[BostonCard]

There was no guarantee Stanford would have won the game against Cal if he had decided not to throw the ball on that down.  In contrast, the Notre Dame game was "won" very late in regulation.  Hell, you could take 3 knees, burn a timeout, and line up for a chippie FG as time expires.  So, Harbaugh's decision to run the ball very much put a W in peril (ND had 2 shots to throw into the end zone late - plus, they had been abusing our secondary all game long).  Thus, that decision was worse than the Big Game decision.


BTW,  I agree that the pass play to the end zone was a bad call there, but primarily because even if it succeeds, Cal still has time to get into game winning FG range.  Toby was on the sideline on that play, iirc, as he had just made an incredible catch and run to get Stanford into "go ahead TD" scoring territory.  I would have run something safer to allow Toby to get his rest, and then trot him back out there and ride him into the end zone.



Lex, as far as redshirting, at some point that season (4 or 5 games?), Luck wanted to RS and keep his eligibility (or at least that's what I heard).  So, I don't put that choice all on Harbaugh.  Having Tavita start the season was defensible; but yes, I would have burned Luck's shirt.  He was known as The Truth from the first day of practice, wasn't he?

The math is not that complicated... you have to balance the possibility of somehow failing to score (a bad snap on your chippie field goal, your RB fumbling it through the end zone, the defense mounting a stand on third and goal, etc.) versus the probability that the other team marches down the field and scores.  So I think you are right in terms of percentages.  The percentage of extra points converted in college is 97%, which is a good proxy for a chip shot field goal, while there is about a ~15% chance of scoring a touchdown when starting on your own 25 (raised a little bit by the fact that ND would have had four downs, but a bit lower because of the amount of time left).  Still, it is really hard to "leave points on the board" as they say, and I think the criticism Harbaugh would have come under had he instructed his players to take a knee short of the goal line to chew up clock, and then watched something go wrong is why most coaches in that position take the touchdown.

I still agree with Giants that the 09 Big Game was probably a worse call (or, at least a call that made more of a difference).  Harbaugh was holding a strong hand and would likely have won the game against ND regardless; the playcalling against Cal was a much more high-leverage situation.  Stanford was down 6 points and had first and 10 with about 1:42 left at the Cal 13.  That's slightly better than a 50/50 probability of scoring a touchdown (a bit higher because you have four downs to do it).  Plus, you kind of want to burn a little clock so that if you score, Cal doesn't have a chance to come back and kick a winning field goal (you know, the same scenario as the ND game).  Toby Gerhart was averaging 6.8 ypc that game; Andrew Luck was 10/28 (he then threw an incomplete and an interception) it should have been a no brainer to run Gerhart on first and second downs.

BC

[BostonCard]

There was no guarantee Stanford would have won the game against Cal if he had decided not to throw the ball on that down.  In contrast, the Notre Dame game was "won" very late in regulation.  Hell, you could take 3 knees, burn a timeout, and line up for a chippie FG as time expires.  So, Harbaugh's decision to run the ball very much put a W in peril (ND had 2 shots to throw into the end zone late - plus, they had been abusing our secondary all game long).  Thus, that decision was worse than the Big Game decision.


BTW,  I agree that the pass play to the end zone was a bad call there, but primarily because even if it succeeds, Cal still has time to get into game winning FG range.  Toby was on the sideline on that play, iirc, as he had just made an incredible catch and run to get Stanford into "go ahead TD" scoring territory.  I would have run something safer to allow Toby to get his rest, and then trot him back out there and ride him into the end zone.



Lex, as far as redshirting, at some point that season (4 or 5 games?), Luck wanted to RS and keep his eligibility (or at least that's what I heard).  So, I don't put that choice all on Harbaugh.  Having Tavita start the season was defensible; but yes, I would have burned Luck's shirt.  He was known as The Truth from the first day of practice, wasn't he?

The math is not that complicated... you have to balance the possibility of somehow failing to score (a bad snap on your chippie field goal, your RB fumbling it through the end zone, the defense mounting a stand on third and goal, etc.) versus the probability that the other team marches down the field and scores.  So I think you are right in terms of percentages.  The percentage of extra points converted in college is 97%, which is a good proxy for a chip shot field goal, while there is about a ~15% chance of scoring a touchdown when starting on your own 25 (raised a little bit by the fact that ND would have had four downs, but a bit lower because of the amount of time left).  Still, it is really hard to "leave points on the board" as they say, and I think the criticism Harbaugh would have come under had he instructed his players to take a knee short of the goal line to chew up clock, and then watched something go wrong is why most coaches in that position take the touchdown.

I still agree with Giants that the 09 Big Game was probably a worse call (or, at least a call that made more of a difference).  Harbaugh was holding a strong hand and would likely have won the game against ND regardless; the playcalling against Cal was a much more high-leverage situation.  Stanford was down 6 points and had first and 10 with about 1:42 left at the Cal 13.  That's slightly better than a 50/50 probability of scoring a touchdown (a bit higher because you have four downs to do it).  Plus, you kind of want to burn a little clock so that if you score, Cal doesn't have a chance to come back and kick a winning field goal (you know, the same scenario as the ND game).  Toby Gerhart was averaging 6.8 ypc that game; Andrew Luck was 10/28 (he then threw an incomplete and an interception) it should have been a no brainer to run Gerhart on first and second downs.

BC