[teejers1]

To really consider it "not much time on the clock", we would have had to score (TD or field goal) with less than a minute left and 0 or 1 time outs, and running twice doesn't accomplish that.  Running twice and getting a first down would have, but we were averaging about 3 yards per carry.
BC

It was 2nd and 4.  

Plus, even if unsuccessful twice, 4th and 1 (or inches) is very intriguing . . .

[teejers1]

To really consider it "not much time on the clock", we would have had to score (TD or field goal) with less than a minute left and 0 or 1 time outs, and running twice doesn't accomplish that.  Running twice and getting a first down would have, but we were averaging about 3 yards per carry.
BC

It was 2nd and 4.  

Plus, even if unsuccessful twice, 4th and 1 (or inches) is very intriguing . . .

[BostonCard]

Sorry, no way do you go for it on fourth and inches when you have a chance to take the lead with less than three minutes left in the game.  Come on, that would have been an AYFKM moment.

My point is that your goal was to maximize the probability of getting a first down or touchdown,  you really can’t blame going with the QB who has been getting 8 yards per attempt, not the running back who has been getting 3 ypc.

After all, wasn’t it you who called the coaches decision to takiethe ball out of Andrew Luck’s arm and running the ball on the ground in the Fiesta Bowl an AYFKM moment?

Like I said, easy to say we should have zigged when we zagged.

BC

[BostonCard]

Sorry, no way do you go for it on fourth and inches when you have a chance to take the lead with less than three minutes left in the game.  Come on, that would have been an AYFKM moment.

My point is that your goal was to maximize the probability of getting a first down or touchdown,  you really can’t blame going with the QB who has been getting 8 yards per attempt, not the running back who has been getting 3 ypc.

After all, wasn’t it you who called the coaches decision to takiethe ball out of Andrew Luck’s arm and running the ball on the ground in the Fiesta Bowl an AYFKM moment?

Like I said, easy to say we should have zigged when we zagged.

BC

[teejers1]

Sorry, no way do you go for it on fourth and inches when you have a chance to take the lead with less than three minutes left in the game.  Come on, that would have been an AYFKM moment.

My point is that your goal was to maximize the probability of getting a first down or touchdown,  you really can’t blame going with the QB who has been getting 8 yards per attempt, not the running back who has been getting 3 ypc.

After all, wasn’t it you who called the coaches decision to takiethe ball out of Andrew Luck’s arm and running the ball on the ground in the Fiesta Bowl an AYFKM moment?

Like I said, easy to say we should have zigged when we zagged.

BC

If YPA vs. YPC is going to be your metric for evaluating the plays to call for getting a first down, then you almost always will pass the ball.  The number of times a Stanford team has had a better YPC than a YPA in a particular game is very small.  It may have happened a handful of times in the last several decades (though I can't recall any off the top of my head).   

You also assume two runs don't get you a first down (which you admit is the most important thing - and I agree with that).

IF Stanford had run twice, and IF Cal had burned two timeouts (or even one just on fourth down) and Stanford faced fourth and inches, then NO, I would not have called a decision to go for it AYFKM.  Not even close.  Because I could support Shaw believing and acting on the conviction that (a) a FG with 2+ minutes left and Cal with the ball is not as strong a position as (b) Stanford with first and 10, the ability to run out the clock and at worst attempt a GW FG at the end of regulation from where they were.  [If Stanford had the 2014 D, then yes, kick the FG, no question].

P.S.  My beef in the Fiesta Bowl was first that he didn't let Andrew continue to move Stanford into the end zone on that last drive in regulation (Stanford was going through Okie State's D like $hit through a goose at that point); but second, if he wanted to take away the risk of an INT, at least run the ball or let Andrew keep it on roll out to get closer.  Instead, we all sat there in disbelief as the clock wound down 40+ seconds so Stanford could line up a 37 yard GW FGA with a kicker returning from injury who had already missed a FGA earlier in the game.  So often Shaw does not maximize the team's chances to win, especially when making strategic decisions on offense.

[teejers1]

Sorry, no way do you go for it on fourth and inches when you have a chance to take the lead with less than three minutes left in the game.  Come on, that would have been an AYFKM moment.

My point is that your goal was to maximize the probability of getting a first down or touchdown,  you really can’t blame going with the QB who has been getting 8 yards per attempt, not the running back who has been getting 3 ypc.

After all, wasn’t it you who called the coaches decision to takiethe ball out of Andrew Luck’s arm and running the ball on the ground in the Fiesta Bowl an AYFKM moment?

Like I said, easy to say we should have zigged when we zagged.

BC

If YPA vs. YPC is going to be your metric for evaluating the plays to call for getting a first down, then you almost always will pass the ball.  The number of times a Stanford team has had a better YPC than a YPA in a particular game is very small.  It may have happened a handful of times in the last several decades (though I can't recall any off the top of my head).   

You also assume two runs don't get you a first down (which you admit is the most important thing - and I agree with that).

IF Stanford had run twice, and IF Cal had burned two timeouts (or even one just on fourth down) and Stanford faced fourth and inches, then NO, I would not have called a decision to go for it AYFKM.  Not even close.  Because I could support Shaw believing and acting on the conviction that (a) a FG with 2+ minutes left and Cal with the ball is not as strong a position as (b) Stanford with first and 10, the ability to run out the clock and at worst attempt a GW FG at the end of regulation from where they were.  [If Stanford had the 2014 D, then yes, kick the FG, no question].

P.S.  My beef in the Fiesta Bowl was first that he didn't let Andrew continue to move Stanford into the end zone on that last drive in regulation (Stanford was going through Okie State's D like $hit through a goose at that point); but second, if he wanted to take away the risk of an INT, at least run the ball or let Andrew keep it on roll out to get closer.  Instead, we all sat there in disbelief as the clock wound down 40+ seconds so Stanford could line up a 37 yard GW FGA with a kicker returning from injury who had already missed a FGA earlier in the game.  So often Shaw does not maximize the team's chances to win, especially when making strategic decisions on offense.

[BostonCard]

The issue is that you are talking about the probability of maximizing success on a specific play, with limited follow-on effects, not of optimizing the overall success of the game, which generally is going to go down if you do nothing but pass.  So yes, it is of course very important to both throw and pass over the course of the game, even though running plays are generally going to get you fewer yards per play than passing plays.

However, in this specific issue, we were facing second and four.  That is generally a favorable down, where you can run it and reasonably expect to get a first down, or hope you catch the defense cheating for the run and throw for a big play.  Given that our passing game was much more effective against Cal than our running game, it was a perfectly defensible choice.  Running it twice would have also been a perfectly defensible choice.  I haven't gone through the permutations based on the distribution of outcomes we had against Cal, but I suspect they wouldn't have strongly favored one approach over the other.

Moreover, the initial reason everyone cited for running the football was that it would have allowed us to run an additional 40 seconds off the game clock. But that would not have made a damned bit of difference, since Cal scored in 1 minute 7 seconds, which was more than enough time even if we had chosen to run twice.  Even running five consecutive times (getting a first down and then running every time in the next set of downs) would still probably have given Cal enough time to score since they would have used their three time outs, so they would have gotten the ball back with about 1 minute 30 and no time outs, which was still more time than they needed to score (though of course they would have blown some time after the sack, which is why I say "probably").

BC

[BostonCard]

The issue is that you are talking about the probability of maximizing success on a specific play, with limited follow-on effects, not of optimizing the overall success of the game, which generally is going to go down if you do nothing but pass.  So yes, it is of course very important to both throw and pass over the course of the game, even though running plays are generally going to get you fewer yards per play than passing plays.

However, in this specific issue, we were facing second and four.  That is generally a favorable down, where you can run it and reasonably expect to get a first down, or hope you catch the defense cheating for the run and throw for a big play.  Given that our passing game was much more effective against Cal than our running game, it was a perfectly defensible choice.  Running it twice would have also been a perfectly defensible choice.  I haven't gone through the permutations based on the distribution of outcomes we had against Cal, but I suspect they wouldn't have strongly favored one approach over the other.

Moreover, the initial reason everyone cited for running the football was that it would have allowed us to run an additional 40 seconds off the game clock. But that would not have made a damned bit of difference, since Cal scored in 1 minute 7 seconds, which was more than enough time even if we had chosen to run twice.  Even running five consecutive times (getting a first down and then running every time in the next set of downs) would still probably have given Cal enough time to score since they would have used their three time outs, so they would have gotten the ball back with about 1 minute 30 and no time outs, which was still more time than they needed to score (though of course they would have blown some time after the sack, which is why I say "probably").

BC

[76lsjumb]

Sorry, no way do you go for it on fourth and inches when you have a chance to take the lead with less than three minutes left in the game.  Come on, that would have been an AYFKM moment.

My point is that your goal was to maximize the probability of getting a first down or touchdown,  you really can’t blame going with the QB who has been getting 8 yards per attempt, not the running back who has been getting 3 ypc.

After all, wasn’t it you who called the coaches decision to takiethe ball out of Andrew Luck’s arm and running the ball on the ground in the Fiesta Bowl an AYFKM moment?

Like I said, easy to say we should have zigged when we zagged.

BC

If YPA vs. YPC is going to be your metric for evaluating the plays to call for getting a first down, then you almost always will pass the ball.  The number of times a Stanford team has had a better YPC than a YPA in a particular game is very small.  It may have happened a handful of times in the last several decades (though I can't recall any off the top of my head).   

You also assume two runs don't get you a first down (which you admit is the most important thing - and I agree with that).

IF Stanford had run twice, and IF Cal had burned two timeouts (or even one just on fourth down) and Stanford faced fourth and inches, then NO, I would not have called a decision to go for it AYFKM.  Not even close.  Because I could support Shaw believing and acting on the conviction that (a) a FG with 2+ minutes left and Cal with the ball is not as strong a position as (b) Stanford with first and 10, the ability to run out the clock and at worst attempt a GW FG at the end of regulation from where they were.  [If Stanford had the 2014 D, then yes, kick the FG, no question].

