[MVDan]

Kevin Reihner, Stanford Grad in 2015 (played backup center during 2011-2014) has been named offensive coordinator at Old Dominion University. He had been the offensive line coach there the three previous seasons. Will be interesting to see how ODU does under his leadership.

https://t.co/lsTF5XgW2p

[MVDan]

Kevin Reihner, Stanford Grad in 2015 (played backup center during 2011-2014) has been named offensive coordinator at Old Dominion University. He had been the offensive line coach there the three previous seasons. Will be interesting to see how ODU does under his leadership.

https://t.co/lsTF5XgW2p

[msqueri]

For those who don't know, Old Dominion is major college football (FBS).

Old Dominion was 74th in Line Yards and 83rd in Sack Rate last season, which doesn't sound great but I find somewhat impressive for a team that's been transitioning to FBS in recent years. The Line Yards rank was the program's best in the last seven years and the Sack Rate was middling.

Obviously being OC/OL coach is a bigger and different job than being OL coach. We'll see how he does. On paper, though, he's a rising star - he's played for David Shaw and James Franklin, been a graduate assistant under Franklin and Dave Clawson, and risen quickly in the coaching ranks to be an FBS OC two months into his 30s.

[msqueri]

For those who don't know, Old Dominion is major college football (FBS).

Old Dominion was 74th in Line Yards and 83rd in Sack Rate last season, which doesn't sound great but I find somewhat impressive for a team that's been transitioning to FBS in recent years. The Line Yards rank was the program's best in the last seven years and the Sack Rate was middling.

Obviously being OC/OL coach is a bigger and different job than being OL coach. We'll see how he does. On paper, though, he's a rising star - he's played for David Shaw and James Franklin, been a graduate assistant under Franklin and Dave Clawson, and risen quickly in the coaching ranks to be an FBS OC two months into his 30s.

[BostonCard]

How does OdU’s line yards compare to Stanford’s?

Third quartile is probably pretty good compared to ODU’s peers (maybe G5 schools?)

BC

[BostonCard]

How does OdU’s line yards compare to Stanford’s?

Third quartile is probably pretty good compared to ODU’s peers (maybe G5 schools?)

BC

[cardcrimson]

Too bad we’re not in need of an OC.

[cardcrimson]

Too bad we’re not in need of an OC.

[BostonCard]

Too bad we’re not in need of an OC.

Even if we were, I’m not sure we’d want to take someone whose experience has been as a position coach at a G5 level.  Maybe we will have a vacancy in a couple of years, at which point Reihner will hopefully have proven himself to be a capable OC.

BC

[BostonCard]

Too bad we’re not in need of an OC.

Even if we were, I’m not sure we’d want to take someone whose experience has been as a position coach at a G5 level.  Maybe we will have a vacancy in a couple of years, at which point Reihner will hopefully have proven himself to be a capable OC.

BC

[msqueri]

How does OdU’s line yards compare to Stanford’s?

Third quartile is probably pretty good compared to ODU’s peers (maybe G5 schools?)

BC

Stanford's Line Yards ranking over the years:

2014: #59
2015: #41
2016: #48
2017: #74
2018: #114
2019: #58
2020: #23
2021: #126

[msqueri]

How does OdU’s line yards compare to Stanford’s?

Third quartile is probably pretty good compared to ODU’s peers (maybe G5 schools?)

BC

Stanford's Line Yards ranking over the years:

2014: #59
2015: #41
2016: #48
2017: #74
2018: #114
2019: #58
2020: #23
2021: #126

[BostonCard]

Thanks, Matt!  As I suspected, ODU’s yard lines last year were much better than ours.

2020 was a crazy year, and one takes all stats there with a grain of salt, but still, it does suggest that large year to year variability in OL play is possible.  Let’s hope we at least have a 2018 to 2019 level improvement.  Is that part of your theory of the case for the offense?  It seems plausible, but I want to avoid wishcasting.

BC

[BostonCard]

Thanks, Matt!  As I suspected, ODU’s yard lines last year were much better than ours.

2020 was a crazy year, and one takes all stats there with a grain of salt, but still, it does suggest that large year to year variability in OL play is possible.  Let’s hope we at least have a 2018 to 2019 level improvement.  Is that part of your theory of the case for the offense?  It seems plausible, but I want to avoid wishcasting.

BC

[msqueri]

Big year-to-year improvement for the OL is the single most important factor for the 2022 theory of the case on offense.

I don't view the offensive theory of the case as wishcasting as much as recognizing a clear pattern under Shaw. When the offense has a proven QB1 returning and that year's starting offensive line has multiple fourth year (or older) guys, good things happen. The years both conditions have applied have been 2011 (#3 Offensive FEI), 2013 (#21 Offensive FEI), 2015 (#2 Offensive FEI), 2018 (#37 Offensive FEI), and 2020 (#21 Offensive FEI). If Hinton remains a turnstile and the year-to-year improvement for the unit is evident but not dramatic, we still should expect a top 40 offense. If all my crowing about the importance of fourth year linemen comes to fruition, I think a top 25 FEI offense is easily attainable.

My concern about how far this can get us stems from my doubts it can translate into enough points to outscore offenses that get to play against our defense. The 2018 and 2020 Stanford offenses were talented, experienced, and efficient....and amounted to 28.4 and 29.3 points per game, respectively. In today's college football that's deeply mediocre. Even 32 points per game, which would be our best showing in half a decade, only would have been 38th in the country last year. I have doubts Shaw has it in him to unleash an offensive tempo/ferocity that can score at the levels now seen by great college football offenses. With our talent and seniority we should be able to really pour it on (I'm talking 36/37/38 points per game kind of offense) but that's just hard to imagine from the head coach we know. And with the state of the Stanford defense in recent years I'm just not sure a 30 point per game offense cuts the mustard.

Current mood on the season: for Stanford football to be good (8+ wins, banging on the door of top 25 relevance), we're going to need either miraculous improvement by the defense to be Lance Anderson's best in over half a decade or the offense to put points on the board somewhere in the vicinity of how they did in 2015. My guess is neither quite reaches that level and something mediocre (4-7 wins) is in the cards.

[msqueri]

Big year-to-year improvement for the OL is the single most important factor for the 2022 theory of the case on offense.

I don't view the offensive theory of the case as wishcasting as much as recognizing a clear pattern under Shaw. When the offense has a proven QB1 returning and that year's starting offensive line has multiple fourth year (or older) guys, good things happen. The years both conditions have applied have been 2011 (#3 Offensive FEI), 2013 (#21 Offensive FEI), 2015 (#2 Offensive FEI), 2018 (#37 Offensive FEI), and 2020 (#21 Offensive FEI). If Hinton remains a turnstile and the year-to-year improvement for the unit is evident but not dramatic, we still should expect a top 40 offense. If all my crowing about the importance of fourth year linemen comes to fruition, I think a top 25 FEI offense is easily attainable.

My concern about how far this can get us stems from my doubts it can translate into enough points to outscore offenses that get to play against our defense. The 2018 and 2020 Stanford offenses were talented, experienced, and efficient....and amounted to 28.4 and 29.3 points per game, respectively. In today's college football that's deeply mediocre. Even 32 points per game, which would be our best showing in half a decade, only would have been 38th in the country last year. I have doubts Shaw has it in him to unleash an offensive tempo/ferocity that can score at the levels now seen by great college football offenses. With our talent and seniority we should be able to really pour it on (I'm talking 36/37/38 points per game kind of offense) but that's just hard to imagine from the head coach we know. And with the state of the Stanford defense in recent years I'm just not sure a 30 point per game offense cuts the mustard.

Current mood on the season: for Stanford football to be good (8+ wins, banging on the door of top 25 relevance), we're going to need either miraculous improvement by the defense to be Lance Anderson's best in over half a decade or the offense to put points on the board somewhere in the vicinity of how they did in 2015. My guess is neither quite reaches that level and something mediocre (4-7 wins) is in the cards.

