[81alum]

The decision by Japan to unconditionally surrender is an interesting case. The fact is nobody really knows what would have happened in all the counterfactual scenarios. One possibility not mentioned here yet was that the US naval blockade would simply starve Japan to impotence. Russia right now appears on a road to the "unconditional surrender" approach. That precludes a stub Ukraine surviving. Obviously if Russia reaches the point it "gives up" on that notion, other outcomes are possible. Right now, I doubt Putin can be persuaded to end the war short of total victory. Ukraine will never have the power to dictate the terms of a settlement. Russia may, and as long as they believe they can and are trying to do so, the war goes on. Unfortunately that is just how it is. The "trick" is to weaken Russia so it can't continue or get a leader in Russia who is sane enough to realize it isn't worth it.

There is a reasonable theory that if we had allowed a conditional surrender--with the sole condition being that Japan could keep its emperor--that the surrender would have come without the nukes--and certainly when the Soviet Union declared war and rolled up Manchuria.  This was politically unacceptable to Truman given that we had spent years telling the American people that we were fighting for an "unconditional surrender."  And yet, when all was said and done, we did allow Japan to keep their emperor.  Greater clarity of communication on that might have saved hundreds of thousands.

I've also read some analysis of the naval blockade.  It was a false choice that the US Military posed between using the nukes and conducting a ground invasion.  By that point of the war, US submarines and air power had completely isolated Japan, which had almost no merchant marine or navy left, not to mention that around 40% of the Japanese population was displaced or homeless after the many firebombings.  It would have been quite sustainable for us to maintain the blockade while the Japanese population starved and froze.  However, this might well have been even more horrendous than the nukes, and it would also have allowed the Soviet Union to overrun more and more Japanese territory.  Bart Bernstein suggested that use of the nukes was in a sense an opening salvo in the Cold War, done to impress the Soviets and end the war when US control over Japan was assured and before the Soviets could partition it with us, as they did in Germany.

So the story my parents told me--and which was almost universally believed by the American people who lived through the war--turns out to be quite incomplete.

[81alum]

The decision by Japan to unconditionally surrender is an interesting case. The fact is nobody really knows what would have happened in all the counterfactual scenarios. One possibility not mentioned here yet was that the US naval blockade would simply starve Japan to impotence. Russia right now appears on a road to the "unconditional surrender" approach. That precludes a stub Ukraine surviving. Obviously if Russia reaches the point it "gives up" on that notion, other outcomes are possible. Right now, I doubt Putin can be persuaded to end the war short of total victory. Ukraine will never have the power to dictate the terms of a settlement. Russia may, and as long as they believe they can and are trying to do so, the war goes on. Unfortunately that is just how it is. The "trick" is to weaken Russia so it can't continue or get a leader in Russia who is sane enough to realize it isn't worth it.

There is a reasonable theory that if we had allowed a conditional surrender--with the sole condition being that Japan could keep its emperor--that the surrender would have come without the nukes--and certainly when the Soviet Union declared war and rolled up Manchuria.  This was politically unacceptable to Truman given that we had spent years telling the American people that we were fighting for an "unconditional surrender."  And yet, when all was said and done, we did allow Japan to keep their emperor.  Greater clarity of communication on that might have saved hundreds of thousands.

I've also read some analysis of the naval blockade.  It was a false choice that the US Military posed between using the nukes and conducting a ground invasion.  By that point of the war, US submarines and air power had completely isolated Japan, which had almost no merchant marine or navy left, not to mention that around 40% of the Japanese population was displaced or homeless after the many firebombings.  It would have been quite sustainable for us to maintain the blockade while the Japanese population starved and froze.  However, this might well have been even more horrendous than the nukes, and it would also have allowed the Soviet Union to overrun more and more Japanese territory.  Bart Bernstein suggested that use of the nukes was in a sense an opening salvo in the Cold War, done to impress the Soviets and end the war when US control over Japan was assured and before the Soviets could partition it with us, as they did in Germany.

So the story my parents told me--and which was almost universally believed by the American people who lived through the war--turns out to be quite incomplete.

[Mick]

The decision by Japan to unconditionally surrender is an interesting case. The fact is nobody really knows what would have happened in all the counterfactual scenarios. One possibility not mentioned here yet was that the US naval blockade would simply starve Japan to impotence. Russia right now appears on a road to the "unconditional surrender" approach. That precludes a stub Ukraine surviving. Obviously if Russia reaches the point it "gives up" on that notion, other outcomes are possible. Right now, I doubt Putin can be persuaded to end the war short of total victory. Ukraine will never have the power to dictate the terms of a settlement. Russia may, and as long as they believe they can and are trying to do so, the war goes on. Unfortunately that is just how it is. The "trick" is to weaken Russia so it can't continue or get a leader in Russia who is sane enough to realize it isn't worth it.

There is a reasonable theory that if we had allowed a conditional surrender--with the sole condition being that Japan could keep its emperor--that the surrender would have come without the nukes--and certainly when the Soviet Union declared war and rolled up Manchuria.  This was politically unacceptable to Truman given that we had spent years telling the American people that we were fighting for an "unconditional surrender."  And yet, when all was said and done, we did allow Japan to keep their emperor.  Greater clarity of communication on that might have saved hundreds of thousands.

I've also read some analysis of the naval blockade.  It was a false choice that the US Military posed between using the nukes and conducting a ground invasion.  By that point of the war, US submarines and air power had completely isolated Japan, which had almost no merchant marine or navy left, not to mention that around 40% of the Japanese population was displaced or homeless after the many firebombings.  It would have been quite sustainable for us to maintain the blockade while the Japanese population starved and froze.  However, this might well have been even more horrendous than the nukes, and it would also have allowed the Soviet Union to overrun more and more Japanese territory.  Bart Bernstein suggested that use of the nukes was in a sense an opening salvo in the Cold War, done to impress the Soviets and end the war when US control over Japan was assured and before the Soviets could partition it with us, as they did in Germany.

So the story my parents told me--and which was almost universally believed by the American people who lived through the war--turns out to be quite incomplete.

I'm confused. What I'm taking from your comments is that Operation Downfall (the projected ground invasion of Japan in late 1945) would not have resulted in over a million+ Allied casualties. Do I have that correct? This after 400k+ American deaths to that point in WWII and four years of global war for the Americans? The study for Stimson's staff indicated between 400k and 800k American soldier deaths, 1.7 million Allied casualties and 5 mm to 10 mm Japanese casualties. You're saying those projections were complete BS? This after Japanese soldiers essentially fought to the death in territories away from the Japanese mainland? So my read of your remarks is that the Japanese people would have been less resolute in defending their home country? That Operation Ketsu-Go, with the motto "The sooner the Americans come, the better...One hundred million die proudly." would not have been executed?