P.S.  My beef in the Fiesta Bowl was first that he didn't let Andrew continue to move Stanford into the end zone on that last drive in regulation (Stanford was going through Okie State's D like $hit through a goose at that point); but second, if he wanted to take away the risk of an INT, at least run the ball or let Andrew keep it on roll out to get closer.  Instead, we all sat there in disbelief as the clock wound down 40+ seconds so Stanford could line up a 37 yard GW FGA with a kicker returning from injury who had already missed a FGA earlier in the game.  So often Shaw does not maximize the team's chances to win, especially when making strategic decisions on offense.

Maybe the problem is that Shaw is just too much like our prior head coach.  Close your eyes and cast your mind back to the end of the 2009 Big Game.  

Here, I'll help:

With four and a half minutes left, Stanford had the opportunity to drive down the field to tie or take the lead. Instead, they were shut down yet again. Luck couldn’t find a receiver and Gerhart was buried. On fourth and eight on the Cardinal’s own 23 yard line, Harbaugh  elected to roll the dice. On fourth down, Luck’s pass to Jim Dray was broken up and Stanford turned the ball over. A heroic performance by the Cardinal defense limited the damage to a field goal and Stanford started their final drive at their own 42, suddenly things didn’t look too bad. There were two and a half minutes left, a relatively short field, with Luck and Gerhart behind the line.
Luck broke off two runs to bring the ball past midfield. On second down, Luck was forced from the pocket and dumped the ball off to Gerhart, who broke two tackles and rumbled down the sideline, he was only stopped by two Cal defenders on the 13 yard line. It was first down with over a minute and a half remaining. It was time for Toby Gerhart. The first play was an incomplete pass to Coby Fleener in the endzone. No big deal, there are at least three more plays left. On second down, Luck drops back and fires over the field, again towards Fleener. The ball doesn’t make it, Mike Mohamed read Luck like a book and sat on the pass, intercepting the ball on the six yard line. The Bears kneeled three times, and that was that. Cal fans rushed the field.
. 
Almost a minute and a half remaining. On the 13 yard line. Best RB in the nation.  Doesn't touch the ball. 

Of course, Harbs is a genius and Shaw's play calling is inexcusable.  Still the same outcome, though: Cal fans rushing the field.

[76lsjumb]

Sorry, no way do you go for it on fourth and inches when you have a chance to take the lead with less than three minutes left in the game.  Come on, that would have been an AYFKM moment.

My point is that your goal was to maximize the probability of getting a first down or touchdown,  you really can’t blame going with the QB who has been getting 8 yards per attempt, not the running back who has been getting 3 ypc.

After all, wasn’t it you who called the coaches decision to takiethe ball out of Andrew Luck’s arm and running the ball on the ground in the Fiesta Bowl an AYFKM moment?

Like I said, easy to say we should have zigged when we zagged.

BC

If YPA vs. YPC is going to be your metric for evaluating the plays to call for getting a first down, then you almost always will pass the ball.  The number of times a Stanford team has had a better YPC than a YPA in a particular game is very small.  It may have happened a handful of times in the last several decades (though I can't recall any off the top of my head).   

You also assume two runs don't get you a first down (which you admit is the most important thing - and I agree with that).

IF Stanford had run twice, and IF Cal had burned two timeouts (or even one just on fourth down) and Stanford faced fourth and inches, then NO, I would not have called a decision to go for it AYFKM.  Not even close.  Because I could support Shaw believing and acting on the conviction that (a) a FG with 2+ minutes left and Cal with the ball is not as strong a position as (b) Stanford with first and 10, the ability to run out the clock and at worst attempt a GW FG at the end of regulation from where they were.  [If Stanford had the 2014 D, then yes, kick the FG, no question].

P.S.  My beef in the Fiesta Bowl was first that he didn't let Andrew continue to move Stanford into the end zone on that last drive in regulation (Stanford was going through Okie State's D like $hit through a goose at that point); but second, if he wanted to take away the risk of an INT, at least run the ball or let Andrew keep it on roll out to get closer.  Instead, we all sat there in disbelief as the clock wound down 40+ seconds so Stanford could line up a 37 yard GW FGA with a kicker returning from injury who had already missed a FGA earlier in the game.  So often Shaw does not maximize the team's chances to win, especially when making strategic decisions on offense.

Maybe the problem is that Shaw is just too much like our prior head coach.  Close your eyes and cast your mind back to the end of the 2009 Big Game.  

Here, I'll help:

With four and a half minutes left, Stanford had the opportunity to drive down the field to tie or take the lead. Instead, they were shut down yet again. Luck couldn’t find a receiver and Gerhart was buried. On fourth and eight on the Cardinal’s own 23 yard line, Harbaugh  elected to roll the dice. On fourth down, Luck’s pass to Jim Dray was broken up and Stanford turned the ball over. A heroic performance by the Cardinal defense limited the damage to a field goal and Stanford started their final drive at their own 42, suddenly things didn’t look too bad. There were two and a half minutes left, a relatively short field, with Luck and Gerhart behind the line.
Luck broke off two runs to bring the ball past midfield. On second down, Luck was forced from the pocket and dumped the ball off to Gerhart, who broke two tackles and rumbled down the sideline, he was only stopped by two Cal defenders on the 13 yard line. It was first down with over a minute and a half remaining. It was time for Toby Gerhart. The first play was an incomplete pass to Coby Fleener in the endzone. No big deal, there are at least three more plays left. On second down, Luck drops back and fires over the field, again towards Fleener. The ball doesn’t make it, Mike Mohamed read Luck like a book and sat on the pass, intercepting the ball on the six yard line. The Bears kneeled three times, and that was that. Cal fans rushed the field.
. 
Almost a minute and a half remaining. On the 13 yard line. Best RB in the nation.  Doesn't touch the ball. 

Of course, Harbs is a genius and Shaw's play calling is inexcusable.  Still the same outcome, though: Cal fans rushing the field.

[teejers1]

Sorry, no way do you go for it on fourth and inches when you have a chance to take the lead with less than three minutes left in the game.  Come on, that would have been an AYFKM moment.

My point is that your goal was to maximize the probability of getting a first down or touchdown,  you really can’t blame going with the QB who has been getting 8 yards per attempt, not the running back who has been getting 3 ypc.

After all, wasn’t it you who called the coaches decision to takiethe ball out of Andrew Luck’s arm and running the ball on the ground in the Fiesta Bowl an AYFKM moment?

Like I said, easy to say we should have zigged when we zagged.

BC

If YPA vs. YPC is going to be your metric for evaluating the plays to call for getting a first down, then you almost always will pass the ball.  The number of times a Stanford team has had a better YPC than a YPA in a particular game is very small.  It may have happened a handful of times in the last several decades (though I can't recall any off the top of my head).   

You also assume two runs don't get you a first down (which you admit is the most important thing - and I agree with that).

IF Stanford had run twice, and IF Cal had burned two timeouts (or even one just on fourth down) and Stanford faced fourth and inches, then NO, I would not have called a decision to go for it AYFKM.  Not even close.  Because I could support Shaw believing and acting on the conviction that (a) a FG with 2+ minutes left and Cal with the ball is not as strong a position as (b) Stanford with first and 10, the ability to run out the clock and at worst attempt a GW FG at the end of regulation from where they were.  [If Stanford had the 2014 D, then yes, kick the FG, no question].

P.S.  My beef in the Fiesta Bowl was first that he didn't let Andrew continue to move Stanford into the end zone on that last drive in regulation (Stanford was going through Okie State's D like $hit through a goose at that point); but second, if he wanted to take away the risk of an INT, at least run the ball or let Andrew keep it on roll out to get closer.  Instead, we all sat there in disbelief as the clock wound down 40+ seconds so Stanford could line up a 37 yard GW FGA with a kicker returning from injury who had already missed a FGA earlier in the game.  So often Shaw does not maximize the team's chances to win, especially when making strategic decisions on offense.

Maybe the problem is that Shaw is just too much like our prior head coach.  Close your eyes and cast your mind back to the end of the 2009 Big Game.  

Here, I'll help:

With four and a half minutes left, Stanford had the opportunity to drive down the field to tie or take the lead. Instead, they were shut down yet again. Luck couldn’t find a receiver and Gerhart was buried. On fourth and eight on the Cardinal’s own 23 yard line, Harbaugh  elected to roll the dice. On fourth down, Luck’s pass to Jim Dray was broken up and Stanford turned the ball over. A heroic performance by the Cardinal defense limited the damage to a field goal and Stanford started their final drive at their own 42, suddenly things didn’t look too bad. There were two and a half minutes left, a relatively short field, with Luck and Gerhart behind the line.
Luck broke off two runs to bring the ball past midfield. On second down, Luck was forced from the pocket and dumped the ball off to Gerhart, who broke two tackles and rumbled down the sideline, he was only stopped by two Cal defenders on the 13 yard line. It was first down with over a minute and a half remaining. It was time for Toby Gerhart. The first play was an incomplete pass to Coby Fleener in the endzone. No big deal, there are at least three more plays left. On second down, Luck drops back and fires over the field, again towards Fleener. The ball doesn’t make it, Mike Mohamed read Luck like a book and sat on the pass, intercepting the ball on the six yard line. The Bears kneeled three times, and that was that. Cal fans rushed the field.
. 
Almost a minute and a half remaining. On the 13 yard line. Best RB in the nation.  Doesn't touch the ball. 

Of course, Harbs is a genius and Shaw's play calling is inexcusable.  Still the same outcome, though: Cal fans rushing the field.

Did you even read the thread?  I also believed Harbs blew it in that Luck Big Game (for similar reasons that Shaw did on Saturday).  Even if the throws to the end zone were successful, you're giving Cal too much time to come down and score.  [But Stanford needed a TD at end of regulation in the Harbaugh game; only needed a FG at end of regulation on Saturday].

