[winflop]

Just me or did it seem like 2021 was a brutal year injury-wise across the conference?  There are 23 teams that have missed more than 3 players per game, and 5 of them were 2021 teams:
Washington, ASU, Oregon, Cal, and Stanford.

As bad as we were, we were pretty much in the middle of the PAC last year for injuries.

Turley’s injury luck doesn’t seem to have transferred to Colorado, who had a greater than average number of injuries.

BC

I'm glad you mentioned this. I had meant to highlight something like it in my post. The Pac-12 North (RIP!) was really snake-bit last season. While Stanford is counting on a reversion to the mean, so are almost all of the teams we aspire to compete against (even true for USC).

I can perhaps get into this in more detail when I look at the relationship between injuries and wins, but I'd be skeptical of anybody putting too much stock into health as a principal driver for a resurgence in Stanford football. Other teams will presumably get healthier too and, most fundamentally, our crappiness in 2019 and 2021 stemmed from an inability to compete in the trenches, which was only partially due to injuries in 2019 and not even in the least due to injuries in 2021.

Injuries are less of an issue when you have depth, which is a function of recruiting & development. When those are lacking, the impact of injuries is bigger, as are the odds of them occurring because your starters are taking more snaps due to the lack of competent backups.

[winflop]

Just me or did it seem like 2021 was a brutal year injury-wise across the conference?  There are 23 teams that have missed more than 3 players per game, and 5 of them were 2021 teams:
Washington, ASU, Oregon, Cal, and Stanford.

As bad as we were, we were pretty much in the middle of the PAC last year for injuries.

Turley’s injury luck doesn’t seem to have transferred to Colorado, who had a greater than average number of injuries.

BC

I'm glad you mentioned this. I had meant to highlight something like it in my post. The Pac-12 North (RIP!) was really snake-bit last season. While Stanford is counting on a reversion to the mean, so are almost all of the teams we aspire to compete against (even true for USC).

I can perhaps get into this in more detail when I look at the relationship between injuries and wins, but I'd be skeptical of anybody putting too much stock into health as a principal driver for a resurgence in Stanford football. Other teams will presumably get healthier too and, most fundamentally, our crappiness in 2019 and 2021 stemmed from an inability to compete in the trenches, which was only partially due to injuries in 2019 and not even in the least due to injuries in 2021.

Injuries are less of an issue when you have depth, which is a function of recruiting & development. When those are lacking, the impact of injuries is bigger, as are the odds of them occurring because your starters are taking more snaps due to the lack of competent backups.

[msqueri]

Just me or did it seem like 2021 was a brutal year injury-wise across the conference?  There are 23 teams that have missed more than 3 players per game, and 5 of them were 2021 teams:
Washington, ASU, Oregon, Cal, and Stanford.

As bad as we were, we were pretty much in the middle of the PAC last year for injuries.

Turley’s injury luck doesn’t seem to have transferred to Colorado, who had a greater than average number of injuries.

BC

I'm glad you mentioned this. I had meant to highlight something like it in my post. The Pac-12 North (RIP!) was really snake-bit last season. While Stanford is counting on a reversion to the mean, so are almost all of the teams we aspire to compete against (even true for USC).

I can perhaps get into this in more detail when I look at the relationship between injuries and wins, but I'd be skeptical of anybody putting too much stock into health as a principal driver for a resurgence in Stanford football. Other teams will presumably get healthier too and, most fundamentally, our crappiness in 2019 and 2021 stemmed from an inability to compete in the trenches, which was only partially due to injuries in 2019 and not even in the least due to injuries in 2021.

Injuries are less of an issue when you have depth, which is a function of recruiting & development. When those are lacking, the impact of injuries is bigger, as are the odds of them occurring because your starters are taking more snaps due to the lack of competent backups.

Stanford's 2019 experience clearly tells this tale. While it was bad luck to have the confluence of OL injuries we had, it wasn't injuries that made us start numerous true freshmen. We had to rely on Rouse, Miller, and Hornibrook because we had recruited OL so lightly the previous years. With a sane pipeline, there'd be a layer of linemen in between the veterans and the newcomers, but we didn't have a sane pipeline. Similarly on defense ILB had to rely on position switches because we had gone multiple years neglecting that position on the recruiting trail.

I don't think 2021 fits as neatly into either the Shawpologist narrative or the Shaw-critical narrative focused on recruiting. That year it's harder to make a case that all the injuries did us in because the trenches stayed healthy yet that was where the primary problems were. And quality depth was certainly not a problem for Stanford at WR, nor could the season be blamed on DB play, the two positions where injuries were concentrated.

I do think the "development" shortcoming is a generally accurate one to pin our lack of resilience to injuries on in the sense that when certain position groups are particularly beleaguered it falls on other position groups to pick up the slack, and our development in general across the roster hasn't been great. I think this is the fundamental issue. It's not so much that Stanford lacks depth but that we lack quality. I think the recent Shaw teams have actually been quite deep by Stanford standards (e.g., think about drop-offs from first to second string compared to past teams) but they lack dudes. Our problem is we haven't had big-time difference-makers, which you need when adversity requires that some part of the roster really pick up the slack.

[msqueri]

Just me or did it seem like 2021 was a brutal year injury-wise across the conference?  There are 23 teams that have missed more than 3 players per game, and 5 of them were 2021 teams:
Washington, ASU, Oregon, Cal, and Stanford.

As bad as we were, we were pretty much in the middle of the PAC last year for injuries.

Turley’s injury luck doesn’t seem to have transferred to Colorado, who had a greater than average number of injuries.

