[martyup]

I just re-watched the 2013 Pac-12 Championship Game.  This is the game that gives me hope for the 2014 season.  Hogan was on his game and our young receivers showed their potential.  If you would like to see it again, here you go:

http://youtu.be/rGpVZbdugIM

[martyup]

I just re-watched the 2013 Pac-12 Championship Game.  This is the game that gives me hope for the 2014 season.  Hogan was on his game and our young receivers showed their potential.  If you would like to see it again, here you go:

http://youtu.be/rGpVZbdugIM

[washingtonismoney]

  Best of all, Shaw opened up his offense, keeping the ASU defense guessing. 

This is why I rarely take play-calling complaints/praise seriously, because it seems to me people are really always just praising success rather than one of its underlying components. The game plan and calling wasn't too much different than in previous games. Stanford ran 44 times out of 62 plays -- 70% of the time. On average last season, Stanford ran 65% of the time.* Was there a bunch of creative/offbeat runs? I remember....some reverses and fly sweeps. But we saw those anyway over the course of the season.

Hogan threw deep a ton in that game -- but, stop me if you've heard this before, but Hogan threw the ball deep a ton over the course of the season.

So what element is present in that game, playcalling-wise, that wasn't in other games? I can't think of it. I think the team just had a good matchup and executed really well. I think that's the case more often than people popularly admit.

At least judging by popular perceptions, I think people have little-to-no ability to identify successful playcalling; I'm skeptical playcalling skill exists at all. We see perception of great playcalling veer wildly from year to year -- I recall Lane Kiffin's playcalling being feted all of 2011 until the beginning of the 2012 season, at which point the nation discovered Lane Kiffin was actually a crummy playcaller. But that seems unlikely to me; it seems more likely that people are just unconsciously thinking, "SC's playing great. Kiffin's a genius!" Playcalling is the most visible of the coaching arts, and so it seems easier to praise playcalling than to examine recruiting, development, preparation, etc.

The biggest tipoff that playcalling isn't actually that important is Chip Kelly's offense. People praise Kelly as a great playcaller, but that shows a fundamental misunderstanding of what Kelly's offense is trying to do: it's trying to minimize the role of playcalling to as small a role as possible. The goal of a playcaller is to call a play the opponent cannot match up with. Kelly's offense builds options for the quarterback so that the defense is always wrong, meaning that Kelly's in-game preferences mean as little as possible. Which makes all the sense in the world. Who has more information: Chip Kelly 30 seconds before the play starts, or the quarterback two seconds in?

tl;dr: I'm really skeptical of playcalling as a coaching attribute and think the virtues I've seen ascribed to it are inconsistent and unquantifiable.

*(of course, that's deceptive. Stanford ran so much because it was up. It's a classic correlation/causation problem.)

[washingtonismoney]

  Best of all, Shaw opened up his offense, keeping the ASU defense guessing. 

This is why I rarely take play-calling complaints/praise seriously, because it seems to me people are really always just praising success rather than one of its underlying components. The game plan and calling wasn't too much different than in previous games. Stanford ran 44 times out of 62 plays -- 70% of the time. On average last season, Stanford ran 65% of the time.* Was there a bunch of creative/offbeat runs? I remember....some reverses and fly sweeps. But we saw those anyway over the course of the season.

Hogan threw deep a ton in that game -- but, stop me if you've heard this before, but Hogan threw the ball deep a ton over the course of the season.

So what element is present in that game, playcalling-wise, that wasn't in other games? I can't think of it. I think the team just had a good matchup and executed really well. I think that's the case more often than people popularly admit.

At least judging by popular perceptions, I think people have little-to-no ability to identify successful playcalling; I'm skeptical playcalling skill exists at all. We see perception of great playcalling veer wildly from year to year -- I recall Lane Kiffin's playcalling being feted all of 2011 until the beginning of the 2012 season, at which point the nation discovered Lane Kiffin was actually a crummy playcaller. But that seems unlikely to me; it seems more likely that people are just unconsciously thinking, "SC's playing great. Kiffin's a genius!" Playcalling is the most visible of the coaching arts, and so it seems easier to praise playcalling than to examine recruiting, development, preparation, etc.

The biggest tipoff that playcalling isn't actually that important is Chip Kelly's offense. People praise Kelly as a great playcaller, but that shows a fundamental misunderstanding of what Kelly's offense is trying to do: it's trying to minimize the role of playcalling to as small a role as possible. The goal of a playcaller is to call a play the opponent cannot match up with. Kelly's offense builds options for the quarterback so that the defense is always wrong, meaning that Kelly's in-game preferences mean as little as possible. Which makes all the sense in the world. Who has more information: Chip Kelly 30 seconds before the play starts, or the quarterback two seconds in?

tl;dr: I'm really skeptical of playcalling as a coaching attribute and think the virtues I've seen ascribed to it are inconsistent and unquantifiable.

*(of course, that's deceptive. Stanford ran so much because it was up. It's a classic correlation/causation problem.)

[Hank 91]

I just watched this as well. Two nights ago, I think. Regardless of what you might say about the play calling (and I tend to agree with WIM), it was a lot of fun to watch.

[Hank 91]

I just watched this as well. Two nights ago, I think. Regardless of what you might say about the play calling (and I tend to agree with WIM), it was a lot of fun to watch.

[Langdude]

I agree, mostly. I think that player execution, ability, and smarts are way more important than play calling. However, I do think that sometimes a play is called that puts one team in a better position to leverage their abilities (or mitigates that leverage). One play comes immediately to mind from last year:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8PWDnBLNg0

IIRC, Shaw even told Hogan not to tell the rest of the offense that he was keeping the ball. Granted, the rest of the team had to do their job, but that was a great call at that point of the game.

-m.

[Langdude]

I agree, mostly. I think that player execution, ability, and smarts are way more important than play calling. However, I do think that sometimes a play is called that puts one team in a better position to leverage their abilities (or mitigates that leverage). One play comes immediately to mind from last year:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8PWDnBLNg0

IIRC, Shaw even told Hogan not to tell the rest of the offense that he was keeping the ball. Granted, the rest of the team had to do their job, but that was a great call at that point of the game.

-m.

[martyup]

[quote author=martyup link=topic=10423.msg95046#msg95046 date=1408829528]  Best of all, Shaw opened up his offense, keeping the ASU defense guessing. 

This is why I rarely take play-calling complaints/praise seriously, because it seems to me people are really always just praising success rather than one of its underlying components. The game plan and calling wasn't too much different than in previous games. . . . So what element is present in that game, playcalling-wise, that wasn't in other games?
[/quote]

I really only posted this video because watching it gets me excited about the prospects of this season.  Your response seems pretty aggressive.  Perhaps I have missed some earlier topics where play calling was passionately debated.  I agree that success always makes a play call look genius.