[Mick]

The decision by Japan to unconditionally surrender is an interesting case. The fact is nobody really knows what would have happened in all the counterfactual scenarios. One possibility not mentioned here yet was that the US naval blockade would simply starve Japan to impotence. Russia right now appears on a road to the "unconditional surrender" approach. That precludes a stub Ukraine surviving. Obviously if Russia reaches the point it "gives up" on that notion, other outcomes are possible. Right now, I doubt Putin can be persuaded to end the war short of total victory. Ukraine will never have the power to dictate the terms of a settlement. Russia may, and as long as they believe they can and are trying to do so, the war goes on. Unfortunately that is just how it is. The "trick" is to weaken Russia so it can't continue or get a leader in Russia who is sane enough to realize it isn't worth it.

There is a reasonable theory that if we had allowed a conditional surrender--with the sole condition being that Japan could keep its emperor--that the surrender would have come without the nukes--and certainly when the Soviet Union declared war and rolled up Manchuria.  This was politically unacceptable to Truman given that we had spent years telling the American people that we were fighting for an "unconditional surrender."  And yet, when all was said and done, we did allow Japan to keep their emperor.  Greater clarity of communication on that might have saved hundreds of thousands.

I've also read some analysis of the naval blockade.  It was a false choice that the US Military posed between using the nukes and conducting a ground invasion.  By that point of the war, US submarines and air power had completely isolated Japan, which had almost no merchant marine or navy left, not to mention that around 40% of the Japanese population was displaced or homeless after the many firebombings.  It would have been quite sustainable for us to maintain the blockade while the Japanese population starved and froze.  However, this might well have been even more horrendous than the nukes, and it would also have allowed the Soviet Union to overrun more and more Japanese territory.  Bart Bernstein suggested that use of the nukes was in a sense an opening salvo in the Cold War, done to impress the Soviets and end the war when US control over Japan was assured and before the Soviets could partition it with us, as they did in Germany.

So the story my parents told me--and which was almost universally believed by the American people who lived through the war--turns out to be quite incomplete.

I'm confused. What I'm taking from your comments is that Operation Downfall (the projected ground invasion of Japan in late 1945) would not have resulted in over a million+ Allied casualties. Do I have that correct? This after 400k+ American deaths to that point in WWII and four years of global war for the Americans? The study for Stimson's staff indicated between 400k and 800k American soldier deaths, 1.7 million Allied casualties and 5 mm to 10 mm Japanese casualties. You're saying those projections were complete BS? This after Japanese soldiers essentially fought to the death in territories away from the Japanese mainland? So my read of your remarks is that the Japanese people would have been less resolute in defending their home country? That Operation Ketsu-Go, with the motto "The sooner the Americans come, the better...One hundred million die proudly." would not have been executed?

[Goose]

What many have said is that an alternative to Operation Downfall was to just continue the close blockade. At the very least it would have killed lots of the Japanese who would have attempted resist a very much delayed invasion, reducing casualties by a lot. This choice was not popular with the Army or with the politicians. The politicians didn't like it because the public was getting real tired of war and wanted it over. Those same people said the casualties were being greatly over hyped. The Army didn't like it because the Navy would get all the credit while the Army had to keep all it's troops in case it didn't work.

IMO the argument that the bombs were dropped as a statement to over-awe Russia is a retrospective analysis based on what we know now. Truman and the other decision makers didn't know there was going to be a "Cold War". They weren't thinking much about keeping Russia out of Japan. Some people were, but not many. Things were starting to get tense with the USSR but weren't there yet. On top of that, the US Army did not predict the rapid advance Russia made into Japanese territory when they entered the war. If Russia had already made such advances when the decision to drop the bomb(s) were initially made, it would make sense we were trying to scare them. That was not the case. Once the initial decision to drop any bombs was made, the idea of stopping it at the last minute wasn't realistic. Military organizations don't work that way. Too much momentum. The AAF would have drug their heels at every step.

[Goose]

What many have said is that an alternative to Operation Downfall was to just continue the close blockade. At the very least it would have killed lots of the Japanese who would have attempted resist a very much delayed invasion, reducing casualties by a lot. This choice was not popular with the Army or with the politicians. The politicians didn't like it because the public was getting real tired of war and wanted it over. Those same people said the casualties were being greatly over hyped. The Army didn't like it because the Navy would get all the credit while the Army had to keep all it's troops in case it didn't work.

IMO the argument that the bombs were dropped as a statement to over-awe Russia is a retrospective analysis based on what we know now. Truman and the other decision makers didn't know there was going to be a "Cold War". They weren't thinking much about keeping Russia out of Japan. Some people were, but not many. Things were starting to get tense with the USSR but weren't there yet. On top of that, the US Army did not predict the rapid advance Russia made into Japanese territory when they entered the war. If Russia had already made such advances when the decision to drop the bomb(s) were initially made, it would make sense we were trying to scare them. That was not the case. Once the initial decision to drop any bombs was made, the idea of stopping it at the last minute wasn't realistic. Military organizations don't work that way. Too much momentum. The AAF would have drug their heels at every step.

[81alum]

I'm confused. What I'm taking from your comments is that Operation Downfall (the projected ground invasion of Japan in late 1945) would not have resulted in over a million+ Allied casualties. Do I have that correct? This after 400k+ American deaths to that point in WWII and four years of global war for the Americans? The study for Stimson's staff indicated between 400k and 800k American soldier deaths, 1.7 million Allied casualties and 5 mm to 10 mm Japanese casualties. You're saying those projections were complete BS? This after Japanese soldiers essentially fought to the death in territories away from the Japanese mainland? So my read of your remarks is that the Japanese people would have been less resolute in defending their home country? That Operation Ketsu-Go, with the motto "The sooner the Americans come, the better...One hundred million die proudly." would not have been executed?

It was a false choice, according to some, because the war could have been won with no ground invasion at all.  Most Americans today do not understand how complete our naval victory was by August 1945.  The Navy's preferred strategy was blockade, not invasion.  While much of Japan's army was intact, nearly all of their naval power and merchant marine had been sunk, and Japan could not feed or supply either its home islands nor its army in distant locations.  US submarines had done what German U-boats had never been able to do--completely annihilate enemy shipping and isolate the enemy homeland.  Japan's warmaking potential was over. 