And Shaw and Harbs are nothing alike.  And I am grateful for that on many fronts and am fine that Harbaugh moved on.  But I also know that when it comes to running a football program - including the W/L column - Shaw can't hold a candle to Harbaugh.  Cue BC drumming p respective records, blah, blah, blah, which he better do quickly because the point is only going to become more clear to even the most ardent Shawpologists.  

There is no comparison to where Stanford and Michigan are right now program-wise, which is pretty depressing inasmuch as Harbs handed Shaw the keys to a Ferrari (while Harbs himself was given a functional Dodge in Ann Arbor).

[teejers1]

Sorry, no way do you go for it on fourth and inches when you have a chance to take the lead with less than three minutes left in the game.  Come on, that would have been an AYFKM moment.

My point is that your goal was to maximize the probability of getting a first down or touchdown,  you really can’t blame going with the QB who has been getting 8 yards per attempt, not the running back who has been getting 3 ypc.

After all, wasn’t it you who called the coaches decision to takiethe ball out of Andrew Luck’s arm and running the ball on the ground in the Fiesta Bowl an AYFKM moment?

Like I said, easy to say we should have zigged when we zagged.

BC

If YPA vs. YPC is going to be your metric for evaluating the plays to call for getting a first down, then you almost always will pass the ball.  The number of times a Stanford team has had a better YPC than a YPA in a particular game is very small.  It may have happened a handful of times in the last several decades (though I can't recall any off the top of my head).   

You also assume two runs don't get you a first down (which you admit is the most important thing - and I agree with that).

IF Stanford had run twice, and IF Cal had burned two timeouts (or even one just on fourth down) and Stanford faced fourth and inches, then NO, I would not have called a decision to go for it AYFKM.  Not even close.  Because I could support Shaw believing and acting on the conviction that (a) a FG with 2+ minutes left and Cal with the ball is not as strong a position as (b) Stanford with first and 10, the ability to run out the clock and at worst attempt a GW FG at the end of regulation from where they were.  [If Stanford had the 2014 D, then yes, kick the FG, no question].

P.S.  My beef in the Fiesta Bowl was first that he didn't let Andrew continue to move Stanford into the end zone on that last drive in regulation (Stanford was going through Okie State's D like $hit through a goose at that point); but second, if he wanted to take away the risk of an INT, at least run the ball or let Andrew keep it on roll out to get closer.  Instead, we all sat there in disbelief as the clock wound down 40+ seconds so Stanford could line up a 37 yard GW FGA with a kicker returning from injury who had already missed a FGA earlier in the game.  So often Shaw does not maximize the team's chances to win, especially when making strategic decisions on offense.

Maybe the problem is that Shaw is just too much like our prior head coach.  Close your eyes and cast your mind back to the end of the 2009 Big Game.  

Here, I'll help:

With four and a half minutes left, Stanford had the opportunity to drive down the field to tie or take the lead. Instead, they were shut down yet again. Luck couldn’t find a receiver and Gerhart was buried. On fourth and eight on the Cardinal’s own 23 yard line, Harbaugh  elected to roll the dice. On fourth down, Luck’s pass to Jim Dray was broken up and Stanford turned the ball over. A heroic performance by the Cardinal defense limited the damage to a field goal and Stanford started their final drive at their own 42, suddenly things didn’t look too bad. There were two and a half minutes left, a relatively short field, with Luck and Gerhart behind the line.
Luck broke off two runs to bring the ball past midfield. On second down, Luck was forced from the pocket and dumped the ball off to Gerhart, who broke two tackles and rumbled down the sideline, he was only stopped by two Cal defenders on the 13 yard line. It was first down with over a minute and a half remaining. It was time for Toby Gerhart. The first play was an incomplete pass to Coby Fleener in the endzone. No big deal, there are at least three more plays left. On second down, Luck drops back and fires over the field, again towards Fleener. The ball doesn’t make it, Mike Mohamed read Luck like a book and sat on the pass, intercepting the ball on the six yard line. The Bears kneeled three times, and that was that. Cal fans rushed the field.
. 
Almost a minute and a half remaining. On the 13 yard line. Best RB in the nation.  Doesn't touch the ball. 

Of course, Harbs is a genius and Shaw's play calling is inexcusable.  Still the same outcome, though: Cal fans rushing the field.

Did you even read the thread?  I also believed Harbs blew it in that Luck Big Game (for similar reasons that Shaw did on Saturday).  Even if the throws to the end zone were successful, you're giving Cal too much time to come down and score.  [But Stanford needed a TD at end of regulation in the Harbaugh game; only needed a FG at end of regulation on Saturday].

And Shaw and Harbs are nothing alike.  And I am grateful for that on many fronts and am fine that Harbaugh moved on.  But I also know that when it comes to running a football program - including the W/L column - Shaw can't hold a candle to Harbaugh.  Cue BC drumming p respective records, blah, blah, blah, which he better do quickly because the point is only going to become more clear to even the most ardent Shawpologists.  

There is no comparison to where Stanford and Michigan are right now program-wise, which is pretty depressing inasmuch as Harbs handed Shaw the keys to a Ferrari (while Harbs himself was given a functional Dodge in Ann Arbor).

[BostonCard]

So I ran the numbers sampling from the actual data from the game against Cal (with the caveat that the sample size especially for the running plays, was small) To be fair, I considered sacks and Mills scrambles to be pass plays as I assume they were not designed runs.  Pretty much regardless of what we called, the probability of "success", defined as getting a first down is between 75 and 80% (because it is a simulation, it fluctuates a bit).  The probability of getting a touchdown (a play of >26 yards) on that set of downs was low regardless of what we did, but zero if we ran twice (we did not have two running plays that together added up to 26 yards), 15% if we passed twice, and about 6% if we passed once.  Of course, a fresh set of downs would have offered a chance to score a touchdown from somewhere inside of the Cal 22, but I didn't want to program and run that.  The flip side of that is that around 7% of the time Mills will throw an interception if he passes it twice.  You could make an argument that this is an unacceptable risk at that stage of the game.  

That being said, to the extent that previous plays in the game are representative of what might have happened, and taking sample size into consideration, it is not clear to me that the numbers prove that one or the other call is clearly a better strategy.

BC

---

And Shaw and Harbs are nothing alike.  And I am grateful for that on many fronts and am fine that Harbaugh moved on.  But I also know that when it comes to running a football program - including the W/L column - Shaw can't hold a candle to Harbaugh.  Cue BC drumming p respective records, blah, blah, blah, which he better do quickly because the point is only going to become more clear to even the most ardent Shawpologists.  

There is no comparison to where Stanford and Michigan are right now program-wise, which is pretty depressing inasmuch as Harbs handed Shaw the keys to a Ferrari (while Harbs himself was given a functional Dodge in Ann Arbor).

Come on, man, Harbs was given the keys to the winningest program in division 1.

BC

[BostonCard]

So I ran the numbers sampling from the actual data from the game against Cal (with the caveat that the sample size especially for the running plays, was small) To be fair, I considered sacks and Mills scrambles to be pass plays as I assume they were not designed runs.  Pretty much regardless of what we called, the probability of "success", defined as getting a first down is between 75 and 80% (because it is a simulation, it fluctuates a bit).  The probability of getting a touchdown (a play of >26 yards) on that set of downs was low regardless of what we did, but zero if we ran twice (we did not have two running plays that together added up to 26 yards), 15% if we passed twice, and about 6% if we passed once.  Of course, a fresh set of downs would have offered a chance to score a touchdown from somewhere inside of the Cal 22, but I didn't want to program and run that.  The flip side of that is that around 7% of the time Mills will throw an interception if he passes it twice.  You could make an argument that this is an unacceptable risk at that stage of the game.  

That being said, to the extent that previous plays in the game are representative of what might have happened, and taking sample size into consideration, it is not clear to me that the numbers prove that one or the other call is clearly a better strategy.

BC

---

And Shaw and Harbs are nothing alike.  And I am grateful for that on many fronts and am fine that Harbaugh moved on.  But I also know that when it comes to running a football program - including the W/L column - Shaw can't hold a candle to Harbaugh.  Cue BC drumming p respective records, blah, blah, blah, which he better do quickly because the point is only going to become more clear to even the most ardent Shawpologists.  

There is no comparison to where Stanford and Michigan are right now program-wise, which is pretty depressing inasmuch as Harbs handed Shaw the keys to a Ferrari (while Harbs himself was given a functional Dodge in Ann Arbor).

Come on, man, Harbs was given the keys to the winningest program in division 1.

BC

[teejers1]

So I ran the numbers sampling from the actual data from the game against Cal (with the caveat that the sample size especially for the running plays, was small) To be fair, I considered sacks and Mills scrambles to be pass plays as I assume they were not designed runs.  Pretty much regardless of what we called, the probability of "success", defined as getting a first down is between 75 and 80% (because it is a simulation, it fluctuates a bit).  The probability of getting a touchdown (a play of >26 yards) on that set of downs was low regardless of what we did, but zero if we ran twice (we did not have two running plays that together added up to 26 yards), 15% if we passed twice, and about 6% if we passed once.  Of course, a fresh set of downs would have offered a chance to score a touchdown from somewhere inside of the Cal 22, but I didn't want to program and run that.  The flip side of that is that around 7% of the time Mills will throw an interception if he passes it twice.  You could make an argument that this is an unacceptable risk at that stage of the game.  

That being said, to the extent that previous plays in the game are representative of what might have happened, and taking sample size into consideration, it is not clear to me that the numbers prove that one or the other call is clearly a better strategy.

BC

---

And Shaw and Harbs are nothing alike.  And I am grateful for that on many fronts and am fine that Harbaugh moved on.  But I also know that when it comes to running a football program - including the W/L column - Shaw can't hold a candle to Harbaugh.  Cue BC drumming p respective records, blah, blah, blah, which he better do quickly because the point is only going to become more clear to even the most ardent Shawpologists.  

