[DenverCard]

Just another average day in Russia:

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/cha...022-09-01/

[DenverCard]

Just another average day in Russia:

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/cha...022-09-01/

[CompSci87]

Just another average day in Russia:

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/cha...022-09-01/

That link didn't seem to work for me. I got a page with nothing but "More from Reuters" links and ads.

[CompSci87]

Just another average day in Russia:

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/cha...022-09-01/

That link didn't seem to work for me. I got a page with nothing but "More from Reuters" links and ads.

[DenverCard]

Sorry about the last link -- might have been behind a paywall that I somehow circumvented.

Try this:'

https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/01/top-russ...s-say.html

[DenverCard]

Sorry about the last link -- might have been behind a paywall that I somehow circumvented.

Try this:'

https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/01/top-russ...s-say.html

[dabigv13]

The Bayraktars are baaaaaaack!

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1565372183244951552?s=20&t=G7OAeazZiDTL6aC0bwHkfA[/tweet]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1565383263954378752?s=20&t=G7OAeazZiDTL6aC0bwHkfA[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

The Bayraktars are baaaaaaack!

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1565372183244951552?s=20&t=G7OAeazZiDTL6aC0bwHkfA[/tweet]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1565383263954378752?s=20&t=G7OAeazZiDTL6aC0bwHkfA[/tweet]

[Treefence]

I'd assume the return of TB2 offensive strikes is a direct effect of HARM missiles clearing some gaps in the AA defenses, but I'm sure Goose would have a better idea. Would love to see more of these, any successful TB2 strike likely saves Ukrainian lives.

[Treefence]

I'd assume the return of TB2 offensive strikes is a direct effect of HARM missiles clearing some gaps in the AA defenses, but I'm sure Goose would have a better idea. Would love to see more of these, any successful TB2 strike likely saves Ukrainian lives.

[dabigv13]

Inferences one could make from the two new TB2 vids today are that 1) Russian air defense in the area is porous, possibly from HARMs and 2) TB2s may be out of high priority targets in the area. If they aren't blowing up command centers, air defense, and ammo dumps, they may have already blown all that stuff up.

And that sets the stage for combined arms offensive operations.

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1565004465358479360?s=20&t=7rcd6v9osvWJL_gj4WAVVQ[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

Inferences one could make from the two new TB2 vids today are that 1) Russian air defense in the area is porous, possibly from HARMs and 2) TB2s may be out of high priority targets in the area. If they aren't blowing up command centers, air defense, and ammo dumps, they may have already blown all that stuff up.

And that sets the stage for combined arms offensive operations.

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1565004465358479360?s=20&t=7rcd6v9osvWJL_gj4WAVVQ[/tweet]

[Goose]

I'd assume the return of TB2 offensive strikes is a direct effect of HARM missiles clearing some gaps in the AA defenses, but I'm sure Goose would have a better idea. Would love to see more of these, any successful TB2 strike likely saves Ukrainian lives.

Inferences one could make from the two new TB2 vids today are that 1) Russian air defense in the area is porous, possibly from HARMs and 2) TB2s may be out of high priority targets in the area. If they aren't blowing up command centers, air defense, and ammo dumps, they may have already blown all that stuff up.

And that sets the stage for combined arms offensive operations.
https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/statu...L_gj4WAVVQ

Russian air defense has not lived up to expectations in Ukraine from day 1. All along they have not really had an "IAD" because they have not used their target acquisition radars to detect the targets and assign specific batteries to engage them. The Buk family, S-300 and S-400 systems have limited organic search capability. While the newer systems are "better", some have likened their target acquisition performance to "watching a football game through a soda straw". As discussed previously, Russia also has not utilized their Mainstay aircraft to acquire targets for their IAD.

Why Russia has not followed their own doctrine is anybodies guess, but it has really impacted their performance. They are better than this. There is no obvious reason I am aware of for their actions. Possible it is simply that their communications systems will not support it. However, they do it in Syria. In Syria, it is on a much smaller scale so less stress on communications. In any case, it results in a very degraded system performance.

Additionally, TB2s are hard to shoot down. They are not very big radar targets. While the Russians have often claimed their systems were effective against drones, the question of which drones and how effective has never really been answered. The TB2 has a 12 m wingspan. The MQ-4C has a 40 m wingspan. Very different beasts. The limited acquisition capability of the missile batteries means in many cases the TB2s simply won't be detected at all. In other cases they will be detected but in such "bad geometries" that it isn't worth engaging. Even if you have a feasible solution a SARAH missile will often not guide on a small target. If the Russians are equipped with and choose to launch an active seeker missile the "basket" presented by the TB2 may be too small and the missile "goes stupid". This is especially true if the target is maneuvering. All kinds of things can go wrong that the missile guys can't control. You do everything right and still miss. Ukraine has figured this out and been able operate the TB2 (and to some extent combat aircraft) successfully.