[Goose]

Current mood on the season: for Stanford football to be good (8+ wins, banging on the door of top 25 relevance), we're going to need either miraculous improvement by the defense to be Lance Anderson's best in over half a decade or the offense to put points on the board somewhere in the vicinity of how they did in 2015. My guess is neither quite reaches that level and something mediocre (4-7 wins) is in the cards.

I would be interested in your thought regarding how tempo and ball control affect the equation. Having been around Stanford football more years than I care to count, we have often been in a situation where we relied on the offense to put tons of points on the board. It seldom worked. We would always (it seemed) be in a position where we needed a defensive stop we just couldn't get. Stanford has never had much luck winning football track meets.

Shaw in the past has had better defenses than Stanford typically did, but Shaw also sought to shorten the game. Given out past history, I think that is a good idea if you can be "efficient". Thoughts?

[Goose]

Current mood on the season: for Stanford football to be good (8+ wins, banging on the door of top 25 relevance), we're going to need either miraculous improvement by the defense to be Lance Anderson's best in over half a decade or the offense to put points on the board somewhere in the vicinity of how they did in 2015. My guess is neither quite reaches that level and something mediocre (4-7 wins) is in the cards.

I would be interested in your thought regarding how tempo and ball control affect the equation. Having been around Stanford football more years than I care to count, we have often been in a situation where we relied on the offense to put tons of points on the board. It seldom worked. We would always (it seemed) be in a position where we needed a defensive stop we just couldn't get. Stanford has never had much luck winning football track meets.

Shaw in the past has had better defenses than Stanford typically did, but Shaw also sought to shorten the game. Given out past history, I think that is a good idea if you can be "efficient". Thoughts?

[msqueri]

Current mood on the season: for Stanford football to be good (8+ wins, banging on the door of top 25 relevance), we're going to need either miraculous improvement by the defense to be Lance Anderson's best in over half a decade or the offense to put points on the board somewhere in the vicinity of how they did in 2015. My guess is neither quite reaches that level and something mediocre (4-7 wins) is in the cards.

I would be interested in your thought regarding how tempo and ball control affect the equation. Having been around Stanford football more years than I care to count, we have often been in a situation where we relied on the offense to put tons of points on the board. It seldom worked. We would always (it seemed) be in a position where we needed a defensive stop we just couldn't get. Stanford has never had much luck winning football track meets.



Shaw in the past has had better defenses than Stanford typically did, but Shaw also sought to shorten the game. Given out past history, I think that is a good idea if you can be "efficient". Thoughts?

I think a ball control offense paired with a stingy defense can be a potent combination. Shaw's modus operandi/vision had a proven track record of success for a while. But it faltered a bit in 2016 when the offense didn't have all the pieces clicking and 2018 when the defense's drop off really came home to roost, and since then that model has done nothing to bring Shaw/Stanford credit.

I'm much less convinced that a ball control offense is competitively useful in today's football when one has a very talented offense and a sieve-like defense. Passing games are so dynamic these years (and really it's been that way for a while) that the logic of trying to keep the ball away from the other team, grind out clock, etc. seems to fall apart a bit. It doesn't take that long to score and when teams have bad defenses the field position difference gets eaten up quickly (think about the times we put from past midfield to pin the other team deep just to have the opponent back where we punted from within plays/seconds).

My bigger problem with lack of tempo is that I think it hamstrings the offense and is enervating to both the team and the fanbase. Our offense almost always has more talent than opposing defenses and we shouldn't consider it advantageous to limit the number of plays the offense gets off. We also should prefer the upside of letting offensive players develop rhythm/tempo/swagger and keeping defenses on their toes to whatever we get from running down the clock and calling an audible at the line of scrimmage practically every play. The biggest advantage an offense has over a defense is the advantage of initiative and surprise. Our lack of tempo lets defenses catch their breath, observe what personnel we're showing, and account for how we adjusted at the line of scrimmage in response to their defense. Our philosophy of grinding clock is fundamentally about leveling the playing field....but our offense shouldn't want a level playing field.

It's also dreadful for fans to watch. I think I'm like many fans in that when I watch my team play I want to see them actually play rather than just watch time run off the clock. Alas, out of 130 teams in the full seasons Shaw has coached our plays per game rankings (excluding the short 2020 season when we were #68) have been #129, #95, #127, #128, #120, #111, #109, #120, #93, and #45. Spot the outlier? This list is in order of recency, so #45 was with Andrew Luck at QB as a fourth year human computer. Without Luck (or fellow NFL starting QB Mills in his fourth year getting us to almost average tempo), it's been slow as molasses. Nobody gets to watch their team less than a Stanford fan. 

I also don't think Shaw's concept of "efficient" is sound. What efficiency really is is the ratio of useful work performed by the offense to the total energy expended by the offense. A reductive but useful way to think about it is yards per play. Or, if one wanted to adhere to the Shawvita concept of avoiding negative plays, the yards per play of Stanford's typical/median play. It is NOT the number of positive plays you have, which is how we talk about it. An offense that has eight positive plays out of ten and averages 5.20 yards per play is exactly as efficient as an offense that has five positive plays out of ten and also averages 5.20 yards per play. They both get 50 yards in that ten play sequence, and are both very inefficient. For too long we've been stuck in a three yards and a cloud of dust era of football in which getting a few yards each play is seen as effective because you're then making third down manageable. That's antiquated. Good offenses avoid third down if they can.

A stat that might bring the evolution (revolution arguably) in offense over time into perspective: the vaunted 1999 Stanford Rose Bowl offense is, to my knowledge, one of the greatest offenses in the history of Stanford football along with 2011 (#5 in the nation in yards per play, with 2011 being #6); the 6.48 yards per play we had in 1999, which again was top five in the nation that year, would have only ranked #17 in the country in 2021. What qualifies as "efficient" now has a higher bar than it used to. Over 50 teams nationally last year had 6+ yards per play. Over 50 teams nationally last year had 30+ points per game. I suspect in Shaw's mind a 6 yard per play/30 point per game offense would be pretty good. Efficient one might say. Wrong, at least not in the sense that is meaningful: competitively.

The bottom line is to actually be efficient you almost always need explosiveness. It's not 3-4 yard run plays, it's catching receivers in space with a head of steam so they can gobble up yards. It's not making each play positive, it's getting the big plays often enough to put up a lot of points. Personally, I think a higher tempo offense would help us be more dynamic, surprising, and entertaining.

If Shaw ever gets back to having a roster like his 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016, I think the shortening the game philosophy makes sense and has a proven track record under Shaw. When the offense is your saving grace and/or the defense can't stop anyone, no thanks.

[msqueri]

Current mood on the season: for Stanford football to be good (8+ wins, banging on the door of top 25 relevance), we're going to need either miraculous improvement by the defense to be Lance Anderson's best in over half a decade or the offense to put points on the board somewhere in the vicinity of how they did in 2015. My guess is neither quite reaches that level and something mediocre (4-7 wins) is in the cards.

I would be interested in your thought regarding how tempo and ball control affect the equation. Having been around Stanford football more years than I care to count, we have often been in a situation where we relied on the offense to put tons of points on the board. It seldom worked. We would always (it seemed) be in a position where we needed a defensive stop we just couldn't get. Stanford has never had much luck winning football track meets.



Shaw in the past has had better defenses than Stanford typically did, but Shaw also sought to shorten the game. Given out past history, I think that is a good idea if you can be "efficient". Thoughts?

I think a ball control offense paired with a stingy defense can be a potent combination. Shaw's modus operandi/vision had a proven track record of success for a while. But it faltered a bit in 2016 when the offense didn't have all the pieces clicking and 2018 when the defense's drop off really came home to roost, and since then that model has done nothing to bring Shaw/Stanford credit.