So Stimson's group might have been perfectly correct in its estimate of casualties--based upon our horrific experiences in Iwo Jima and Okinawa.  But they would have been irrelevant if we decided to take the Navy's recommended strategy and not invade at all.  It was, after all, probably the most comprehensive and successful naval blockade in world history, by that point in time.

However, as neither the Navy nor Stimson understood at the time, the A-bombs might have been more humane than a blockade--if you are just counting deaths.  Blockade may have killed 10-20 times more Japanese civilians than the bombs.  But that was never part of the calculus of the Stimson group, whose proceedings are now available.

---

IMO the argument that the bombs were dropped as a statement to over-awe Russia is a retrospective analysis based on what we know now. Truman and the other decision makers didn't know there was going to be a "Cold War". They weren't thinking much about keeping Russia out of Japan. Some people were, but not many. Things were starting to get tense with the USSR but weren't there yet.

Gaddis argues that the Cold War originated very much during WWII, particularly Churchill's desire to delay D-Day by a year to allow the Germans and Soviets to chew each other up.  Whether this was actually deliberate or not--Stalin certainly thought it was--and he thought that the United States and UK had reneged on a promise to open the western front in 1943.   (North Africa and Italy being a sideshow, to him.)  I think there is a good consensus of scholarship that by 1944 all sides knew that as soon as the Axis was defeated that there would be a contest for influence between the West and the Soviet Union. Now just how strong Bart Bernstein's thesis that the A-bombs were a demonstration for the benefit of the Soviet Union I'm not sure.  I haven't read this literature in years--my guess is any such interpretation would--by now--be proven or disproven as the documents from that era become increasingly public.

Getting back to Ukraine, the Soviet propaganda that the United States is willing to support Ukraine "fighting to the last Ukrainian" is eerily reminiscent of the Soviet Union's bitterness that the West left it to fight alone for a long time against Hitler.  Just as we bled it dry by not opening the second front as promised, now we are bleeding it dry by subsidizing a war on its border (without actually risking American lives.)

I believe both such views are distortions, by the way, in case anyone wonders.  But I do think this is how Russia generally perceives the West--as cynically using every opportunity possible to prevent Russia from being the great power it deserves to be.

[81alum]

I'm confused. What I'm taking from your comments is that Operation Downfall (the projected ground invasion of Japan in late 1945) would not have resulted in over a million+ Allied casualties. Do I have that correct? This after 400k+ American deaths to that point in WWII and four years of global war for the Americans? The study for Stimson's staff indicated between 400k and 800k American soldier deaths, 1.7 million Allied casualties and 5 mm to 10 mm Japanese casualties. You're saying those projections were complete BS? This after Japanese soldiers essentially fought to the death in territories away from the Japanese mainland? So my read of your remarks is that the Japanese people would have been less resolute in defending their home country? That Operation Ketsu-Go, with the motto "The sooner the Americans come, the better...One hundred million die proudly." would not have been executed?

It was a false choice, according to some, because the war could have been won with no ground invasion at all.  Most Americans today do not understand how complete our naval victory was by August 1945.  The Navy's preferred strategy was blockade, not invasion.  While much of Japan's army was intact, nearly all of their naval power and merchant marine had been sunk, and Japan could not feed or supply either its home islands nor its army in distant locations.  US submarines had done what German U-boats had never been able to do--completely annihilate enemy shipping and isolate the enemy homeland.  Japan's warmaking potential was over. 

So Stimson's group might have been perfectly correct in its estimate of casualties--based upon our horrific experiences in Iwo Jima and Okinawa.  But they would have been irrelevant if we decided to take the Navy's recommended strategy and not invade at all.  It was, after all, probably the most comprehensive and successful naval blockade in world history, by that point in time.

However, as neither the Navy nor Stimson understood at the time, the A-bombs might have been more humane than a blockade--if you are just counting deaths.  Blockade may have killed 10-20 times more Japanese civilians than the bombs.  But that was never part of the calculus of the Stimson group, whose proceedings are now available.

---

IMO the argument that the bombs were dropped as a statement to over-awe Russia is a retrospective analysis based on what we know now. Truman and the other decision makers didn't know there was going to be a "Cold War". They weren't thinking much about keeping Russia out of Japan. Some people were, but not many. Things were starting to get tense with the USSR but weren't there yet.

Gaddis argues that the Cold War originated very much during WWII, particularly Churchill's desire to delay D-Day by a year to allow the Germans and Soviets to chew each other up.  Whether this was actually deliberate or not--Stalin certainly thought it was--and he thought that the United States and UK had reneged on a promise to open the western front in 1943.   (North Africa and Italy being a sideshow, to him.)  I think there is a good consensus of scholarship that by 1944 all sides knew that as soon as the Axis was defeated that there would be a contest for influence between the West and the Soviet Union. Now just how strong Bart Bernstein's thesis that the A-bombs were a demonstration for the benefit of the Soviet Union I'm not sure.  I haven't read this literature in years--my guess is any such interpretation would--by now--be proven or disproven as the documents from that era become increasingly public.

Getting back to Ukraine, the Soviet propaganda that the United States is willing to support Ukraine "fighting to the last Ukrainian" is eerily reminiscent of the Soviet Union's bitterness that the West left it to fight alone for a long time against Hitler.  Just as we bled it dry by not opening the second front as promised, now we are bleeding it dry by subsidizing a war on its border (without actually risking American lives.)

I believe both such views are distortions, by the way, in case anyone wonders.  But I do think this is how Russia generally perceives the West--as cynically using every opportunity possible to prevent Russia from being the great power it deserves to be.

[dabigv13]

Fantastic post 81alum.

I have not done a done of reading on this subject but from Toland's Rising Sun, it's clear the Japanese domestic governance by summer 45 was chaotic, but the groups that advocated fighting on would probably have not been able to outmaneuver an Emperor set on a certain course of action. The bomb probably was not necessary to end the war without an invasion of the home islands, if the US wanted to go that route, and signaled appropriately to the Japanese that surrender while allowing the continuance of the Imperial family was acceptable.

The bomb was dropped because we made it, and Groves was always going to drop it once we had it. Truman was almost a secondary figure in it's deployment. I don't think it was really a demonstration to the Soviets as a discrete and thought out piece of foreign policy.

