[dabigv13]

Bakhmut still Ukrainian, and Ukraine has made some limited counter attacks successfully in the area. Seems the Russian offensive has run out of steam there.

Whether or not it was wise to hold Bakhmut is beyond probably anybody who doesn't have the actual casualty figures to know. Still very telling that Russia for ~ half a year has been focusing almost all their offensive power on this one tiny town and still they have not taken it.

[dabigv13]

Bakhmut still Ukrainian, and Ukraine has made some limited counter attacks successfully in the area. Seems the Russian offensive has run out of steam there.

Whether or not it was wise to hold Bakhmut is beyond probably anybody who doesn't have the actual casualty figures to know. Still very telling that Russia for ~ half a year has been focusing almost all their offensive power on this one tiny town and still they have not taken it.

[BostonCard]

Crazy that Russia seemed on the verge of taking over the town, and they are now at risk of failing.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-say..._permalink

Still a dynamic situation, and the article makes clear that this week will be key, but…

The U.K.’s Defense Ministry echoed that assessment on Saturday, saying that Russia’s assault on Bakhmut had largely stalled, primarily as a result of what it called “extreme attrition”—a reference to Russia’s heavy losses of men and equipment.

I know it’s largely symbolic either way, and even if Ukraine manages to hold the town, it will have come at a cost, but the successful defense of Bakhmut can really be a rallying cry for Ukraine.

BC

[BostonCard]

Crazy that Russia seemed on the verge of taking over the town, and they are now at risk of failing.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-say..._permalink

Still a dynamic situation, and the article makes clear that this week will be key, but…

The U.K.’s Defense Ministry echoed that assessment on Saturday, saying that Russia’s assault on Bakhmut had largely stalled, primarily as a result of what it called “extreme attrition”—a reference to Russia’s heavy losses of men and equipment.

I know it’s largely symbolic either way, and even if Ukraine manages to hold the town, it will have come at a cost, but the successful defense of Bakhmut can really be a rallying cry for Ukraine.

BC

[Goose]

I know it’s largely symbolic either way, and even if Ukraine manages to hold the town, it will have come at a cost, but the successful defense of Bakhmut can really be a rallying cry for Ukraine.


BC

It is indeed a victory to hold the town. An intriguing question is what reserves Russia retains behind the FEBA in that area. While I am not a fan of making Donbas the main focus of a Ukrainian offensive, could it be that once again Russia has created a hollow shell? The notes of caution in the Russian blogosphere may indicate they have not, but the fact Wagner was doing the fighting may mean there is not much behind them. Wagner generally doesn't do defense. That is left to "regular" troops. If Ukraine can start a limited offensive that hits air, we may have another Russian evacuation in the near future similar to Kupiansk. Even if there is another line of defense eventually formed, a 30 km advance by Ukraine would suck in any available troops, leaving vulnerabilities elsewhere. I am sure the Ukrainians are studying this with great interest.

[Goose]

I know it’s largely symbolic either way, and even if Ukraine manages to hold the town, it will have come at a cost, but the successful defense of Bakhmut can really be a rallying cry for Ukraine.


BC

It is indeed a victory to hold the town. An intriguing question is what reserves Russia retains behind the FEBA in that area. While I am not a fan of making Donbas the main focus of a Ukrainian offensive, could it be that once again Russia has created a hollow shell? The notes of caution in the Russian blogosphere may indicate they have not, but the fact Wagner was doing the fighting may mean there is not much behind them. Wagner generally doesn't do defense. That is left to "regular" troops. If Ukraine can start a limited offensive that hits air, we may have another Russian evacuation in the near future similar to Kupiansk. Even if there is another line of defense eventually formed, a 30 km advance by Ukraine would suck in any available troops, leaving vulnerabilities elsewhere. I am sure the Ukrainians are studying this with great interest.

[BostonCard]

That's a very intriguing point.  I guess we will see, but we should also get some sense pretty soon, as it seems likely that Ukraine will counterattack in Bakhmut to relieve the town and the troops in the center.  If they cause a rout on the Russian troops in the area, could they advance quickly to Horlivka, and potentially get to the city of Donetsk?

BC

[BostonCard]

That's a very intriguing point.  I guess we will see, but we should also get some sense pretty soon, as it seems likely that Ukraine will counterattack in Bakhmut to relieve the town and the troops in the center.  If they cause a rout on the Russian troops in the area, could they advance quickly to Horlivka, and potentially get to the city of Donetsk?