BC

I'm glad you mentioned this. I had meant to highlight something like it in my post. The Pac-12 North (RIP!) was really snake-bit last season. While Stanford is counting on a reversion to the mean, so are almost all of the teams we aspire to compete against (even true for USC).

I can perhaps get into this in more detail when I look at the relationship between injuries and wins, but I'd be skeptical of anybody putting too much stock into health as a principal driver for a resurgence in Stanford football. Other teams will presumably get healthier too and, most fundamentally, our crappiness in 2019 and 2021 stemmed from an inability to compete in the trenches, which was only partially due to injuries in 2019 and not even in the least due to injuries in 2021.

Injuries are less of an issue when you have depth, which is a function of recruiting & development. When those are lacking, the impact of injuries is bigger, as are the odds of them occurring because your starters are taking more snaps due to the lack of competent backups.

Stanford's 2019 experience clearly tells this tale. While it was bad luck to have the confluence of OL injuries we had, it wasn't injuries that made us start numerous true freshmen. We had to rely on Rouse, Miller, and Hornibrook because we had recruited OL so lightly the previous years. With a sane pipeline, there'd be a layer of linemen in between the veterans and the newcomers, but we didn't have a sane pipeline. Similarly on defense ILB had to rely on position switches because we had gone multiple years neglecting that position on the recruiting trail.

I don't think 2021 fits as neatly into either the Shawpologist narrative or the Shaw-critical narrative focused on recruiting. That year it's harder to make a case that all the injuries did us in because the trenches stayed healthy yet that was where the primary problems were. And quality depth was certainly not a problem for Stanford at WR, nor could the season be blamed on DB play, the two positions where injuries were concentrated.

I do think the "development" shortcoming is a generally accurate one to pin our lack of resilience to injuries on in the sense that when certain position groups are particularly beleaguered it falls on other position groups to pick up the slack, and our development in general across the roster hasn't been great. I think this is the fundamental issue. It's not so much that Stanford lacks depth but that we lack quality. I think the recent Shaw teams have actually been quite deep by Stanford standards (e.g., think about drop-offs from first to second string compared to past teams) but they lack dudes. Our problem is we haven't had big-time difference-makers, which you need when adversity requires that some part of the roster really pick up the slack.

[Mick]

* To my mind, this research bolsters Shaw's narrative. The last two full seasons for Stanford have been inordinately unlucky in terms of missed games by key contributors and there can be a reasonable expectation of reversion to the mean going forward. We can expect about one more key contributor per game than we had in the two seasons that serve as the major cases against Shaw. 

Just thinking out loud, but I also wonder if there are more injuries among players who no longer believe in a coach or a system. I'd be interested in knowing if there's a correlation between plunging W/L records and number of injuries.

[Mick]

* To my mind, this research bolsters Shaw's narrative. The last two full seasons for Stanford have been inordinately unlucky in terms of missed games by key contributors and there can be a reasonable expectation of reversion to the mean going forward. We can expect about one more key contributor per game than we had in the two seasons that serve as the major cases against Shaw. 

Just thinking out loud, but I also wonder if there are more injuries among players who no longer believe in a coach or a system. I'd be interested in knowing if there's a correlation between plunging W/L records and number of injuries.

[BostonCard]

That’s one where it is hard to tell which came first, the chicken or the egg.

It seems likely that there is a correlation between injuries and outcomes, but to a first approximation I would say that the causal arrow likely flows from injuries to poor outcomes.  If the starter is out with an injury, by definition the back-up who now steps out, is likely to be a less capable player (or they would have been the starter). As si flip notes above, if the gap between the starter and backup is small, the costs are low. If, on the hand, you have poor depth because of poor recruiting or lack of development, the loss of players to injury will bite more.

BC

[BostonCard]

That’s one where it is hard to tell which came first, the chicken or the egg.

It seems likely that there is a correlation between injuries and outcomes, but to a first approximation I would say that the causal arrow likely flows from injuries to poor outcomes.  If the starter is out with an injury, by definition the back-up who now steps out, is likely to be a less capable player (or they would have been the starter). As si flip notes above, if the gap between the starter and backup is small, the costs are low. If, on the hand, you have poor depth because of poor recruiting or lack of development, the loss of players to injury will bite more.

BC

[CardinalSagehen]

As msqueri said, the injuries last year were not terribly significant in the position groups where we exhibited the most problems, specifically OL and DL/front 7.  

We couldn't run or stop the run.  Whether it was recruiting, development, or both, we lacked quality and difference-makers in those core areas.  Let’s hope to see some improvement in those areas this season.

[CardinalSagehen]

As msqueri said, the injuries last year were not terribly significant in the position groups where we exhibited the most problems, specifically OL and DL/front 7.  

We couldn't run or stop the run.  Whether it was recruiting, development, or both, we lacked quality and difference-makers in those core areas.  Let’s hope to see some improvement in those areas this season.

[CTcard]

Ok, you guys have gotten this bee in my bonnet and it can't get out without empirical observations. With full acknowledgement of the sbortcuts/flaws/blind spots in this approach, here is a list of every Pac-12 team since 2014 ranked by number of games missed by players in their season-end top 15 for snaps on either offense or defense:

1. 2021 Washington - 61 (12 games) - 5.08
...

Some questions about your chart.

1. What exactly is the number listed for each team? 
You stated, "number of games missed by players in their season-end top 15 for snaps on either offense or defense".
Number of games missed ought to be a whole number. Here something is apparently divided out. 
Is it something like average number of players missing per game? 

2. Where do you find stats for snaps played?  And games missed? (PFF?)
Or is the stat you list itself available somewhere? 

3. It would seem that this might account for minor injuries but not major injuries. i.e. a player with a major injury would miss enough time that he wouldn't end up in the top 15 for the team in snaps played. Does that seem correct?