I of course can't know the "actual" HARM contribution to the current success. However, it's existence does two things. First and least important it has hit and destroyed some Russian radars and some Russian air defense vehicles/sites. This is good, but limited in scope. IMHO the more important effect is that the Russian radar operators are going to be increasingly reluctant to turn on their radars and search for targets. They may eat a HARM without ever knowing it is there. Even worse, if they actually engage a target they have to leave their radar operating (in most cases) until it hits or clearly misses. Finding the target is hard enough. Sitting there and waiting for a result is worse. You are screaming "Here I am. Hit me". If you then detect a constant bearing object going pretty fast, what do you do? This is a "big deal" and does affect the air defense significantly. You bosses generally don't know if your radar is actually radiating. If it isn't, maybe nobody will notice you exist.

As far as the target selection, I wouldn't necessarily conclude that the drones are shooting at secondary targets. It might be that they are now more focused on eliminating immediate threats to advancing units because previously there were no advancing units. TB2s have a relatively small payload. They carry up to 4 missiles weighing 37.5 kg each. Enough to reliably kill a couple of armored vehicles, but not more. Attacking a headquarters or a large concentration of material is more a HIMARS thing because it can bring in lots of explosive. The main thing is that the TB2s are there and still flying. They are probably more valuable as reconnaissance drones than attack drones. Of course, targets of opportunity do exist.

[Goose]

I'd assume the return of TB2 offensive strikes is a direct effect of HARM missiles clearing some gaps in the AA defenses, but I'm sure Goose would have a better idea. Would love to see more of these, any successful TB2 strike likely saves Ukrainian lives.

Inferences one could make from the two new TB2 vids today are that 1) Russian air defense in the area is porous, possibly from HARMs and 2) TB2s may be out of high priority targets in the area. If they aren't blowing up command centers, air defense, and ammo dumps, they may have already blown all that stuff up.

And that sets the stage for combined arms offensive operations.
https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/statu...L_gj4WAVVQ

Russian air defense has not lived up to expectations in Ukraine from day 1. All along they have not really had an "IAD" because they have not used their target acquisition radars to detect the targets and assign specific batteries to engage them. The Buk family, S-300 and S-400 systems have limited organic search capability. While the newer systems are "better", some have likened their target acquisition performance to "watching a football game through a soda straw". As discussed previously, Russia also has not utilized their Mainstay aircraft to acquire targets for their IAD.

Why Russia has not followed their own doctrine is anybodies guess, but it has really impacted their performance. They are better than this. There is no obvious reason I am aware of for their actions. Possible it is simply that their communications systems will not support it. However, they do it in Syria. In Syria, it is on a much smaller scale so less stress on communications. In any case, it results in a very degraded system performance.

Additionally, TB2s are hard to shoot down. They are not very big radar targets. While the Russians have often claimed their systems were effective against drones, the question of which drones and how effective has never really been answered. The TB2 has a 12 m wingspan. The MQ-4C has a 40 m wingspan. Very different beasts. The limited acquisition capability of the missile batteries means in many cases the TB2s simply won't be detected at all. In other cases they will be detected but in such "bad geometries" that it isn't worth engaging. Even if you have a feasible solution a SARAH missile will often not guide on a small target. If the Russians are equipped with and choose to launch an active seeker missile the "basket" presented by the TB2 may be too small and the missile "goes stupid". This is especially true if the target is maneuvering. All kinds of things can go wrong that the missile guys can't control. You do everything right and still miss. Ukraine has figured this out and been able operate the TB2 (and to some extent combat aircraft) successfully.

I of course can't know the "actual" HARM contribution to the current success. However, it's existence does two things. First and least important it has hit and destroyed some Russian radars and some Russian air defense vehicles/sites. This is good, but limited in scope. IMHO the more important effect is that the Russian radar operators are going to be increasingly reluctant to turn on their radars and search for targets. They may eat a HARM without ever knowing it is there. Even worse, if they actually engage a target they have to leave their radar operating (in most cases) until it hits or clearly misses. Finding the target is hard enough. Sitting there and waiting for a result is worse. You are screaming "Here I am. Hit me". If you then detect a constant bearing object going pretty fast, what do you do? This is a "big deal" and does affect the air defense significantly. You bosses generally don't know if your radar is actually radiating. If it isn't, maybe nobody will notice you exist.