BC

[Goose]

That's a very intriguing point.  I guess we will see, but we should also get some sense pretty soon, as it seems likely that Ukraine will counterattack in Bakhmut to relieve the town and the troops in the center.  If they cause a rout on the Russian troops in the area, could they advance quickly to Horlivka, and potentially get to the city of Donetsk?

BC

I think it probable Ukraine will attack near but not at Bakhmut.  They probably don't want to hit the Russian spearhead on it's point, but rather on it's side. Even if the Russian troops fight well at the start of the Ukrainian counterattack, if there is nothing behind them it won't matter. Last year in the Kharkiv Oblast it wasn't really a "rout". There just weren't any Russians behind the front lines. Ukraine moved a great distance virtually unopposed. That was actually part of the problem. While Ukraine captured lots of land, they didn't actually kill or capture that many Russians. A rout is better, in that at a minimum you get lots of prisoners. Agree, we shall see. Even a limited success will fix the Russians in place, which helps actions elsewhere.

[Goose]

That's a very intriguing point.  I guess we will see, but we should also get some sense pretty soon, as it seems likely that Ukraine will counterattack in Bakhmut to relieve the town and the troops in the center.  If they cause a rout on the Russian troops in the area, could they advance quickly to Horlivka, and potentially get to the city of Donetsk?

BC

I think it probable Ukraine will attack near but not at Bakhmut.  They probably don't want to hit the Russian spearhead on it's point, but rather on it's side. Even if the Russian troops fight well at the start of the Ukrainian counterattack, if there is nothing behind them it won't matter. Last year in the Kharkiv Oblast it wasn't really a "rout". There just weren't any Russians behind the front lines. Ukraine moved a great distance virtually unopposed. That was actually part of the problem. While Ukraine captured lots of land, they didn't actually kill or capture that many Russians. A rout is better, in that at a minimum you get lots of prisoners. Agree, we shall see. Even a limited success will fix the Russians in place, which helps actions elsewhere.

[gocard14]

Read an interesting thread about the use of T55s basically saying that this is proof of the effectiveness of western sanctions. It is not that the Russians don’t have more T72s and 80s in storage. They have far more of them then the 250 or so T55s they have. It is that they are unable to get the needed “advanced” electronic and optical components to restore them, while much less is required to get a mothballed T55 up and running.

[gocard14]

Read an interesting thread about the use of T55s basically saying that this is proof of the effectiveness of western sanctions. It is not that the Russians don’t have more T72s and 80s in storage. They have far more of them then the 250 or so T55s they have. It is that they are unable to get the needed “advanced” electronic and optical components to restore them, while much less is required to get a mothballed T55 up and running.

[GK3]

Read an interesting thread about the use of T55s basically saying that this is proof of the effectiveness of western sanctions. It is not that the Russians don’t have more T72s and 80s in storage. They have far more of them then the 250 or so T55s they have. It is that they are unable to get the needed “advanced” electronic and optical components to restore them, while much less is required to get a mothballed T55 up and running.

Putin just made some rather outlandish statements concerning Russia's ability to produce tanks during the balance of 2023.  I wonder whether he actually thinks anyone believes what he says. It appears he will find it difficult to even replace the tanks he has lost and other reports reflect that the few new tanks reaching the front are missing parts like reactive armor. Doesn't mean Ukraine will win but they are drinking some strong Vodka in the Kremlin.
https://www.newsweek.com/russia-tank-los...ne-1790332
More here
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...ct-updates

[GK3]

Read an interesting thread about the use of T55s basically saying that this is proof of the effectiveness of western sanctions. It is not that the Russians don’t have more T72s and 80s in storage. They have far more of them then the 250 or so T55s they have. It is that they are unable to get the needed “advanced” electronic and optical components to restore them, while much less is required to get a mothballed T55 up and running.

Putin just made some rather outlandish statements concerning Russia's ability to produce tanks during the balance of 2023.  I wonder whether he actually thinks anyone believes what he says. It appears he will find it difficult to even replace the tanks he has lost and other reports reflect that the few new tanks reaching the front are missing parts like reactive armor. Doesn't mean Ukraine will win but they are drinking some strong Vodka in the Kremlin.
https://www.newsweek.com/russia-tank-los...ne-1790332
More here
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...ct-updates

[gocard14]

Reports that Ukraine conducting some limited offensives on the right bank of the Dnipro near Kherson to clear a 30km zone east of the river. This would put Kherson out of artillery range but also presumably allow for a controlled river crossing to stage units on the right bank. 

https://twitter.com/noelreports/status/1...CCZ3SP6dPw

[gocard14]

Reports that Ukraine conducting some limited offensives on the right bank of the Dnipro near Kherson to clear a 30km zone east of the river. This would put Kherson out of artillery range but also presumably allow for a controlled river crossing to stage units on the right bank. 

https://twitter.com/noelreports/status/1...CCZ3SP6dPw

[BostonCard]

Reports now that Russians and Ukrainians collaborators are making plans for evacuating Zaporizhia oblast

[tweet]https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status/1639995342539169792?s=61&t=uOULmTXhVLkcXRmnxXcClQ[/tweet]

Likely wishful thinking, but it is also possible that Russia doesn’t have much left to defend it with.

