit Russian territory just fine with either. We trust they won't do it with the short range ones but fear they will do it with the long range ones?