As far as the target selection, I wouldn't necessarily conclude that the drones are shooting at secondary targets. It might be that they are now more focused on eliminating immediate threats to advancing units because previously there were no advancing units. TB2s have a relatively small payload. They carry up to 4 missiles weighing 37.5 kg each. Enough to reliably kill a couple of armored vehicles, but not more. Attacking a headquarters or a large concentration of material is more a HIMARS thing because it can bring in lots of explosive. The main thing is that the TB2s are there and still flying. They are probably more valuable as reconnaissance drones than attack drones. Of course, targets of opportunity do exist.

[Leftcoast]

Russian oligarchs allegedly self-defenestrating, unexpectedly suiciding, strangely falling off a well-traveled trail, and (my favorite), "dying in a drug induced heart-attack during a shamanic ritual" in 2022 have become so common that they now have their own wikipedia page.

The deal they struck with the Putin regime seems to be get rich while full-throatedly propping up the Russian government or die an unexpectedly tragic death - often alongside your family.  The promise of Russian (and Chinese) full integration into the world system we hoped for in the early 2000s seems so very long ago now.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russi...ery_deaths

[Leftcoast]

Russian oligarchs allegedly self-defenestrating, unexpectedly suiciding, strangely falling off a well-traveled trail, and (my favorite), "dying in a drug induced heart-attack during a shamanic ritual" in 2022 have become so common that they now have their own wikipedia page.

The deal they struck with the Putin regime seems to be get rich while full-throatedly propping up the Russian government or die an unexpectedly tragic death - often alongside your family.  The promise of Russian (and Chinese) full integration into the world system we hoped for in the early 2000s seems so very long ago now.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russi...ery_deaths

[BostonCard]

Reportedly hospitalised for heart problems and depression, then "fell out of a window".[14]

in Russian hospitals, “fall precautions” take a whole new meaning.

BC

[BostonCard]

Reportedly hospitalised for heart problems and depression, then "fell out of a window".[14]

in Russian hospitals, “fall precautions” take a whole new meaning.

BC

[cardcrimson]

A long line of suspicious deaths/suicides seems like conspiracy theory to me. Or so I've read. . . .

[cardcrimson]

A long line of suspicious deaths/suicides seems like conspiracy theory to me. Or so I've read. . . .

[BostonCard]

Well, it could all be coincidence, of course.  Still, if I were a Russian billionaire, I might stay away from tall buildings for a bit.  Just because you are paranoid doesn’t mean they’re not out to get you.

BC

[BostonCard]

Well, it could all be coincidence, of course.  Still, if I were a Russian billionaire, I might stay away from tall buildings for a bit.  Just because you are paranoid doesn’t mean they’re not out to get you.

BC

[dabigv13]

Hey guys, you can talk dumb Clinton conspiracies on Truth Social if you want, you don't need to try and act clever on the Ukraine War thread here. I'm sure you will get much more informed discussion over there.

[dabigv13]

Hey guys, you can talk dumb Clinton conspiracies on Truth Social if you want, you don't need to try and act clever on the Ukraine War thread here. I'm sure you will get much more informed discussion over there.

[dabigv13]

Very interesting article from Jack Watling of RUSI about the Ukrainian offensive and its objectives and role in the greater conflict.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/pu...ome-stages

If the Ukrainians can expend a limited amount of their combat power to pen the Russians into the city, they can reverse the challenges they faced in Severodonetsk and create a killing area for a large portion of Russia’s best assault troops – primarily airborne forces – who will be fixed defending a politically critical position even as it becomes militarily untenable. In this scenario, the Russian leadership must either contend with the progressive degradation of their assault troops at a time when they are desperately short of motivated infantry, or make a ‘goodwill gesture’ and withdraw – in the process suffering a heavy symbolic defeat, as Kherson is one of only two cities that were occupied largely intact during Russia’s war against Ukraine.

There are a number of Western academics and former officers calling for negotiations with Russia. There is nothing wrong with negotiations, but treating them as separate from fighting is ahistorical and immature. There is no reason why negotiations need take place from a presumption of weakness. Convincing the Russians to negotiate seriously requires demonstrating to them that military defeat – and not just a stalemate – is entirely plausible.