In my post I said that Shaw "opened up his offense, keeping the ASU defense guessing."  My comment was not limited to "play calling" from the coaches.  However, I can point to two pivotal plays that were called by Shaw or Bloomgren (see below).  What I saw was a confident Hogan that made some key read audibles that led to big plays.  I think it's safe to say that Shaw and Bloomgren gave Hogan the green light to audible when he made certain reads.  I think the long pass to Cajuste on 3rd down with our back to the goal line was an audible.  I also believe that the TD pass to Ty on that same drive was called by Hogan at the line.

A play that was instrumental in breaking this game open for Stanford was the first play of the second quarter (at 31:00 in the video).  It was 1st and 10 on the ASU 24.  We had been pounding the ball down ASU's throats on the previous drives.  We lined up in a power "I" formation and faked to Gaffney up the middle and then handed off to Ty on an "end around."  The ASU defense took the bait and Ty scored.  Even the game announcers said it was a great call.

Another successful play that broke our pattern came at 1:23 on the video (9:56 remaining in the 3rd Q).  It was 3rd and 3 on the Stanford 27.  We line up in an "I" formation with tight splits.  Hogan fakes a handoff to Gaffney and hits Ty on a hitch route that goes for 23 yards.  Again, the announcers talked of how everyone thought we were going to run the ball on that down.

This season, I sure hope we see a Hogan like the one we saw in the 2013 Pac-12 Championship.  He didn't play a perfect game, but he looked pretty good to me.

[martyup]

[quote author=martyup link=topic=10423.msg95046#msg95046 date=1408829528]  Best of all, Shaw opened up his offense, keeping the ASU defense guessing. 

This is why I rarely take play-calling complaints/praise seriously, because it seems to me people are really always just praising success rather than one of its underlying components. The game plan and calling wasn't too much different than in previous games. . . . So what element is present in that game, playcalling-wise, that wasn't in other games?
[/quote]

I really only posted this video because watching it gets me excited about the prospects of this season.  Your response seems pretty aggressive.  Perhaps I have missed some earlier topics where play calling was passionately debated.  I agree that success always makes a play call look genius.

In my post I said that Shaw "opened up his offense, keeping the ASU defense guessing."  My comment was not limited to "play calling" from the coaches.  However, I can point to two pivotal plays that were called by Shaw or Bloomgren (see below).  What I saw was a confident Hogan that made some key read audibles that led to big plays.  I think it's safe to say that Shaw and Bloomgren gave Hogan the green light to audible when he made certain reads.  I think the long pass to Cajuste on 3rd down with our back to the goal line was an audible.  I also believe that the TD pass to Ty on that same drive was called by Hogan at the line.

A play that was instrumental in breaking this game open for Stanford was the first play of the second quarter (at 31:00 in the video).  It was 1st and 10 on the ASU 24.  We had been pounding the ball down ASU's throats on the previous drives.  We lined up in a power "I" formation and faked to Gaffney up the middle and then handed off to Ty on an "end around."  The ASU defense took the bait and Ty scored.  Even the game announcers said it was a great call.

Another successful play that broke our pattern came at 1:23 on the video (9:56 remaining in the 3rd Q).  It was 3rd and 3 on the Stanford 27.  We line up in an "I" formation with tight splits.  Hogan fakes a handoff to Gaffney and hits Ty on a hitch route that goes for 23 yards.  Again, the announcers talked of how everyone thought we were going to run the ball on that down.

This season, I sure hope we see a Hogan like the one we saw in the 2013 Pac-12 Championship.  He didn't play a perfect game, but he looked pretty good to me.

[StanFan88]

My plentiful criticisms of playcalling have all been focused in one area:  What does Shaw do to CHANGE the gameplan when the one he had going in DOESN'T WORK???

This game doesn't do anything to address that criticism.  We all know the issues in the games that were lost last year so no need to elaborate.  When it works like it did in the P12 championship, there's nothing to criticize.  They had a gameplan going in worked and that's fantastic.  It's the failure to adjust the gameplan when it isn't working that was the team's downfall last year.

[StanFan88]

My plentiful criticisms of playcalling have all been focused in one area:  What does Shaw do to CHANGE the gameplan when the one he had going in DOESN'T WORK???

This game doesn't do anything to address that criticism.  We all know the issues in the games that were lost last year so no need to elaborate.  When it works like it did in the P12 championship, there's nothing to criticize.  They had a gameplan going in worked and that's fantastic.  It's the failure to adjust the gameplan when it isn't working that was the team's downfall last year.

[Rally]

My plentiful criticisms of playcalling have all been focused in one area:  What does Shaw do to CHANGE the gameplan when the one he had going in DOESN'T WORK???

This game doesn't do anything to address that criticism.  We all know the issues in the games that were lost last year so no need to elaborate.  When it works like it did in the P12 championship, there's nothing to criticize.  They had a gameplan going in worked and that's fantastic.  It's the failure to adjust the gameplan when it isn't working that was the team's downfall last year.

Maybe you cant adjust if the options aren't there?  No reliable short/intermediate targets, how can you "adjust" to them in crunch time?  I still think criticizing play-calling is influenced a lot by hindsight.  MMQ.

Personally, watching the end of the Fiesta Bowl I coulsn't understand the decision to take the ball out of our all-world quarterback and give it to the kicker, that is my right as a fan, safely in the stands or in front of the TV, and events proved me right.  Or did they?  What if the kick had been good?

The only terrible play call I saw last year was Saban calling for a 60+ yard field goal to win the game rather than settle for overtime.  Definition of arrogance, IMHO.

[Rally]

My plentiful criticisms of playcalling have all been focused in one area:  What does Shaw do to CHANGE the gameplan when the one he had going in DOESN'T WORK???

This game doesn't do anything to address that criticism.  We all know the issues in the games that were lost last year so no need to elaborate.  When it works like it did in the P12 championship, there's nothing to criticize.  They had a gameplan going in worked and that's fantastic.  It's the failure to adjust the gameplan when it isn't working that was the team's downfall last year.

Maybe you cant adjust if the options aren't there?  No reliable short/intermediate targets, how can you "adjust" to them in crunch time?  I still think criticizing play-calling is influenced a lot by hindsight.  MMQ.

Personally, watching the end of the Fiesta Bowl I coulsn't understand the decision to take the ball out of our all-world quarterback and give it to the kicker, that is my right as a fan, safely in the stands or in front of the TV, and events proved me right.  Or did they?  What if the kick had been good?

The only terrible play call I saw last year was Saban calling for a 60+ yard field goal to win the game rather than settle for overtime.  Definition of arrogance, IMHO.