There is no comparison to where Stanford and Michigan are right now program-wise, which is pretty depressing inasmuch as Harbs handed Shaw the keys to a Ferrari (while Harbs himself was given a functional Dodge in Ann Arbor).

Come on, man, Harbs was given the keys to the winningest program in division 1.

BC

Your first paragraph is almost entirely a non-sequitur.  The 75-80% success (for what?  Run twice or pass twice for 4 yards?) is a mystery, and one that does not account for the benefit of burning clock.  The goal was (or should have been) to score at the very end of regulation (or with as little time left on the clock as possible).  The goal was not - or should not have been - to score a TD from 26 yards out.

I take it your last line is just a throwaway, which is about all that is left when anyone tries to compare Harbaugh and Shaw as D1 coaches.  But to be clear, I was totally good with Harbaugh moving on (mainly because the players were, if rumblings I heard were representative).  And I was "wait and see" with Shaw at time of hire.  His record is good, but his deficiencies on O were apparent very early on.  What is most disheartening is that he could have rectified those with a good hire and delegation, but he has stubbornly refused to do so.

And as a result, Stanford is now 4-7 (soon to be 4-8), with our recent post-season "glory" being two of the ugliest, least-enjoyable Sun Bowl wins imaginable.  That is a precipitous decline from the NY6 bowls, and the prospect of a return to that level (forget CFP) is really difficult to see, barring massive shake-ups.  [And this doesn't even account for home game atmosphere, whose decline is even more precipitous than Stanford's bowl participation].

[teejers1]

So I ran the numbers sampling from the actual data from the game against Cal (with the caveat that the sample size especially for the running plays, was small) To be fair, I considered sacks and Mills scrambles to be pass plays as I assume they were not designed runs.  Pretty much regardless of what we called, the probability of "success", defined as getting a first down is between 75 and 80% (because it is a simulation, it fluctuates a bit).  The probability of getting a touchdown (a play of >26 yards) on that set of downs was low regardless of what we did, but zero if we ran twice (we did not have two running plays that together added up to 26 yards), 15% if we passed twice, and about 6% if we passed once.  Of course, a fresh set of downs would have offered a chance to score a touchdown from somewhere inside of the Cal 22, but I didn't want to program and run that.  The flip side of that is that around 7% of the time Mills will throw an interception if he passes it twice.  You could make an argument that this is an unacceptable risk at that stage of the game.  

That being said, to the extent that previous plays in the game are representative of what might have happened, and taking sample size into consideration, it is not clear to me that the numbers prove that one or the other call is clearly a better strategy.

BC

---

And Shaw and Harbs are nothing alike.  And I am grateful for that on many fronts and am fine that Harbaugh moved on.  But I also know that when it comes to running a football program - including the W/L column - Shaw can't hold a candle to Harbaugh.  Cue BC drumming p respective records, blah, blah, blah, which he better do quickly because the point is only going to become more clear to even the most ardent Shawpologists.  

There is no comparison to where Stanford and Michigan are right now program-wise, which is pretty depressing inasmuch as Harbs handed Shaw the keys to a Ferrari (while Harbs himself was given a functional Dodge in Ann Arbor).

Come on, man, Harbs was given the keys to the winningest program in division 1.

BC

Your first paragraph is almost entirely a non-sequitur.  The 75-80% success (for what?  Run twice or pass twice for 4 yards?) is a mystery, and one that does not account for the benefit of burning clock.  The goal was (or should have been) to score at the very end of regulation (or with as little time left on the clock as possible).  The goal was not - or should not have been - to score a TD from 26 yards out.

I take it your last line is just a throwaway, which is about all that is left when anyone tries to compare Harbaugh and Shaw as D1 coaches.  But to be clear, I was totally good with Harbaugh moving on (mainly because the players were, if rumblings I heard were representative).  And I was "wait and see" with Shaw at time of hire.  His record is good, but his deficiencies on O were apparent very early on.  What is most disheartening is that he could have rectified those with a good hire and delegation, but he has stubbornly refused to do so.

And as a result, Stanford is now 4-7 (soon to be 4-8), with our recent post-season "glory" being two of the ugliest, least-enjoyable Sun Bowl wins imaginable.  That is a precipitous decline from the NY6 bowls, and the prospect of a return to that level (forget CFP) is really difficult to see, barring massive shake-ups.  [And this doesn't even account for home game atmosphere, whose decline is even more precipitous than Stanford's bowl participation].

[yvonne]

[quote="BostonCard" pid='262151' dateline='1574704300']

As I've said before, ultimately the buck stops at the coach. But I find the playcalling "analyses" facile and non-disproveable so they don't really add much to the discussion other than as a chance to vent, and in this case it doesn't even hold up to scrutiny.

BC
[/quote

+1.

Well, I actually don't think I second-guess much of what Shaw does offensively . . . only the most basic AYFKM stuff.

But let's try it this way:

Best outcome on Stanford's penultimate drive:  score TD, with little/no time on the clock;
Next best outcome:  score FG with little/no time on the clock;
Next best outcome:  score TD w/o using up much clock;
Next best outcome:  score FG w/o using up much clock; 
Next "best" outcome:  not scoring but burning most of time on clock; and
Worst outcome:  not scoring and burning little clock.

Throwing to end zone on second and goal - even if the play was "successful" - gives you, at best, the third best outcome.  This is exactly why I thought Harbaugh's decision to have Luck throw for the end zone on first down in the last Big Game Cal won (prior to Saturday) was the wrong decision, even putting aside that Toby was on the sideline (catching some rest after just having gashed Cal's D with a huuge catch and run).  Even if you score a TD there, you give Cal way too much time to respond with the winning (Luck's game) or tying (Saturday's game) score.

Lastly, I agree with BC that the D failed to make stops at end of game and that was brutal.  But did you have any confidence in this D at any time this season?  It clearly is a step (or three) down from the really good Ds Stanford had in early years of Shaw's tenure.  This actually magnifies the importance of making the right decisions on O, where your roster talent is.

But enough.  We'll never convince each other on this point.

P.S.  Someone on the other board posted a very interesting nugget:  A few years ago Stanford beat ND, leaving the Domers with a 4-8 season record.  After that season, the AD met with Brian Kelley and changes were made at both coordinator positions, and Kelly gave up calling plays.  Since then ND has had 3 very good seasons (records of 9 wins, 11 wins, and 10 wins (after Saturday), IIRC.  What are the chances . . .

Probably about the same as Stanford had at going to the Rose Bowl the last time it had a down season.

[yvonne]

[quote="BostonCard" pid='262151' dateline='1574704300']

As I've said before, ultimately the buck stops at the coach. But I find the playcalling "analyses" facile and non-disproveable so they don't really add much to the discussion other than as a chance to vent, and in this case it doesn't even hold up to scrutiny.

BC
[/quote

+1.

Well, I actually don't think I second-guess much of what Shaw does offensively . . . only the most basic AYFKM stuff.

But let's try it this way:

Best outcome on Stanford's penultimate drive:  score TD, with little/no time on the clock;
Next best outcome:  score FG with little/no time on the clock;
Next best outcome:  score TD w/o using up much clock;
Next best outcome:  score FG w/o using up much clock; 
Next "best" outcome:  not scoring but burning most of time on clock; and
Worst outcome:  not scoring and burning little clock.

Throwing to end zone on second and goal - even if the play was "successful" - gives you, at best, the third best outcome.  This is exactly why I thought Harbaugh's decision to have Luck throw for the end zone on first down in the last Big Game Cal won (prior to Saturday) was the wrong decision, even putting aside that Toby was on the sideline (catching some rest after just having gashed Cal's D with a huuge catch and run).  Even if you score a TD there, you give Cal way too much time to respond with the winning (Luck's game) or tying (Saturday's game) score.

Lastly, I agree with BC that the D failed to make stops at end of game and that was brutal.  But did you have any confidence in this D at any time this season?  It clearly is a step (or three) down from the really good Ds Stanford had in early years of Shaw's tenure.  This actually magnifies the importance of making the right decisions on O, where your roster talent is.

But enough.  We'll never convince each other on this point.

P.S.  Someone on the other board posted a very interesting nugget:  A few years ago Stanford beat ND, leaving the Domers with a 4-8 season record.  After that season, the AD met with Brian Kelley and changes were made at both coordinator positions, and Kelly gave up calling plays.  Since then ND has had 3 very good seasons (records of 9 wins, 11 wins, and 10 wins (after Saturday), IIRC.  What are the chances . . .

Probably about the same as Stanford had at going to the Rose Bowl the last time it had a down season.

[BostonCard]

No it wasn't a throwaway line; it was a response to you trying to make an apples to oranges comparison with what Harbaugh inherited at Michigan and what Shaw inherited at Stanford.  While Shaw came into Stanford while it was doing well at the time, that was not the norm for Stanford historically, Harbaugh inherited a team that had been struggling recently, but it has been a football powerhouse and a an average level coach can and should accomplish there is higher than what a average level coach can accomplish at Stanford over the long term.  The better analogy is that Michigan is the Ferrari whose owner has left it in the garage a few years gathering dust.  It takes some work and EUTM to get the car gleaming, but if your a competent mechanic and tune the thing properly, you can reasonably expect to dominate.  

BC

[BostonCard]

No it wasn't a throwaway line; it was a response to you trying to make an apples to oranges comparison with what Harbaugh inherited at Michigan and what Shaw inherited at Stanford.  While Shaw came into Stanford while it was doing well at the time, that was not the norm for Stanford historically, Harbaugh inherited a team that had been struggling recently, but it has been a football powerhouse and a an average level coach can and should accomplish there is higher than what a average level coach can accomplish at Stanford over the long term.  The better analogy is that Michigan is the Ferrari whose owner has left it in the garage a few years gathering dust.  It takes some work and EUTM to get the car gleaming, but if your a competent mechanic and tune the thing properly, you can reasonably expect to dominate.  