I'm much less convinced that a ball control offense is competitively useful in today's football when one has a very talented offense and a sieve-like defense. Passing games are so dynamic these years (and really it's been that way for a while) that the logic of trying to keep the ball away from the other team, grind out clock, etc. seems to fall apart a bit. It doesn't take that long to score and when teams have bad defenses the field position difference gets eaten up quickly (think about the times we put from past midfield to pin the other team deep just to have the opponent back where we punted from within plays/seconds).

My bigger problem with lack of tempo is that I think it hamstrings the offense and is enervating to both the team and the fanbase. Our offense almost always has more talent than opposing defenses and we shouldn't consider it advantageous to limit the number of plays the offense gets off. We also should prefer the upside of letting offensive players develop rhythm/tempo/swagger and keeping defenses on their toes to whatever we get from running down the clock and calling an audible at the line of scrimmage practically every play. The biggest advantage an offense has over a defense is the advantage of initiative and surprise. Our lack of tempo lets defenses catch their breath, observe what personnel we're showing, and account for how we adjusted at the line of scrimmage in response to their defense. Our philosophy of grinding clock is fundamentally about leveling the playing field....but our offense shouldn't want a level playing field.

It's also dreadful for fans to watch. I think I'm like many fans in that when I watch my team play I want to see them actually play rather than just watch time run off the clock. Alas, out of 130 teams in the full seasons Shaw has coached our plays per game rankings (excluding the short 2020 season when we were #68) have been #129, #95, #127, #128, #120, #111, #109, #120, #93, and #45. Spot the outlier? This list is in order of recency, so #45 was with Andrew Luck at QB as a fourth year human computer. Without Luck (or fellow NFL starting QB Mills in his fourth year getting us to almost average tempo), it's been slow as molasses. Nobody gets to watch their team less than a Stanford fan. 

I also don't think Shaw's concept of "efficient" is sound. What efficiency really is is the ratio of useful work performed by the offense to the total energy expended by the offense. A reductive but useful way to think about it is yards per play. Or, if one wanted to adhere to the Shawvita concept of avoiding negative plays, the yards per play of Stanford's typical/median play. It is NOT the number of positive plays you have, which is how we talk about it. An offense that has eight positive plays out of ten and averages 5.20 yards per play is exactly as efficient as an offense that has five positive plays out of ten and also averages 5.20 yards per play. They both get 50 yards in that ten play sequence, and are both very inefficient. For too long we've been stuck in a three yards and a cloud of dust era of football in which getting a few yards each play is seen as effective because you're then making third down manageable. That's antiquated. Good offenses avoid third down if they can.

A stat that might bring the evolution (revolution arguably) in offense over time into perspective: the vaunted 1999 Stanford Rose Bowl offense is, to my knowledge, one of the greatest offenses in the history of Stanford football along with 2011 (#5 in the nation in yards per play, with 2011 being #6); the 6.48 yards per play we had in 1999, which again was top five in the nation that year, would have only ranked #17 in the country in 2021. What qualifies as "efficient" now has a higher bar than it used to. Over 50 teams nationally last year had 6+ yards per play. Over 50 teams nationally last year had 30+ points per game. I suspect in Shaw's mind a 6 yard per play/30 point per game offense would be pretty good. Efficient one might say. Wrong, at least not in the sense that is meaningful: competitively.

The bottom line is to actually be efficient you almost always need explosiveness. It's not 3-4 yard run plays, it's catching receivers in space with a head of steam so they can gobble up yards. It's not making each play positive, it's getting the big plays often enough to put up a lot of points. Personally, I think a higher tempo offense would help us be more dynamic, surprising, and entertaining.

If Shaw ever gets back to having a roster like his 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016, I think the shortening the game philosophy makes sense and has a proven track record under Shaw. When the offense is your saving grace and/or the defense can't stop anyone, no thanks.

[McKenwood]

Current mood on the season: for Stanford football to be good (8+ wins, banging on the door of top 25 relevance), we're going to need either miraculous improvement by the defense to be Lance Anderson's best in over half a decade or the offense to put points on the board somewhere in the vicinity of how they did in 2015. My guess is neither quite reaches that level and something mediocre (4-7 wins) is in the cards.

I would be interested in your thought regarding how tempo and ball control affect the equation. Having been around Stanford football more years than I care to count, we have often been in a situation where we relied on the offense to put tons of points on the board. It seldom worked. We would always (it seemed) be in a position where we needed a defensive stop we just couldn't get. Stanford has never had much luck winning football track meets.



Shaw in the past has had better defenses than Stanford typically did, but Shaw also sought to shorten the game. Given out past history, I think that is a good idea if you can be "efficient". Thoughts?

I think a ball control offense paired with a stingy defense can be a potent combination. Shaw's modus operandi/vision had a proven track record of success for a while. But it faltered a bit in 2016 when the offense didn't have all the pieces clicking and 2018 when the defense's drop off really came home to roost, and since then that model has done nothing to bring Shaw/Stanford credit.

I'm much less convinced that a ball control offense is competitively useful in today's football when one has a very talented offense and a sieve-like defense. Passing games are so dynamic these years (and really it's been that way for a while) that the logic of trying to keep the ball away from the other team, grind out clock, etc. seems to fall apart a bit. It doesn't take that long to score and when teams have bad defenses the field position difference gets eaten up quickly (think about the times we put from past midfield to pin the other team deep just to have the opponent back where we punted from within plays/seconds).

My bigger problem with lack of tempo is that I think it hamstrings the offense and is enervating to both the team and the fanbase. Our offense almost always has more talent than opposing defenses and we shouldn't consider it advantageous to limit the number of plays the offense gets off. We also should prefer the upside of letting offensive players develop rhythm/tempo/swagger and keeping defenses on their toes to whatever we get from running down the clock and calling an audible at the line of scrimmage practically every play. The biggest advantage an offense has over a defense is the advantage of initiative and surprise. Our lack of tempo lets defenses catch their breath, observe what personnel we're showing, and account for how we adjusted at the line of scrimmage in response to their defense. Our philosophy of grinding clock is fundamentally about leveling the playing field....but our offense shouldn't want a level playing field.

It's also dreadful for fans to watch. I think I'm like many fans in that when I watch my team play I want to see them actually play rather than just watch time run off the clock. Alas, out of 130 teams in the full seasons Shaw has coached our plays per game rankings (excluding the short 2020 season when we were #68) have been #129, #95, #127, #128, #120, #111, #109, #120, #93, and #45. Spot the outlier? This list is in order of recency, so #45 was with Andrew Luck at QB as a fourth year human computer. Without Luck (or fellow NFL starting QB Mills in his fourth year getting us to almost average tempo), it's been slow as molasses. Nobody gets to watch their team less than a Stanford fan. 

I also don't think Shaw's concept of "efficient" is sound. What efficiency really is is the ratio of useful work performed by the offense to the total energy expended by the offense. A reductive but useful way to think about it is yards per play. Or, if one wanted to adhere to the Shawvita concept of avoiding negative plays, the yards per play of Stanford's typical/median play. It is NOT the number of positive plays you have, which is how we talk about it. An offense that has eight positive plays out of ten and averages 5.20 yards per play is exactly as efficient as an offense that has five positive plays out of ten and also averages 5.20 yards per play. They both get 50 yards in that ten play sequence, and are both very inefficient. For too long we've been stuck in a three yards and a cloud of dust era of football in which getting a few yards each play is seen as effective because you're then making third down manageable. That's antiquated. Good offenses avoid third down if they can.

A stat that might bring the evolution (revolution arguably) in offense over time into perspective: the vaunted 1999 Stanford Rose Bowl offense is, to my knowledge, one of the greatest offenses in the history of Stanford football along with 2011 (#5 in the nation in yards per play, with 2011 being #6); the 6.48 yards per play we had in 1999, which again was top five in the nation that year, would have only ranked #17 in the country in 2021. What qualifies as "efficient" now has a higher bar than it used to. Over 50 teams nationally last year had 6+ yards per play. Over 50 teams nationally last year had 30+ points per game. I suspect in Shaw's mind a 6 yard per play/30 point per game offense would be pretty good. Efficient one might say. Wrong, at least not in the sense that is meaningful: competitively.