BC

[BostonCard]

Reports now that Russians and Ukrainians collaborators are making plans for evacuating Zaporizhia oblast

[tweet]https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status/1639995342539169792?s=61&t=uOULmTXhVLkcXRmnxXcClQ[/tweet]

Likely wishful thinking, but it is also possible that Russia doesn’t have much left to defend it with.

BC

[Goose]

Reports now that Russians and Ukrainians collaborators are making plans for evacuating Zaporizhia oblast

https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status...XRmnxXcClQ

Likely wishful thinking, but it is also possible that Russia doesn’t have much left to defend it with.

BC

It is always wise to have a plan even (or perhaps especially) for things you believe are very improbable. This type of planning would merely be prudent. By itself, it means nothing. There is a strong tendency on the part of "the West" to assume that Russian troops/authorities are basically stupid and don't make such plans. There is certainly some history to justify this conclusion. However, there are clearly many cases of the opposite, so attaching predictive significance to such a meeting is unwise.

Zaporizhia oblast has many defensive advantages and some important disadvantages for Russia. There is lots of marshy ground that restricts the plausible Ukrainian lines of approach. Large areas of the oblast are not important enough to defend and a basically tactical "dead ends". This reduces the number of troops needed to defend the oblast. Conversely, if the Ukrainians get behind the Russian defenders, the paths of organized retreat are limited. This means that having plans to retreat under adverse conditions are important.

The lines of supply to this area require that the land bridge to Russia proper remain intact. If Ukraine cuts this supply route, it would seriously degrade the defense of Zaporizhia oblast, probably even more than Crimea and Kherson oblast which would still have the bridge and the ferries. Zaporizhia would only get what had already passed through the above. There are ports on the Sea of Azov but that is a slower and much less desirable method than the current direct road/rail network. However, it isn't obvious how Ukraine could do this, as the closer to the Donbas they attempt it, the stronger Russia is. These facts may have lead to thinning out the troops in Zaporizhia to the point a direct assault could work. Russia clearly considers defense of Crimea to be more important than just about anything else. For quite some time they have had lots of troops there doing nothing much. We shall see what Ukraine comes up with. Any success virtually anywhere along the "land bridge" is going to make Russia even more nervous than they already are.

[Goose]

Reports now that Russians and Ukrainians collaborators are making plans for evacuating Zaporizhia oblast

https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status...XRmnxXcClQ

Likely wishful thinking, but it is also possible that Russia doesn’t have much left to defend it with.

BC

It is always wise to have a plan even (or perhaps especially) for things you believe are very improbable. This type of planning would merely be prudent. By itself, it means nothing. There is a strong tendency on the part of "the West" to assume that Russian troops/authorities are basically stupid and don't make such plans. There is certainly some history to justify this conclusion. However, there are clearly many cases of the opposite, so attaching predictive significance to such a meeting is unwise.

Zaporizhia oblast has many defensive advantages and some important disadvantages for Russia. There is lots of marshy ground that restricts the plausible Ukrainian lines of approach. Large areas of the oblast are not important enough to defend and a basically tactical "dead ends". This reduces the number of troops needed to defend the oblast. Conversely, if the Ukrainians get behind the Russian defenders, the paths of organized retreat are limited. This means that having plans to retreat under adverse conditions are important.

The lines of supply to this area require that the land bridge to Russia proper remain intact. If Ukraine cuts this supply route, it would seriously degrade the defense of Zaporizhia oblast, probably even more than Crimea and Kherson oblast which would still have the bridge and the ferries. Zaporizhia would only get what had already passed through the above. There are ports on the Sea of Azov but that is a slower and much less desirable method than the current direct road/rail network. However, it isn't obvious how Ukraine could do this, as the closer to the Donbas they attempt it, the stronger Russia is. These facts may have lead to thinning out the troops in Zaporizhia to the point a direct assault could work. Russia clearly considers defense of Crimea to be more important than just about anything else. For quite some time they have had lots of troops there doing nothing much. We shall see what Ukraine comes up with. Any success virtually anywhere along the "land bridge" is going to make Russia even more nervous than they already are.