[dabigv13]

Fantastic post 81alum.

I have not done a done of reading on this subject but from Toland's Rising Sun, it's clear the Japanese domestic governance by summer 45 was chaotic, but the groups that advocated fighting on would probably have not been able to outmaneuver an Emperor set on a certain course of action. The bomb probably was not necessary to end the war without an invasion of the home islands, if the US wanted to go that route, and signaled appropriately to the Japanese that surrender while allowing the continuance of the Imperial family was acceptable.

The bomb was dropped because we made it, and Groves was always going to drop it once we had it. Truman was almost a secondary figure in it's deployment. I don't think it was really a demonstration to the Soviets as a discrete and thought out piece of foreign policy.

[BostonCard]

Getting back to Ukraine, this is a more optimistic assessment of what is going on.

https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/w...-update-15

TL; DR: unlikely that there is much of a Russian offensive to be had, and the Russians don’t seem to be learning much.

BC

[BostonCard]

Getting back to Ukraine, this is a more optimistic assessment of what is going on.

https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/w...-update-15

TL; DR: unlikely that there is much of a Russian offensive to be had, and the Russians don’t seem to be learning much.

BC

[81alum]

I do wonder how military historians many years from now will analyze the first year of this war--no doubt it will depend on the outcome.  But so far it doesn't feel as if there is a single military mind giving the Russians a cohesive strategy; instead, t feels like a strategy driven by bureaucracy and standard operating procedures.  Hopefully that won't change, but so far it isn't up to 1914 standards even, with what may be even worse results.

[81alum]

I do wonder how military historians many years from now will analyze the first year of this war--no doubt it will depend on the outcome.  But so far it doesn't feel as if there is a single military mind giving the Russians a cohesive strategy; instead, t feels like a strategy driven by bureaucracy and standard operating procedures.  Hopefully that won't change, but so far it isn't up to 1914 standards even, with what may be even worse results.

[BostonCard]

Necessity is the mother of invention. And I wonder, in this war of choice for Russia, whether there is much incentive To challenge Putin and do something different.  If you are a mod-level commander in Donetsk, your goals are basically a) to survive and b) not to piss off your superior (and I recognize that these two may be in conflict).  So, I would imagine a lot of CYAing and a lot of trying not to upset the Apple cart, probably trying to avoid engagement, and very little innovation.

BC

[BostonCard]

Necessity is the mother of invention. And I wonder, in this war of choice for Russia, whether there is much incentive To challenge Putin and do something different.  If you are a mod-level commander in Donetsk, your goals are basically a) to survive and b) not to piss off your superior (and I recognize that these two may be in conflict).  So, I would imagine a lot of CYAing and a lot of trying not to upset the Apple cart, probably trying to avoid engagement, and very little innovation.

BC

[TrumpCard]

. . . And I wonder, in this war of choice for Russia, whether there is much incentive To challenge Putin and do something different. . . .

In a different context, but this article speaks to the same issue.  Lots of people leaving Russia to avoid the war or the resulting economic sanctions.  Many of the people leaving would have been the type you'd expect to challenge Putin (if anyone would or could).  The mass exodus may further trap Russia in Putin's grip.  

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202...r-ukraine/

[TrumpCard]

. . . And I wonder, in this war of choice for Russia, whether there is much incentive To challenge Putin and do something different. . . .

In a different context, but this article speaks to the same issue.  Lots of people leaving Russia to avoid the war or the resulting economic sanctions.  Many of the people leaving would have been the type you'd expect to challenge Putin (if anyone would or could).  The mass exodus may further trap Russia in Putin's grip.  

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202...r-ukraine/

[Mick]

Necessity is the mother of invention. And I wonder, in this war of choice for Russia, whether there is much incentive To challenge Putin and do something different.  If you are a mod-level commander in Donetsk, your goals are basically a) to survive and b) not to piss off your superior (and I recognize that these two may be in conflict).  So, I would imagine a lot of CYAing and a lot of trying not to upset the Apple cart, probably trying to avoid engagement, and very little innovation.

BC

When I was younger, I had accumulated a lot of knowledge on CRM systems, and my employer at the time (Arthur Andersen) was trying -- very unsuccessfully -- to build its own. The boss of the project leader (and AA board member) asked for my candid opinion on their proprietary CRM tool, and I made the enormous political mistake of thinking that he actually wanted my candid opinion. I wrote a 17-bullet point memo detailing the shortcomings of the AA solution compared with off-the-shelf, commercially available CRM programs.

I still remember the terse e-mail he sent me two weeks later, which began: "I am sorry that you decided to put your career in jeopardy by criticizing..."

Ah, good times at Enron's auditing firm...

[Mick]

Necessity is the mother of invention. And I wonder, in this war of choice for Russia, whether there is much incentive To challenge Putin and do something different.  If you are a mod-level commander in Donetsk, your goals are basically a) to survive and b) not to piss off your superior (and I recognize that these two may be in conflict).  So, I would imagine a lot of CYAing and a lot of trying not to upset the Apple cart, probably trying to avoid engagement, and very little innovation.

BC

When I was younger, I had accumulated a lot of knowledge on CRM systems, and my employer at the time (Arthur Andersen) was trying -- very unsuccessfully -- to build its own. The boss of the project leader (and AA board member) asked for my candid opinion on their proprietary CRM tool, and I made the enormous political mistake of thinking that he actually wanted my candid opinion. I wrote a 17-bullet point memo detailing the shortcomings of the AA solution compared with off-the-shelf, commercially available CRM programs.

I still remember the terse e-mail he sent me two weeks later, which began: "I am sorry that you decided to put your career in jeopardy by criticizing..."

Ah, good times at Enron's auditing firm...

[81alum]

Ah, good times at Enron's auditing firm...

Great story!

Did you just compare your former boss to Vladimir Putin?  ;)

[81alum]

Ah, good times at Enron's auditing firm...

Great story!

Did you just compare your former boss to Vladimir Putin?  ;)

[Softball Fan]

If you sent your opinion memo to the boss only, he should have appreciated the value in a different point of view.  If you copied your memo to others in the company, that would have been a mistake.

[Softball Fan]

If you sent your opinion memo to the boss only, he should have appreciated the value in a different point of view.  If you copied your memo to others in the company, that would have been a mistake.