The bottom line is to actually be efficient you almost always need explosiveness. It's not 3-4 yard run plays, it's catching receivers in space with a head of steam so they can gobble up yards. It's not making each play positive, it's getting the big plays often enough to put up a lot of points. Personally, I think a higher tempo offense would help us be more dynamic, surprising, and entertaining.

If Shaw ever gets back to having a roster like his 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016, I think the shortening the game philosophy makes sense and has a proven track record under Shaw. When the offense is your saving grace and/or the defense can't stop anyone, no thanks.

Excellent post.

Stanford does have the weapons on offense. Use them and avoid third downs.

Interestingly Todd Husak in a preseason interview on KNBR last year advocated that Stanford move to an uptempo offense to take advantage of what he thought was Stanford's stronger unit, namely its offense. He probably still feels the same way.

[McKenwood]

Current mood on the season: for Stanford football to be good (8+ wins, banging on the door of top 25 relevance), we're going to need either miraculous improvement by the defense to be Lance Anderson's best in over half a decade or the offense to put points on the board somewhere in the vicinity of how they did in 2015. My guess is neither quite reaches that level and something mediocre (4-7 wins) is in the cards.

I would be interested in your thought regarding how tempo and ball control affect the equation. Having been around Stanford football more years than I care to count, we have often been in a situation where we relied on the offense to put tons of points on the board. It seldom worked. We would always (it seemed) be in a position where we needed a defensive stop we just couldn't get. Stanford has never had much luck winning football track meets.



Shaw in the past has had better defenses than Stanford typically did, but Shaw also sought to shorten the game. Given out past history, I think that is a good idea if you can be "efficient". Thoughts?

I think a ball control offense paired with a stingy defense can be a potent combination. Shaw's modus operandi/vision had a proven track record of success for a while. But it faltered a bit in 2016 when the offense didn't have all the pieces clicking and 2018 when the defense's drop off really came home to roost, and since then that model has done nothing to bring Shaw/Stanford credit.

I'm much less convinced that a ball control offense is competitively useful in today's football when one has a very talented offense and a sieve-like defense. Passing games are so dynamic these years (and really it's been that way for a while) that the logic of trying to keep the ball away from the other team, grind out clock, etc. seems to fall apart a bit. It doesn't take that long to score and when teams have bad defenses the field position difference gets eaten up quickly (think about the times we put from past midfield to pin the other team deep just to have the opponent back where we punted from within plays/seconds).

My bigger problem with lack of tempo is that I think it hamstrings the offense and is enervating to both the team and the fanbase. Our offense almost always has more talent than opposing defenses and we shouldn't consider it advantageous to limit the number of plays the offense gets off. We also should prefer the upside of letting offensive players develop rhythm/tempo/swagger and keeping defenses on their toes to whatever we get from running down the clock and calling an audible at the line of scrimmage practically every play. The biggest advantage an offense has over a defense is the advantage of initiative and surprise. Our lack of tempo lets defenses catch their breath, observe what personnel we're showing, and account for how we adjusted at the line of scrimmage in response to their defense. Our philosophy of grinding clock is fundamentally about leveling the playing field....but our offense shouldn't want a level playing field.

It's also dreadful for fans to watch. I think I'm like many fans in that when I watch my team play I want to see them actually play rather than just watch time run off the clock. Alas, out of 130 teams in the full seasons Shaw has coached our plays per game rankings (excluding the short 2020 season when we were #68) have been #129, #95, #127, #128, #120, #111, #109, #120, #93, and #45. Spot the outlier? This list is in order of recency, so #45 was with Andrew Luck at QB as a fourth year human computer. Without Luck (or fellow NFL starting QB Mills in his fourth year getting us to almost average tempo), it's been slow as molasses. Nobody gets to watch their team less than a Stanford fan. 

I also don't think Shaw's concept of "efficient" is sound. What efficiency really is is the ratio of useful work performed by the offense to the total energy expended by the offense. A reductive but useful way to think about it is yards per play. Or, if one wanted to adhere to the Shawvita concept of avoiding negative plays, the yards per play of Stanford's typical/median play. It is NOT the number of positive plays you have, which is how we talk about it. An offense that has eight positive plays out of ten and averages 5.20 yards per play is exactly as efficient as an offense that has five positive plays out of ten and also averages 5.20 yards per play. They both get 50 yards in that ten play sequence, and are both very inefficient. For too long we've been stuck in a three yards and a cloud of dust era of football in which getting a few yards each play is seen as effective because you're then making third down manageable. That's antiquated. Good offenses avoid third down if they can.

A stat that might bring the evolution (revolution arguably) in offense over time into perspective: the vaunted 1999 Stanford Rose Bowl offense is, to my knowledge, one of the greatest offenses in the history of Stanford football along with 2011 (#5 in the nation in yards per play, with 2011 being #6); the 6.48 yards per play we had in 1999, which again was top five in the nation that year, would have only ranked #17 in the country in 2021. What qualifies as "efficient" now has a higher bar than it used to. Over 50 teams nationally last year had 6+ yards per play. Over 50 teams nationally last year had 30+ points per game. I suspect in Shaw's mind a 6 yard per play/30 point per game offense would be pretty good. Efficient one might say. Wrong, at least not in the sense that is meaningful: competitively.

The bottom line is to actually be efficient you almost always need explosiveness. It's not 3-4 yard run plays, it's catching receivers in space with a head of steam so they can gobble up yards. It's not making each play positive, it's getting the big plays often enough to put up a lot of points. Personally, I think a higher tempo offense would help us be more dynamic, surprising, and entertaining.

If Shaw ever gets back to having a roster like his 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016, I think the shortening the game philosophy makes sense and has a proven track record under Shaw. When the offense is your saving grace and/or the defense can't stop anyone, no thanks.

Excellent post.

Stanford does have the weapons on offense. Use them and avoid third downs.

Interestingly Todd Husak in a preseason interview on KNBR last year advocated that Stanford move to an uptempo offense to take advantage of what he thought was Stanford's stronger unit, namely its offense. He probably still feels the same way.

[Phogge]

Let me get this straight. Stanford has an offensive coordinator?

[Phogge]

Let me get this straight. Stanford has an offensive coordinator?

[BostonCard]

In the end, more possessions for the offense will lead to the defense having to defend more possessions (barring insides kicks), so I don’t get the idea that if we have a very good offense, we should leverage that by playing uptempo, since it also exposes the defense to more possessions.

In the end, given the broad approximation that in almost every game, the number of offensive and defensive possessions are going to be almost identical, the goal is to be more efficient on the offensive possessions (ie, scoring more points per possession) than we allow our opponents when they possess the ball.  More possessions gives our (good) offense more opportunities, but puts more pressure on the (bad) defense to make stops.

I don’t take a position on faster versus slower pace of play.  I support whatever gets us more offensive efficiency and reduces our defensive liabilities.

BC

[BostonCard]

In the end, more possessions for the offense will lead to the defense having to defend more possessions (barring insides kicks), so I don’t get the idea that if we have a very good offense, we should leverage that by playing uptempo, since it also exposes the defense to more possessions.

In the end, given the broad approximation that in almost every game, the number of offensive and defensive possessions are going to be almost identical, the goal is to be more efficient on the offensive possessions (ie, scoring more points per possession) than we allow our opponents when they possess the ball.  More possessions gives our (good) offense more opportunities, but puts more pressure on the (bad) defense to make stops.

I don’t take a position on faster versus slower pace of play.  I support whatever gets us more offensive efficiency and reduces our defensive liabilities.