[Hank 91]

I think that a coach's personality and football philosophy are more important than individual play calling. Fans often criticize their team's coach for being too conservative, probably because when we're sitting in the stands or sitting on our couches, we always want to go for it on 4th and 1. Football coaches, though, often seem to make their decisions with the idea of eliminating as many potential negative outcomes as possible. The Fiesta Bowl is the most egregious example of this for David Shaw. While most of America could only think about the best college quarterback in a generation, Shaw (presumably) thought about the potential negatives. There could've been a sack that moved the team out of field goal range, an interception, a fumbled center exchange, or any number of other things that would've either pushed them beyond Williamson's range or given OSU the ball in the closing minute. After all, even though I was perplexed by the way that final possession played out, I was still completely confident that Williamson would hit that field goal.

I don't bring this up to rehash that game or even to defend Shaw's decision, but to point out that Shaw's conservative nature probably impacts the game much more than any single choice on any single play.

But let me ask you this -- would you rather have Shaw coaching your team and putting on the breaks from time to time, or someone like Mike Leach, swinging his sword? For your answer, take a look at the closing minutes of the 2013 New Mexico Bowl. Leach botched that game, not because of his play calling, but because of his overall philosophy.

[Hank 91]

I think that a coach's personality and football philosophy are more important than individual play calling. Fans often criticize their team's coach for being too conservative, probably because when we're sitting in the stands or sitting on our couches, we always want to go for it on 4th and 1. Football coaches, though, often seem to make their decisions with the idea of eliminating as many potential negative outcomes as possible. The Fiesta Bowl is the most egregious example of this for David Shaw. While most of America could only think about the best college quarterback in a generation, Shaw (presumably) thought about the potential negatives. There could've been a sack that moved the team out of field goal range, an interception, a fumbled center exchange, or any number of other things that would've either pushed them beyond Williamson's range or given OSU the ball in the closing minute. After all, even though I was perplexed by the way that final possession played out, I was still completely confident that Williamson would hit that field goal.

I don't bring this up to rehash that game or even to defend Shaw's decision, but to point out that Shaw's conservative nature probably impacts the game much more than any single choice on any single play.

But let me ask you this -- would you rather have Shaw coaching your team and putting on the breaks from time to time, or someone like Mike Leach, swinging his sword? For your answer, take a look at the closing minutes of the 2013 New Mexico Bowl. Leach botched that game, not because of his play calling, but because of his overall philosophy.

[CTcard]

My plentiful criticisms of playcalling have all been focused in one area:  What does Shaw do to CHANGE the gameplan when the one he had going in DOESN'T WORK???

That's not really play calling as I understand the term.

Play calling is a play to play instant decision on what to do next.

Adjustments are a broader strategy issue, really more akin to game planning - as every game plan ought to have a "Step 2 - what next if approach #1 doesn't work or the defense adjusts".

I agree that Stanford did not always do well on the "Step 2" front.

However, I more or less agree with WIM that fans tend to make too much of play calling. It seems to be the #1 complaint of every fan base in the country. Certainly most coaching staffs make bad play calls, but it is not possible for most coaching staffs to be the worst in their league at play calling.

[CTcard]

My plentiful criticisms of playcalling have all been focused in one area:  What does Shaw do to CHANGE the gameplan when the one he had going in DOESN'T WORK???

That's not really play calling as I understand the term.

Play calling is a play to play instant decision on what to do next.

Adjustments are a broader strategy issue, really more akin to game planning - as every game plan ought to have a "Step 2 - what next if approach #1 doesn't work or the defense adjusts".

I agree that Stanford did not always do well on the "Step 2" front.

However, I more or less agree with WIM that fans tend to make too much of play calling. It seems to be the #1 complaint of every fan base in the country. Certainly most coaching staffs make bad play calls, but it is not possible for most coaching staffs to be the worst in their league at play calling.

[OutsiderFan]

While it is true that superior execution can make any play work, and sometimes coaches adopt a "we don't care if you know what's coming, go and ahead and stop us" mentality, the ability to know tendencies is still the greatest tactical asset a defense has.  If a defense knows what is coming, based on video study and preparation, it's odds of stopping an offense increase.

So at the end of the day, play calling is effective based on the right combination of doing what is working, what a unit can execute, and keeping the opponent off balance, so it can't anticipate what will happen and employ a tactic to neutralize what's coming. 

One person's bad play call is another's poor execution.  That said, it seems logical that being unpredictable is on balance a bit more valuable than superior execution, because a play has more margin for error when it is unexpected, and less when anticipated.

[OutsiderFan]

While it is true that superior execution can make any play work, and sometimes coaches adopt a "we don't care if you know what's coming, go and ahead and stop us" mentality, the ability to know tendencies is still the greatest tactical asset a defense has.  If a defense knows what is coming, based on video study and preparation, it's odds of stopping an offense increase.

So at the end of the day, play calling is effective based on the right combination of doing what is working, what a unit can execute, and keeping the opponent off balance, so it can't anticipate what will happen and employ a tactic to neutralize what's coming. 

One person's bad play call is another's poor execution.  That said, it seems logical that being unpredictable is on balance a bit more valuable than superior execution, because a play has more margin for error when it is unexpected, and less when anticipated.

[81alum]

My plentiful criticisms of playcalling have all been focused in one area:  What does Shaw do to CHANGE the gameplan when the one he had going in DOESN'T WORK???

This game doesn't do anything to address that criticism.  We all know the issues in the games that were lost last year so no need to elaborate.  When it works like it did in the P12 championship, there's nothing to criticize.  They had a gameplan going in worked and that's fantastic.  It's the failure to adjust the gameplan when it isn't working that was the team's downfall last year.

I agree with this, mostly.

What makes the Shaw playcalling debate interesting, however, is that it is his philosophy to NOT adjust playcalling "on the fly."  He is convinced that even if interior runs don't work in the 1st quarter, or the 2nd quarter, or the 3rd quarter--that they are nonetheless doing something productive in wearing down the opposing defense and that they will work in the 4th quarter.  So you could say it is a deliberate part of his strategy to be stubborn.

The question is--how well does this work?  Sometimes it works very well and those 2 yard runs become 7 yard runs.  But against some opponents it never works (Michigan State?)  At what point does a coach realize that the other team will not be worn down and trampled in the 4th quarter?  I think a brilliant coach would know the signs to indicate whether the Woody Hayes strategy was likely to pay off later in the game or that it was not--and if not, a shift to a less predictable and less stubborn strategy would follow.

All that said, having tight ends I think will solve the "stubborn" problem, so I am a lot less worried about a conservative philosophy this year than last.

[81alum]

My plentiful criticisms of playcalling have all been focused in one area:  What does Shaw do to CHANGE the gameplan when the one he had going in DOESN'T WORK???

This game doesn't do anything to address that criticism.  We all know the issues in the games that were lost last year so no need to elaborate.  When it works like it did in the P12 championship, there's nothing to criticize.  They had a gameplan going in worked and that's fantastic.  It's the failure to adjust the gameplan when it isn't working that was the team's downfall last year.

I agree with this, mostly.