[CTcard]

Ok, you guys have gotten this bee in my bonnet and it can't get out without empirical observations. With full acknowledgement of the sbortcuts/flaws/blind spots in this approach, here is a list of every Pac-12 team since 2014 ranked by number of games missed by players in their season-end top 15 for snaps on either offense or defense:

1. 2021 Washington - 61 (12 games) - 5.08
...

Some questions about your chart.

1. What exactly is the number listed for each team? 
You stated, "number of games missed by players in their season-end top 15 for snaps on either offense or defense".
Number of games missed ought to be a whole number. Here something is apparently divided out. 
Is it something like average number of players missing per game? 

2. Where do you find stats for snaps played?  And games missed? (PFF?)
Or is the stat you list itself available somewhere? 

3. It would seem that this might account for minor injuries but not major injuries. i.e. a player with a major injury would miss enough time that he wouldn't end up in the top 15 for the team in snaps played. Does that seem correct?

[msqueri]

Ok, you guys have gotten this bee in my bonnet and it can't get out without empirical observations. With full acknowledgement of the sbortcuts/flaws/blind spots in this approach, here is a list of every Pac-12 team since 2014 ranked by number of games missed by players in their season-end top 15 for snaps on either offense or defense:

1. 2021 Washington - 61 (12 games) - 5.08
...

Some questions about your chart.

1. What exactly is the number listed for each team? 
You stated, "number of games missed by players in their season-end top 15 for snaps on either offense or defense".
Number of games missed ought to be a whole number. Here something is apparently divided out. 
Is it something like average number of players missing per game? 

2. Where do you find stats for snaps played?  And games missed? (PFF?)
Or is the stat you list itself available somewhere? 

3. It would seem that this might account for minor injuries but not major injuries. i.e. a player with a major injury would miss enough time that he wouldn't end up in the top 15 for the team in snaps played. Does that seem correct?

1. The format "2019 Stanford - 43 (12 games) - 3.58" signifies that the 2019 Stanford team had 43 games missed by players who finished the season top 15 in snaps on offense or defense and, given that the team played 12 games that divided to 3.58 key contributors missing per game the team played.

2. Yes, PFF is my source for all of this.

3. One of the blind spots of this is that it would miss players who missed essentially the whole season with injury. It should account for starters who missed two thirds of the season or less as being a starter for only a third of the season would usually be enough to qualify for top 15 in snaps. This window into games played definitely misses guys who missed so much time as to not be key contributors, but all teams experience that to some degree and most injuries either occur sometime some weeks into the season and/or do not result in the player missing the entire season. My sense is this methodology generally captures things.

There definitely are contributors who this methodology misses, which is why if I were truly crazy I would have picked another methodology with a qualitative element where I assess all preseason depth charts as well to see who might be excluded by this approach. Or maybe run some sort of statistical analysis to figure out the appropriate cutoff for number of snaps rather than "top 15" (for instance, Tremayne and Wilson tied for #16 in snaps last year but were closer to #13 than #18 and obviously were "key contributors.") But I'm not that crazy. Given that these dynamics occur for all teams I think this analysis can provide general/directional insights even as I recognize it's definitely not perfect.

I also think that this approach of counting missed games by top 15 snap players seems to even out in the way it demonstrates the extent to which teams had to cobble together the requisite snaps from a mix of players. The teams that are relatively unscathed by injury have a much higher proportion of key players playing all or nearly all of their games. As an example, the 2014 Stanford team had 14 of the top 15 snap count guys play 13 or 14 games while the 2019 Stanford offense had 10 of the top 15 snap count guys play 11 or 12 games. In other words, this analysis perhaps could have looked at it that way in terms of how many of the top contributors missed negligible time. But my sense is that it would have been two different routes to generally similar destinations in terms of what the data demonstrate.

[msqueri]

Ok, you guys have gotten this bee in my bonnet and it can't get out without empirical observations. With full acknowledgement of the sbortcuts/flaws/blind spots in this approach, here is a list of every Pac-12 team since 2014 ranked by number of games missed by players in their season-end top 15 for snaps on either offense or defense:

1. 2021 Washington - 61 (12 games) - 5.08
...

Some questions about your chart.

1. What exactly is the number listed for each team? 
You stated, "number of games missed by players in their season-end top 15 for snaps on either offense or defense".
Number of games missed ought to be a whole number. Here something is apparently divided out. 
Is it something like average number of players missing per game? 

2. Where do you find stats for snaps played?  And games missed? (PFF?)
Or is the stat you list itself available somewhere? 

3. It would seem that this might account for minor injuries but not major injuries. i.e. a player with a major injury would miss enough time that he wouldn't end up in the top 15 for the team in snaps played. Does that seem correct?

1. The format "2019 Stanford - 43 (12 games) - 3.58" signifies that the 2019 Stanford team had 43 games missed by players who finished the season top 15 in snaps on offense or defense and, given that the team played 12 games that divided to 3.58 key contributors missing per game the team played.

2. Yes, PFF is my source for all of this.

3. One of the blind spots of this is that it would miss players who missed essentially the whole season with injury. It should account for starters who missed two thirds of the season or less as being a starter for only a third of the season would usually be enough to qualify for top 15 in snaps. This window into games played definitely misses guys who missed so much time as to not be key contributors, but all teams experience that to some degree and most injuries either occur sometime some weeks into the season and/or do not result in the player missing the entire season. My sense is this methodology generally captures things.