BC

[CTcard]

I also don't think Shaw's concept of "efficient" is sound. What efficiency really is is the ratio of useful work performed by the offense to the total energy expended by the offense. A reductive but useful way to think about it is yards per play. Or, if one wanted to adhere to the Shawvita concept of avoiding negative plays, the yards per play of Stanford's typical/median play. It is NOT the number of positive plays you have, which is how we talk about it. An offense that has eight positive plays out of ten and averages 5.20 yards per play is exactly as efficient as an offense that has five positive plays out of ten and also averages 5.20 yards per play. They both get 50 yards in that ten play sequence, and are both very inefficient. For too long we've been stuck in a three yards and a cloud of dust era of football in which getting a few yards each play is seen as effective because you're then making third down manageable. That's antiquated. Good offenses avoid third down if they can.

That's not really the definition of efficiency, or an efficient offense. 

The most meaningful definition of offensive efficiency is points per drive. That is basically what FEI is, modulo some complicated manipulations that are supposed to account for strength of opponents and giving reductions for outcomes that really hurt (like turnovers). If you believe in it, you could say that FEI itself is the best measure of efficiency. 

Some advanced stats focus on yards per play. That's typically easier to dig out from many standard stats, but it's not really the same thing. Four yards each and every play means you don't punt. 40 yards on one play followed by 9 plays of zero typically means at least two or three punts every four drives. More broadly, if you are scoring frequently, less variation is typically better (i.e. it should increase your points per drive) whereas if you score rarely, more variation should help. 

There are definitely fan/stylistic issues on slow tempo versus fast tempo. I would tend to agree that I would rather watch more football rather than less and it offends my sense of competition that one can make a youtube of all the plays in a football game that lasts about 12 minutes. 
However, the winning versus losing considerations are different. Here are some reasons one might perform better in a slowed down version of a football game (i.e. fewer possessions).
1. Thin roster, particularly a thin defense. Fewer possessions and more time between plays might help a thin team get by. 
2. If you manage to get an early lead, lowering the number of possessions should give you better odds. (but vice versa)
3. If you have personnel that allows for overwhelming the defense in particular situations, changing the folks on the field for particular plays can provide a significant advantage - and changing personnel takes time. [This has been a particular point of contention on Stanford fan boards, as it might also signal what play is coming.]
4. If your opponent is simply not used to playing in this manner, it might throw them off; though it would seem easier to adjust to slow play than fast. 

Simply looking at won-loss records in previous Stanford seasons aren't really a good measure of whether playing slow is a good idea or not, as one cannot tell what would have happened with a different approach. 

An odd feature of Stanford in recent years is that we have tilted heavily towards the pass game while still sticking to a slow tempo. Since the clock stops after incompletions, this tends to run less total clock than the more traditional mode of playing slow with a dominant ground game, but it is still slow. We've also gone to a generally more dink/dunk passing offense since Hogan left. That may be as much about ability as intent, as an exception was 2018 when Costello was at his best.

[CTcard]

I also don't think Shaw's concept of "efficient" is sound. What efficiency really is is the ratio of useful work performed by the offense to the total energy expended by the offense. A reductive but useful way to think about it is yards per play. Or, if one wanted to adhere to the Shawvita concept of avoiding negative plays, the yards per play of Stanford's typical/median play. It is NOT the number of positive plays you have, which is how we talk about it. An offense that has eight positive plays out of ten and averages 5.20 yards per play is exactly as efficient as an offense that has five positive plays out of ten and also averages 5.20 yards per play. They both get 50 yards in that ten play sequence, and are both very inefficient. For too long we've been stuck in a three yards and a cloud of dust era of football in which getting a few yards each play is seen as effective because you're then making third down manageable. That's antiquated. Good offenses avoid third down if they can.

That's not really the definition of efficiency, or an efficient offense. 

The most meaningful definition of offensive efficiency is points per drive. That is basically what FEI is, modulo some complicated manipulations that are supposed to account for strength of opponents and giving reductions for outcomes that really hurt (like turnovers). If you believe in it, you could say that FEI itself is the best measure of efficiency. 

Some advanced stats focus on yards per play. That's typically easier to dig out from many standard stats, but it's not really the same thing. Four yards each and every play means you don't punt. 40 yards on one play followed by 9 plays of zero typically means at least two or three punts every four drives. More broadly, if you are scoring frequently, less variation is typically better (i.e. it should increase your points per drive) whereas if you score rarely, more variation should help. 

There are definitely fan/stylistic issues on slow tempo versus fast tempo. I would tend to agree that I would rather watch more football rather than less and it offends my sense of competition that one can make a youtube of all the plays in a football game that lasts about 12 minutes. 
However, the winning versus losing considerations are different. Here are some reasons one might perform better in a slowed down version of a football game (i.e. fewer possessions).
1. Thin roster, particularly a thin defense. Fewer possessions and more time between plays might help a thin team get by. 
2. If you manage to get an early lead, lowering the number of possessions should give you better odds. (but vice versa)
3. If you have personnel that allows for overwhelming the defense in particular situations, changing the folks on the field for particular plays can provide a significant advantage - and changing personnel takes time. [This has been a particular point of contention on Stanford fan boards, as it might also signal what play is coming.]
4. If your opponent is simply not used to playing in this manner, it might throw them off; though it would seem easier to adjust to slow play than fast. 

Simply looking at won-loss records in previous Stanford seasons aren't really a good measure of whether playing slow is a good idea or not, as one cannot tell what would have happened with a different approach. 

An odd feature of Stanford in recent years is that we have tilted heavily towards the pass game while still sticking to a slow tempo. Since the clock stops after incompletions, this tends to run less total clock than the more traditional mode of playing slow with a dominant ground game, but it is still slow. We've also gone to a generally more dink/dunk passing offense since Hogan left. That may be as much about ability as intent, as an exception was 2018 when Costello was at his best.

[bl82]

In addition to the fan issues related to slow tempo above, it is important to consider that there are likely recruiting/retention issues related to tempo as well.

Our WRs will never put up gaudy stats. Their first priority appears to be run blocking and we tend to run mostly possession-type patterns. Not only that, but we often favor TEs over WRs more than other offenses. In many ways, our prototypical WR is a tall, stronger blocker who can also also catch, but who is not primarily a deep threat. Almost like a WR/TE hybrid. For most HS WRs, our offensive style and the role of WRs in our offense is not going to be particularly sexy. You might be able to extend this same argument to how we use our RBs (more power, anyone?) too. Maybe two RBs at USC have some thoughts on this.

Kids are more excited by teams that can put up 50 points in a game, have no problem with 4-receiver sets and like to run a wide-open offense. Any offense that leads the nation in delay-of-game penalties, fewest plays per game, most punts inside the opponent's 40, etc. is not going to excite the speedster type of receiver that we desperately need to stretch the field, get separation, etc. On the other hand, our self-selection process might make us particularly attractive to bigger possession receivers who feel like they might be better utilized at Stanford than at a program that throws the ball 50 times per game and places an emphasis on speed.

[bl82]

In addition to the fan issues related to slow tempo above, it is important to consider that there are likely recruiting/retention issues related to tempo as well.

Our WRs will never put up gaudy stats. Their first priority appears to be run blocking and we tend to run mostly possession-type patterns. Not only that, but we often favor TEs over WRs more than other offenses. In many ways, our prototypical WR is a tall, stronger blocker who can also also catch, but who is not primarily a deep threat. Almost like a WR/TE hybrid. For most HS WRs, our offensive style and the role of WRs in our offense is not going to be particularly sexy. You might be able to extend this same argument to how we use our RBs (more power, anyone?) too. Maybe two RBs at USC have some thoughts on this.

Kids are more excited by teams that can put up 50 points in a game, have no problem with 4-receiver sets and like to run a wide-open offense. Any offense that leads the nation in delay-of-game penalties, fewest plays per game, most punts inside the opponent's 40, etc. is not going to excite the speedster type of receiver that we desperately need to stretch the field, get separation, etc. On the other hand, our self-selection process might make us particularly attractive to bigger possession receivers who feel like they might be better utilized at Stanford than at a program that throws the ball 50 times per game and places an emphasis on speed.