What makes the Shaw playcalling debate interesting, however, is that it is his philosophy to NOT adjust playcalling "on the fly."  He is convinced that even if interior runs don't work in the 1st quarter, or the 2nd quarter, or the 3rd quarter--that they are nonetheless doing something productive in wearing down the opposing defense and that they will work in the 4th quarter.  So you could say it is a deliberate part of his strategy to be stubborn.

The question is--how well does this work?  Sometimes it works very well and those 2 yard runs become 7 yard runs.  But against some opponents it never works (Michigan State?)  At what point does a coach realize that the other team will not be worn down and trampled in the 4th quarter?  I think a brilliant coach would know the signs to indicate whether the Woody Hayes strategy was likely to pay off later in the game or that it was not--and if not, a shift to a less predictable and less stubborn strategy would follow.

All that said, having tight ends I think will solve the "stubborn" problem, so I am a lot less worried about a conservative philosophy this year than last.

[teejers1]

OutsiderFan, you stated that beautifully.

Separately, I categorically reject the charges by WIM and Hank and others who think criticism of play-calling is all 20/20 hindsight bias.  That is just wrong.  There is NO GOOD ARGUMENT that the play calling against Utah at game's end was sound or smart or good.  I will always believe that, and would have still believed it even had Stanford completed the pass on third and 2 to the third string TE in the back of the end zone.  (Of course, Utah may still have come back for the winning FG at that point . . .).  The same holds, imo, on the second and two call against SC - when Hogan threw the pick.  That should have been a running play in that game situation.  And yes, it is a fluid situation based on what you see happening on the field at that point in the game.  And that is what was so discouraging about those play calls:  the only people in the football universe who thought passing in those situations was the right call happened to be on the Stanford sideline.  That is pretty darn alarming.

And the flipside is true, too.  Harbaugh's "plan" not to take a knee late against ND "worked" because Stanford managed to hold on for the win.  But not taking one knee (or even two?) was INDEFENSIBLE.  I also think trying the FG against Oregon - you know, the one that was blocked and returned for a TD - was the right call by Shaw.  Stanford was 4-4 up to that point, the additional points would have put Stanford up by more than 3 TDs.  Thus, even though the result was the absolute worst thing possible, the play call was very defensible.

It's eliminating the indefensible play calls that is the "baby first step" I'm hoping for.  We shall see.

[teejers1]

OutsiderFan, you stated that beautifully.

Separately, I categorically reject the charges by WIM and Hank and others who think criticism of play-calling is all 20/20 hindsight bias.  That is just wrong.  There is NO GOOD ARGUMENT that the play calling against Utah at game's end was sound or smart or good.  I will always believe that, and would have still believed it even had Stanford completed the pass on third and 2 to the third string TE in the back of the end zone.  (Of course, Utah may still have come back for the winning FG at that point . . .).  The same holds, imo, on the second and two call against SC - when Hogan threw the pick.  That should have been a running play in that game situation.  And yes, it is a fluid situation based on what you see happening on the field at that point in the game.  And that is what was so discouraging about those play calls:  the only people in the football universe who thought passing in those situations was the right call happened to be on the Stanford sideline.  That is pretty darn alarming.

And the flipside is true, too.  Harbaugh's "plan" not to take a knee late against ND "worked" because Stanford managed to hold on for the win.  But not taking one knee (or even two?) was INDEFENSIBLE.  I also think trying the FG against Oregon - you know, the one that was blocked and returned for a TD - was the right call by Shaw.  Stanford was 4-4 up to that point, the additional points would have put Stanford up by more than 3 TDs.  Thus, even though the result was the absolute worst thing possible, the play call was very defensible.

It's eliminating the indefensible play calls that is the "baby first step" I'm hoping for.  We shall see.

[BostonCard]

A play that was instrumental in breaking this game open for Stanford was the first play of the second quarter (at 31:00 in the video).  It was 1st and 10 on the ASU 24.  We had been pounding the ball down ASU's throats on the previous drives.  We lined up in a power "I" formation and faked to Gaffney up the middle and then handed off to Ty on an "end around."  The ASU defense took the bait and Ty scored.  Even the game announcers said it was a great call.

Well, there are two questions here.  Suppose the play had been called but ASU doesn't take the bait and Ty gets stuffed behind the line of scrimmage.  Wouldn't the criticism have been "We were stuffing the ball down their throat, why did we have to get cute?"  Moreover, given that we were stuffing the ball down their throat, wouldn't it have been likely that we could have run the last 24 yards up the middle and still scored?  As WIM has posted, our perception of whether a play is great or not rests too heavily on whether it is successful or not.  And, generally speaking, I would venture that the best predictor on whether a play is successful or not is whether prior plays were successful or not.  First, successful plays are an indicator that the offense is executing better than the defense.  Second, successful plays throw the defense off balance, and allow the offense to run more successful plays.

Another successful play that broke our pattern came at 1:23 on the video (9:56 remaining in the 3rd Q).  It was 3rd and 3 on the Stanford 27.  We line up in an "I" formation with tight splits.  Hogan fakes a handoff to Gaffney and hits Ty on a hitch route that goes for 23 yards.  Again, the announcers talked of how everyone thought we were going to run the ball on that down.

Similar thing.  How much of the success of this play call was due to the inherent nature of the play calling, and how much was due to the fact that our success on prior plays showed that we were the superior team (remember, we also manhandled ASU at home, until late in the game), and the fact that our earlier plays threw them off balance.

BC

[BostonCard]

A play that was instrumental in breaking this game open for Stanford was the first play of the second quarter (at 31:00 in the video).  It was 1st and 10 on the ASU 24.  We had been pounding the ball down ASU's throats on the previous drives.  We lined up in a power "I" formation and faked to Gaffney up the middle and then handed off to Ty on an "end around."  The ASU defense took the bait and Ty scored.  Even the game announcers said it was a great call.

Well, there are two questions here.  Suppose the play had been called but ASU doesn't take the bait and Ty gets stuffed behind the line of scrimmage.  Wouldn't the criticism have been "We were stuffing the ball down their throat, why did we have to get cute?"  Moreover, given that we were stuffing the ball down their throat, wouldn't it have been likely that we could have run the last 24 yards up the middle and still scored?  As WIM has posted, our perception of whether a play is great or not rests too heavily on whether it is successful or not.  And, generally speaking, I would venture that the best predictor on whether a play is successful or not is whether prior plays were successful or not.  First, successful plays are an indicator that the offense is executing better than the defense.  Second, successful plays throw the defense off balance, and allow the offense to run more successful plays.

Another successful play that broke our pattern came at 1:23 on the video (9:56 remaining in the 3rd Q).  It was 3rd and 3 on the Stanford 27.  We line up in an "I" formation with tight splits.  Hogan fakes a handoff to Gaffney and hits Ty on a hitch route that goes for 23 yards.  Again, the announcers talked of how everyone thought we were going to run the ball on that down.