There definitely are contributors who this methodology misses, which is why if I were truly crazy I would have picked another methodology with a qualitative element where I assess all preseason depth charts as well to see who might be excluded by this approach. Or maybe run some sort of statistical analysis to figure out the appropriate cutoff for number of snaps rather than "top 15" (for instance, Tremayne and Wilson tied for #16 in snaps last year but were closer to #13 than #18 and obviously were "key contributors.") But I'm not that crazy. Given that these dynamics occur for all teams I think this analysis can provide general/directional insights even as I recognize it's definitely not perfect.

I also think that this approach of counting missed games by top 15 snap players seems to even out in the way it demonstrates the extent to which teams had to cobble together the requisite snaps from a mix of players. The teams that are relatively unscathed by injury have a much higher proportion of key players playing all or nearly all of their games. As an example, the 2014 Stanford team had 14 of the top 15 snap count guys play 13 or 14 games while the 2019 Stanford offense had 10 of the top 15 snap count guys play 11 or 12 games. In other words, this analysis perhaps could have looked at it that way in terms of how many of the top contributors missed negligible time. But my sense is that it would have been two different routes to generally similar destinations in terms of what the data demonstrate.

[gailtate]

There are times when things are actually pretty simple and this is one of those times. It's been evident for multiple years now, Covid notwithstanding, that somewhere along the way David Shaw misplaced his mojo. He cannot get enough football athletes he needs and can't do very much with the ones he's getting. Both of these shortcomings are made worse by his steadfast refusal to improve his coaching staff. Indeed, this is what the chicken-and-egg issue is about. And here we are again, looking at yet another football season in the doldrums. No mystery here.

[gailtate]

There are times when things are actually pretty simple and this is one of those times. It's been evident for multiple years now, Covid notwithstanding, that somewhere along the way David Shaw misplaced his mojo. He cannot get enough football athletes he needs and can't do very much with the ones he's getting. Both of these shortcomings are made worse by his steadfast refusal to improve his coaching staff. Indeed, this is what the chicken-and-egg issue is about. And here we are again, looking at yet another football season in the doldrums. No mystery here.

[SamuelMcF]

There are times when things are actually pretty simple and this is one of those times. It's been evident for multiple years now, Covid notwithstanding, that somewhere along the way David Shaw misplaced his mojo. He cannot get enough football athletes he needs and can't do very much with the ones he's getting. Both of these shortcomings are made worse by his steadfast refusal to improve his coaching staff. Indeed, this is what the chicken-and-egg issue is about. And here we are again, looking at yet another football season in the doldrums. No mystery here.

Though correct, this has nothing to do with what to this point has been a very interesting discussion on injuries.

[SamuelMcF]

There are times when things are actually pretty simple and this is one of those times. It's been evident for multiple years now, Covid notwithstanding, that somewhere along the way David Shaw misplaced his mojo. He cannot get enough football athletes he needs and can't do very much with the ones he's getting. Both of these shortcomings are made worse by his steadfast refusal to improve his coaching staff. Indeed, this is what the chicken-and-egg issue is about. And here we are again, looking at yet another football season in the doldrums. No mystery here.

Though correct, this has nothing to do with what to this point has been a very interesting discussion on injuries.

[gailtate]

There are times when things are actually pretty simple and this is one of those times. It's been evident for multiple years now, Covid notwithstanding, that somewhere along the way David Shaw misplaced his mojo. He cannot get enough football athletes he needs and can't do very much with the ones he's getting. Both of these shortcomings are made worse by his steadfast refusal to improve his coaching staff. Indeed, this is what the chicken-and-egg issue is about. And here we are again, looking at yet another football season in the doldrums. No mystery here.

Though correct, this has nothing to do with what to this point has been a very interesting discussion on injuries.

Sammy boy, navel gazing on injuries is fine if you're into that sort of thing, but every team has injuries. And this is MY point. It's just that some teams seem to overcome these injuries and sustain their winning ways. For a very short while, Stanford was one of those teams. No mas, amigo

[gailtate]

There are times when things are actually pretty simple and this is one of those times. It's been evident for multiple years now, Covid notwithstanding, that somewhere along the way David Shaw misplaced his mojo. He cannot get enough football athletes he needs and can't do very much with the ones he's getting. Both of these shortcomings are made worse by his steadfast refusal to improve his coaching staff. Indeed, this is what the chicken-and-egg issue is about. And here we are again, looking at yet another football season in the doldrums. No mystery here.

Though correct, this has nothing to do with what to this point has been a very interesting discussion on injuries.

Sammy boy, navel gazing on injuries is fine if you're into that sort of thing, but every team has injuries. And this is MY point. It's just that some teams seem to overcome these injuries and sustain their winning ways. For a very short while, Stanford was one of those teams. No mas, amigo

[CTcard]

...
1. The format "2019 Stanford - 43 (12 games) - 3.58" signifies that the 2019 Stanford team had 43 games missed by players who finished the season top 15 in snaps on offense or defense and, given that the team played 12 games that divided to 3.58 key contributors missing per game the team played.

2. Yes, PFF is my source for all of this.

3. One of the blind spots of this is that it would miss players who missed essentially the whole season with injury. 

Now that I understand the table, a few observations. 

- As to cause of injuries, the table seems to primarily be putting numbers on randomness. Of course, to do otherwise would involve connecting to a lot of detailed information about what was going on within each program each year. 


- The anticorrelation between games missed due to injury and overall winning stands out as extremely strong. 

Take Stanford. The chart below lists: Year, Players/game missed, Record, Winning Percentage (as decimal), all in order of most injuries to fewest:
2019  3.58  4-8   0.333
2021  3.17  3-9   0.250
2018  2.85  9-4   0.692
2017  2.50  9-5   0.643
2016  2.23  10-3  0.769
2020  1.50  4-2    0.667
2015  0.93  12-2  0.857
2014  0.92  8-5   0.615

The correlation isn't -1, but sure is strong. 
I suspect if you ran through each team, you'd see something similar (but can't group schools: Colorado without injuries versus Oregon with isn't relevant). 
Next-man-up is a lovely sports cliche, but doesn't really overcome the problem.