[gocard14]

---

Circling back to the main topic, I thought this was a very interesting article basically diving into the orders Russian units receive and lack of any adaptability to circumstances on the ground. 

https://wavellroom.com/2023/02/01/anatom...e-assault/

Basically it came down to 
X:00-T:00 Artillery fires blindly to blanket the target area. Drones are used at the end to assess damage and plan firing for the next day, not for re-directing fire.
Infantry attack with tanks + BMPs with no air or artillery support
They try to make progress until the can't, reserves come to dig in to try to consolidate gains.

No coordination between troops and artillery or air. Limited and/or unencrypted communication, so everything proceeds based on time on the clock/schedule, not based on communication or facts on the ground.

[gocard14]

---

Circling back to the main topic, I thought this was a very interesting article basically diving into the orders Russian units receive and lack of any adaptability to circumstances on the ground. 

https://wavellroom.com/2023/02/01/anatom...e-assault/

Basically it came down to 
X:00-T:00 Artillery fires blindly to blanket the target area. Drones are used at the end to assess damage and plan firing for the next day, not for re-directing fire.
Infantry attack with tanks + BMPs with no air or artillery support
They try to make progress until the can't, reserves come to dig in to try to consolidate gains.

No coordination between troops and artillery or air. Limited and/or unencrypted communication, so everything proceeds based on time on the clock/schedule, not based on communication or facts on the ground.

[Mick]

If you sent your opinion memo to the boss only, he should have appreciated the value in a different point of view.  If you copied your memo to others in the company, that would have been a mistake.

I sent the very straightforward memo solely to the person who requested it, and I agree, he should have appreciated my PoV. He was aware of my lengthy involvement in CRM systems, including building my own CRM solution on a Foxbase system using an old Burroughs B900 back in the '80s. And yes, I'm that old...

---

Ah, good times at Enron's auditing firm...

Great story!

Did you just compare your former boss to Vladimir Putin?  ;)

I think with Putin, you might stand a chance.  Not with this guy...

[Mick]

If you sent your opinion memo to the boss only, he should have appreciated the value in a different point of view.  If you copied your memo to others in the company, that would have been a mistake.

I sent the very straightforward memo solely to the person who requested it, and I agree, he should have appreciated my PoV. He was aware of my lengthy involvement in CRM systems, including building my own CRM solution on a Foxbase system using an old Burroughs B900 back in the '80s. And yes, I'm that old...

---

Ah, good times at Enron's auditing firm...

Great story!

Did you just compare your former boss to Vladimir Putin?  ;)

I think with Putin, you might stand a chance.  Not with this guy...

[cardcrimson]

Ah, good times at Enron's auditing firm...

Collaborated with the Enron folks on a project in the late 90's. Met with a folks at a multiple of levels, including those in very senior positions.  They all had one thing in common. They were the most arrogant group I've ever dealt with.

[cardcrimson]

Ah, good times at Enron's auditing firm...

Collaborated with the Enron folks on a project in the late 90's. Met with a folks at a multiple of levels, including those in very senior positions.  They all had one thing in common. They were the most arrogant group I've ever dealt with.

[Goose]

I do wonder how military historians many years from now will analyze the first year of this war--no doubt it will depend on the outcome.  But so far it doesn't feel as if there is a single military mind giving the Russians a cohesive strategy; instead, t feels like a strategy driven by bureaucracy and standard operating procedures.  Hopefully that won't change, but so far it isn't up to 1914 standards even, with what may be even worse results.

I think you maybe should rethink your comparison. In 1914 Russia invaded East Prussia on17th August and made some progress. By 30 August  Russia had suffered 92,000 captured, 78,000 killed or wounded (out of 230,000) at Tannenberg. The Russian Second Army was completely encircled and destroyed. The Germans followed that up with the first battle of the Masurian Lakes where the Russians suffered another 70,000 killed and wounded, 30,000–45,000 prisoners (out of 554,000). The Russian First Army was only partially encircled, but it was wrecked. At that point Russia had been driven out of East Prussia.

Even if one accepts the current Ukrainian estimates of over 200,000 Russian casualties, the Russians indeed suffered more in 1914 (including prisoners), and that was in a month, not almost a year. Russia also holds quite a bit of captured territory in Ukraine, while in 1914 Russia was completely driven from East Prussia. I would say the Russian performance in 1914 was far worse. It is also interesting to note that in Ukraine the number of captured is not talked about much. While it isn't zero, it undoubtedly isn't nearly as large percentage-wise as in 1914. This indicates that the current Russian army at least has avoided strategic errors that force them to surrender largely intact forces. The Germans were also undoubtedly capable of superior maneuver warfare than the Ukrainians have demonstrated, which isn't "apples to apples".
 
For what it's worth, the Russian army was following a plan that was developed by a single individual (in as much as a single person can ever direct 800,000 men), Yakov Zhilinsky. The plan was not a good one, but it also shouldn't have been as much of a disaster as it was. The Russian communications were non-existent, and the ones they had actually were probably of more use to the Germans than the Russians. The Russian generals were totally unable to direct the battles and had no situational awareness. Their troops were also hopelessly untrained. There are some obvious similarities to the present case.

There is no known single formula of organization that ensures competent military planning. The trend has been away from single individuals and toward a "general staff" (or JCS) organization. It has been amply demonstrated that both types of organizations can produce shockingly bad plans (at least in retrospect). The perception is that the general staff tends to produce "safer" plans that may lack panache and also often aren't "optimal". These plans generally seem to not contain "gross" errors, while individuals often did make plans that did. In all cases the plans are greatly influenced by what the planners think they "know" about the opponent and what they "know" about their nation's war aims and the abilities of their own forces. It almost all cases, bad plans are the product of bad initial assumptions. Bad outcomes are sometimes the result of bad plans, but at least equally often an adequate plan poorly executed. It is also true the enemy gets a vote, and even a perfect plan can be upset by the enemy. What one does then is critical, and both in 1914 and 2022 Russia failed that test.

[Goose]

I do wonder how military historians many years from now will analyze the first year of this war--no doubt it will depend on the outcome.  But so far it doesn't feel as if there is a single military mind giving the Russians a cohesive strategy; instead, t feels like a strategy driven by bureaucracy and standard operating procedures.  Hopefully that won't change, but so far it isn't up to 1914 standards even, with what may be even worse results.

