There were warning signs during January and February that should have caused the administration to take more aggressive action to prepare for the coronavirus. There has been plenty of news coverage of this issue. Here are some of the facts that have been reported, quoted from the articles linked below:
- It was early January, and the call with a Hong Kong epidemiologist left Matthew Pottinger rattled. Mr. Pottinger, the deputy national security adviser and a hawk on China, took a blunt warning away from the call with the doctor, a longtime friend: A ferocious, new outbreak that on the surface appeared similar to the SARS epidemic of 2003 had emerged in China. It had spread far more quickly than the government was admitting to, and it wouldn’t be long before it reached other parts of the world. . . . [H]is friend had a blunt message: You need to be ready. The virus, he warned, which originated in the city of Wuhan, was being transmitted by people who were showing no symptoms — an insight that American health officials had not yet accepted.
- In a report to the director of national intelligence, the State Department’s epidemiologist wrote in early January that the virus was likely to spread across the globe, and warned that the coronavirus could develop into a pandemic. Working independently, a small outpost of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Center for Medical Intelligence, came to the same conclusion. Within weeks after getting initial information about the virus early in the year, biodefense experts inside the National Security Council, looking at what was happening in Wuhan, started urging officials to think about what would be needed to quarantine a city the size of Chicago.
- Intelligence agencies “have been warning on this since January,” said a U.S. official who had access to intelligence reporting that was disseminated to members of Congress and their staffs as well as to officials in the Trump administration. . . . “Donald Trump may not have been expecting this, but a lot of other people in the government were — they just couldn’t get him to do anything about it,” this official said. “The system was blinking red.”
- Jan. 23: Chinese officials take the drastic step of shutting down Wuhan. “That was like, whoa,” a senior U.S. official involved in White House meetings later told The Post. “That was when the Richter scale hit 8.”
- “Any way you cut it, this is going to be bad,” a senior medical adviser at the Department of Veterans Affairs, Dr. Carter Mecher, wrote on the night of Jan. 28, in an email to a group of public health experts scattered around the government and universities. “The projected size of the outbreak already seems hard to believe.”
- A top White House adviser [Peter Navarro] starkly warned Trump administration officials in late January [Jan. 29] that the coronavirus crisis could cost the United States trillions of dollars and put millions of Americans at risk of illness or death. . . . “The lack of immune protection or an existing cure or vaccine would leave Americans defenseless in the case of a full-blown coronavirus outbreak on U.S. soil,” Mr. Navarro’s memo said. “This lack of protection elevates the risk of the coronavirus evolving into a full-blown pandemic, imperiling the lives of millions of Americans.”
- The health and human services secretary, Alex M. Azar II, directly warned Mr. Trump of the possibility of a pandemic during a call on Jan. 30, the second warning he delivered to the president about the virus in two weeks. The president, who was on Air Force One while traveling for appearances in the Midwest, responded that Mr. Azar was being alarmist.
- The warnings from U.S. intelligence agencies increased in volume toward the end of January and into early February, said officials familiar with the reports. By then, a majority of the intelligence reporting included in daily briefing papers and digests from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the CIA was about covid-19, said officials who have read the reports.
- Feb. 14: A memo is drafted by health officials and the National Security Council about the potential need for “quarantine and isolation measures to combat the virus,” per the Times, but a scheduled meeting to brief Trump on the plan is later canceled.
- When Dr. Robert Kadlec, the top disaster response official at the Health and Human Services Department, convened the White House coronavirus task force on Feb. 21, his agenda was urgent. There were deep cracks in the administration’s strategy for keeping the virus out of the United States. They were going to have to lock down the country to prevent it from spreading. The question was: When?
- A second memo that Mr. Navarro wrote, dated Feb. 23, warned of an “increasing probability of a full-blown COVID-19 pandemic that could infect as many as 100 million Americans, with a loss of life of as many as 1-2 million souls.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/po...ponse.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/po...virus.html
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/...y-damning/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-...story.html
The administration had more than enough information to understand the imminent risk. But the administration failed to adequately prepare. Boston Card has posted several times about the actions the administration could have taken during January and February. But the President spent those months denying the risk and claiming that the virus would go away. The time was largely wasted.