- The other curious thing I see is Washington State completely dominating the low-injury end of the list with the three seasons with the fewest games missed overall, and 5 of the lowest 10. 
I had never noticed WSU standing out for exceptionally great strength and conditioning, but maybe I wasn't paying attention??

[CTcard]

...
1. The format "2019 Stanford - 43 (12 games) - 3.58" signifies that the 2019 Stanford team had 43 games missed by players who finished the season top 15 in snaps on offense or defense and, given that the team played 12 games that divided to 3.58 key contributors missing per game the team played.

2. Yes, PFF is my source for all of this.

3. One of the blind spots of this is that it would miss players who missed essentially the whole season with injury. 

Now that I understand the table, a few observations. 

- As to cause of injuries, the table seems to primarily be putting numbers on randomness. Of course, to do otherwise would involve connecting to a lot of detailed information about what was going on within each program each year. 


- The anticorrelation between games missed due to injury and overall winning stands out as extremely strong. 

Take Stanford. The chart below lists: Year, Players/game missed, Record, Winning Percentage (as decimal), all in order of most injuries to fewest:
2019  3.58  4-8   0.333
2021  3.17  3-9   0.250
2018  2.85  9-4   0.692
2017  2.50  9-5   0.643
2016  2.23  10-3  0.769
2020  1.50  4-2    0.667
2015  0.93  12-2  0.857
2014  0.92  8-5   0.615

The correlation isn't -1, but sure is strong. 
I suspect if you ran through each team, you'd see something similar (but can't group schools: Colorado without injuries versus Oregon with isn't relevant). 
Next-man-up is a lovely sports cliche, but doesn't really overcome the problem.


- The other curious thing I see is Washington State completely dominating the low-injury end of the list with the three seasons with the fewest games missed overall, and 5 of the lowest 10. 
I had never noticed WSU standing out for exceptionally great strength and conditioning, but maybe I wasn't paying attention??

[SamuelMcF]

- The other curious thing I see is Washington State completely dominating the low-injury end of the list with the three seasons with the fewest games missed overall, and 5 of the lowest 10. 
I had never noticed WSU standing out for exceptionally great strength and conditioning, but maybe I wasn't paying attention??

Wazzu DOES NOT have "exceptionally great S&C," and never did. I will continue to bang the drum that S&C has little overall effect on injuries.

[SamuelMcF]

- The other curious thing I see is Washington State completely dominating the low-injury end of the list with the three seasons with the fewest games missed overall, and 5 of the lowest 10. 
I had never noticed WSU standing out for exceptionally great strength and conditioning, but maybe I wasn't paying attention??

Wazzu DOES NOT have "exceptionally great S&C," and never did. I will continue to bang the drum that S&C has little overall effect on injuries.

[msqueri]

I am not sure what I think about the connection between S&C and injuries. My hunch is it’s overrated but not nonexistent.

On Washington State, the primary factor seems clear: Cougs don’t run much or have linemen bunched together and running and having linemen bunched together are dangerous.

[msqueri]

I am not sure what I think about the connection between S&C and injuries. My hunch is it’s overrated but not nonexistent.

On Washington State, the primary factor seems clear: Cougs don’t run much or have linemen bunched together and running and having linemen bunched together are dangerous.

[winflop]

- The other curious thing I see is Washington State completely dominating the low-injury end of the list with the three seasons with the fewest games missed overall, and 5 of the lowest 10. 
I had never noticed WSU standing out for exceptionally great strength and conditioning, but maybe I wasn't paying attention??

That might be a function of the pirate king's Air Raid offense as much as anything else.

[winflop]

- The other curious thing I see is Washington State completely dominating the low-injury end of the list with the three seasons with the fewest games missed overall, and 5 of the lowest 10. 
I had never noticed WSU standing out for exceptionally great strength and conditioning, but maybe I wasn't paying attention??

That might be a function of the pirate king's Air Raid offense as much as anything else.

[CTcard]

- The other curious thing I see is Washington State completely dominating the low-injury end of the list with the three seasons with the fewest games missed overall, and 5 of the lowest 10. 
I had never noticed WSU standing out for exceptionally great strength and conditioning, but maybe I wasn't paying attention??

Wazzu DOES NOT have "exceptionally great S&C," and never did. I will continue to bang the drum that S&C has little overall effect on injuries.

I see (yet again) that facetious understatement doesn't come through in a web forum post.

[CTcard]

- The other curious thing I see is Washington State completely dominating the low-injury end of the list with the three seasons with the fewest games missed overall, and 5 of the lowest 10. 
I had never noticed WSU standing out for exceptionally great strength and conditioning, but maybe I wasn't paying attention??

Wazzu DOES NOT have "exceptionally great S&C," and never did. I will continue to bang the drum that S&C has little overall effect on injuries.

I see (yet again) that facetious understatement doesn't come through in a web forum post.

[BostonCard]

Because WSU runs more than an average number of plays, i am a little surprised that they didn’t have too many injuries. On the other hand, lots of injuries happen during practices.  So, who knows.

BC

[BostonCard]

Because WSU runs more than an average number of plays, i am a little surprised that they didn’t have too many injuries. On the other hand, lots of injuries happen during practices.  So, who knows.

BC

[Phogge]

CT... there are some very serious people around here. Not serious like Albert Anastasia but serious nonetheless.

[Phogge]

CT... there are some very serious people around here. Not serious like Albert Anastasia but serious nonetheless.