I think you maybe should rethink your comparison. In 1914 Russia invaded East Prussia on17th August and made some progress. By 30 August  Russia had suffered 92,000 captured, 78,000 killed or wounded (out of 230,000) at Tannenberg. The Russian Second Army was completely encircled and destroyed. The Germans followed that up with the first battle of the Masurian Lakes where the Russians suffered another 70,000 killed and wounded, 30,000–45,000 prisoners (out of 554,000). The Russian First Army was only partially encircled, but it was wrecked. At that point Russia had been driven out of East Prussia.

Even if one accepts the current Ukrainian estimates of over 200,000 Russian casualties, the Russians indeed suffered more in 1914 (including prisoners), and that was in a month, not almost a year. Russia also holds quite a bit of captured territory in Ukraine, while in 1914 Russia was completely driven from East Prussia. I would say the Russian performance in 1914 was far worse. It is also interesting to note that in Ukraine the number of captured is not talked about much. While it isn't zero, it undoubtedly isn't nearly as large percentage-wise as in 1914. This indicates that the current Russian army at least has avoided strategic errors that force them to surrender largely intact forces. The Germans were also undoubtedly capable of superior maneuver warfare than the Ukrainians have demonstrated, which isn't "apples to apples".
 
For what it's worth, the Russian army was following a plan that was developed by a single individual (in as much as a single person can ever direct 800,000 men), Yakov Zhilinsky. The plan was not a good one, but it also shouldn't have been as much of a disaster as it was. The Russian communications were non-existent, and the ones they had actually were probably of more use to the Germans than the Russians. The Russian generals were totally unable to direct the battles and had no situational awareness. Their troops were also hopelessly untrained. There are some obvious similarities to the present case.

There is no known single formula of organization that ensures competent military planning. The trend has been away from single individuals and toward a "general staff" (or JCS) organization. It has been amply demonstrated that both types of organizations can produce shockingly bad plans (at least in retrospect). The perception is that the general staff tends to produce "safer" plans that may lack panache and also often aren't "optimal". These plans generally seem to not contain "gross" errors, while individuals often did make plans that did. In all cases the plans are greatly influenced by what the planners think they "know" about the opponent and what they "know" about their nation's war aims and the abilities of their own forces. It almost all cases, bad plans are the product of bad initial assumptions. Bad outcomes are sometimes the result of bad plans, but at least equally often an adequate plan poorly executed. It is also true the enemy gets a vote, and even a perfect plan can be upset by the enemy. What one does then is critical, and both in 1914 and 2022 Russia failed that test.

[BostonCard]

Looks like Ukraine is prepping for a withdrawal from Bakhmut.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/f...plnews_d-1

BC

[BostonCard]

Looks like Ukraine is prepping for a withdrawal from Bakhmut.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/f...plnews_d-1

BC

[GK3]

What many have said is that an alternative to Operation Downfall was to just continue the close blockade. At the very least it would have killed lots of the Japanese who would have attempted resist a very much delayed invasion, reducing casualties by a lot. This choice was not popular with the Army or with the politicians. The politicians didn't like it because the public was getting real tired of war and wanted it over. Those same people said the casualties were being greatly over hyped. The Army didn't like it because the Navy would get all the credit while the Army had to keep all it's troops in case it didn't work.

IMO the argument that the bombs were dropped as a statement to over-awe Russia is a retrospective analysis based on what we know now. Truman and the other decision makers didn't know there was going to be a "Cold War". They weren't thinking much about keeping Russia out of Japan. Some people were, but not many. Things were starting to get tense with the USSR but weren't there yet. On top of that, the US Army did not predict the rapid advance Russia made into Japanese territory when they entered the war. If Russia had already made such advances when the decision to drop the bomb(s) were initially made, it would make sense we were trying to scare them. That was not the case. Once the initial decision to drop any bombs was made, the idea of stopping it at the last minute wasn't realistic. Military organizations don't work that way. Too much momentum. The AAF would have drug their heels at every step.

From a historians perspective you can only analyze what happened almost 80 years ago in light of the knowledge you had then, but it is very hard to ignore the now.  We and the British did not break the Venona code until 1946 and we began to have a clearer understanding of how much of our secrets were then in Russian hands.

[GK3]

What many have said is that an alternative to Operation Downfall was to just continue the close blockade. At the very least it would have killed lots of the Japanese who would have attempted resist a very much delayed invasion, reducing casualties by a lot. This choice was not popular with the Army or with the politicians. The politicians didn't like it because the public was getting real tired of war and wanted it over. Those same people said the casualties were being greatly over hyped. The Army didn't like it because the Navy would get all the credit while the Army had to keep all it's troops in case it didn't work.

IMO the argument that the bombs were dropped as a statement to over-awe Russia is a retrospective analysis based on what we know now. Truman and the other decision makers didn't know there was going to be a "Cold War". They weren't thinking much about keeping Russia out of Japan. Some people were, but not many. Things were starting to get tense with the USSR but weren't there yet. On top of that, the US Army did not predict the rapid advance Russia made into Japanese territory when they entered the war. If Russia had already made such advances when the decision to drop the bomb(s) were initially made, it would make sense we were trying to scare them. That was not the case. Once the initial decision to drop any bombs was made, the idea of stopping it at the last minute wasn't realistic. Military organizations don't work that way. Too much momentum. The AAF would have drug their heels at every step.

From a historians perspective you can only analyze what happened almost 80 years ago in light of the knowledge you had then, but it is very hard to ignore the now.  We and the British did not break the Venona code until 1946 and we began to have a clearer understanding of how much of our secrets were then in Russian hands.

[81alum]

I do wonder how military historians many years from now will analyze the first year of this war--no doubt it will depend on the outcome.  But so far it doesn't feel as if there is a single military mind giving the Russians a cohesive strategy; instead, t feels like a strategy driven by bureaucracy and standard operating procedures.  Hopefully that won't change, but so far it isn't up to 1914 standards even, with what may be even worse results.

I think you maybe should rethink your comparison. In 1914 Russia invaded East Prussia on17th August and made some progress. By 30 August  Russia had suffered 92,000 captured, 78,000 killed or wounded (out of 230,000) at Tannenberg. The Russian Second Army was completely encircled and destroyed. The Germans followed that up with the first battle of the Masurian Lakes where the Russians suffered another 70,000 killed and wounded, 30,000–45,000 prisoners (out of 554,000). The Russian First Army was only partially encircled, but it was wrecked. At that point Russia had been driven out of East Prussia.