[BostonCard]

There is a strong tendency on the part of "the West" to assume that Russian troops/authorities are basically stupid and don't make such plans. There is certainly some history to justify this conclusion. However, there are clearly many cases of the opposite, so attaching predictive significance to such a meeting is unwise.

That was kind of my read as well, but it is less improbable than it was, say, six months ago.

BC

[BostonCard]

There is a strong tendency on the part of "the West" to assume that Russian troops/authorities are basically stupid and don't make such plans. There is certainly some history to justify this conclusion. However, there are clearly many cases of the opposite, so attaching predictive significance to such a meeting is unwise.

That was kind of my read as well, but it is less improbable than it was, say, six months ago.

BC

[Goose]

There is a strong tendency on the part of "the West" to assume that Russian troops/authorities are basically stupid and don't make such plans. There is certainly some history to justify this conclusion. However, there are clearly many cases of the opposite, so attaching predictive significance to such a meeting is unwise.

That was kind of my read as well, but it is less improbable than it was, say, six months ago.

BC

True! Another difference is that at one time Russia kept significant reserves in Zaporizhia because it was a central location and these reserves could (at least in theory) easily be moved either to Kherson oblast or Donbas. It appears, as near as I can tell, that this is no longer the case and most of these reserves have been moved either to Crimea where they form a defensive reserve (and do nothing) or to Donbas, where they have mostly been committed (as opposed to remaining a reserve). That does seem to make Zaporizhia a better target than before.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/crimean-occup...00387.html
If it is really true Russia has 80,000 troops in Crimea while their offensive in Bakhmut is failing due to running out of troops, that indeed says they are paranoid. These troops are also not deployed forward, but rather are building defensive works everywhere. Granted, some of these troops are being rotated out of the front lines, but it is still a lot of combat capability located in what is supposedly a "secure" area.

[Goose]

There is a strong tendency on the part of "the West" to assume that Russian troops/authorities are basically stupid and don't make such plans. There is certainly some history to justify this conclusion. However, there are clearly many cases of the opposite, so attaching predictive significance to such a meeting is unwise.

That was kind of my read as well, but it is less improbable than it was, say, six months ago.

BC

True! Another difference is that at one time Russia kept significant reserves in Zaporizhia because it was a central location and these reserves could (at least in theory) easily be moved either to Kherson oblast or Donbas. It appears, as near as I can tell, that this is no longer the case and most of these reserves have been moved either to Crimea where they form a defensive reserve (and do nothing) or to Donbas, where they have mostly been committed (as opposed to remaining a reserve). That does seem to make Zaporizhia a better target than before.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/crimean-occup...00387.html
If it is really true Russia has 80,000 troops in Crimea while their offensive in Bakhmut is failing due to running out of troops, that indeed says they are paranoid. These troops are also not deployed forward, but rather are building defensive works everywhere. Granted, some of these troops are being rotated out of the front lines, but it is still a lot of combat capability located in what is supposedly a "secure" area.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-holds...43836.html

More info on the current state of play in the South. Obviously, like in all cases elsewhere, the soldier's perspective is what they see locally. The "big picture" is not fleshed out for them. I do indeed hope that the Ukrainian offensive begins without either the Russians or Ukrainians fighting on that front anticipating it based on local buildups. Surprise, in so far as possible, is a big force multiplier :-)

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-holds...43836.html

More info on the current state of play in the South. Obviously, like in all cases elsewhere, the soldier's perspective is what they see locally. The "big picture" is not fleshed out for them. I do indeed hope that the Ukrainian offensive begins without either the Russians or Ukrainians fighting on that front anticipating it based on local buildups. Surprise, in so far as possible, is a big force multiplier :-)

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ap/status/1640392765489004547?s=61&t=uOULmTXhVLkcXRmnxXcClQ[/tweet]

I think Turkey is the last country left to ratify.

Sweden will be a bit harder, but things should get easier after the elections in May.

BC

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ap/status/1640392765489004547?s=61&t=uOULmTXhVLkcXRmnxXcClQ[/tweet]

I think Turkey is the last country left to ratify.

Sweden will be a bit harder, but things should get easier after the elections in May.

BC

[M T]

Germany announced they have sent 18 Leopard 2 tanks after training of the crews. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65095126

[M T]

Germany announced they have sent 18 Leopard 2 tanks after training of the crews. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65095126

[cardcrimson]

Germany announced they have sent 18 Leopard 2 tanks after training of the crews. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65095126

I know very little of military equipment. However, in the 80s visited a sister KraussMaffei facility in Allach. Was amazing to watch the tanks (I assume the Leopard 2) fly around the test track. Those things could haul ass. . . .