BC

[winflop]

Sorry, no way do you go for it on fourth and inches when you have a chance to take the lead with less than three minutes left in the game.  Come on, that would have been an AYFKM moment.

My point is that your goal was to maximize the probability of getting a first down or touchdown,  you really can’t blame going with the QB who has been getting 8 yards per attempt, not the running back who has been getting 3 ypc.

After all, wasn’t it you who called the coaches decision to takiethe ball out of Andrew Luck’s arm and running the ball on the ground in the Fiesta Bowl an AYFKM moment?

Like I said, easy to say we should have zigged when we zagged.

BC

If YPA vs. YPC is going to be your metric for evaluating the plays to call for getting a first down, then you almost always will pass the ball.  The number of times a Stanford team has had a better YPC than a YPA in a particular game is very small.  It may have happened a handful of times in the last several decades (though I can't recall any off the top of my head).   

You also assume two runs don't get you a first down (which you admit is the most important thing - and I agree with that).

IF Stanford had run twice, and IF Cal had burned two timeouts (or even one just on fourth down) and Stanford faced fourth and inches, then NO, I would not have called a decision to go for it AYFKM.  Not even close.  Because I could support Shaw believing and acting on the conviction that (a) a FG with 2+ minutes left and Cal with the ball is not as strong a position as (b) Stanford with first and 10, the ability to run out the clock and at worst attempt a GW FG at the end of regulation from where they were.  [If Stanford had the 2014 D, then yes, kick the FG, no question].

P.S.  My beef in the Fiesta Bowl was first that he didn't let Andrew continue to move Stanford into the end zone on that last drive in regulation (Stanford was going through Okie State's D like $hit through a goose at that point); but second, if he wanted to take away the risk of an INT, at least run the ball or let Andrew keep it on roll out to get closer.  Instead, we all sat there in disbelief as the clock wound down 40+ seconds so Stanford could line up a 37 yard GW FGA with a kicker returning from injury who had already missed a FGA earlier in the game.  So often Shaw does not maximize the team's chances to win, especially when making strategic decisions on offense.

Maybe the problem is that Shaw is just too much like our prior head coach.  Close your eyes and cast your mind back to the end of the 2009 Big Game.  

Here, I'll help:

With four and a half minutes left, Stanford had the opportunity to drive down the field to tie or take the lead. Instead, they were shut down yet again. Luck couldn’t find a receiver and Gerhart was buried. On fourth and eight on the Cardinal’s own 23 yard line, Harbaugh  elected to roll the dice. On fourth down, Luck’s pass to Jim Dray was broken up and Stanford turned the ball over. A heroic performance by the Cardinal defense limited the damage to a field goal and Stanford started their final drive at their own 42, suddenly things didn’t look too bad. There were two and a half minutes left, a relatively short field, with Luck and Gerhart behind the line.
Luck broke off two runs to bring the ball past midfield. On second down, Luck was forced from the pocket and dumped the ball off to Gerhart, who broke two tackles and rumbled down the sideline, he was only stopped by two Cal defenders on the 13 yard line. It was first down with over a minute and a half remaining. It was time for Toby Gerhart. The first play was an incomplete pass to Coby Fleener in the endzone. No big deal, there are at least three more plays left. On second down, Luck drops back and fires over the field, again towards Fleener. The ball doesn’t make it, Mike Mohamed read Luck like a book and sat on the pass, intercepting the ball on the six yard line. The Bears kneeled three times, and that was that. Cal fans rushed the field.
. 
Almost a minute and a half remaining. On the 13 yard line. Best RB in the nation.  Doesn't touch the ball. 

Of course, Harbs is a genius and Shaw's play calling is inexcusable.  Still the same outcome, though: Cal fans rushing the field.

Night & day difference. In 2009, Luck was a freshman and Toby Gerhart was the best player in college football. In 2011, Luck was the best player in college football and settling for a 40+ yarder is very different then settling for a 30-yarder.

In both cases, the head coach made a stupid decision that cost Stanford the game.

[winflop]

Sorry, no way do you go for it on fourth and inches when you have a chance to take the lead with less than three minutes left in the game.  Come on, that would have been an AYFKM moment.

My point is that your goal was to maximize the probability of getting a first down or touchdown,  you really can’t blame going with the QB who has been getting 8 yards per attempt, not the running back who has been getting 3 ypc.

After all, wasn’t it you who called the coaches decision to takiethe ball out of Andrew Luck’s arm and running the ball on the ground in the Fiesta Bowl an AYFKM moment?

Like I said, easy to say we should have zigged when we zagged.

BC

If YPA vs. YPC is going to be your metric for evaluating the plays to call for getting a first down, then you almost always will pass the ball.  The number of times a Stanford team has had a better YPC than a YPA in a particular game is very small.  It may have happened a handful of times in the last several decades (though I can't recall any off the top of my head).   

You also assume two runs don't get you a first down (which you admit is the most important thing - and I agree with that).

IF Stanford had run twice, and IF Cal had burned two timeouts (or even one just on fourth down) and Stanford faced fourth and inches, then NO, I would not have called a decision to go for it AYFKM.  Not even close.  Because I could support Shaw believing and acting on the conviction that (a) a FG with 2+ minutes left and Cal with the ball is not as strong a position as (b) Stanford with first and 10, the ability to run out the clock and at worst attempt a GW FG at the end of regulation from where they were.  [If Stanford had the 2014 D, then yes, kick the FG, no question].

P.S.  My beef in the Fiesta Bowl was first that he didn't let Andrew continue to move Stanford into the end zone on that last drive in regulation (Stanford was going through Okie State's D like $hit through a goose at that point); but second, if he wanted to take away the risk of an INT, at least run the ball or let Andrew keep it on roll out to get closer.  Instead, we all sat there in disbelief as the clock wound down 40+ seconds so Stanford could line up a 37 yard GW FGA with a kicker returning from injury who had already missed a FGA earlier in the game.  So often Shaw does not maximize the team's chances to win, especially when making strategic decisions on offense.

Maybe the problem is that Shaw is just too much like our prior head coach.  Close your eyes and cast your mind back to the end of the 2009 Big Game.  

Here, I'll help:

With four and a half minutes left, Stanford had the opportunity to drive down the field to tie or take the lead. Instead, they were shut down yet again. Luck couldn’t find a receiver and Gerhart was buried. On fourth and eight on the Cardinal’s own 23 yard line, Harbaugh  elected to roll the dice. On fourth down, Luck’s pass to Jim Dray was broken up and Stanford turned the ball over. A heroic performance by the Cardinal defense limited the damage to a field goal and Stanford started their final drive at their own 42, suddenly things didn’t look too bad. There were two and a half minutes left, a relatively short field, with Luck and Gerhart behind the line.
Luck broke off two runs to bring the ball past midfield. On second down, Luck was forced from the pocket and dumped the ball off to Gerhart, who broke two tackles and rumbled down the sideline, he was only stopped by two Cal defenders on the 13 yard line. It was first down with over a minute and a half remaining. It was time for Toby Gerhart. The first play was an incomplete pass to Coby Fleener in the endzone. No big deal, there are at least three more plays left. On second down, Luck drops back and fires over the field, again towards Fleener. The ball doesn’t make it, Mike Mohamed read Luck like a book and sat on the pass, intercepting the ball on the six yard line. The Bears kneeled three times, and that was that. Cal fans rushed the field.
. 
Almost a minute and a half remaining. On the 13 yard line. Best RB in the nation.  Doesn't touch the ball. 

Of course, Harbs is a genius and Shaw's play calling is inexcusable.  Still the same outcome, though: Cal fans rushing the field.

Night & day difference. In 2009, Luck was a freshman and Toby Gerhart was the best player in college football. In 2011, Luck was the best player in college football and settling for a 40+ yarder is very different then settling for a 30-yarder.

In both cases, the head coach made a stupid decision that cost Stanford the game.

[CTcard]

So I ran the numbers sampling from the actual data from the game against Cal (with the caveat that the sample size especially for the running plays, was small) To be fair, I considered sacks and Mills scrambles to be pass plays as I assume they were not designed runs.  Pretty much regardless of what we called, the probability of "success", defined as getting a first down is between 75 and 80% (because it is a simulation, it fluctuates a bit).  The probability of getting a touchdown (a play of >26 yards) on that set of downs was low regardless of what we did, but zero if we ran twice (we did not have two running plays that together added up to 26 yards), 15% if we passed twice, and about 6% if we passed once.  Of course, a fresh set of downs would have offered a chance to score a touchdown from somewhere inside of the Cal 22, but I didn't want to program and run that.  The flip side of that is that around 7% of the time Mills will throw an interception if he passes it twice.  You could make an argument that this is an unacceptable risk at that stage of the game.  



That being said, to the extent that previous plays in the game are representative of what might have happened, and taking sample size into consideration, it is not clear to me that the numbers prove that one or the other call is clearly a better strategy.


BC

I am taking teejers side on this one, at least mostly.

I see a couple of problems with much of the discussion above.
First of all, the numbers you sample from this game are fairly meaningless; too small a sample size, all runs are not the same play - even more so all passes are not the same play, defenses were both tiring, etc.

Secondly, I don't think the issue is so much run vs pass, but whether the immediate tactical goal should have been to make a first down or take the chance for a quick TD. 

I'd argue that the primary goal at that moment in time should have been a first down. We were already in FG range, making the key element to run clock. cal isn't a quick strike team, but it was clear Stanford's chances to hold them for very long weren't particularly high. Taking time off the clock was critical.  A first down gives at least another three downs to run clock, perhaps in addition to the second down play itself.

A first down would also seem rather achievable goal at that point as well, since it was second and four (a short four).