[cardcrimson]

CT... there are some very serious people around here. Not serious like Albert Anastasia but serious nonetheless.

Did you camp out in front of his hq in a darkened van with a film crew?

fwiw, sarcasm is a lost art form . . . .

[cardcrimson]

CT... there are some very serious people around here. Not serious like Albert Anastasia but serious nonetheless.

Did you camp out in front of his hq in a darkened van with a film crew?

fwiw, sarcasm is a lost art form . . . .

[msqueri]

For those who don't mind way over-the-top obsession with football data:

I attempted to visualize the injury discussion by taking the same list to represent the teams by frequency of key contributor absences and including for each the win percentage that year, parenthetically listing the delta between that win percentage and the average win percentage of the four nearest seasons. I want to say up front that the shortcomings of this approach are quite evident to me. I realize team success/failure ebbs and flows based on numerous factors and that single year win percentages are subject to significant variance. I just want a way to visualize the relationship between injury absences and win/loss record in a way that made sense to me, so take this for what it's worth.

1. 2021 Washington - .333 (- .372)
2. 2017 UCLA - .462 (+ .074)
3. 2020 Washington State - .250 (- .375)
4. 2021 Arizona State - .615 (+ .057)
5. 2016 Arizona State - .417 (- .160)
6. 2021 Oregon - .714 (+ 0.33)
7. 2019 USC - .615 (+ .047)
8. 2019 Stanford - .333 (- .223)
9. 2020 Colorado - .667 (+ .271)
9. 2016 Oregon - .333 (- .371)
11. 2016 Utah - .692 (+ .032)
12. 2016 Arizona - .250 (- .308)
13. 2017 Arizona State - .538 (+ .028)
14. 2015 Oregon State - .167 (- .180)
15. 2021 Cal - .417 (- .083)
15. 2016 Oregon State - .333  (+ .125)
15. 2021 Stanford - .250 (- .328)
18. 2017 Oregon State - .083 (- .188)
18. 2016 UCLA - .333 (- .196)
20. 2015 Oregon - .692 (+ .032)
20. 2020 Oregon State - .286 (- .020)
20. 2014 Washington - .571 (- .089)
20. 2014 Washington State - .250 (- .260)
24. 2018 USC - .417 (- .322)
25. 2017 USC - .786 (+ .190)
26. 2019 Cal - .615 (+ .176)
26. 2018 Stanford - .692 (+ .092)
28. 2019 Colorado - .417 (- .012)
28. 2021 USC - .333 (- .311)
30. 2020 Cal - .250 (- .250)
31. 2017 Utah - .538 (- .184)
32. 2021 Arizona - .091 (- .153)
32. 2021 Colorado - .333 (- .119)
32. 2014 Oregon State - .417 (- .023)
32. 2019 Oregon State - .417 (+ .144)
36. 2015 USC - .571 (- .170)
37. 2018 Cal - .538 (+ .075)
37. 2017 Oregon - .538 (- .116)
39. 2018 Colorado - .417 (- .128)
39. 2017 Stanford - .643 (- .030)
39. 2020 USC - .833 (+ .284)
42. 2017 Washington - .769 (+ .084)
43. 2020 Utah - .600 (- .073)
44. 2015 Arizona - .538 (EVEN)
45. 2018 Utah - .643 (- .024)
46. 2017 Colorado - .417 (- .054)
47. 2017 Arizona - .538 (+ .150)
47. 2015 Colorado - .308 (- .112)
47. 2014 Utah - .692 (+ .112)

50. 2018 Oregon State - .167 (- .112)
50. 2015 Utah - .769 (+ .181)
50. 2019 Washington - .615 (- .013)
53. 2016 Stanford - .769 (+ .065)
54. 2018 Washington - .714 (- .036)
55. 2016 Cal - .417 (- .083)
55. 2018 UCLA - .250 (- .136)
57. 2020 UCLA - .429 (EVEN)
57. 2021 Utah - .714 (+ .062)
59. 2014 Cal - .417 (+ .070)
59. 2017 Cal - .417 (+ .132)
61. 2014 Arizona - .714 (+ .204)
62. 2020 Arizona - .000 (- .347)
63. 2019 UCLA - .333 (- .122)
64. 2016 Washington - .857 (+ .209)
65. 2019 Arizona State - .615 (+.057)
65. 2021 Washington State - .538 (- .090)
67. 2018 Arizona - .417 (+ .084)
68. 2014 Oregon - .867 (+ .161)
69. 2018 Arizona State - .538 (+ .060)
70. 2014 Colorado - .167 (- .206)
70. 2020 Washington - .750 (+ .135)
72. 2016 Colorado - .714 (+ .387)
73. 2014 Arizona State - .769 (+ .211)
73. 2015 Cal - .615 (+ .282)
73. 2015 Washington - .538 (- .184)
76. 2014 UCLA - .769 (+ .173)
76. 2015 UCLA - .615 (+ .027)
78. 2019 Oregon - .857 (+ .219)
78. 2020 Oregon - .571 (- .133)
80. 2015 Arizona State - .462 (- .153)
81. 2020 Stanford - .667 (+ .177)
82. 2018 Oregon - .692 (+ .105)
82. 2021 Oregon State - .538 (+ .305)
82. 2014 USC - .692 (+ .044)
85. 2019 Arizona - .333 (+ .023)
86. 2016 USC - .769 (+ .144)
86. 2015 Washington State - .692 (+ .182)
88. 2020 Arizona State - .500 (- .077)
89. 2017 Washington State - .692 (+ .038)
90. 2019 Utah - .786 (+ .156)
91. 2015 Stanford - .857 (+ .153)
92. 2014 Stanford - .615 (- .203)
92. 2021 UCLA - .667 (+ .303)
94. 2016 Washington State - .615 (- .012)
95. 2019 Washington State - .462 (- .189)
96. 2018 Washington State - .846 (+ .288)

Somebody better than me at statistics can perhaps let me know if this data shows anything interesting, but just eye balling it I can see that 61 percent of the teams in the bottom half of injury luck (the first 49 listed) had negative numbers (i.e., worst seasons than the program's average of that era) and 64 percent of the teams in the top half of injury luck (i.e., the second 47 listed) had positive numbers (i.e., better seasons than the program's average of that era). To me that suggests that a) injury luck is not determinative for a season but b) it's generally better to not have injuries than to have injuries. I realize these are exceedingly obvious observations, but I wanted to be empirical about this.