Even if one accepts the current Ukrainian estimates of over 200,000 Russian casualties, the Russians indeed suffered more in 1914 (including prisoners), and that was in a month, not almost a year. Russia also holds quite a bit of captured territory in Ukraine, while in 1914 Russia was completely driven from East Prussia. I would say the Russian performance in 1914 was far worse. It is also interesting to note that in Ukraine the number of captured is not talked about much. While it isn't zero, it undoubtedly isn't nearly as large percentage-wise as in 1914. This indicates that the current Russian army at least has avoided strategic errors that force them to surrender largely intact forces. The Germans were also undoubtedly capable of superior maneuver warfare than the Ukrainians have demonstrated, which isn't "apples to apples".

 

For what it's worth, the Russian army was following a plan that was developed by a single individual (in as much as a single person can ever direct 800,000 men), Yakov Zhilinsky. The plan was not a good one, but it also shouldn't have been as much of a disaster as it was. The Russian communications were non-existent, and the ones they had actually were probably of more use to the Germans than the Russians. The Russian generals were totally unable to direct the battles and had no situational awareness. Their troops were also hopelessly untrained. There are some obvious similarities to the present case.



There is no known single formula of organization that ensures competent military planning. The trend has been away from single individuals and toward a "general staff" (or JCS) organization. It has been amply demonstrated that both types of organizations can produce shockingly bad plans (at least in retrospect). The perception is that the general staff tends to produce "safer" plans that may lack panache and also often aren't "optimal". These plans generally seem to not contain "gross" errors, while individuals often did make plans that did. In all cases the plans are greatly influenced by what the planners think they "know" about the opponent and what they "know" about their nation's war aims and the abilities of their own forces. It almost all cases, bad plans are the product of bad initial assumptions. Bad outcomes are sometimes the result of bad plans, but at least equally often an adequate plan poorly executed. It is also true the enemy gets a vote, and even a perfect plan can be upset by the enemy. What one does then is critical, and both in 1914 and 2022 Russia failed that test.

Touche.  When I said 1914 I was thinking of the Schlieffen Plan by Germany to invade France and completely neglected to think about the other front--which of course would logically have been the implied analogy given that it was Russia.  So of course you are correct if thinking of the east.



What I was trying to say is that in 1914 the Germans did reasonably well with the Schileffen Plan until Allied resistence coalesced, but even then Germany held onto most of its territorial gains.  Both in 1914 and in 2022 the attacker failed to deliver the knockout blow that they expected and hoped for.  In both 1914 and 2022 the war of movement rapidly dissipated into static lines.  However, in Ukraine 2022 the attacker got rolled back and defeated in several key battles for strategically important positions: Kiev, Kharkiv, Kherson.  I guess the battle of the Marne was somewhat analogous to the Ukrainian defeat of the forces advancing on Kiev in that it assured at least a stalemate for the foreseeable future.  But if I had to say whether Germany in 1914 accomplished more of its aims than Russia in 2022, I would say both flopped, but 1914 Germany was better off 2022 Russia.  And 1914 Germany did not exactly have great prospects--it took years, but there eventually was a coup and defeat and a revolution and a transition to democracy.  (Short lived though it was.)


I don't think any of us know how the current war will turn out, but I am inclined to think that Russia's failure to knock out Ukraine rapidly at the start of the war will wind up, sooner or later, leading to the same effect that Germany's failure to knock out France led to.  By this logic the outcome was determined early on, but it may take years for both sides to realize it.

[81alum]

I do wonder how military historians many years from now will analyze the first year of this war--no doubt it will depend on the outcome.  But so far it doesn't feel as if there is a single military mind giving the Russians a cohesive strategy; instead, t feels like a strategy driven by bureaucracy and standard operating procedures.  Hopefully that won't change, but so far it isn't up to 1914 standards even, with what may be even worse results.

I think you maybe should rethink your comparison. In 1914 Russia invaded East Prussia on17th August and made some progress. By 30 August  Russia had suffered 92,000 captured, 78,000 killed or wounded (out of 230,000) at Tannenberg. The Russian Second Army was completely encircled and destroyed. The Germans followed that up with the first battle of the Masurian Lakes where the Russians suffered another 70,000 killed and wounded, 30,000–45,000 prisoners (out of 554,000). The Russian First Army was only partially encircled, but it was wrecked. At that point Russia had been driven out of East Prussia.



Even if one accepts the current Ukrainian estimates of over 200,000 Russian casualties, the Russians indeed suffered more in 1914 (including prisoners), and that was in a month, not almost a year. Russia also holds quite a bit of captured territory in Ukraine, while in 1914 Russia was completely driven from East Prussia. I would say the Russian performance in 1914 was far worse. It is also interesting to note that in Ukraine the number of captured is not talked about much. While it isn't zero, it undoubtedly isn't nearly as large percentage-wise as in 1914. This indicates that the current Russian army at least has avoided strategic errors that force them to surrender largely intact forces. The Germans were also undoubtedly capable of superior maneuver warfare than the Ukrainians have demonstrated, which isn't "apples to apples".

 

For what it's worth, the Russian army was following a plan that was developed by a single individual (in as much as a single person can ever direct 800,000 men), Yakov Zhilinsky. The plan was not a good one, but it also shouldn't have been as much of a disaster as it was. The Russian communications were non-existent, and the ones they had actually were probably of more use to the Germans than the Russians. The Russian generals were totally unable to direct the battles and had no situational awareness. Their troops were also hopelessly untrained. There are some obvious similarities to the present case.



There is no known single formula of organization that ensures competent military planning. The trend has been away from single individuals and toward a "general staff" (or JCS) organization. It has been amply demonstrated that both types of organizations can produce shockingly bad plans (at least in retrospect). The perception is that the general staff tends to produce "safer" plans that may lack panache and also often aren't "optimal". These plans generally seem to not contain "gross" errors, while individuals often did make plans that did. In all cases the plans are greatly influenced by what the planners think they "know" about the opponent and what they "know" about their nation's war aims and the abilities of their own forces. It almost all cases, bad plans are the product of bad initial assumptions. Bad outcomes are sometimes the result of bad plans, but at least equally often an adequate plan poorly executed. It is also true the enemy gets a vote, and even a perfect plan can be upset by the enemy. What one does then is critical, and both in 1914 and 2022 Russia failed that test.

Touche.  When I said 1914 I was thinking of the Schlieffen Plan by Germany to invade France and completely neglected to think about the other front--which of course would logically have been the implied analogy given that it was Russia.  So of course you are correct if thinking of the east.



