[Goose]

And Russia is in real trouble IMO.  Their economy is a mess.  And no western company will be able to invest in Russia for decades even if Putin goes away....

The war has been a dismal failure for Russia and for Putin but particularly for Russian people. The Russian people had a taste of the success of the West after the USSR fell.

I wonder if there's a candidate in Russia who would proactively embrace the West, reject Satan/Putin, consider China to be the common enemy, and lobby for Western companies to establish (re-establish) in Russia?

If there were he would fall out of a window twice about an hour from now.

[Goose]

And Russia is in real trouble IMO.  Their economy is a mess.  And no western company will be able to invest in Russia for decades even if Putin goes away....

The war has been a dismal failure for Russia and for Putin but particularly for Russian people. The Russian people had a taste of the success of the West after the USSR fell.

I wonder if there's a candidate in Russia who would proactively embrace the West, reject Satan/Putin, consider China to be the common enemy, and lobby for Western companies to establish (re-establish) in Russia?

If there were he would fall out of a window twice about an hour from now.

[BostonCard]

That person is rotting in a Russian prison after he was poisoned with nerve gas.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/n...imir-putin

BC

[BostonCard]

That person is rotting in a Russian prison after he was poisoned with nerve gas.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/n...imir-putin

BC

[TrumpCard]

The chorus of people who are not optimistic about further military advances by Ukraine is growing. I hope Zelensky has an ace up his sleeve, maybe in the form of better weapons systems.

[TrumpCard]

The chorus of people who are not optimistic about further military advances by Ukraine is growing. I hope Zelensky has an ace up his sleeve, maybe in the form of better weapons systems.

[BostonCard]

How many people saw Ukraine taking Kharkiv oblast before it happened?  And after, how many thought they would be stopped before they took the area around Lyman?  Only Kherson was deemed likely before it happened.

I agree that it will become harder for Ukraine going forward, as Russia has more defensible lines and shorter GLOCs.  And while a stalemate seems like a reasonably likely outcome, it is mostly just speculation at this point.

Russia still has to contend with an unmotivated force fighting against a motivated defender.  Russian missile attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure probably tell us more about Russia than Ukraine.

BC

[BostonCard]

How many people saw Ukraine taking Kharkiv oblast before it happened?  And after, how many thought they would be stopped before they took the area around Lyman?  Only Kherson was deemed likely before it happened.

I agree that it will become harder for Ukraine going forward, as Russia has more defensible lines and shorter GLOCs.  And while a stalemate seems like a reasonably likely outcome, it is mostly just speculation at this point.

Russia still has to contend with an unmotivated force fighting against a motivated defender.  Russian missile attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure probably tell us more about Russia than Ukraine.

BC

[Durty Nelly]

Seems there is potential for the Ukraine to take all of the Kherson province.  Russians are falling back from the bank of the Dnipro River.  If they achieve taking all of Kherson, then Crimea would be threatened.  Supply lines into Crimea would then be limited to the Kerch bridge and ferries.  If so, Russia may want be willing to give up the Donbass to retain Crimea in negotiations.

[Durty Nelly]

Seems there is potential for the Ukraine to take all of the Kherson province.  Russians are falling back from the bank of the Dnipro River.  If they achieve taking all of Kherson, then Crimea would be threatened.  Supply lines into Crimea would then be limited to the Kerch bridge and ferries.  If so, Russia may want be willing to give up the Donbass to retain Crimea in negotiations.

[Goose]

Seems there is potential for the Ukraine to take all of the Kherson province.  Russians are falling back from the bank of the Dnipro River.  If they achieve taking all of Kherson, then Crimea would be threatened.  Supply lines into Crimea would then be limited to the Kerch bridge and ferries.  If so, Russia may want be willing to give up the Donbass to retain Crimea in negotiations.

There is that potential. However, Russia is fortifying positions in Kherson province. The land is open and therefore moving unobserved is difficult. Not to say Ukraine can't do it. They can, but it won't be easy. Crimea is more important to Russia than the Donbas. Obviously, they want both but I doubt they would give up either without a long, bloody on both sides fight.

---

Russia still has to contend with an unmotivated force fighting against a motivated defender.

Indeed, agree with you there. A NATO force is (was anyway) trying to accomplish the 4Fs (Find them, Fix them, Fight them Finish them). If the enemy chooses to occupy a fortified position without a mobile reserve, he has done the first two things for you. When you fight them, you look for a way through that will threaten their entire line of fortifications. You endeavor to create a situation where you can simply screen the remaining fortifications or take them from the rear if appropriate. Russia knows this and is building second lines behind the MLR to contain a breakthrough and hamper the movement of enveloping forces. If that second line is not effective because it is full of conscripts who don't have a clue, a NATO force would go all the way through both. They can inflict massive losses on a force trapped in it's own fortifications that are now cut off from supply.