Similar thing.  How much of the success of this play call was due to the inherent nature of the play calling, and how much was due to the fact that our success on prior plays showed that we were the superior team (remember, we also manhandled ASU at home, until late in the game), and the fact that our earlier plays threw them off balance.

BC

[StanFan88]

Maybe you cant adjust if the options aren't there?  No reliable short/intermediate targets, how can you "adjust" to them in crunch time?  I still think criticizing play-calling is influenced a lot by hindsight.  MMQ.

Is it MMQ if those comments were being made during the game?  Just asking.

If something isn't working, try something else.  The second-half gameplan against Michigan State NEEDED to be materially different because it was clear that they were stacking 8 or 9 in the box and trusting their corners to cover Montgomery and Rector 1 on 1.  There were plenty of other options, especially given that we had a decided speed advantage on the edges - jet sweeps, bubble screens, screen passes to Gaffney, flare passes, slants out of the slot, going four or five wide to spread them out and give Gaffney more room.  How many of those were run more than once in the second half?

Same goes for the Utah game.  No change from first to second half.

Stanford has a MAMMOTH playbook - last year we needed to use more of it when the usual plays weren't working.  Cost us at least two games.

If it ain't broke don't fix it, but if it is broke don't keep doing the same thing and expecting a different result.

[StanFan88]

Maybe you cant adjust if the options aren't there?  No reliable short/intermediate targets, how can you "adjust" to them in crunch time?  I still think criticizing play-calling is influenced a lot by hindsight.  MMQ.

Is it MMQ if those comments were being made during the game?  Just asking.

If something isn't working, try something else.  The second-half gameplan against Michigan State NEEDED to be materially different because it was clear that they were stacking 8 or 9 in the box and trusting their corners to cover Montgomery and Rector 1 on 1.  There were plenty of other options, especially given that we had a decided speed advantage on the edges - jet sweeps, bubble screens, screen passes to Gaffney, flare passes, slants out of the slot, going four or five wide to spread them out and give Gaffney more room.  How many of those were run more than once in the second half?

Same goes for the Utah game.  No change from first to second half.

Stanford has a MAMMOTH playbook - last year we needed to use more of it when the usual plays weren't working.  Cost us at least two games.

If it ain't broke don't fix it, but if it is broke don't keep doing the same thing and expecting a different result.

[Ratmandoo]

[quote author=ferrari link=topic=10423.msg95137#msg95137 date=1408938787]
Maybe you cant adjust if the options aren't there?  No reliable short/intermediate targets, how can you "adjust" to them in crunch time?  I still think criticizing play-calling is influenced a lot by hindsight.  MMQ.

Is it MMQ if those comments were being made during the game?  Just asking.

[/quote]

No, they're not. But what about all the times that you thought what Shaw was calling during the game was wrong but it WORKED? Everyone always remembers the times they were screaming about a play being called live that doesn't work out but never the reverse. Or, what about the times you've agreed with a Shaw play call that didn't work?

Stanford has a MAMMOTH playbook - last year we needed to use more of it when the usual plays weren't working.  Cost us at least two games.

But how many of the 11 games did we win because Shaw was stubborn (i.e. staying with the plays that we execute best)?

[Ratmandoo]

[quote author=ferrari link=topic=10423.msg95137#msg95137 date=1408938787]
Maybe you cant adjust if the options aren't there?  No reliable short/intermediate targets, how can you "adjust" to them in crunch time?  I still think criticizing play-calling is influenced a lot by hindsight.  MMQ.

Is it MMQ if those comments were being made during the game?  Just asking.

[/quote]

No, they're not. But what about all the times that you thought what Shaw was calling during the game was wrong but it WORKED? Everyone always remembers the times they were screaming about a play being called live that doesn't work out but never the reverse. Or, what about the times you've agreed with a Shaw play call that didn't work?

Stanford has a MAMMOTH playbook - last year we needed to use more of it when the usual plays weren't working.  Cost us at least two games.

But how many of the 11 games did we win because Shaw was stubborn (i.e. staying with the plays that we execute best)?

[washingtonismoney]

Let's talk Utah end-of-game playcalling. I think if you walk through the entire scenario it becomes more understandable why Shaw et al. did what they did (though I still think they made errors). First, though, I think some of the criticism is a mite ironic. Many of the same people who criticize Utah playcalling also feel that Shaw is too predictable and conservative. Say whatever else you will about the end of the Utah game, but it certainly wasn't ... predictable and conservative. One might argue that this should force a bit of a re-think, but I'm not too hopeful.

Anyway, let's get specific on Utah. Most people seem to have a problem with the pass-over-run call, so we'll examine that:

BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS:

1. One thing we knew about Stanford, up to that point, was that Kevin Hogan is very good at end-of-game situations. In 2012, he was excellent against Oregon State, Oregon, and UCLA (the second time) to pull out wins where there might have been losses. He also came up with some clutch plays against ASU in the following year, though his performance was a bit weak against UW. Overall, though, you'd have to say that more often than not, if the game was on the line, Hogan makes plays to win it. That gives you more confidence, of course, when you put the game in his hands.

2. On the other hand, of course, Stanford is built to get that yard on 3rd-and-1 and 4th-and-1. That also gives you confidence in grounding-and-pounding. (In a weird way, you might also think that gives you confidence in zagging when everyone thinks you'll zig.)

3. Let's review the game up to that point as well. The first half was not so great, but Hogan was 11-16 for 139 yards in the second half. By comparison, Gaffney had 8 carries for 36 yards -- also solid, but I think a bit worse than Hogan.

So that's the publicly-available information. Of course, we don't know a lot of other factors that might play into Shaw's decision. Was Gaffney (or Hogan) hurt? What happened in practice in the week leading up to the game? Was Stanford particularly weak in short yardage, for example? Or was there a redzone passing play that was being executed well?

We also don't know what Shaw knew about Utah. Did Utah have exploitable tendencies in the redzone? A particularly bad matchup? Something else? This is part of the reason why critiquing playcalling is so difficult.

LET'S WALK THROUGH THE SITUATION

OK. It's 3rd-and-2 at the Utah 6 with one timeout and around (I believe) 1:10 on the clock. The prevailing sentiment is that you run. Here's what might happen (a bit simplified):

1. Gaffney scores: Yay! You (probably) win the game. This is pretty unlikely; most 3rd-and-short plays produce a short gain.
2. No gain: OK. Clock is ticking. What do you do? You might, for example, call a timeout and run again. If that ends up converting, you have (I'll estimate) around :45 seconds at around the 5 or so. Because you don't have a  timeout, it's three passes for the win. Of course, if you don't convert, you lose.
3. Conversion: OK. You've converted. It's probably about a yard, meaning that you're at the 4 or 5 or so with just under a minute. The clock will start pretty quickly, meaning that you'll probably think about burning a timeout. If you do, it's three pass attempts for the win. Otherwise, you get one running attempt, if you'd like. The problem is that running it in from four yards out is not exactly guaranteed. You'll probably have to pass it to win.