What I was trying to say is that in 1914 the Germans did reasonably well with the Schileffen Plan until Allied resistence coalesced, but even then Germany held onto most of its territorial gains.  Both in 1914 and in 2022 the attacker failed to deliver the knockout blow that they expected and hoped for.  In both 1914 and 2022 the war of movement rapidly dissipated into static lines.  However, in Ukraine 2022 the attacker got rolled back and defeated in several key battles for strategically important positions: Kiev, Kharkiv, Kherson.  I guess the battle of the Marne was somewhat analogous to the Ukrainian defeat of the forces advancing on Kiev in that it assured at least a stalemate for the foreseeable future.  But if I had to say whether Germany in 1914 accomplished more of its aims than Russia in 2022, I would say both flopped, but 1914 Germany was better off 2022 Russia.  And 1914 Germany did not exactly have great prospects--it took years, but there eventually was a coup and defeat and a revolution and a transition to democracy.  (Short lived though it was.)


I don't think any of us know how the current war will turn out, but I am inclined to think that Russia's failure to knock out Ukraine rapidly at the start of the war will wind up, sooner or later, leading to the same effect that Germany's failure to knock out France led to.  By this logic the outcome was determined early on, but it may take years for both sides to realize it.

[Goose]

From a historians perspective you can only analyze what happened almost 80 years ago in light of the knowledge you had then, but it is very hard to ignore the now.  We and the British did not break the Venona code until 1946 and we began to have a clearer understanding of how much of our secrets were then in Russian hands.

Totally agree here. It is also I think worth of note that the "long telegram" was not sent until Feb 22,  1946 and the Truman Doctrine was not promulgated until March 12, 1947. While it is undoubtedly true that there were some people who were concerned about Russia in August of 1945, they obviously had not yet attained any traction among the decision makers. The US was exclusively concerned about winning the war as quickly as possible and at the same time at the lowest US casualty count possible. Anything else was secondary. Those two goals work directly against each other in most cases. The nuclear option was one thing that addressed both, and for that reason was inevitable. Add to that the vested interest and military inertia of those involved and it seems hard to imagine any decision but using it. Even after the war was won and the Truman doctrine announced, the Truman administrations actions and defense policy clearly shows they did not actually appreciate the USSR's threat potential. Part of that was the "We have the bomb and they don't" thinking, but most of it was an underestimation of the USSR.

The naval blockade option was a very long shot in large measure because the Navy had been uniquely successful in accomplishing what Germany could not (against Britain) and what had never been done previously. No nation in history had ever been defeated by naval blockade alone. Everybody got invaded. The concept that Japan would be thus defeated seemed fanciful in that light. It could have been argued that waiting for Japan to be significantly weakened and then invading would have been a plausible choice. However, the US would have been required to maintain an absolutely enormous army sitting ready to go for months, which was considered impossible. The troops were getting tired of war, the nation was getting tired of war. Having lots of troops sitting doing nothing was considered unacceptable from a morale point of view and a political point of view. Ironically, getting more people killed was viewed as more acceptable than doing nothing.

It also must be noted that not invading would surrender the initiative. This is something that military forces never like to do. Keeping the pressure on allows you, at least in theory, to dictate events. Not doing so risks the enemy figuring out a way to dictate events, never a good thing. It is tempting to say that Japan was so weakened it couldn't do that, but doing so smacks of hubris. Nobody wanted to lose the war at the last minute by doing anything less than all we could. Arguably, the blockade would have worked, but nobody was willing to do the experiment.

The Russian actions on Sakhalin island actually would not have let to an invasion of even northern Japan because Russia did not have the shipping to do it. They had literally nothing in that area. They could bring troops to Japan in very limited numbers and very slowly. Even if these troops prevailed they absolutely could not have been supplied and would have run out of food and ammunition very quickly. It was a "no go". This was independent of any naval action by Japan.

[Goose]

From a historians perspective you can only analyze what happened almost 80 years ago in light of the knowledge you had then, but it is very hard to ignore the now.  We and the British did not break the Venona code until 1946 and we began to have a clearer understanding of how much of our secrets were then in Russian hands.

Totally agree here. It is also I think worth of note that the "long telegram" was not sent until Feb 22,  1946 and the Truman Doctrine was not promulgated until March 12, 1947. While it is undoubtedly true that there were some people who were concerned about Russia in August of 1945, they obviously had not yet attained any traction among the decision makers. The US was exclusively concerned about winning the war as quickly as possible and at the same time at the lowest US casualty count possible. Anything else was secondary. Those two goals work directly against each other in most cases. The nuclear option was one thing that addressed both, and for that reason was inevitable. Add to that the vested interest and military inertia of those involved and it seems hard to imagine any decision but using it. Even after the war was won and the Truman doctrine announced, the Truman administrations actions and defense policy clearly shows they did not actually appreciate the USSR's threat potential. Part of that was the "We have the bomb and they don't" thinking, but most of it was an underestimation of the USSR.

The naval blockade option was a very long shot in large measure because the Navy had been uniquely successful in accomplishing what Germany could not (against Britain) and what had never been done previously. No nation in history had ever been defeated by naval blockade alone. Everybody got invaded. The concept that Japan would be thus defeated seemed fanciful in that light. It could have been argued that waiting for Japan to be significantly weakened and then invading would have been a plausible choice. However, the US would have been required to maintain an absolutely enormous army sitting ready to go for months, which was considered impossible. The troops were getting tired of war, the nation was getting tired of war. Having lots of troops sitting doing nothing was considered unacceptable from a morale point of view and a political point of view. Ironically, getting more people killed was viewed as more acceptable than doing nothing.

It also must be noted that not invading would surrender the initiative. This is something that military forces never like to do. Keeping the pressure on allows you, at least in theory, to dictate events. Not doing so risks the enemy figuring out a way to dictate events, never a good thing. It is tempting to say that Japan was so weakened it couldn't do that, but doing so smacks of hubris. Nobody wanted to lose the war at the last minute by doing anything less than all we could. Arguably, the blockade would have worked, but nobody was willing to do the experiment.

The Russian actions on Sakhalin island actually would not have let to an invasion of even northern Japan because Russia did not have the shipping to do it. They had literally nothing in that area. They could bring troops to Japan in very limited numbers and very slowly. Even if these troops prevailed they absolutely could not have been supplied and would have run out of food and ammunition very quickly. It was a "no go". This was independent of any naval action by Japan.