That doesn't necessarily mean a run play however, given how bad Stanford's run game has been. It could have meant a short safe pass with a much higher completion probability than the end zone shot we took.

Obviously a possibility is that either two runs don't get a first down, or a short pass still ends up incomplete and we're back where we ended up anyway, but I still think the fundamental tactical imperative at that moment in time was a first down rather than the chance at an immediate TD.

So, I'd say it was a tactical mistake.
It could have worked out anyway, and the opposite could still have ended in a loss. It's probably not the most critical issue surrounding the game, but still a mistake I think.

[CTcard]

So I ran the numbers sampling from the actual data from the game against Cal (with the caveat that the sample size especially for the running plays, was small) To be fair, I considered sacks and Mills scrambles to be pass plays as I assume they were not designed runs.  Pretty much regardless of what we called, the probability of "success", defined as getting a first down is between 75 and 80% (because it is a simulation, it fluctuates a bit).  The probability of getting a touchdown (a play of >26 yards) on that set of downs was low regardless of what we did, but zero if we ran twice (we did not have two running plays that together added up to 26 yards), 15% if we passed twice, and about 6% if we passed once.  Of course, a fresh set of downs would have offered a chance to score a touchdown from somewhere inside of the Cal 22, but I didn't want to program and run that.  The flip side of that is that around 7% of the time Mills will throw an interception if he passes it twice.  You could make an argument that this is an unacceptable risk at that stage of the game.  



That being said, to the extent that previous plays in the game are representative of what might have happened, and taking sample size into consideration, it is not clear to me that the numbers prove that one or the other call is clearly a better strategy.


BC

I am taking teejers side on this one, at least mostly.

I see a couple of problems with much of the discussion above.
First of all, the numbers you sample from this game are fairly meaningless; too small a sample size, all runs are not the same play - even more so all passes are not the same play, defenses were both tiring, etc.

Secondly, I don't think the issue is so much run vs pass, but whether the immediate tactical goal should have been to make a first down or take the chance for a quick TD. 

I'd argue that the primary goal at that moment in time should have been a first down. We were already in FG range, making the key element to run clock. cal isn't a quick strike team, but it was clear Stanford's chances to hold them for very long weren't particularly high. Taking time off the clock was critical.  A first down gives at least another three downs to run clock, perhaps in addition to the second down play itself.

A first down would also seem rather achievable goal at that point as well, since it was second and four (a short four).

That doesn't necessarily mean a run play however, given how bad Stanford's run game has been. It could have meant a short safe pass with a much higher completion probability than the end zone shot we took.

Obviously a possibility is that either two runs don't get a first down, or a short pass still ends up incomplete and we're back where we ended up anyway, but I still think the fundamental tactical imperative at that moment in time was a first down rather than the chance at an immediate TD.

So, I'd say it was a tactical mistake.
It could have worked out anyway, and the opposite could still have ended in a loss. It's probably not the most critical issue surrounding the game, but still a mistake I think.

[murky]

I didn't understand why the commentators were complimenting us for milking the clock when there was like 7 minutes left.  

It was improbable that we'd use all of the time.  I'd rather score (or fail to) with 5 minutes left than with 2 minutes left.

[murky]

I didn't understand why the commentators were complimenting us for milking the clock when there was like 7 minutes left.  

It was improbable that we'd use all of the time.  I'd rather score (or fail to) with 5 minutes left than with 2 minutes left.

[BostonCard]

So I ran the numbers sampling from the actual data from the game against Cal (with the caveat that the sample size especially for the running plays, was small) To be fair, I considered sacks and Mills scrambles to be pass plays as I assume they were not designed runs.  Pretty much regardless of what we called, the probability of "success", defined as getting a first down is between 75 and 80% (because it is a simulation, it fluctuates a bit).  The probability of getting a touchdown (a play of >26 yards) on that set of downs was low regardless of what we did, but zero if we ran twice (we did not have two running plays that together added up to 26 yards), 15% if we passed twice, and about 6% if we passed once.  Of course, a fresh set of downs would have offered a chance to score a touchdown from somewhere inside of the Cal 22, but I didn't want to program and run that.  The flip side of that is that around 7% of the time Mills will throw an interception if he passes it twice.  You could make an argument that this is an unacceptable risk at that stage of the game.  







That being said, to the extent that previous plays in the game are representative of what might have happened, and taking sample size into consideration, it is not clear to me that the numbers prove that one or the other call is clearly a better strategy.





BC

I am taking teejers side on this one, at least mostly.



I see a couple of problems with much of the discussion above.

First of all, the numbers you sample from this game are fairly meaningless; too small a sample size, all runs are not the same play - even more so all passes are not the same play, defenses were both tiring, etc.



Secondly, I don't think the issue is so much run vs pass, but whether the immediate tactical goal should have been to make a first down or take the chance for a quick TD. 



I'd argue that the primary goal at that moment in time should have been a first down. We were already in FG range, making the key element to run clock. cal isn't a quick strike team, but it was clear Stanford's chances to hold them for very long weren't particularly high. Taking time off the clock was critical.  A first down gives at least another three downs to run clock, perhaps in addition to the second down play itself.



A first down would also seem rather achievable goal at that point as well, since it was second and four (a short four).



That doesn't necessarily mean a run play however, given how bad Stanford's run game has been. It could have meant a short safe pass with a much higher completion probability than the end zone shot we took.



Obviously a possibility is that either two runs don't get a first down, or a short pass still ends up incomplete and we're back where we ended up anyway, but I still think the fundamental tactical imperative at that moment in time was a first down rather than the chance at an immediate TD.



So, I'd say it was a tactical mistake.

It could have worked out anyway, and the opposite could still have ended in a loss. It's probably not the most critical issue surrounding the game, but still a mistake I think.

I don't disagree inasmuch as your argument introduces some subtlety that teejers' doesn't.  His point is that we should have run the ball twice and that is obvious to everyone who knows anything about football.  My argument is not so much that passing is better than running, but rather that both options are defensible.

In looking at the situation, the goals of the drive at that point are twofold: milk as much time off the clock (certainly once we got first and 10 with about 3 minutes left; Murky does have a point that it is hard to run a 7 1/2 minute drive in the best of circumstances, and the worst of circumstances is the one that hands Cal the ball with just enough time to mount the winning drive) and score points (ideally a TD, but a FG is better than nothing, and a FG as time expires is better than a TD any time).  The best way to do that is to get a fresh set of downs, to force cal to use up its timeouts and to drive the clock down to less than a minute left.  I would say that scoring (especially a TD) would be preferable to a FG attempt with less time on the clock (that is, you would not instruct your player to take a knee at the 1 inch line in order to be able to milk more time off the clock).

I haven't had a chance to look at the play in detail, but the play may not have been designed specifically to try to score a TD.  There were likely multiple receiving options, one of which was short and one of which was in the end zone.  If I were the one giving the QB instructions, I would say try to hit the short receiver if you can, but don't force it, and if you see a favorable, low-risk, match-up in the end zone take a shot.  But I'm not privy of any discussions.

BC

[BostonCard]

So I ran the numbers sampling from the actual data from the game against Cal (with the caveat that the sample size especially for the running plays, was small) To be fair, I considered sacks and Mills scrambles to be pass plays as I assume they were not designed runs.  Pretty much regardless of what we called, the probability of "success", defined as getting a first down is between 75 and 80% (because it is a simulation, it fluctuates a bit).  The probability of getting a touchdown (a play of >26 yards) on that set of downs was low regardless of what we did, but zero if we ran twice (we did not have two running plays that together added up to 26 yards), 15% if we passed twice, and about 6% if we passed once.  Of course, a fresh set of downs would have offered a chance to score a touchdown from somewhere inside of the Cal 22, but I didn't want to program and run that.  The flip side of that is that around 7% of the time Mills will throw an interception if he passes it twice.  You could make an argument that this is an unacceptable risk at that stage of the game.  







That being said, to the extent that previous plays in the game are representative of what might have happened, and taking sample size into consideration, it is not clear to me that the numbers prove that one or the other call is clearly a better strategy.





BC

I am taking teejers side on this one, at least mostly.



I see a couple of problems with much of the discussion above.

First of all, the numbers you sample from this game are fairly meaningless; too small a sample size, all runs are not the same play - even more so all passes are not the same play, defenses were both tiring, etc.



Secondly, I don't think the issue is so much run vs pass, but whether the immediate tactical goal should have been to make a first down or take the chance for a quick TD. 



I'd argue that the primary goal at that moment in time should have been a first down. We were already in FG range, making the key element to run clock. cal isn't a quick strike team, but it was clear Stanford's chances to hold them for very long weren't particularly high. Taking time off the clock was critical.  A first down gives at least another three downs to run clock, perhaps in addition to the second down play itself.



A first down would also seem rather achievable goal at that point as well, since it was second and four (a short four).



That doesn't necessarily mean a run play however, given how bad Stanford's run game has been. It could have meant a short safe pass with a much higher completion probability than the end zone shot we took.



Obviously a possibility is that either two runs don't get a first down, or a short pass still ends up incomplete and we're back where we ended up anyway, but I still think the fundamental tactical imperative at that moment in time was a first down rather than the chance at an immediate TD.



So, I'd say it was a tactical mistake.

It could have worked out anyway, and the opposite could still have ended in a loss. It's probably not the most critical issue surrounding the game, but still a mistake I think.

I don't disagree inasmuch as your argument introduces some subtlety that teejers' doesn't.  His point is that we should have run the ball twice and that is obvious to everyone who knows anything about football.  My argument is not so much that passing is better than running, but rather that both options are defensible.