[CTcard]

Our WRs will never put up gaudy stats.  Their first priority appears to be run blocking and we tend to run mostly possession-type patterns.  Not only that, but we often favor TEs over WRs more than other offenses.  ...



  Any offense that leads the nation in delay-of-game penalties, fewest plays per game, most punts inside the opponent's 40, etc. is not going to excite the speedster type of receiver that we desperately need to stretch the field, get separation, etc.  On the other hand, our self-selection process might make us particularly attractive to bigger possession receivers who feel like they might be better utilized at Stanford than at a program that throws the ball 50 times per game and places an emphasis on speed.

Well, we have had a few receivers that have put up pretty good stats, but we also generally haven't had fantastic receivers.
Arcega-Whiteside was perhaps the statistically top receiver in the conference over 2017-18. 
Fehoko led the conference in yds/gm in 2020.
It is true, however, that since a lot of stats folks pay attention to are gross totals, simply running more plays tends to give players better stats. 

On a second front, at least a few bits of your comments seem to more reflect the Stanford offense of 2012-2017 rather than the current state. 
Stanford still huddles and tends to play slow. However, Stanford also doesn't run much anymore. That mix means that when the offense is decent, and can keep the ball, they run a reasonable number of plays. When they cannot get first downs, the number of plays is very low. So, 2021 Stanford had the fewest plays per game in the conference; in 2020 third most; 2019 ninth (third fewest).

Run blocking doesn't seem to be a priority for our receivers as we don't run much anymore. Stanford had the fewest rushing attempts in the conference in 2021, second fewest in 2019 and 2018 - only more than WSU under Leach. 
Nobody coached by somebody other than Leach throws the ball 50 times per game. [The last time any team coached by somebody other than Mike Leach to throw at least 50 passes per game was cal under Sonny Dykes in 2016.]
It is true that by running fewer plays, Stanford has fewer pass attempts than many. However, as a percentage of plays Stanford is on the high end tail of most-passing. Stanford has had more passing attempts than running every year since 2017; that's not very common.

[CTcard]

Our WRs will never put up gaudy stats.  Their first priority appears to be run blocking and we tend to run mostly possession-type patterns.  Not only that, but we often favor TEs over WRs more than other offenses.  ...



  Any offense that leads the nation in delay-of-game penalties, fewest plays per game, most punts inside the opponent's 40, etc. is not going to excite the speedster type of receiver that we desperately need to stretch the field, get separation, etc.  On the other hand, our self-selection process might make us particularly attractive to bigger possession receivers who feel like they might be better utilized at Stanford than at a program that throws the ball 50 times per game and places an emphasis on speed.

Well, we have had a few receivers that have put up pretty good stats, but we also generally haven't had fantastic receivers.
Arcega-Whiteside was perhaps the statistically top receiver in the conference over 2017-18. 
Fehoko led the conference in yds/gm in 2020.
It is true, however, that since a lot of stats folks pay attention to are gross totals, simply running more plays tends to give players better stats. 

On a second front, at least a few bits of your comments seem to more reflect the Stanford offense of 2012-2017 rather than the current state. 
Stanford still huddles and tends to play slow. However, Stanford also doesn't run much anymore. That mix means that when the offense is decent, and can keep the ball, they run a reasonable number of plays. When they cannot get first downs, the number of plays is very low. So, 2021 Stanford had the fewest plays per game in the conference; in 2020 third most; 2019 ninth (third fewest).

Run blocking doesn't seem to be a priority for our receivers as we don't run much anymore. Stanford had the fewest rushing attempts in the conference in 2021, second fewest in 2019 and 2018 - only more than WSU under Leach. 
Nobody coached by somebody other than Leach throws the ball 50 times per game. [The last time any team coached by somebody other than Mike Leach to throw at least 50 passes per game was cal under Sonny Dykes in 2016.]
It is true that by running fewer plays, Stanford has fewer pass attempts than many. However, as a percentage of plays Stanford is on the high end tail of most-passing. Stanford has had more passing attempts than running every year since 2017; that's not very common.

[BostonCard]

Tremayne and Fehoko were both in the top 10 in yards per catch in the PAC-12 in 2020.  Fehoko was the top receiver in yards per catch in 2019, with a ridiculous 25 yards per reception. Arcega-Whiteside was in the top 10 in ypc in each of the three years he played.

BC

[BostonCard]

Tremayne and Fehoko were both in the top 10 in yards per catch in the PAC-12 in 2020.  Fehoko was the top receiver in yards per catch in 2019, with a ridiculous 25 yards per reception. Arcega-Whiteside was in the top 10 in ypc in each of the three years he played.

BC

[Goose]

I believe the approach that has historically worked best for Stanford (early and middle Shaw) was to minimize the number of offensive possessions by both teams. Stanford had an offense that was designed to make each possession by our offense result in a touchdown (duh!) and to do that by out-executing our opponent. It took advantage of our (at the time) ability to create a good OL and to have at least adequate running backs. When we also had a QB that could throw the ball with accuracy (and/or receivers that were just much bigger than the opposition) we would wear out opposing defenses. Athletically, we often weren't "better" than our opponent but we were oriented towards making few mistakes and maximizing what strength we did have.

Our defense was usually not as good relative to our opponent's offense, even when it was successful. We had a "bend but don't break" approach. We had enough athletes that were competitive with our opponents for our "first 11" to be "average or better". We pretty much always lacked depth and if our defense was on the field a lot we would invariably wear down. As I evaluated it, we were good for 3 or 4 "stops" a game. By stops I mean situations where the opponent did everything right and we forced them to punt anyway because our defense played equally well or better. This doesn't include turnovers where we made a great play or they made a bad one, because these are somewhat random events.

This small number of stops doesn't mean the opponent always scored otherwise. Our strategy was to prevent the big play and make the opponent execute lots of plays. On some of them our defense would get a slight advantage and put them behind the chains. When that happened the small differences in execution would often force a punt. It wasn't that we "stopped" them, it was partly luck and partly slightly outplaying them for 3 plays in a row. Lots of possessions by the opponent ended that way. The other very large factor was that (during that time) college teams seldom could sustain a long (say > 7 play) drive without making a big mistake, like the QB not seeing an open receiver, somebody completely missing a block, or running the wrong pattern etc. Our defense was competent enough to blow those plays up (when the first 11 were out there) and effectively the opponent would stop themselves. We would get 3 or 4 of those a game as well. Kal under Dykes and UCLA with Rosen could be counted on to do this predictably. OTOH, our offense seldom did this, so that was a net plus.

Limiting the total number of possessions maximized our strengths and allowed us to get by with a pretty thin defense. Today, this approach is not working. It is not working for three reasons. First, we are not more effective at the LOS than our opponents and can't reliably execute long drives to keep our opponent's offense off the field. This requires our defense to function for more snaps which means we either wear down or have to play guys who really aren't as good. It also gives our opponents opportunities to locate where we aren't as good by trial and error. When they do, look out!

Second, opposing offenses are getting better (IMHO at least) in not beating themselves. It still happens, (see Oregon last year) but less frequently. I think this is partly driven by opposing coaches recognizing that the best way to attack Stanford's defense is just go right at them. Don't be too "cute" and beat yourself. Make Stanford beat you (and they probably can't). We have recently been relying on a few really good players to make up for some not-so-good players. Teams now strategize neutralizing our real good players and assume the rest will take care of itself.

Third, the quality of our defense overall has dropped. This dead horse has been beaten long and hard here, but it is true. Our "bend but don't break" philosophy doesn't work when you give up 7 yards or more on first down. You have to be athletic enough to force the opponent to execute lots of plays for this approach to work. We recently have not been able to do that. In the past, by the fourth quarter we were sometimes in that situation. At that point, we just knew we were going to get beat because we couldn't stop them. We had to hope they stopped themselves. Recently that has been true (at times) from the first play of the game.