To further test this, I divided the teams into groups to see if things looked any different if I tried to look at it more in terms of teams with rotten, average, or good injury luck. What I found:

Rotten luck (teams 1-31): 61 percent had negative seasons; median was a - .089 effect

Average luck (teams 32-64): 55 percent had negative seasons, median was a - .023

Good luck  (teams 65-96): 28 percent had negative seasons a + .084/+ /.105

This is interesting, if I do say so myself. The results seem so intuitive. 

The median impact of rotten luck, negative 8.9 percent compared to a team's norm for that era, is very close to a one game difference ( one game is 8.3 percent of a 12 game season). 

The median impact of average luck, negative 2.3 percent, is arguably negligible. That's about a quarter of one game. 

The median impact of good luck, positive 8.4 percent or positive 10.1 percent, is in the ballpark of a one game difference. Perhaps others will have views on whether the positive impact of good luck being a bit bigger than the negative impact of rotten luck is significant or if it's just an issue of my flawed sample size/methodology/etc.

As a general, back of the envelope, Matt is not a statistician approximation, a team with rotten luck could generally be expected for that to cost them about one game. IMHO, this corroborates the gut instinct of most on this board, that poor injury luck in 2019 and 2021 explains part of those seasons but is a far cry from justifying those failures. Those teams were sub-par teams regardless of the injuries. Injuries may have made them 4 and 3 win seasons, but healthy they likely would have been 4-6 win seasons. Those weren't good teams irrespective of injuries.

Forecasting ahead to 2022, our four year program average is a .465 winning percentage. In other words, our current sea level as a program is an expectation of 5.58 wins. A 5-6 win regular season even if you give us the benefit of the feels-very-long-ago 2018 season. If we have rotten injury luck again, one might peg us for 4-5 wins. If we can actually benefit from some good injury luck, one might peg us for 6-7 wins. I actually don't think those win totals necessarily tell different things about the health of the program, but making a bowl would mean a lot to me and to the players so that's what I'll be hoping for this year. Six wins or bust!

[msqueri]

For those who don't mind way over-the-top obsession with football data:

I attempted to visualize the injury discussion by taking the same list to represent the teams by frequency of key contributor absences and including for each the win percentage that year, parenthetically listing the delta between that win percentage and the average win percentage of the four nearest seasons. I want to say up front that the shortcomings of this approach are quite evident to me. I realize team success/failure ebbs and flows based on numerous factors and that single year win percentages are subject to significant variance. I just want a way to visualize the relationship between injury absences and win/loss record in a way that made sense to me, so take this for what it's worth.

1. 2021 Washington - .333 (- .372)
2. 2017 UCLA - .462 (+ .074)
3. 2020 Washington State - .250 (- .375)
4. 2021 Arizona State - .615 (+ .057)
5. 2016 Arizona State - .417 (- .160)
6. 2021 Oregon - .714 (+ 0.33)
7. 2019 USC - .615 (+ .047)
8. 2019 Stanford - .333 (- .223)
9. 2020 Colorado - .667 (+ .271)
9. 2016 Oregon - .333 (- .371)
11. 2016 Utah - .692 (+ .032)
12. 2016 Arizona - .250 (- .308)
13. 2017 Arizona State - .538 (+ .028)
14. 2015 Oregon State - .167 (- .180)
15. 2021 Cal - .417 (- .083)
15. 2016 Oregon State - .333  (+ .125)
15. 2021 Stanford - .250 (- .328)
18. 2017 Oregon State - .083 (- .188)
18. 2016 UCLA - .333 (- .196)
20. 2015 Oregon - .692 (+ .032)
20. 2020 Oregon State - .286 (- .020)
20. 2014 Washington - .571 (- .089)
20. 2014 Washington State - .250 (- .260)
24. 2018 USC - .417 (- .322)
25. 2017 USC - .786 (+ .190)
26. 2019 Cal - .615 (+ .176)
26. 2018 Stanford - .692 (+ .092)
28. 2019 Colorado - .417 (- .012)
28. 2021 USC - .333 (- .311)
30. 2020 Cal - .250 (- .250)
31. 2017 Utah - .538 (- .184)
32. 2021 Arizona - .091 (- .153)
32. 2021 Colorado - .333 (- .119)
32. 2014 Oregon State - .417 (- .023)
32. 2019 Oregon State - .417 (+ .144)
36. 2015 USC - .571 (- .170)
37. 2018 Cal - .538 (+ .075)
37. 2017 Oregon - .538 (- .116)
39. 2018 Colorado - .417 (- .128)
39. 2017 Stanford - .643 (- .030)
39. 2020 USC - .833 (+ .284)
42. 2017 Washington - .769 (+ .084)
43. 2020 Utah - .600 (- .073)
44. 2015 Arizona - .538 (EVEN)
45. 2018 Utah - .643 (- .024)
46. 2017 Colorado - .417 (- .054)
47. 2017 Arizona - .538 (+ .150)
47. 2015 Colorado - .308 (- .112)
47. 2014 Utah - .692 (+ .112)