In looking at the situation, the goals of the drive at that point are twofold: milk as much time off the clock (certainly once we got first and 10 with about 3 minutes left; Murky does have a point that it is hard to run a 7 1/2 minute drive in the best of circumstances, and the worst of circumstances is the one that hands Cal the ball with just enough time to mount the winning drive) and score points (ideally a TD, but a FG is better than nothing, and a FG as time expires is better than a TD any time).  The best way to do that is to get a fresh set of downs, to force cal to use up its timeouts and to drive the clock down to less than a minute left.  I would say that scoring (especially a TD) would be preferable to a FG attempt with less time on the clock (that is, you would not instruct your player to take a knee at the 1 inch line in order to be able to milk more time off the clock).

I haven't had a chance to look at the play in detail, but the play may not have been designed specifically to try to score a TD.  There were likely multiple receiving options, one of which was short and one of which was in the end zone.  If I were the one giving the QB instructions, I would say try to hit the short receiver if you can, but don't force it, and if you see a favorable, low-risk, match-up in the end zone take a shot.  But I'm not privy of any discussions.

BC

[teejers1]

So I ran the numbers sampling from the actual data from the game against Cal (with the caveat that the sample size especially for the running plays, was small) To be fair, I considered sacks and Mills scrambles to be pass plays as I assume they were not designed runs.  Pretty much regardless of what we called, the probability of "success", defined as getting a first down is between 75 and 80% (because it is a simulation, it fluctuates a bit).  The probability of getting a touchdown (a play of >26 yards) on that set of downs was low regardless of what we did, but zero if we ran twice (we did not have two running plays that together added up to 26 yards), 15% if we passed twice, and about 6% if we passed once.  Of course, a fresh set of downs would have offered a chance to score a touchdown from somewhere inside of the Cal 22, but I didn't want to program and run that.  The flip side of that is that around 7% of the time Mills will throw an interception if he passes it twice.  You could make an argument that this is an unacceptable risk at that stage of the game.  







That being said, to the extent that previous plays in the game are representative of what might have happened, and taking sample size into consideration, it is not clear to me that the numbers prove that one or the other call is clearly a better strategy.





BC

I am taking teejers side on this one, at least mostly.



I see a couple of problems with much of the discussion above.

First of all, the numbers you sample from this game are fairly meaningless; too small a sample size, all runs are not the same play - even more so all passes are not the same play, defenses were both tiring, etc.

Secondly, I don't think the issue is so much run vs pass, but whether the immediate tactical goal should have been to make a first down or take the chance for a quick TD. 

I'd argue that the primary goal at that moment in time should have been a first down. We were already in FG range, making the key element to run clock. cal isn't a quick strike team, but it was clear Stanford's chances to hold them for very long weren't particularly high. Taking time off the clock was critical.  A first down gives at least another three downs to run clock, perhaps in addition to the second down play itself.

A first down would also seem rather achievable goal at that point as well, since it was second and four (a short four). 

That doesn't necessarily mean a run play however, given how bad Stanford's run game has been. It could have meant a short safe pass with a much higher completion probability than the end zone shot we took.

Obviously a possibility is that either two runs don't get a first down, or a short pass still ends up incomplete and we're back where we ended up anyway, but I still think the fundamental tactical imperative at that moment in time was a first down rather than the chance at an immediate TD. 

So, I'd say it was a tactical mistake. 

It could have worked out anyway, and the opposite could still have ended in a loss. It's probably not the most critical issue surrounding the game, but still a mistake I think.

I don't disagree inasmuch as your argument introduces some subtlety that teejers' doesn't.  His point is that we should have run the ball twice and that is obvious to everyone who knows anything about football.  My argument is not so much that passing is better than running, but rather that both options are defensible.

In looking at the situation, the goals of the drive at that point are twofold: milk as much time off the clock (certainly once we got first and 10 with about 3 minutes left; Murky does have a point that it is hard to run a 7 1/2 minute drive in the best of circumstances, and the worst of circumstances is the one that hands Cal the ball with just enough time to mount the winning drive) and score points (ideally a TD, but a FG is better than nothing, and a FG as time expires is better than a TD any time).  The best way to do that is to get a fresh set of downs, to force cal to use up its timeouts and to drive the clock down to less than a minute left.  I would say that scoring (especially a TD) would be preferable to a FG attempt with less time on the clock (that is, you would not instruct your player to take a knee at the 1 inch line in order to be able to milk more time off the clock).

I haven't had a chance to look at the play in detail, but the play may not have been designed specifically to try to score a TD.  There were likely multiple receiving options, one of which was short and one of which was in the end zone.  If I were the one giving the QB instructions, I would say try to hit the short receiver if you can, but don't force it, and if you see a favorable, low-risk, match-up in the end zone take a shot.  But I'm not privy of any discussions.

BC

Did you even listen to the post-game presser?  Shaw said "the plan" was to take the TD shot on second down and then run on third down to burn clock (that was reported on TOS).  Now, I can understand your predisposition to defend Shaw at every turn, but at some point don't you have to take him at his word?  And if so, how can that possibly be sound game management in that down and distance and score situation?  

Short answer:  it cannot.

And murky, there were 3 minutes left on second and 4 (IIRC).  Cal had 3 timeouts.  If you run it twice* to get a first down, let's assume Cal calls one of its TOs (on third down).  That means you have first and 10, Cal has 2 timeouts left.  That's 2:15 and the clock running.  Best case scenario for Cal there (barring a TO) is that Cal gets ball back with no timeouts and 1:30 on the clock.  And that assumes Stanford does not get another first down; or that Stanford does not score a TD.  Of course, if Stanford takes four downs to get the initial first down, then Cal will have (at best) 45 seconds or so to score.  

Now, it's certainly true that Cal could have scored game tying or game-winning FG or TD in 1:30 with no timeouts (and in fact, they did score a TD in just over a minute, IIRC).  But it's also possible that Stanford could have closed out the game with another first down (after the one at issue).  And it's also possible that after Stanford gets that initial first down - and Cal sees Stanford is in "make Cal burn its timeouts as we set up for late go-ahead FG" - Cal would be particularly vulnerable to play-action for the TD.

It's all about maximizing the chances for the W at each juncture of the game and having the foresight to know how that calculation changes with each play, especially late in the game.  And I think Stanford is sorely lacking on that front under this regime, as repeatedly demonstrated over the years.  

* And BC, I'm not blindly advocating for run-run in that 2nd and 4 situation.  But I am definitely advocating for a run on second down.  If it was stuffed in the backfield for a loss of 3, then yes, a pass would be the call because the immediate goal is to get the first down.  OTOH, if a second down run gained 1 or 2 yards, then I'd be inclined to run again (especially if you had a conviction to go for it on fourth and short).  As noted, fourth and 1 or inches is intriguing.  Again, it's all about having the variables sorted out in your head prior to each play and understanding "the next move."  I have zero sense that this staff "gets that."

[teejers1]

So I ran the numbers sampling from the actual data from the game against Cal (with the caveat that the sample size especially for the running plays, was small) To be fair, I considered sacks and Mills scrambles to be pass plays as I assume they were not designed runs.  Pretty much regardless of what we called, the probability of "success", defined as getting a first down is between 75 and 80% (because it is a simulation, it fluctuates a bit).  The probability of getting a touchdown (a play of >26 yards) on that set of downs was low regardless of what we did, but zero if we ran twice (we did not have two running plays that together added up to 26 yards), 15% if we passed twice, and about 6% if we passed once.  Of course, a fresh set of downs would have offered a chance to score a touchdown from somewhere inside of the Cal 22, but I didn't want to program and run that.  The flip side of that is that around 7% of the time Mills will throw an interception if he passes it twice.  You could make an argument that this is an unacceptable risk at that stage of the game.  







That being said, to the extent that previous plays in the game are representative of what might have happened, and taking sample size into consideration, it is not clear to me that the numbers prove that one or the other call is clearly a better strategy.





BC

I am taking teejers side on this one, at least mostly.



I see a couple of problems with much of the discussion above.

First of all, the numbers you sample from this game are fairly meaningless; too small a sample size, all runs are not the same play - even more so all passes are not the same play, defenses were both tiring, etc.

Secondly, I don't think the issue is so much run vs pass, but whether the immediate tactical goal should have been to make a first down or take the chance for a quick TD. 

I'd argue that the primary goal at that moment in time should have been a first down. We were already in FG range, making the key element to run clock. cal isn't a quick strike team, but it was clear Stanford's chances to hold them for very long weren't particularly high. Taking time off the clock was critical.  A first down gives at least another three downs to run clock, perhaps in addition to the second down play itself.

A first down would also seem rather achievable goal at that point as well, since it was second and four (a short four). 

That doesn't necessarily mean a run play however, given how bad Stanford's run game has been. It could have meant a short safe pass with a much higher completion probability than the end zone shot we took.

Obviously a possibility is that either two runs don't get a first down, or a short pass still ends up incomplete and we're back where we ended up anyway, but I still think the fundamental tactical imperative at that moment in time was a first down rather than the chance at an immediate TD. 

So, I'd say it was a tactical mistake. 

It could have worked out anyway, and the opposite could still have ended in a loss. It's probably not the most critical issue surrounding the game, but still a mistake I think.

I don't disagree inasmuch as your argument introduces some subtlety that teejers' doesn't.  His point is that we should have run the ball twice and that is obvious to everyone who knows anything about football.  My argument is not so much that passing is better than running, but rather that both options are defensible.

In looking at the situation, the goals of the drive at that point are twofold: milk as much time off the clock (certainly once we got first and 10 with about 3 minutes left; Murky does have a point that it is hard to run a 7 1/2 minute drive in the best of circumstances, and the worst of circumstances is the one that hands Cal the ball with just enough time to mount the winning drive) and score points (ideally a TD, but a FG is better than nothing, and a FG as time expires is better than a TD any time).  The best way to do that is to get a fresh set of downs, to force cal to use up its timeouts and to drive the clock down to less than a minute left.  I would say that scoring (especially a TD) would be preferable to a FG attempt with less time on the clock (that is, you would not instruct your player to take a knee at the 1 inch line in order to be able to milk more time off the clock).