Ukraine hasn't as yet shown the ability to accomplish the "Finish them" part. These breakthroughs may require taking casualties and you need to make sure the results are worth it. Let's hope that can change. Ukraine has shown the ability to infiltrate Russian positions and find "creases" they can exploit. That can avoid casualties but is much slower and generally not decisive. I think we will see a lot of that this winter. If the Russian forces can't stand up to these tactics, they can become decisive politically. So far, every time Russia has had a setback that gave Ukraine access to their interior lines of communication, Russia has backed away, even in cases it wasn't obvious they needed to. They don't want their infantry fighting Ukrainian infantry. Get Ukrainian infantry in the second line of defense and it could do the trick.

Russian missile attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure probably tell us more about Russia than Ukraine.


BC

Not sure what that means. Although we in the west don't like it, if you are going to fight a modern war (that you are "serious" about), you attack your opponent's ability to wage war. That includes the power grid. The fact Russia waited as long as they did to do this surprises me.They undoubtedly thought it wouldn't be necessary. Yes, it isn't "nice". We have weapons especially designed to do exactly this. We used them in Iraq.

[Goose]

Seems there is potential for the Ukraine to take all of the Kherson province.  Russians are falling back from the bank of the Dnipro River.  If they achieve taking all of Kherson, then Crimea would be threatened.  Supply lines into Crimea would then be limited to the Kerch bridge and ferries.  If so, Russia may want be willing to give up the Donbass to retain Crimea in negotiations.

There is that potential. However, Russia is fortifying positions in Kherson province. The land is open and therefore moving unobserved is difficult. Not to say Ukraine can't do it. They can, but it won't be easy. Crimea is more important to Russia than the Donbas. Obviously, they want both but I doubt they would give up either without a long, bloody on both sides fight.

---

Russia still has to contend with an unmotivated force fighting against a motivated defender.

Indeed, agree with you there. A NATO force is (was anyway) trying to accomplish the 4Fs (Find them, Fix them, Fight them Finish them). If the enemy chooses to occupy a fortified position without a mobile reserve, he has done the first two things for you. When you fight them, you look for a way through that will threaten their entire line of fortifications. You endeavor to create a situation where you can simply screen the remaining fortifications or take them from the rear if appropriate. Russia knows this and is building second lines behind the MLR to contain a breakthrough and hamper the movement of enveloping forces. If that second line is not effective because it is full of conscripts who don't have a clue, a NATO force would go all the way through both. They can inflict massive losses on a force trapped in it's own fortifications that are now cut off from supply.

Ukraine hasn't as yet shown the ability to accomplish the "Finish them" part. These breakthroughs may require taking casualties and you need to make sure the results are worth it. Let's hope that can change. Ukraine has shown the ability to infiltrate Russian positions and find "creases" they can exploit. That can avoid casualties but is much slower and generally not decisive. I think we will see a lot of that this winter. If the Russian forces can't stand up to these tactics, they can become decisive politically. So far, every time Russia has had a setback that gave Ukraine access to their interior lines of communication, Russia has backed away, even in cases it wasn't obvious they needed to. They don't want their infantry fighting Ukrainian infantry. Get Ukrainian infantry in the second line of defense and it could do the trick.

Russian missile attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure probably tell us more about Russia than Ukraine.


BC

Not sure what that means. Although we in the west don't like it, if you are going to fight a modern war (that you are "serious" about), you attack your opponent's ability to wage war. That includes the power grid. The fact Russia waited as long as they did to do this surprises me.They undoubtedly thought it wouldn't be necessary. Yes, it isn't "nice". We have weapons especially designed to do exactly this. We used them in Iraq.

[dabigv13]

This would be big

KYIV, Nov 27 (Reuters) - The head of Ukraine's state-run nuclear energy firm said on Sunday there were signs that Russian forces might be preparing to leave the vast Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant which they seized in March soon after their invasion.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukr...022-11-27/

[dabigv13]

This would be big

KYIV, Nov 27 (Reuters) - The head of Ukraine's state-run nuclear energy firm said on Sunday there were signs that Russian forces might be preparing to leave the vast Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant which they seized in March soon after their invasion.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukr...022-11-27/

[BostonCard]

Not sure what that means. Although we in the west don't like it, if you are going to fight a modern war (that you are "serious" about), you attack your opponent's ability to wage war. That includes the power grid. The fact Russia waited as long as they did to do this surprises me.They undoubtedly thought it wouldn't be necessary. Yes, it isn't "nice". We have weapons especially designed to do exactly this. We used them in Iraq.

