(12-04-2019, 02:52 PM)BostonCard Wrote: I posted the link to it elsewhere. I think it says what people have inferred. Not sure it is that insightful to basically say what many posters on here have said or believe.
I also posted a link to a blog post on whether changing coordinators makes a difference. It appears that changing offensive coordinators doesn’t make much of a difference in the first two years after a coordinator change; changing defensive coordinators makes a small difference.
I think it goes back to the old adage that it is about the “jesses and joes and not the x’s and o’s.”
BC
I think the antipathy towards Wilner is overdone in these parts. He is the only Bay Area member of a main stream media outlet who seems to even try to write about college sports. That's worth something.
On the other hand, he isn't all that good and I often wonder if he actually likes football.
In this case, he has some things correct. Stanford's run game certainly collapsed after 2017. That is indeed connected to many things - some of which he lists.
BUT, he doesn't really examine what contributed to this collapse, what might make it better, and doesn't even mention the complete inversion of what Stanford has tried to do on offense. He makes the bland statement that "the evidence doesn't favor the status quo" without stating what exactly he thinks the status quo is that has to change. Presumably he means replacing offensive coaches since he only talks about the offense and mentions Carberry and Pritchard, though also seems to say the collapse isn't their fault.
Mostly it sounds to me like the politician's remedy described by somebody else here recently: things didn't go well so we have to do something, firing coaches is something, therefore we have to fire coaches.
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By the way, a good chunk of that collapse in rush yards per game is that we simply quit trying to run the ball. Our run plays per game have been:
2015 = 43.6
2016 = 40.2
2017 = 34.3
2018 = 29.5
2019 = 28.8
[And this year that dropped significantly as the year wore on, was 21.7 attempts over final four games.]
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I don't think a statistical analysis of new offensive/defensive coordinators is particularly useful. If a competent head coach sees a particular problem with a coordinator and has a particular idea of who would be a better coordinator, then replacing said coordinator is likely to make things better. If a coach is looking to "do something", its likely a crapshoot. If a great coordinator moves along and upwards, then the situation is most likely to get worse. Altogether its probably a wash, but those three situations are likely not statistically similar events that should be grouped together.
[Besides, if you take the year on year changes for every offense and defense coordinator those are by definition a wash. And given the generally short tenure of football coaches, it's no real surprise that new coordinators in their first two years are generally a wash.]
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One of the items I found strange from Wilner is the idea that Herm Edwards is the shining example that all Pac 12 coaches should follow. He simply was the first to fire a bunch of coaches this year. Whether that ends up being particularly good for ASU football remains to be seen. Edwards himself certainly hasn't come in and turned the tide of the program.
ASU's conference record the past few years:
Edwards
2019: 4-5
2018: 5-4
Graham
2017: 6-3
2016: 2-7
2015: 4-5
2014: 6-3
2013: 8-1