Our recent change in philosophy to a simpler, more "attack" oriented defense may be a reaction to these three problems. However, the attack oriented approach, much like "all or nothing" battleship armor, is great when it's assumptions are valid and disastrous when they are not. Normally, attacking defenses work best when you are possibly a bit undersized but posses superior speed. I kind of doubt that describes our players strengths. I hope I am wrong.

[Goose]

I believe the approach that has historically worked best for Stanford (early and middle Shaw) was to minimize the number of offensive possessions by both teams. Stanford had an offense that was designed to make each possession by our offense result in a touchdown (duh!) and to do that by out-executing our opponent. It took advantage of our (at the time) ability to create a good OL and to have at least adequate running backs. When we also had a QB that could throw the ball with accuracy (and/or receivers that were just much bigger than the opposition) we would wear out opposing defenses. Athletically, we often weren't "better" than our opponent but we were oriented towards making few mistakes and maximizing what strength we did have.

Our defense was usually not as good relative to our opponent's offense, even when it was successful. We had a "bend but don't break" approach. We had enough athletes that were competitive with our opponents for our "first 11" to be "average or better". We pretty much always lacked depth and if our defense was on the field a lot we would invariably wear down. As I evaluated it, we were good for 3 or 4 "stops" a game. By stops I mean situations where the opponent did everything right and we forced them to punt anyway because our defense played equally well or better. This doesn't include turnovers where we made a great play or they made a bad one, because these are somewhat random events.

This small number of stops doesn't mean the opponent always scored otherwise. Our strategy was to prevent the big play and make the opponent execute lots of plays. On some of them our defense would get a slight advantage and put them behind the chains. When that happened the small differences in execution would often force a punt. It wasn't that we "stopped" them, it was partly luck and partly slightly outplaying them for 3 plays in a row. Lots of possessions by the opponent ended that way. The other very large factor was that (during that time) college teams seldom could sustain a long (say > 7 play) drive without making a big mistake, like the QB not seeing an open receiver, somebody completely missing a block, or running the wrong pattern etc. Our defense was competent enough to blow those plays up (when the first 11 were out there) and effectively the opponent would stop themselves. We would get 3 or 4 of those a game as well. Kal under Dykes and UCLA with Rosen could be counted on to do this predictably. OTOH, our offense seldom did this, so that was a net plus.

Limiting the total number of possessions maximized our strengths and allowed us to get by with a pretty thin defense. Today, this approach is not working. It is not working for three reasons. First, we are not more effective at the LOS than our opponents and can't reliably execute long drives to keep our opponent's offense off the field. This requires our defense to function for more snaps which means we either wear down or have to play guys who really aren't as good. It also gives our opponents opportunities to locate where we aren't as good by trial and error. When they do, look out!

Second, opposing offenses are getting better (IMHO at least) in not beating themselves. It still happens, (see Oregon last year) but less frequently. I think this is partly driven by opposing coaches recognizing that the best way to attack Stanford's defense is just go right at them. Don't be too "cute" and beat yourself. Make Stanford beat you (and they probably can't). We have recently been relying on a few really good players to make up for some not-so-good players. Teams now strategize neutralizing our real good players and assume the rest will take care of itself.

Third, the quality of our defense overall has dropped. This dead horse has been beaten long and hard here, but it is true. Our "bend but don't break" philosophy doesn't work when you give up 7 yards or more on first down. You have to be athletic enough to force the opponent to execute lots of plays for this approach to work. We recently have not been able to do that. In the past, by the fourth quarter we were sometimes in that situation. At that point, we just knew we were going to get beat because we couldn't stop them. We had to hope they stopped themselves. Recently that has been true (at times) from the first play of the game.

Our recent change in philosophy to a simpler, more "attack" oriented defense may be a reaction to these three problems. However, the attack oriented approach, much like "all or nothing" battleship armor, is great when it's assumptions are valid and disastrous when they are not. Normally, attacking defenses work best when you are possibly a bit undersized but posses superior speed. I kind of doubt that describes our players strengths. I hope I am wrong.

[msqueri]

Thoughtful post, Goose. Thanks.

But I do have a different read. I think your post ascribes too much grand strategy to Shaw's offensive "successes," credits far too much of the causal story to the offense period (including any ball control aspects), underestimates the defenses (including the depth) of the best years, and confuses correlation with causation (for instance by thinking the way we ran the offensive railroad was pivotal to our success whereas I think a good case can be made that any number of offensive strategies would have worked given the defenses we had).

Here's the fundamental thing I think your post gets wrong: Shaw's glory years were mostly about defense. The 2012 Rose Bowl team, 2013 Rose Bowl team, 2014 Foster Farms Bowl team, and 2016 Sun Bowl team all had significantly better defenses than offenses. Only twice post-Luck have we won because of our offense rather than despite it (2015 and 2017). In 2012 we had the #52 offense and finished #6 in the AP poll. In 2013 we had the #30 offense and finished #10 in the AP poll. In 2014 we had the #45 offense and finished unranked but top 25 in computer polls. In 2016 we had the #78 offense and finished #12 in the AP poll.

The story of David Shaw at Stanford: the best years in Stanford history due to the best defenses in Stanford history and then, once the defense regressed, so did Shaw (the senior years of Luck and Hogan complicate this, which is why I tend to also focus on the ability of Shawfense to succeed when QB/OL seniority align). His offenses have been bad relative to talent the vast majority of the time (giving him 2011, 2015, and 2017). When he's had a sublime confluence of offensive talent and circumstances, the offense has been great....two and a half times (2017 once Costello in can count as a half) in 11 years. But I have trouble with narratives about what made Stanford succeed in its best years that suggest it had very much to do with offensive design when the vast majority of our successful years were despite the offense rather than because of it. Imagine the 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016 teams with top 25 offenses. Filthy.

[msqueri]

Thoughtful post, Goose. Thanks.

But I do have a different read. I think your post ascribes too much grand strategy to Shaw's offensive "successes," credits far too much of the causal story to the offense period (including any ball control aspects), underestimates the defenses (including the depth) of the best years, and confuses correlation with causation (for instance by thinking the way we ran the offensive railroad was pivotal to our success whereas I think a good case can be made that any number of offensive strategies would have worked given the defenses we had).

Here's the fundamental thing I think your post gets wrong: Shaw's glory years were mostly about defense. The 2012 Rose Bowl team, 2013 Rose Bowl team, 2014 Foster Farms Bowl team, and 2016 Sun Bowl team all had significantly better defenses than offenses. Only twice post-Luck have we won because of our offense rather than despite it (2015 and 2017). In 2012 we had the #52 offense and finished #6 in the AP poll. In 2013 we had the #30 offense and finished #10 in the AP poll. In 2014 we had the #45 offense and finished unranked but top 25 in computer polls. In 2016 we had the #78 offense and finished #12 in the AP poll.

The story of David Shaw at Stanford: the best years in Stanford history due to the best defenses in Stanford history and then, once the defense regressed, so did Shaw (the senior years of Luck and Hogan complicate this, which is why I tend to also focus on the ability of Shawfense to succeed when QB/OL seniority align). His offenses have been bad relative to talent the vast majority of the time (giving him 2011, 2015, and 2017). When he's had a sublime confluence of offensive talent and circumstances, the offense has been great....two and a half times (2017 once Costello in can count as a half) in 11 years. But I have trouble with narratives about what made Stanford succeed in its best years that suggest it had very much to do with offensive design when the vast majority of our successful years were despite the offense rather than because of it. Imagine the 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016 teams with top 25 offenses. Filthy.

[Goose]

Thoughtful post, Goose. Thanks.