Not passing judgment on the targets, but it largely speaks to Russia’s inability to get much of anything done in the war since they took Severodonetsk and Lyshyshank months ago. Moreover, they are supposedly running out of missiles (though Russia is supposedly always “running out” of things). I think it increasingly speaks to Russias inability to mount offensive operations.

But, that may suit them just fine; they are occupying 20% of Ukrainian territory that will be hard to dislodge them from.

BC

[BostonCard]

Not sure what that means. Although we in the west don't like it, if you are going to fight a modern war (that you are "serious" about), you attack your opponent's ability to wage war. That includes the power grid. The fact Russia waited as long as they did to do this surprises me.They undoubtedly thought it wouldn't be necessary. Yes, it isn't "nice". We have weapons especially designed to do exactly this. We used them in Iraq.

Not passing judgment on the targets, but it largely speaks to Russia’s inability to get much of anything done in the war since they took Severodonetsk and Lyshyshank months ago. Moreover, they are supposedly running out of missiles (though Russia is supposedly always “running out” of things). I think it increasingly speaks to Russias inability to mount offensive operations.

But, that may suit them just fine; they are occupying 20% of Ukrainian territory that will be hard to dislodge them from.

BC

[Goose]

Not passing judgment on the targets, but it largely speaks to Russia’s inability to get much of anything done in the war since they took Severodonetsk and Lyshyshank months ago. Moreover, they are supposedly running out of missiles (though Russia is supposedly always “running out” of things). I think it increasingly speaks to Russias inability to mount offensive operations.


But, that may suit them just fine; they are occupying 20% of Ukrainian territory that will be hard to dislodge them from.



BC

I am not sure it suits Putin just fine, but the new theater commander is apparently a realist and a good soldier, if not exactly a "nice" person. It probably suits him. It isn't a tolerable situation for Ukraine, and while Russia is surrendering the initiative to Ukraine, it isn't clear Ukraine can do anything with it. This is an example of a case where if you give Russia enough time they will find the people who can fix most of the problems. I think it is more a case where the Russians do not have to mount offensive operations. They know the Ukrainians do, and Russia is going to turtle for a while (at least). Putin may get impatient and do something stupid. Lets hope so.

[Goose]

Not passing judgment on the targets, but it largely speaks to Russia’s inability to get much of anything done in the war since they took Severodonetsk and Lyshyshank months ago. Moreover, they are supposedly running out of missiles (though Russia is supposedly always “running out” of things). I think it increasingly speaks to Russias inability to mount offensive operations.


But, that may suit them just fine; they are occupying 20% of Ukrainian territory that will be hard to dislodge them from.



BC

I am not sure it suits Putin just fine, but the new theater commander is apparently a realist and a good soldier, if not exactly a "nice" person. It probably suits him. It isn't a tolerable situation for Ukraine, and while Russia is surrendering the initiative to Ukraine, it isn't clear Ukraine can do anything with it. This is an example of a case where if you give Russia enough time they will find the people who can fix most of the problems. I think it is more a case where the Russians do not have to mount offensive operations. They know the Ukrainians do, and Russia is going to turtle for a while (at least). Putin may get impatient and do something stupid. Lets hope so.

[BostonCard]

Is Bakhmut “something stupid”?

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/27/world...khmut.html

BC

[BostonCard]

Is Bakhmut “something stupid”?

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/27/world...khmut.html

BC

[Goose]

Is Bakhmut “something stupid”?

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/27/world...khmut.html

BC

Yes, but probably not stupid enough to defeat the Russians. The battle there is very bloody for both sides, probably more so for the Russians but not overwhelmingly so. The defensive positions Russia is building are designed to force Ukraine into bloody attacks on prepared positions where the Russians can prevail with low-quality troops and suffer only "moderate" casualties. The Russian casualties in Bakhmut are generally better troops and are "heavy", not "moderate". This is bad but not disastrous. It also uses up lots of Russian and Ukrainian artillery. Russia should stop the nonsense but probably Putin has to save face.

We need Putin to loose patience with the "rope-a-dope" and come out swinging. That way Ukraine can fight on ground of their own choosing when they have an advantage. This can result in "disastrous" casualties for Russia, and that is what we need. It would be equally good for Ukraine to achieve a breakthrough and exploit it, but the former is difficult and risky. The latter Ukraine seems unable to execute.

