(06-21-2022, 10:34 PM)BostonCard Wrote: That seems like a sad, but true assessment.
There are two important questions. The first is the rate of Russian advance. The distance between Popsana and Lyshyshank/Severodonetsk is less than 10 miles as the crow flies. That gives you an idea of the size of the salient. I’d have to go back and look at the maps from early May, but it suggests a very slow Russian advance, probably less than half a kilometer a day.
So, the follow up and key question is what is Ukraine getting in exchange for this territory, and specifically, whether it is enough.
These are important questions, but there are others that I think govern the potential outcomes. Russia clearly wants to secure the political entirety of the Luhansk Oblast. Will they stop there, or keep grinding West? Do they instead shift their emphasis to the Donetsk Oblast? That is the entire "Donbas". Russia does have the option of going on the defensive for a while and rebuilding it's forces. During that time they can keep throwing missiles and such into Ukraine.
The big question is whether Ukraine has been training its forces and developing the offensive potential to attack at points of their own choosing and significantly (and relatively quickly) drive the Russians back. Russia has shown it cannot fight a war of movement. If Ukraine can, they can rapidly cause a collapse of the Russian position. Ukraine has enough troops with very high morale that can execute operations the Russians can only dream about, as the battle for Mariupol demonstrated. What Ukraine needs to have is a striking force that can utilize the Western supplied equipment to encircle and cut off big chunks of the Russian forces. With no supply and bad morale, these Russian units will probably fold up pretty quickly. Once Ukraine is on their GLOCs, the Russians have no real answer.
If, OTOH, Ukraine intends to liberate the Donbas the way Russia is capturing it, they cannot win. If Russia can control the tempo of the war, they are in good shape. Yes, they have lost lots of troops, but Ukraine has lost over 50% of their economy. The effect of sanctions on Russia is nothing compared to that. If Ukraine's intention is to use Western artillery and Ukrainian infantry to slowly push Russia back, it isn't going to work. Ukraine can't economically survive that and it will cost too many lives. The West doesn't have the 1000 guns to give or the intention of building them. Russia can tolerate the status quo indefinitely. If they can control the level and style of combat, they can keep banging away for years. The weather will support offensive campaigning for at least three more months, maybe four. After that, movement gets more difficult.
Ukraine needs a viable plan to win, not one that causes them to just hang on for years as they are slowly nibbled away in a stop and go war. The West needs to understand at least the outline of that plan and what we have to do to make that plan work. If it involves something we can't or won't do, Ukraine has to know this and re-calibrate. Hopefully, that discussion has been had, although I doubt it myself. Assuming Russia will just give up and go home isn't going to work. They won't. If Ukraine's plans involve waiting until next spring, fine, but the West needs to figure out how to keep the country afloat and fed until then. Will France, Germany et al literally "buy in"?
Different topic: What do we do about the Bears and Backfires tossing missiles at Ukraine from around the Caspian Sea? Really annoying. Granted, these are often anti-ship missiles used as air to ground but they are a constant threat and more than a nuisance if you are the one they land on?