Notice what most of these scenarios have in common? If you answered, "you'll eventually have to pass in order to win," you're correct. So the question is, "which sort of pass attempts maximize your chance of winning?" As we know, it's harder to pass the closer you get to the endzone. And it's not exactly crazy to think that passing on 3rd-and-2 is unexpected (and gains some surprise), while passing at 1st-and-goal at the 5 is conventional (and has little surprise value.)

I basically think it's non-obvious what the correct decision is here. So I tend to defer to the people on the ground, especially when their results are at the top of their profession.

THE GENERAL POINT

That being said, I don't think Shaw escapes blame here. Not necessarily for the pass decision, but the rest of the situation. As it turned out, after the first pass attempt, Shaw burned his timeout, which removes a ton of options and exposes him to a lot of risk (it's awfully annoying to get stuck at the 1.) In the best case scenario, that's a necessary evil to make sure everyone's ready and prepared to run a play. But that scenario implicates Shaw's coaching anyway -- his preparation rather than his in-game coaching.

The other problem with the situation is who was on the field. I think it was the fourth down play that targeted Eddie Plantaric, which is goofy. Do you really want your undefeated season riding on a converted defensive end? I'll save you the effort of completing that rhetorical question. That issue was endemic to the offense throughout the year -- too many personnel groups featuring too many players whose standard was well off our best. Did we really need to see Rollins Stallworth as often as we did? Dear reader, we did not.

And, in terms of the specific play, why not have a play-action fake at all? I would've preferred that, although I don't think it's a brobdingnagian difference.

Anyway, if you're fixating on the Utah end-of-game, Freud would tell you you're being illogical. I would guess, at most, it changed the team's chances of winning by, like, 2 or 3%. And if you're complaining about your coach spoiling .02 or .03 of an expected win, you're really admitting that you have an excellent coach and you're being hyper-critical.

And, at any rate, if you really wanted to focus on coaching in the Utah game, why not the defensive side of the ball? Why'd they give up a 50-yard completion for a touchdown on 3rd-and-17 to tie the game 14-14? This has been a surprisingly frequent problem with the defense since 2012. More egregious was the team's inability to defend that swing pass to the running back, which had only been hurting the team since Arizona...or was it UCLA in the Pac-12 championship?...or was it Washington the week before? The team's braintrust had ample warning that the play was a damaging one, and wasn't able to correct it. Now that's poor coaching.

(Obviously the overall record of the defense is good. But then, why not extend that charity to the whole team? In truth, the Utah game was a confluence of a lot of unforced errors -- Jordan Williamson missing an easy field goal to goal up 17-7, after which Utah marched right down the field to tie at 14-14...or the number of fumbles lost...the false starts...not to mention coaching difficulties. Everyone screwed up! It's weird to focus on a couple of plays, even if you think they were botched.)

[washingtonismoney]

Let's talk Utah end-of-game playcalling. I think if you walk through the entire scenario it becomes more understandable why Shaw et al. did what they did (though I still think they made errors). First, though, I think some of the criticism is a mite ironic. Many of the same people who criticize Utah playcalling also feel that Shaw is too predictable and conservative. Say whatever else you will about the end of the Utah game, but it certainly wasn't ... predictable and conservative. One might argue that this should force a bit of a re-think, but I'm not too hopeful.

Anyway, let's get specific on Utah. Most people seem to have a problem with the pass-over-run call, so we'll examine that:

BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS:

1. One thing we knew about Stanford, up to that point, was that Kevin Hogan is very good at end-of-game situations. In 2012, he was excellent against Oregon State, Oregon, and UCLA (the second time) to pull out wins where there might have been losses. He also came up with some clutch plays against ASU in the following year, though his performance was a bit weak against UW. Overall, though, you'd have to say that more often than not, if the game was on the line, Hogan makes plays to win it. That gives you more confidence, of course, when you put the game in his hands.

2. On the other hand, of course, Stanford is built to get that yard on 3rd-and-1 and 4th-and-1. That also gives you confidence in grounding-and-pounding. (In a weird way, you might also think that gives you confidence in zagging when everyone thinks you'll zig.)

3. Let's review the game up to that point as well. The first half was not so great, but Hogan was 11-16 for 139 yards in the second half. By comparison, Gaffney had 8 carries for 36 yards -- also solid, but I think a bit worse than Hogan.

So that's the publicly-available information. Of course, we don't know a lot of other factors that might play into Shaw's decision. Was Gaffney (or Hogan) hurt? What happened in practice in the week leading up to the game? Was Stanford particularly weak in short yardage, for example? Or was there a redzone passing play that was being executed well?

We also don't know what Shaw knew about Utah. Did Utah have exploitable tendencies in the redzone? A particularly bad matchup? Something else? This is part of the reason why critiquing playcalling is so difficult.

LET'S WALK THROUGH THE SITUATION

OK. It's 3rd-and-2 at the Utah 6 with one timeout and around (I believe) 1:10 on the clock. The prevailing sentiment is that you run. Here's what might happen (a bit simplified):

1. Gaffney scores: Yay! You (probably) win the game. This is pretty unlikely; most 3rd-and-short plays produce a short gain.
2. No gain: OK. Clock is ticking. What do you do? You might, for example, call a timeout and run again. If that ends up converting, you have (I'll estimate) around :45 seconds at around the 5 or so. Because you don't have a  timeout, it's three passes for the win. Of course, if you don't convert, you lose.
3. Conversion: OK. You've converted. It's probably about a yard, meaning that you're at the 4 or 5 or so with just under a minute. The clock will start pretty quickly, meaning that you'll probably think about burning a timeout. If you do, it's three pass attempts for the win. Otherwise, you get one running attempt, if you'd like. The problem is that running it in from four yards out is not exactly guaranteed. You'll probably have to pass it to win.

Notice what most of these scenarios have in common? If you answered, "you'll eventually have to pass in order to win," you're correct. So the question is, "which sort of pass attempts maximize your chance of winning?" As we know, it's harder to pass the closer you get to the endzone. And it's not exactly crazy to think that passing on 3rd-and-2 is unexpected (and gains some surprise), while passing at 1st-and-goal at the 5 is conventional (and has little surprise value.)

I basically think it's non-obvious what the correct decision is here. So I tend to defer to the people on the ground, especially when their results are at the top of their profession.

THE GENERAL POINT

That being said, I don't think Shaw escapes blame here. Not necessarily for the pass decision, but the rest of the situation. As it turned out, after the first pass attempt, Shaw burned his timeout, which removes a ton of options and exposes him to a lot of risk (it's awfully annoying to get stuck at the 1.) In the best case scenario, that's a necessary evil to make sure everyone's ready and prepared to run a play. But that scenario implicates Shaw's coaching anyway -- his preparation rather than his in-game coaching.