[Goose]

Is Bakhmut “something stupid”?

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/27/world...khmut.html

BC

Yes, but probably not stupid enough to defeat the Russians. The battle there is very bloody for both sides, probably more so for the Russians but not overwhelmingly so. The defensive positions Russia is building are designed to force Ukraine into bloody attacks on prepared positions where the Russians can prevail with low-quality troops and suffer only "moderate" casualties. The Russian casualties in Bakhmut are generally better troops and are "heavy", not "moderate". This is bad but not disastrous. It also uses up lots of Russian and Ukrainian artillery. Russia should stop the nonsense but probably Putin has to save face.

We need Putin to loose patience with the "rope-a-dope" and come out swinging. That way Ukraine can fight on ground of their own choosing when they have an advantage. This can result in "disastrous" casualties for Russia, and that is what we need. It would be equally good for Ukraine to achieve a breakthrough and exploit it, but the former is difficult and risky. The latter Ukraine seems unable to execute.

[dabigv13]

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospa...022-11-28/

These would be slick. Not quite as long range as ATACMS but at ~94 miles about twice as far as the GMLRS rounds which they have now, with a slightly smaller warhead. Capable of being fired from HIMARS and M270 launchers.

[dabigv13]

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospa...022-11-28/

These would be slick. Not quite as long range as ATACMS but at ~94 miles about twice as far as the GMLRS rounds which they have now, with a slightly smaller warhead. Capable of being fired from HIMARS and M270 launchers.

[Mick]

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospa...022-11-28/

These would be slick. Not quite as long range as ATACMS but at ~94 miles about twice as far as the GMLRS rounds which they have now, with a slightly smaller warhead. Capable of being fired from HIMARS and M270 launchers.

...at all those tempting Russian targets inside of Russia...

[Mick]

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospa...022-11-28/

These would be slick. Not quite as long range as ATACMS but at ~94 miles about twice as far as the GMLRS rounds which they have now, with a slightly smaller warhead. Capable of being fired from HIMARS and M270 launchers.

...at all those tempting Russian targets inside of Russia...

[Goose]

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospa...022-11-28/

These would be slick. Not quite as long range as ATACMS but at ~94 miles about twice as far as the GMLRS rounds which they have now, with a slightly smaller warhead. Capable of being fired from HIMARS and M270 launchers.

...at all those tempting Russian targets inside of Russia...

Going to be a while before anybody sees these items. This weapon is not yet developed. It always sounds easier than it turns out to be. Good luck to Boeing in getting the waiver on the sole-source audit.

[Goose]

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospa...022-11-28/

These would be slick. Not quite as long range as ATACMS but at ~94 miles about twice as far as the GMLRS rounds which they have now, with a slightly smaller warhead. Capable of being fired from HIMARS and M270 launchers.

...at all those tempting Russian targets inside of Russia...

Going to be a while before anybody sees these items. This weapon is not yet developed. It always sounds easier than it turns out to be. Good luck to Boeing in getting the waiver on the sole-source audit.

[dabigv13]

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospa...022-11-28/

These would be slick. Not quite as long range as ATACMS but at ~94 miles about twice as far as the GMLRS rounds which they have now, with a slightly smaller warhead. Capable of being fired from HIMARS and M270 launchers.

...at all those tempting Russian targets inside of Russia...

There are good targets in Russia in range of GMLRS that Ukraine has already and AFAIK they have not once used them on any targets in Russia. So I think Ukraine would adhere to any red lines the US places on the use of these or other long range weapons such as ATACMS or extended range GMLRS that is currently being trialed.

[dabigv13]

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospa...022-11-28/

These would be slick. Not quite as long range as ATACMS but at ~94 miles about twice as far as the GMLRS rounds which they have now, with a slightly smaller warhead. Capable of being fired from HIMARS and M270 launchers.

...at all those tempting Russian targets inside of Russia...

There are good targets in Russia in range of GMLRS that Ukraine has already and AFAIK they have not once used them on any targets in Russia. So I think Ukraine would adhere to any red lines the US places on the use of these or other long range weapons such as ATACMS or extended range GMLRS that is currently being trialed.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-stops-...00318.html

Some of you may recall the discussion early in this war about the potential shortcomings of the BTG as an organizational concept. It appears these criticisms had some merit and Russia is no longer using the BTG as the smallest stand-alone sub-unit of their forces. The question then becomes, what are they using? This is something that is difficult to improvise in the middle of a war. Going back to a divisional architecture would be very difficult in the short term. This issue can lead to even more fragmentation of the Russian military effort. The Russian chain of command now becomes a lot of dotted lines connecting random groupings. It is going to take longer than just the winter months to sort this out, and that is assuming Ukraine doesn't put a lot of pressure on the Russians while they do so.