But I do have a different read. I think your post ascribes too much grand strategy to Shaw's offensive "successes," credits far too much of the causal story to the offense period (including any ball control aspects), underestimates the defenses (including the depth) of the best years, and confuses correlation with causation (for instance by thinking the way we ran the offensive railroad was pivotal to our success whereas I think a good case can be made that any number of offensive strategies would have worked given the defenses we had).

Here's the fundamental thing I think your post gets wrong: Shaw's glory years were mostly about defense. The 2012 Rose Bowl team, 2013 Rose Bowl team, 2014 Foster Farms Bowl team, and 2016 Sun Bowl team all had significantly better defenses than offenses. Only twice post-Luck have we won because of our offense rather than despite it (2015 and 2017). In 2012 we had the #52 offense and finished #6 in the AP poll. In 2013 we had the #30 offense and finished #10 in the AP poll. In 2014 we had the #45 offense and finished unranked but top 25 in computer polls. In 2016 we had the #78 offense and finished #12 in the AP poll.

The story of David Shaw at Stanford: the best years in Stanford history due to the best defenses in Stanford history and then, once the defense regressed, so did Shaw (the senior years of Luck and Hogan complicate this, which is why I tend to also focus on the ability of Shawfense to succeed when QB/OL seniority align). His offenses have been bad relative to talent the vast majority of the time (giving him 2011, 2015, and 2017). When he's had a sublime confluence of offensive talent and circumstances, the offense has been great....two and a half times (2017 once Costello in can count as a half) in 11 years. But I have trouble with narratives about what made Stanford succeed in its best years that suggest it had very much to do with offensive design when the vast majority of our successful years were despite the offense rather than because of it. Imagine the 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016 teams with top 25 offenses. Filthy.

I understand your point. However, both of us suffer from the fact Stanford had both an offense and a defense during the "better times". You argue the the success of these teams were due to the "best defenses in Stanford history". I argue that these defenses were the best in Stanford history largely because they didn't have to defend as many drives ("play a whole game") as previous defenses had to. You state that when the defense regressed, so did Shaw, except when he didn't.

I think your definition of "successful defense" is, understandably, based on the statistics they racked up. What else is there? However, I think if you looked at the personnel these defenses had, they were characterized by a few very successful players that arguably played "over their head" relative to what they did later. I don't recall many writers (FWIW) gushing over our defensive personnel and saying that the defense was the strength of the team. My argument is that their statistical success was possible because they didn't have to spend that much time on the field, and when they did, their results were not nearly as good. "Does Stanford have an Oregon problem". Yes, we did. And we changed both the defense and offense to address it. Obviously, the problem is what caused what. Correlation by itself does imply causation, but when their is a clear mechanism for said causation it is difficult to argue there is none. 

To your hypothetical of what would have happened if some of these statistically good defenses were paired with a "top 25 offense" (say a wide open one), I believe we would have seen defenses that did not grade out very well, particularly in the second half of games and the second half of the season. Shaw offenses didn't have the offensive statistics partly because if the defense turned in a couple of stops while we were ahead in the second half, it was turtle time. Why? Because that was the best way to win. Could Stanford's offenses under Shaw put up better numbers if they paid no attention to protecting our defense? Yes, probably. Would they have put up numbers that won more games? No way to know, but I don't think so.

Since there is no way to decouple the performance of the two units, there can never be a definitive answer to the question of which factor caused the most effects. It is always a synergy. One goal of good coaching is to maximize the sum of the parts, not each one individually. For sure Stanford's more successful years required a defense that had better talent and played "better" than most previous Stanford defenses. I admit that I am affected by the many years where Stanford had extremely dynamic and successful offenses and still lost many games late because the associated defenses couldn't stop anybody reliably. As Chip said, "Shane Skov is a very good football player". Stanford's defenses were better manned in those years than they are today. But, as was pointed out at the time, despite the fact Stanford led the country in rushing defense, their  two very talented ILBs were not considered fast enough. How much difference did it make that they didn't have to play as many snaps?

[Goose]

Thoughtful post, Goose. Thanks.

But I do have a different read. I think your post ascribes too much grand strategy to Shaw's offensive "successes," credits far too much of the causal story to the offense period (including any ball control aspects), underestimates the defenses (including the depth) of the best years, and confuses correlation with causation (for instance by thinking the way we ran the offensive railroad was pivotal to our success whereas I think a good case can be made that any number of offensive strategies would have worked given the defenses we had).

Here's the fundamental thing I think your post gets wrong: Shaw's glory years were mostly about defense. The 2012 Rose Bowl team, 2013 Rose Bowl team, 2014 Foster Farms Bowl team, and 2016 Sun Bowl team all had significantly better defenses than offenses. Only twice post-Luck have we won because of our offense rather than despite it (2015 and 2017). In 2012 we had the #52 offense and finished #6 in the AP poll. In 2013 we had the #30 offense and finished #10 in the AP poll. In 2014 we had the #45 offense and finished unranked but top 25 in computer polls. In 2016 we had the #78 offense and finished #12 in the AP poll.

The story of David Shaw at Stanford: the best years in Stanford history due to the best defenses in Stanford history and then, once the defense regressed, so did Shaw (the senior years of Luck and Hogan complicate this, which is why I tend to also focus on the ability of Shawfense to succeed when QB/OL seniority align). His offenses have been bad relative to talent the vast majority of the time (giving him 2011, 2015, and 2017). When he's had a sublime confluence of offensive talent and circumstances, the offense has been great....two and a half times (2017 once Costello in can count as a half) in 11 years. But I have trouble with narratives about what made Stanford succeed in its best years that suggest it had very much to do with offensive design when the vast majority of our successful years were despite the offense rather than because of it. Imagine the 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016 teams with top 25 offenses. Filthy.

I understand your point. However, both of us suffer from the fact Stanford had both an offense and a defense during the "better times". You argue the the success of these teams were due to the "best defenses in Stanford history". I argue that these defenses were the best in Stanford history largely because they didn't have to defend as many drives ("play a whole game") as previous defenses had to. You state that when the defense regressed, so did Shaw, except when he didn't.

I think your definition of "successful defense" is, understandably, based on the statistics they racked up. What else is there? However, I think if you looked at the personnel these defenses had, they were characterized by a few very successful players that arguably played "over their head" relative to what they did later. I don't recall many writers (FWIW) gushing over our defensive personnel and saying that the defense was the strength of the team. My argument is that their statistical success was possible because they didn't have to spend that much time on the field, and when they did, their results were not nearly as good. "Does Stanford have an Oregon problem". Yes, we did. And we changed both the defense and offense to address it. Obviously, the problem is what caused what. Correlation by itself does imply causation, but when their is a clear mechanism for said causation it is difficult to argue there is none. 

To your hypothetical of what would have happened if some of these statistically good defenses were paired with a "top 25 offense" (say a wide open one), I believe we would have seen defenses that did not grade out very well, particularly in the second half of games and the second half of the season. Shaw offenses didn't have the offensive statistics partly because if the defense turned in a couple of stops while we were ahead in the second half, it was turtle time. Why? Because that was the best way to win. Could Stanford's offenses under Shaw put up better numbers if they paid no attention to protecting our defense? Yes, probably. Would they have put up numbers that won more games? No way to know, but I don't think so.

Since there is no way to decouple the performance of the two units, there can never be a definitive answer to the question of which factor caused the most effects. It is always a synergy. One goal of good coaching is to maximize the sum of the parts, not each one individually. For sure Stanford's more successful years required a defense that had better talent and played "better" than most previous Stanford defenses. I admit that I am affected by the many years where Stanford had extremely dynamic and successful offenses and still lost many games late because the associated defenses couldn't stop anybody reliably. As Chip said, "Shane Skov is a very good football player". Stanford's defenses were better manned in those years than they are today. But, as was pointed out at the time, despite the fact Stanford led the country in rushing defense, their  two very talented ILBs were not considered fast enough. How much difference did it make that they didn't have to play as many snaps?