The other problem with the situation is who was on the field. I think it was the fourth down play that targeted Eddie Plantaric, which is goofy. Do you really want your undefeated season riding on a converted defensive end? I'll save you the effort of completing that rhetorical question. That issue was endemic to the offense throughout the year -- too many personnel groups featuring too many players whose standard was well off our best. Did we really need to see Rollins Stallworth as often as we did? Dear reader, we did not.

And, in terms of the specific play, why not have a play-action fake at all? I would've preferred that, although I don't think it's a brobdingnagian difference.

Anyway, if you're fixating on the Utah end-of-game, Freud would tell you you're being illogical. I would guess, at most, it changed the team's chances of winning by, like, 2 or 3%. And if you're complaining about your coach spoiling .02 or .03 of an expected win, you're really admitting that you have an excellent coach and you're being hyper-critical.

And, at any rate, if you really wanted to focus on coaching in the Utah game, why not the defensive side of the ball? Why'd they give up a 50-yard completion for a touchdown on 3rd-and-17 to tie the game 14-14? This has been a surprisingly frequent problem with the defense since 2012. More egregious was the team's inability to defend that swing pass to the running back, which had only been hurting the team since Arizona...or was it UCLA in the Pac-12 championship?...or was it Washington the week before? The team's braintrust had ample warning that the play was a damaging one, and wasn't able to correct it. Now that's poor coaching.

(Obviously the overall record of the defense is good. But then, why not extend that charity to the whole team? In truth, the Utah game was a confluence of a lot of unforced errors -- Jordan Williamson missing an easy field goal to goal up 17-7, after which Utah marched right down the field to tie at 14-14...or the number of fumbles lost...the false starts...not to mention coaching difficulties. Everyone screwed up! It's weird to focus on a couple of plays, even if you think they were botched.)

[needle]

The only thing I would say is that a play call (short-to-intermediate pass) relying on a team weakness (short-to-intermediate passing game) in an absolutely crucial game situation is always going to get criticized.

That said, in the Rose Bowl we had a bit of the opposite sort of criticism, when a team strength (running game) got stuffed repeatedly and the play-calling didn't adjust.

[needle]

The only thing I would say is that a play call (short-to-intermediate pass) relying on a team weakness (short-to-intermediate passing game) in an absolutely crucial game situation is always going to get criticized.

That said, in the Rose Bowl we had a bit of the opposite sort of criticism, when a team strength (running game) got stuffed repeatedly and the play-calling didn't adjust.

[CTcard]

Let's talk Utah end-of-game playcalling.

I very much appreciate that you have laid out in detail your argument and thoughts here. Far more interesting than merely stating "A is terrible" or "No, A is great".

I thought a few details might be of interest.

You can watch the whole fiasco of our final four plays at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-e61_FZWOo

1. Stanford lined up for their first and goal play at the 14 yard line with 2 minutes and 20 seconds left in the game. I think that a fair amount of time had already ticked off since the previous first down completion. That was plenty of time to run the offense but there was little sense of urgency to get moving to preserve options for later.

2. The first down marker was at the 4, so if Stanford had converted they would have likely had about 3 yards to go - certainly not 5.

3. The third down play was under center in a heavy-run formation and was a play-action pass. It was thrown to Hopkins (not Plantaric) which is probably not a meaningful difference to your argument.

I think the #1 target for the play was Hewitt rolling out to the right flat. He was covered. I think the #2 target (though this is much less clear in watching Hogan) was Cajuste who cut across the middle of the field and had his man picked by Murphy who was lined up as a TE. While the other safety (backer?) picked up Cajuste, he might have been open enough if Hogan waited a split second more.  Hopkins was the only other receiver out on a pattern (assuming Murphy wasn't a real option), he was kind of open though the pass was far off target to the wrong side.

That's the sort of play that would have benefited from a real blocking-catching capable TE, though the throw would have to be on target as well.

4. The fourth down play was a passing formation, shot gun, four-wide set where nobody picked up the blitzing MLB and we somehow ran too many receivers to the same spot on the field. Bit of a mess. The target was Cajuste.

5. Broader issues.

The defensive side of the ball.

In all three losses last year there were some significant let downs on defense as well as offense. Utah had 410 total yards and was moving the ball well until late third quarter. SC moved at will in the first half with three long scoring drives to start the game. MSU also had 400 yards of offense and their best passing game of the year against us. The good news is that in all cases the defense eventually adjusted and none of those teams had much fourth quarter offense against us.

I certainly would not say that the defense lost those games, but they were three of the poorer performances on the year.


"too many personnel groups featuring too many players whose standard was well off our best."

From what I can tell Shaw seems pretty committed to the various personnel packages. It's pretty easy to see the pluses and minuses there. They set up personnel advantages for particular plays, newer players get trained to do specific things well, and it keeps everybody involved and improving. On the other hand, they tend to tip off what you are likely to do and they may result in having less than your best personnel on the field.

The Hogan packages in 2012 worked pretty well, both by themselves and in preparing Hogan. The Lloyd packages in 2013 less so.

Presumably with more capable TEs we could run a bigger variety of stuff out of some of the heavy formations - it will be interesting to see whether that happens this year.

[CTcard]

Let's talk Utah end-of-game playcalling.

I very much appreciate that you have laid out in detail your argument and thoughts here. Far more interesting than merely stating "A is terrible" or "No, A is great".

I thought a few details might be of interest.

You can watch the whole fiasco of our final four plays at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-e61_FZWOo

1. Stanford lined up for their first and goal play at the 14 yard line with 2 minutes and 20 seconds left in the game. I think that a fair amount of time had already ticked off since the previous first down completion. That was plenty of time to run the offense but there was little sense of urgency to get moving to preserve options for later.

2. The first down marker was at the 4, so if Stanford had converted they would have likely had about 3 yards to go - certainly not 5.

3. The third down play was under center in a heavy-run formation and was a play-action pass. It was thrown to Hopkins (not Plantaric) which is probably not a meaningful difference to your argument.

I think the #1 target for the play was Hewitt rolling out to the right flat. He was covered. I think the #2 target (though this is much less clear in watching Hogan) was Cajuste who cut across the middle of the field and had his man picked by Murphy who was lined up as a TE. While the other safety (backer?) picked up Cajuste, he might have been open enough if Hogan waited a split second more.  Hopkins was the only other receiver out on a pattern (assuming Murphy wasn't a real option), he was kind of open though the pass was far off target to the wrong side.

That's the sort of play that would have benefited from a real blocking-catching capable TE, though the throw would have to be on target as well.

4. The fourth down play was a passing formation, shot gun, four-wide set where nobody picked up the blitzing MLB and we somehow ran too many receivers to the same spot on the field. Bit of a mess. The target was Cajuste.

5. Broader issues.

The defensive side of the ball.