[dabigv13]

Very interesting article from Jack Watling of RUSI about the Ukrainian offensive and its objectives and role in the greater conflict.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/pu...ome-stages

If the Ukrainians can expend a limited amount of their combat power to pen the Russians into the city, they can reverse the challenges they faced in Severodonetsk and create a killing area for a large portion of Russia’s best assault troops – primarily airborne forces – who will be fixed defending a politically critical position even as it becomes militarily untenable. In this scenario, the Russian leadership must either contend with the progressive degradation of their assault troops at a time when they are desperately short of motivated infantry, or make a ‘goodwill gesture’ and withdraw – in the process suffering a heavy symbolic defeat, as Kherson is one of only two cities that were occupied largely intact during Russia’s war against Ukraine.

There are a number of Western academics and former officers calling for negotiations with Russia. There is nothing wrong with negotiations, but treating them as separate from fighting is ahistorical and immature. There is no reason why negotiations need take place from a presumption of weakness. Convincing the Russians to negotiate seriously requires demonstrating to them that military defeat – and not just a stalemate – is entirely plausible.

[Goose]

Very interesting article from Jack Watling of RUSI about the Ukrainian offensive and its objectives and role in the greater conflict.



https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/pu...ome-stages

If the Ukrainians can expend a limited amount of their combat power to pen the Russians into the city, they can reverse the challenges they faced in Severodonetsk and create a killing area for a large portion of Russia’s best assault troops – primarily airborne forces – who will be fixed defending a politically critical position even as it becomes militarily untenable. In this scenario, the Russian leadership must either contend with the progressive degradation of their assault troops at a time when they are desperately short of motivated infantry, or make a ‘goodwill gesture’ and withdraw – in the process suffering a heavy symbolic defeat, as Kherson is one of only two cities that were occupied largely intact during Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The problem with this analysis is that the Russians were perfectly able and willing to level Severodonetsk to destroy the Ukrainians defending it, along with any Ukrainian civilians remaining there. Ukraine probably doesn't have either the desire or the artillery to do the same in Kherson. The only way to "destroy" any Russians inside the city would be to cut off their supplies (which one can do by controlling the GLOCs by artillery fire) and wait them out. Of course, this will also involve cutting off food supplies to the civilians inside the city. Hopefully everybody who can will leave before it comes to that. The other bad news for cutting the GLOCs by fire is that when the river freezes you don't need the bridges. It isn't "convenient" but it will be entirely possible to supply the city at a "basic" level that way. Russia has done it before, several times. For that reason the next few months are critical to getting the Russians out of Kherson. A mild/late winter would be a big help here.

The only sure way to drive the Russians out of Kherson is to occupy a bridgehead on the other side of the river and/or achieve local air superiority. The latter is improbable. The former is possible and has the additional advantage of creating a threat of further advances. Failing that, the reality is that the Russians will only leave Kherson city by their own choice, either due to a collapse in morale leading to a disorganized run or because the high command decides it isn't worth the attrition that holding it will cause. Ukraine doesn't want a Stalingrad. The question is whether Russia is willing to risk one. Right now it appears they expect to hold on, but who knows? https://english.nv.ua/amp/russia-will-no...66944.html

The author presents a need for Ukraine to show to the "West" that they are making progress and casting that as a motivating factor for "early" offensives. While there is IMHO some truth to this, I think a much, much greater factor is for the government of the Ukraine to show their own people and military that there is hope. Ukraine is a democracy and unlike Russia they can't fight if the people don't want to do so. Very few people in Ukraine want to "give up", but over time that will change as hardships mount and it appears defeat is inevitable. Ukraine needs some "good news" much more than the West does I suspect. As we know, there are many undercurrents in Ukrainian politics. So far, the war has overcome most of them. As winter sets in, that will be less so. A few victories can be a great motivator to hold everybody together.

[Goose]

Very interesting article from Jack Watling of RUSI about the Ukrainian offensive and its objectives and role in the greater conflict.