It also might be a good idea for the US to examine the revisions we have made in our divisional structure to support two independent maneuver forces in each division. It could have some of the same problems the BTG has, although in fairness these are much larger forces and the US Army has been using sub-divisional "Combat Teams" forever. Still, worth looking at.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-stops-...00318.html

Some of you may recall the discussion early in this war about the potential shortcomings of the BTG as an organizational concept. It appears these criticisms had some merit and Russia is no longer using the BTG as the smallest stand-alone sub-unit of their forces. The question then becomes, what are they using? This is something that is difficult to improvise in the middle of a war. Going back to a divisional architecture would be very difficult in the short term. This issue can lead to even more fragmentation of the Russian military effort. The Russian chain of command now becomes a lot of dotted lines connecting random groupings. It is going to take longer than just the winter months to sort this out, and that is assuming Ukraine doesn't put a lot of pressure on the Russians while they do so.

It also might be a good idea for the US to examine the revisions we have made in our divisional structure to support two independent maneuver forces in each division. It could have some of the same problems the BTG has, although in fairness these are much larger forces and the US Army has been using sub-divisional "Combat Teams" forever. Still, worth looking at.

[BostonCard]

Lessons from the first phase of the Ukranian War, from Rusi.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1597943870154997761?s=46&t=mH3wPUQ6vnrQ9HSr4ftfjQ[/tweet]

Some sobering numbers in there.

BC

[BostonCard]

Lessons from the first phase of the Ukranian War, from Rusi.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1597943870154997761?s=46&t=mH3wPUQ6vnrQ9HSr4ftfjQ[/tweet]

Some sobering numbers in there.

BC

[Goose]

Lessons from the first phase of the Ukranian War, from Rusi.

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/159794...9HSr4ftfjQ

Some sobering numbers in there.

BC

Great article. Thanks for the info. Here is a direct link to the .pdf in case it is easier for some to use.
https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-P...-final.pdf

I am looking forward to their next effort, which will undoubtedly have even more interesting information. There are two points in the current one (among many) that really caught my attention. First, they agree AFRF aren't totally incompetent and given enough time will mitigate some of their shortcomings. Some are prety inherent, but much improvement is possible and also probable. Second, the Mainstays can indeed see lots of stuff but the administrative paths clog up the process so much that the VKS basically gave up. We kind of knew this, but confirmation is always good. Let's hope this is one they can't/don't fix.

[Goose]

Lessons from the first phase of the Ukranian War, from Rusi.

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/159794...9HSr4ftfjQ

Some sobering numbers in there.

BC

Great article. Thanks for the info. Here is a direct link to the .pdf in case it is easier for some to use.
https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-P...-final.pdf

I am looking forward to their next effort, which will undoubtedly have even more interesting information. There are two points in the current one (among many) that really caught my attention. First, they agree AFRF aren't totally incompetent and given enough time will mitigate some of their shortcomings. Some are prety inherent, but much improvement is possible and also probable. Second, the Mainstays can indeed see lots of stuff but the administrative paths clog up the process so much that the VKS basically gave up. We kind of knew this, but confirmation is always good. Let's hope this is one they can't/don't fix.

[Mick]

Putin's original plan to take over Ukraine in ten days and execute Zelensky. 

Oops.

Putin's botched plan to takeover Ukraine in just 10 days and execute Zelensky - Daily Star

[Mick]

Putin's original plan to take over Ukraine in ten days and execute Zelensky. 

Oops.

Putin's botched plan to takeover Ukraine in just 10 days and execute Zelensky - Daily Star

[GK3]

Putin's original plan to take over Ukraine in ten days and execute Zelensky. 

Oops.

Putin's botched plan to takeover Ukraine in just 10 days and execute Zelensky - Daily Star

Recent reports reflect that NATO is starting to run a lot more members of the Ukrainian Army through its training center and possibly other places indicating they believe NATO philosophy may improve the UA performance going forward.

[GK3]

Putin's original plan to take over Ukraine in ten days and execute Zelensky. 

Oops.

Putin's botched plan to takeover Ukraine in just 10 days and execute Zelensky - Daily Star

Recent reports reflect that NATO is starting to run a lot more members of the Ukrainian Army through its training center and possibly other places indicating they believe NATO philosophy may improve the UA performance going forward.