In all three losses last year there were some significant let downs on defense as well as offense. Utah had 410 total yards and was moving the ball well until late third quarter. SC moved at will in the first half with three long scoring drives to start the game. MSU also had 400 yards of offense and their best passing game of the year against us. The good news is that in all cases the defense eventually adjusted and none of those teams had much fourth quarter offense against us.

I certainly would not say that the defense lost those games, but they were three of the poorer performances on the year.


"too many personnel groups featuring too many players whose standard was well off our best."

From what I can tell Shaw seems pretty committed to the various personnel packages. It's pretty easy to see the pluses and minuses there. They set up personnel advantages for particular plays, newer players get trained to do specific things well, and it keeps everybody involved and improving. On the other hand, they tend to tip off what you are likely to do and they may result in having less than your best personnel on the field.

The Hogan packages in 2012 worked pretty well, both by themselves and in preparing Hogan. The Lloyd packages in 2013 less so.

Presumably with more capable TEs we could run a bigger variety of stuff out of some of the heavy formations - it will be interesting to see whether that happens this year.

[washingtonismoney]

From what I can tell Shaw seems pretty committed to the various personnel packages. It's pretty easy to see the pluses and minuses there. They set up personnel advantages for particular plays, newer players get trained to do specific things well, and it keeps everybody involved and improving. On the other hand, they tend to tip off what you are likely to do and they may result in having less than your best personnel on the field.

Don't have a problem with multiple personnel in general. It's a tradeoff, as you say. The question is, what are you trading off? If you're spelling Michael Rector with Jordan Pratt, that seems acceptable. But the team went much, much deeper than I think is wise -- your Rollins Stallworths or Eddie Plantarics. At a certain point the tradeoffs don't favor you and I think Stanford's offense too often reached that point last year.

It should be interesting to see how that plays out this year. Wideouts are deep and established. We should see some improvement from TEs, though it's unclear how much (or how deep we are). There are a lot of names are RB, but again it's not clear how good they are (or how deep they are). So there will be a lot of decisions to make and information to process on Shaw et al.'s part.

[washingtonismoney]

From what I can tell Shaw seems pretty committed to the various personnel packages. It's pretty easy to see the pluses and minuses there. They set up personnel advantages for particular plays, newer players get trained to do specific things well, and it keeps everybody involved and improving. On the other hand, they tend to tip off what you are likely to do and they may result in having less than your best personnel on the field.

Don't have a problem with multiple personnel in general. It's a tradeoff, as you say. The question is, what are you trading off? If you're spelling Michael Rector with Jordan Pratt, that seems acceptable. But the team went much, much deeper than I think is wise -- your Rollins Stallworths or Eddie Plantarics. At a certain point the tradeoffs don't favor you and I think Stanford's offense too often reached that point last year.

It should be interesting to see how that plays out this year. Wideouts are deep and established. We should see some improvement from TEs, though it's unclear how much (or how deep we are). There are a lot of names are RB, but again it's not clear how good they are (or how deep they are). So there will be a lot of decisions to make and information to process on Shaw et al.'s part.

[teejers1]

Good god, WIM, how can you watch that sequence and be anything other than nauseous? 
If you're really worried about the clock, how about getting the plays in more quickly?  And how about NOT burning a TO?  And did you notice that Stanford ran the same play after calling the TO that it was poised to run before the TO came from the sideline?  AAARRRGGHHHH!

And what that clip doesn't show you is how Stanford got into the position.  I think it FINALLY began to run the ball effectively, IIRC (a 6 minute drive on that one possession, anyway); and in all events, Stanford picked up 8 yards on the first 2 running plays.  You can't get 2 more in 2 plays (with 2 TOs left?).  And once you pass on third down, you basically force a pass on fourth down - do you think Shaw would run it on fourth and 2, if he wouldn't on third and 2?  The last series was a GIANT CLUSTERBOMB

Just makes me sick to be reminded about that game situation, because the reality is this:  the offensive braintrust completely locked up in that end of game situation.  The Rose Bowl - remember when Stanford needed to go the length of the field and the Cardinal took forever to run four running plays with no sense of urgency? - was eerily reminiscent of the Utah end game, in terms of the sideline having no clue.  (And btw, WIM, I think the play selection altered Stanford's chances of winning that game from about 75% to about 20%.  You may think that's okay . . . I'm on the other side).

CTC, thanks for nothing with that link.  "Fiasco," indeed.

I hope the staff has learned from last season.  We shall see.

P.S.  While I agree about predictability being a general criticism of the offense under this regime, the criticism that really has bite is the one that the sideline is calling plays - whether pass or run - that are indefensible in the given situation.  Utah is in that category; as is SC, and maybe the entire last series against MSU (not so much running the ball - which I think was futile at that point - but doing so with ZERO SENSE OF URGENCY/HURRY UP OFFENSE).  That was just so wrong/indefensible in that situation.  So the goal for this year is to eliminate the AYFKM calls, which I happen to think is a pretty modest goal for an offensive brain trust.

[teejers1]

Good god, WIM, how can you watch that sequence and be anything other than nauseous? 
If you're really worried about the clock, how about getting the plays in more quickly?  And how about NOT burning a TO?  And did you notice that Stanford ran the same play after calling the TO that it was poised to run before the TO came from the sideline?  AAARRRGGHHHH!

And what that clip doesn't show you is how Stanford got into the position.  I think it FINALLY began to run the ball effectively, IIRC (a 6 minute drive on that one possession, anyway); and in all events, Stanford picked up 8 yards on the first 2 running plays.  You can't get 2 more in 2 plays (with 2 TOs left?).  And once you pass on third down, you basically force a pass on fourth down - do you think Shaw would run it on fourth and 2, if he wouldn't on third and 2?  The last series was a GIANT CLUSTERBOMB

Just makes me sick to be reminded about that game situation, because the reality is this:  the offensive braintrust completely locked up in that end of game situation.  The Rose Bowl - remember when Stanford needed to go the length of the field and the Cardinal took forever to run four running plays with no sense of urgency? - was eerily reminiscent of the Utah end game, in terms of the sideline having no clue.  (And btw, WIM, I think the play selection altered Stanford's chances of winning that game from about 75% to about 20%.  You may think that's okay . . . I'm on the other side).

CTC, thanks for nothing with that link.  "Fiasco," indeed.

I hope the staff has learned from last season.  We shall see.

P.S.  While I agree about predictability being a general criticism of the offense under this regime, the criticism that really has bite is the one that the sideline is calling plays - whether pass or run - that are indefensible in the given situation.  Utah is in that category; as is SC, and maybe the entire last series against MSU (not so much running the ball - which I think was futile at that point - but doing so with ZERO SENSE OF URGENCY/HURRY UP OFFENSE).  That was just so wrong/indefensible in that situation.  So the goal for this year is to eliminate the AYFKM calls, which I happen to think is a pretty modest goal for an offensive brain trust.