https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/pu...ome-stages

If the Ukrainians can expend a limited amount of their combat power to pen the Russians into the city, they can reverse the challenges they faced in Severodonetsk and create a killing area for a large portion of Russia’s best assault troops – primarily airborne forces – who will be fixed defending a politically critical position even as it becomes militarily untenable. In this scenario, the Russian leadership must either contend with the progressive degradation of their assault troops at a time when they are desperately short of motivated infantry, or make a ‘goodwill gesture’ and withdraw – in the process suffering a heavy symbolic defeat, as Kherson is one of only two cities that were occupied largely intact during Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The problem with this analysis is that the Russians were perfectly able and willing to level Severodonetsk to destroy the Ukrainians defending it, along with any Ukrainian civilians remaining there. Ukraine probably doesn't have either the desire or the artillery to do the same in Kherson. The only way to "destroy" any Russians inside the city would be to cut off their supplies (which one can do by controlling the GLOCs by artillery fire) and wait them out. Of course, this will also involve cutting off food supplies to the civilians inside the city. Hopefully everybody who can will leave before it comes to that. The other bad news for cutting the GLOCs by fire is that when the river freezes you don't need the bridges. It isn't "convenient" but it will be entirely possible to supply the city at a "basic" level that way. Russia has done it before, several times. For that reason the next few months are critical to getting the Russians out of Kherson. A mild/late winter would be a big help here.

The only sure way to drive the Russians out of Kherson is to occupy a bridgehead on the other side of the river and/or achieve local air superiority. The latter is improbable. The former is possible and has the additional advantage of creating a threat of further advances. Failing that, the reality is that the Russians will only leave Kherson city by their own choice, either due to a collapse in morale leading to a disorganized run or because the high command decides it isn't worth the attrition that holding it will cause. Ukraine doesn't want a Stalingrad. The question is whether Russia is willing to risk one. Right now it appears they expect to hold on, but who knows? https://english.nv.ua/amp/russia-will-no...66944.html

The author presents a need for Ukraine to show to the "West" that they are making progress and casting that as a motivating factor for "early" offensives. While there is IMHO some truth to this, I think a much, much greater factor is for the government of the Ukraine to show their own people and military that there is hope. Ukraine is a democracy and unlike Russia they can't fight if the people don't want to do so. Very few people in Ukraine want to "give up", but over time that will change as hardships mount and it appears defeat is inevitable. Ukraine needs some "good news" much more than the West does I suspect. As we know, there are many undercurrents in Ukrainian politics. So far, the war has overcome most of them. As winter sets in, that will be less so. A few victories can be a great motivator to hold everybody together.

[BostonCard]

Ukrainians are largely winning The war within the war; the info war.

https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/08...-on-russia

At least in the west (there’s a good article on Russia’s influence operations in places like India and South Africa).

BC

[BostonCard]

Ukrainians are largely winning The war within the war; the info war.

https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/08...-on-russia

At least in the west (there’s a good article on Russia’s influence operations in places like India and South Africa).

BC

[Treefence]

This is our first time seeing a TB2 take out a tank in this war, it seems pretty clear the TB2's are back, at least for the Kherson offensive for now.  Really nice to see, and another indication that air defense has been failing for Russia in that area.  Hopefully many more videos to come, and an update on the offensive.

https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1566...-WZ6rYLDug

[Treefence]

This is our first time seeing a TB2 take out a tank in this war, it seems pretty clear the TB2's are back, at least for the Kherson offensive for now.  Really nice to see, and another indication that air defense has been failing for Russia in that area.  Hopefully many more videos to come, and an update on the offensive.

https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1566...-WZ6rYLDug

[dabigv13]

It's such a great capability for Ukraine. Relatively cheap, no pilot at risk. Azerbaijan did a number on Armenian armor with them, and now that Ukraine seems to have degraded or scared away Russian air defense they will be very useful in an close air support role for the Kherson offensive as well.

And they make such awesome videos!

[dabigv13]

It's such a great capability for Ukraine. Relatively cheap, no pilot at risk. Azerbaijan did a number on Armenian armor with them, and now that Ukraine seems to have degraded or scared away Russian air defense they will be very useful in an close air support role for the Kherson offensive as well.

And they make such awesome videos!

[Goose]

It's such a great capability for Ukraine. Relatively cheap, no pilot at risk. Azerbaijan did a number on Armenian armor with them, and now that Ukraine seems to have degraded or scared away Russian air defense they will be very useful in an close air support role for the Kherson offensive as well.

Lets not get carried away. Russia's (and the US to a lesser extent) air defense never had the ability to prevent these drones from operating. It does have the ability to kill them with some significant probability. That is why Ukraine has used them skillfully, not ubiquitously. By now, Ukraine knows which areas are permissive and which are not. These drones are not "anytime, anywhere" weapons. They are absolutely not CAS weapons. They are far too slow and carry far too little ordinance to do that. They are useful weapons to be sure, but destroying two tanks, flying (slowly) home to re-arm, flying back and repeat is not something that is a serious threat. They also have to operate where they cannot be optically "seen". If you can see them, eventually a "golden BB" will kill them. Their unmanned nature gives them pretty slow "reflexes". They either need to operate at night or above about 10K feet to be "safe" from ground fire.