I haven't had a chance to look at the play in detail, but the play may not have been designed specifically to try to score a TD.  There were likely multiple receiving options, one of which was short and one of which was in the end zone.  If I were the one giving the QB instructions, I would say try to hit the short receiver if you can, but don't force it, and if you see a favorable, low-risk, match-up in the end zone take a shot.  But I'm not privy of any discussions.

BC

Did you even listen to the post-game presser?  Shaw said "the plan" was to take the TD shot on second down and then run on third down to burn clock (that was reported on TOS).  Now, I can understand your predisposition to defend Shaw at every turn, but at some point don't you have to take him at his word?  And if so, how can that possibly be sound game management in that down and distance and score situation?  

Short answer:  it cannot.

And murky, there were 3 minutes left on second and 4 (IIRC).  Cal had 3 timeouts.  If you run it twice* to get a first down, let's assume Cal calls one of its TOs (on third down).  That means you have first and 10, Cal has 2 timeouts left.  That's 2:15 and the clock running.  Best case scenario for Cal there (barring a TO) is that Cal gets ball back with no timeouts and 1:30 on the clock.  And that assumes Stanford does not get another first down; or that Stanford does not score a TD.  Of course, if Stanford takes four downs to get the initial first down, then Cal will have (at best) 45 seconds or so to score.  

Now, it's certainly true that Cal could have scored game tying or game-winning FG or TD in 1:30 with no timeouts (and in fact, they did score a TD in just over a minute, IIRC).  But it's also possible that Stanford could have closed out the game with another first down (after the one at issue).  And it's also possible that after Stanford gets that initial first down - and Cal sees Stanford is in "make Cal burn its timeouts as we set up for late go-ahead FG" - Cal would be particularly vulnerable to play-action for the TD.

It's all about maximizing the chances for the W at each juncture of the game and having the foresight to know how that calculation changes with each play, especially late in the game.  And I think Stanford is sorely lacking on that front under this regime, as repeatedly demonstrated over the years.  

* And BC, I'm not blindly advocating for run-run in that 2nd and 4 situation.  But I am definitely advocating for a run on second down.  If it was stuffed in the backfield for a loss of 3, then yes, a pass would be the call because the immediate goal is to get the first down.  OTOH, if a second down run gained 1 or 2 yards, then I'd be inclined to run again (especially if you had a conviction to go for it on fourth and short).  As noted, fourth and 1 or inches is intriguing.  Again, it's all about having the variables sorted out in your head prior to each play and understanding "the next move."  I have zero sense that this staff "gets that."

[BostonCard]

I was walking back to my car, so I did not hear the presser (but bear in mind, as always, that we are not the intended audience for the press conference). That being said,  given a choice between a lower probability play that resulted in a touchdown and a higher probability play that resulted in a first down, I would take the first down under the game circumstances.  But as you yourself realized, we really needed to run six more plays (that did not result in clock stoppage), which would have required two first downs, to give Cal the ball back with less time than what they scored in.

I can see Shaw's logic, though.  Given a choice between scoring a touchdown with 2+ minutes remaining and kicking a field goal with 1+ minutes remaining, I think you take the touchdown.  Not saying that was the prospective choice faced by Shaw at the time, but second and short is the best time to take a deep-ish shot, and lets face it, we have been pretty dismal at punching it in.  I'm not saying I agree with the call if it really was to try to score right there, but I can see the logic.

BC

[BostonCard]

I was walking back to my car, so I did not hear the presser (but bear in mind, as always, that we are not the intended audience for the press conference). That being said,  given a choice between a lower probability play that resulted in a touchdown and a higher probability play that resulted in a first down, I would take the first down under the game circumstances.  But as you yourself realized, we really needed to run six more plays (that did not result in clock stoppage), which would have required two first downs, to give Cal the ball back with less time than what they scored in.

I can see Shaw's logic, though.  Given a choice between scoring a touchdown with 2+ minutes remaining and kicking a field goal with 1+ minutes remaining, I think you take the touchdown.  Not saying that was the prospective choice faced by Shaw at the time, but second and short is the best time to take a deep-ish shot, and lets face it, we have been pretty dismal at punching it in.  I'm not saying I agree with the call if it really was to try to score right there, but I can see the logic.

BC

[qwerty49]

I was walking back to my car, so I did not hear the presser (but bear in mind, as always, that we are not the intended audience for the press conference). 

I don't have the patience to listen to a 45-minute presser, particularly when after all these years no one ever seems to be able to mic the questions so that the broadcast audience can hear them.  I mean, that's a pretty low-tech challenge, isn't it?  Or is this something that gets fixed 3-4 minutes into the presser, after I've clicked on something else?

[qwerty49]

I was walking back to my car, so I did not hear the presser (but bear in mind, as always, that we are not the intended audience for the press conference). 

I don't have the patience to listen to a 45-minute presser, particularly when after all these years no one ever seems to be able to mic the questions so that the broadcast audience can hear them.  I mean, that's a pretty low-tech challenge, isn't it?  Or is this something that gets fixed 3-4 minutes into the presser, after I've clicked on something else?

[winflop]

Did you even listen to the post-game presser?  Shaw said "the plan" was to take the TD shot on second down and then run on third down to burn clock (that was reported on TOS).  Now, I can understand your predisposition to defend Shaw at every turn, but at some point don't you have to take him at his word?  And if so, how can that possibly be sound game management in that down and distance and score situation?  

Short answer:  it cannot.

And murky, there were 3 minutes left on second and 4 (IIRC).  Cal had 3 timeouts.  If you run it twice* to get a first down, let's assume Cal calls one of its TOs (on third down).  That means you have first and 10, Cal has 2 timeouts left.  That's 2:15 and the clock running.  Best case scenario for Cal there (barring a TO) is that Cal gets ball back with no timeouts and 1:30 on the clock.  And that assumes Stanford does not get another first down; or that Stanford does not score a TD.  Of course, if Stanford takes four downs to get the initial first down, then Cal will have (at best) 45 seconds or so to score.  

Now, it's certainly true that Cal could have scored game tying or game-winning FG or TD in 1:30 with no timeouts (and in fact, they did score a TD in just over a minute, IIRC).  But it's also possible that Stanford could have closed out the game with another first down (after the one at issue).  And it's also possible that after Stanford gets that initial first down - and Cal sees Stanford is in "make Cal burn its timeouts as we set up for late go-ahead FG" - Cal would be particularly vulnerable to play-action for the TD.

It's all about maximizing the chances for the W at each juncture of the game and having the foresight to know how that calculation changes with each play, especially late in the game.  And I think Stanford is sorely lacking on that front under this regime, as repeatedly demonstrated over the years.  

* And BC, I'm not blindly advocating for run-run in that 2nd and 4 situation.  But I am definitely advocating for a run on second down.  If it was stuffed in the backfield for a loss of 3, then yes, a pass would be the call because the immediate goal is to get the first down.  OTOH, if a second down run gained 1 or 2 yards, then I'd be inclined to run again (especially if you had a conviction to go for it on fourth and short).  As noted, fourth and 1 or inches is intriguing.  Again, it's all about having the variables sorted out in your head prior to each play and understanding "the next move."  I have zero sense that this staff "gets that."

Shaw's explanation frustrates me even further because it's back-@$$wards. Run on second down, then pass if you don't get at least two yards. Force the Weenies to burn a TO on second down or let the clock run down another 30 seconds.

Shaw's clock management has been awful for years now. When and where/how does he get better?

[winflop]

Did you even listen to the post-game presser?  Shaw said "the plan" was to take the TD shot on second down and then run on third down to burn clock (that was reported on TOS).  Now, I can understand your predisposition to defend Shaw at every turn, but at some point don't you have to take him at his word?  And if so, how can that possibly be sound game management in that down and distance and score situation?  

Short answer:  it cannot.

And murky, there were 3 minutes left on second and 4 (IIRC).  Cal had 3 timeouts.  If you run it twice* to get a first down, let's assume Cal calls one of its TOs (on third down).  That means you have first and 10, Cal has 2 timeouts left.  That's 2:15 and the clock running.  Best case scenario for Cal there (barring a TO) is that Cal gets ball back with no timeouts and 1:30 on the clock.  And that assumes Stanford does not get another first down; or that Stanford does not score a TD.  Of course, if Stanford takes four downs to get the initial first down, then Cal will have (at best) 45 seconds or so to score.  

Now, it's certainly true that Cal could have scored game tying or game-winning FG or TD in 1:30 with no timeouts (and in fact, they did score a TD in just over a minute, IIRC).  But it's also possible that Stanford could have closed out the game with another first down (after the one at issue).  And it's also possible that after Stanford gets that initial first down - and Cal sees Stanford is in "make Cal burn its timeouts as we set up for late go-ahead FG" - Cal would be particularly vulnerable to play-action for the TD.

It's all about maximizing the chances for the W at each juncture of the game and having the foresight to know how that calculation changes with each play, especially late in the game.  And I think Stanford is sorely lacking on that front under this regime, as repeatedly demonstrated over the years.  

* And BC, I'm not blindly advocating for run-run in that 2nd and 4 situation.  But I am definitely advocating for a run on second down.  If it was stuffed in the backfield for a loss of 3, then yes, a pass would be the call because the immediate goal is to get the first down.  OTOH, if a second down run gained 1 or 2 yards, then I'd be inclined to run again (especially if you had a conviction to go for it on fourth and short).  As noted, fourth and 1 or inches is intriguing.  Again, it's all about having the variables sorted out in your head prior to each play and understanding "the next move."  I have zero sense that this staff "gets that."

Shaw's explanation frustrates me even further because it's back-@$$wards. Run on second down, then pass if you don't get at least two yards. Force the Weenies to burn a TO on second down or let the clock run down another 30 seconds.

Shaw's clock management has been awful for years now. When and where/how does he get better?