50. 2018 Oregon State - .167 (- .112)
50. 2015 Utah - .769 (+ .181)
50. 2019 Washington - .615 (- .013)
53. 2016 Stanford - .769 (+ .065)
54. 2018 Washington - .714 (- .036)
55. 2016 Cal - .417 (- .083)
55. 2018 UCLA - .250 (- .136)
57. 2020 UCLA - .429 (EVEN)
57. 2021 Utah - .714 (+ .062)
59. 2014 Cal - .417 (+ .070)
59. 2017 Cal - .417 (+ .132)
61. 2014 Arizona - .714 (+ .204)
62. 2020 Arizona - .000 (- .347)
63. 2019 UCLA - .333 (- .122)
64. 2016 Washington - .857 (+ .209)
65. 2019 Arizona State - .615 (+.057)
65. 2021 Washington State - .538 (- .090)
67. 2018 Arizona - .417 (+ .084)
68. 2014 Oregon - .867 (+ .161)
69. 2018 Arizona State - .538 (+ .060)
70. 2014 Colorado - .167 (- .206)
70. 2020 Washington - .750 (+ .135)
72. 2016 Colorado - .714 (+ .387)
73. 2014 Arizona State - .769 (+ .211)
73. 2015 Cal - .615 (+ .282)
73. 2015 Washington - .538 (- .184)
76. 2014 UCLA - .769 (+ .173)
76. 2015 UCLA - .615 (+ .027)
78. 2019 Oregon - .857 (+ .219)
78. 2020 Oregon - .571 (- .133)
80. 2015 Arizona State - .462 (- .153)
81. 2020 Stanford - .667 (+ .177)
82. 2018 Oregon - .692 (+ .105)
82. 2021 Oregon State - .538 (+ .305)
82. 2014 USC - .692 (+ .044)
85. 2019 Arizona - .333 (+ .023)
86. 2016 USC - .769 (+ .144)
86. 2015 Washington State - .692 (+ .182)
88. 2020 Arizona State - .500 (- .077)
89. 2017 Washington State - .692 (+ .038)
90. 2019 Utah - .786 (+ .156)
91. 2015 Stanford - .857 (+ .153)
92. 2014 Stanford - .615 (- .203)
92. 2021 UCLA - .667 (+ .303)
94. 2016 Washington State - .615 (- .012)
95. 2019 Washington State - .462 (- .189)
96. 2018 Washington State - .846 (+ .288)

Somebody better than me at statistics can perhaps let me know if this data shows anything interesting, but just eye balling it I can see that 61 percent of the teams in the bottom half of injury luck (the first 49 listed) had negative numbers (i.e., worst seasons than the program's average of that era) and 64 percent of the teams in the top half of injury luck (i.e., the second 47 listed) had positive numbers (i.e., better seasons than the program's average of that era). To me that suggests that a) injury luck is not determinative for a season but b) it's generally better to not have injuries than to have injuries. I realize these are exceedingly obvious observations, but I wanted to be empirical about this.

To further test this, I divided the teams into groups to see if things looked any different if I tried to look at it more in terms of teams with rotten, average, or good injury luck. What I found:

Rotten luck (teams 1-31): 61 percent had negative seasons; median was a - .089 effect

Average luck (teams 32-64): 55 percent had negative seasons, median was a - .023

Good luck  (teams 65-96): 28 percent had negative seasons a + .084/+ /.105

This is interesting, if I do say so myself. The results seem so intuitive. 

The median impact of rotten luck, negative 8.9 percent compared to a team's norm for that era, is very close to a one game difference ( one game is 8.3 percent of a 12 game season). 

The median impact of average luck, negative 2.3 percent, is arguably negligible. That's about a quarter of one game. 

The median impact of good luck, positive 8.4 percent or positive 10.1 percent, is in the ballpark of a one game difference. Perhaps others will have views on whether the positive impact of good luck being a bit bigger than the negative impact of rotten luck is significant or if it's just an issue of my flawed sample size/methodology/etc.

As a general, back of the envelope, Matt is not a statistician approximation, a team with rotten luck could generally be expected for that to cost them about one game. IMHO, this corroborates the gut instinct of most on this board, that poor injury luck in 2019 and 2021 explains part of those seasons but is a far cry from justifying those failures. Those teams were sub-par teams regardless of the injuries. Injuries may have made them 4 and 3 win seasons, but healthy they likely would have been 4-6 win seasons. Those weren't good teams irrespective of injuries.

Forecasting ahead to 2022, our four year program average is a .465 winning percentage. In other words, our current sea level as a program is an expectation of 5.58 wins. A 5-6 win regular season even if you give us the benefit of the feels-very-long-ago 2018 season. If we have rotten injury luck again, one might peg us for 4-5 wins. If we can actually benefit from some good injury luck, one might peg us for 6-7 wins. I actually don't think those win totals necessarily tell different things about the health of the program, but making a bowl would mean a lot to me and to the players so that's what I'll be hoping for this year. Six wins or bust!

[Phogge]

Rod Garcia once remarked that after practice ending wind sprints they would run one, “For the coach.” Meaning Ralston. A very hightly knit team back in ‘71. Over the last seven games in 2021 it looked like nobody cared.

Wonder how the morale is right now.

[Phogge]

Rod Garcia once remarked that after practice ending wind sprints they would run one, “For the coach.” Meaning Ralston. A very hightly knit team back in ‘71. Over the last seven games in 2021 it looked like nobody cared.

Wonder how the morale is right now.