And they make such awesome videos!

Indeed they do! These drones are like snipers. They are hard to see and are unpredictable in their attacks. They can be relatively far behind Russian lines where it should be "safe" for the Russians but isn't. They are also long range enough that they can use a safe "corridor" to get inside defended zones and then transit safely to target areas. The Russians will probably never know how they got there undetected. Takes skill and planning but it is possible. Much of the transit can be outside of the active control range of the ground station using "fly to" points. Even more confusing.

[Goose]

It's such a great capability for Ukraine. Relatively cheap, no pilot at risk. Azerbaijan did a number on Armenian armor with them, and now that Ukraine seems to have degraded or scared away Russian air defense they will be very useful in an close air support role for the Kherson offensive as well.

Lets not get carried away. Russia's (and the US to a lesser extent) air defense never had the ability to prevent these drones from operating. It does have the ability to kill them with some significant probability. That is why Ukraine has used them skillfully, not ubiquitously. By now, Ukraine knows which areas are permissive and which are not. These drones are not "anytime, anywhere" weapons. They are absolutely not CAS weapons. They are far too slow and carry far too little ordinance to do that. They are useful weapons to be sure, but destroying two tanks, flying (slowly) home to re-arm, flying back and repeat is not something that is a serious threat. They also have to operate where they cannot be optically "seen". If you can see them, eventually a "golden BB" will kill them. Their unmanned nature gives them pretty slow "reflexes". They either need to operate at night or above about 10K feet to be "safe" from ground fire.

And they make such awesome videos!

Indeed they do! These drones are like snipers. They are hard to see and are unpredictable in their attacks. They can be relatively far behind Russian lines where it should be "safe" for the Russians but isn't. They are also long range enough that they can use a safe "corridor" to get inside defended zones and then transit safely to target areas. The Russians will probably never know how they got there undetected. Takes skill and planning but it is possible. Much of the transit can be outside of the active control range of the ground station using "fly to" points. Even more confusing.

[thatboy]

This thread seems very focused on tactics and the prosecution of the war. Can I digress slightly and ask you all, who are more knowledgeable than me, what the real cause of this war was? How did we get here?

Offline, I'm in a debate with someone who is pro-Russia and they claim this whole thing traces back to Euromaidan and Victoria Nuland -- and generally the US meddling in Ukrainian politics to the point where Viktor Yanukovych abandoned the Presidency of Ukraine and fled to Russia. I'm oversimplifying it, but that seems to be the crux of it. I know Nuland was caught on tape talking about who she (or the US) would like to work with if the opposition took over from Yanukovych. Is there any evidence the US actually orchestrated any kind of coup? I don't believe so, but curious if I'm being naive or missed something.

[thatboy]

This thread seems very focused on tactics and the prosecution of the war. Can I digress slightly and ask you all, who are more knowledgeable than me, what the real cause of this war was? How did we get here?

Offline, I'm in a debate with someone who is pro-Russia and they claim this whole thing traces back to Euromaidan and Victoria Nuland -- and generally the US meddling in Ukrainian politics to the point where Viktor Yanukovych abandoned the Presidency of Ukraine and fled to Russia. I'm oversimplifying it, but that seems to be the crux of it. I know Nuland was caught on tape talking about who she (or the US) would like to work with if the opposition took over from Yanukovych. Is there any evidence the US actually orchestrated any kind of coup? I don't believe so, but curious if I'm being naive or missed something.

[dabigv13]

Each TB2 can carry 4 missiles, and Ukraine probably has more of them than Su24s and Su25s, and I'm sure is happier losing one than a piloted aircraft. Yes they will be more effective at night and at altitude, but they will still provide a lot of tactical capability in supporting a ground offensive. Ukraine has proven very adept at using systems outside of what they were designed for in this war.

I wouldn't be surprised if by the end of the war Ukrainian TB2s will have taken out more armor than their Frogfoots and Hinds.

[dabigv13]

Each TB2 can carry 4 missiles, and Ukraine probably has more of them than Su24s and Su25s, and I'm sure is happier losing one than a piloted aircraft. Yes they will be more effective at night and at altitude, but they will still provide a lot of tactical capability in supporting a ground offensive. Ukraine has proven very adept at using systems outside of what they were designed for in this war.

I wouldn't be surprised if by the end of the war Ukrainian TB2s will have taken out more armor than their Frogfoots and Hinds.