[cardcrimson]

Germany announced they have sent 18 Leopard 2 tanks after training of the crews. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65095126

I know very little of military equipment. However, in the 80s visited a sister KraussMaffei facility in Allach. Was amazing to watch the tanks (I assume the Leopard 2) fly around the test track. Those things could haul ass. . . .

[BostonCard]

https://www.pcmag.com/news/ukraine-needs...ing-in-the

As the Financial Times(Opens in a new window) reports, ammunition manufacturer Nammo wants to expand its Raufoss plant in central Norway, 75 miles north of Oslo, but has been told there isn't enough electricity to support the expansion. There's actually plenty of surplus electricity, but it's been promised to TikTok, which is building three data centers nearby and potentially two more by 2025.

John McEnroe's quote comes to mind.

BC

[BostonCard]

https://www.pcmag.com/news/ukraine-needs...ing-in-the

As the Financial Times(Opens in a new window) reports, ammunition manufacturer Nammo wants to expand its Raufoss plant in central Norway, 75 miles north of Oslo, but has been told there isn't enough electricity to support the expansion. There's actually plenty of surplus electricity, but it's been promised to TikTok, which is building three data centers nearby and potentially two more by 2025.

John McEnroe's quote comes to mind.

BC

[fullmetal]

Nationalize that surplus electricity and have TikTok run with a fraction of their allotment, maybe even as their servers start to come online.  It's not like they're going to install three data centers' worth of servers overnight.

(And here we see a global security implication of TikTok!)

[fullmetal]

Nationalize that surplus electricity and have TikTok run with a fraction of their allotment, maybe even as their servers start to come online.  It's not like they're going to install three data centers' worth of servers overnight.

(And here we see a global security implication of TikTok!)

[TrumpCard]

The fog of war is real. Could these assessments of Bakhmut be more different?
NYT this morning:
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/30/world...ussia.html
ISW last night:
https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status...WU_MYtAAAA

[TrumpCard]

The fog of war is real. Could these assessments of Bakhmut be more different?
NYT this morning:
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/30/world...ussia.html
ISW last night:
https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status...WU_MYtAAAA

[Goose]

The fog of war is real. Could these assessments of Bakhmut be more different?
NYT this morning:
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/30/world...ussia.html
ISW last night:
https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status...WU_MYtAAAA

Bakhmut is a very "interesting" battle. All in all, Ukraine has pretty much gotten the best results they could possibly have wanted. The Ukraine has lots of poorly trained but highly motivated infantry that lacks mobility but not courage. Bakhmut is a place where they can use those troops to full advantage without engaging the more mobile, better trained troops they are (supposedly) building up for a "combined arms" assault. These troops have inflicted very heavy casualties on the Wagner troops used in the assault and has apparently destroyed it's military potential. The Russians are now using mostly "regular" troops in that area. Russia is deeply committed, both in "word and deed" to the fight in and near Bakhmut. They are fixed in position and cannot easily disengage. That is good for Ukraine.

There are two factors that are not good for Ukraine. Recently the casualty ratio has become less favorable to Ukraine and has forced them to commit much higher levels of artillery support than they desired/planned for. This has reduced their stock of shells and worn out gun barrels that they wanted to use in their counter-offensive later in the spring. The casualties have also forced Ukraine to commit some "class 1" formations that they probably intended to hold in strategic reserve to exploit gaps created by the Ukrainian offensive. This could limit their ability to exploit advances in the future and is obviously not good. These units are not part of the "combined arms" assault force, but are units that would be needed right behind them to destroy bypassed Russian units and break up attempts to reorganize a defense as the striking force rapidly advances. These units also have a history of finding gaps in the Russian defenses that can be exploited.

The second factor is that Ukraine has created the expectation that they can and will hold Bakhmut. That unfortunately fixes a lot of their forces there, just as it does the Russians. That would be fine if Bakhmut was of great importance in and of itself. However it isn't. Ukraine is now committed to defend a place they otherwise could just walk away from. It is true the terrain around Bakhmut is better than the terrain immediately behind it for defensive purposes, but not by that much. Ukraine can't change their story now. Giving up Bakhmut, while not inherently disastrous, now is politically disastrous. Ukraine is boxed in. and that is never a good thing.

[Goose]

The fog of war is real. Could these assessments of Bakhmut be more different?
NYT this morning:
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/30/world...ussia.html
ISW last night:
https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status...WU_MYtAAAA

Bakhmut is a very "interesting" battle. All in all, Ukraine has pretty much gotten the best results they could possibly have wanted. The Ukraine has lots of poorly trained but highly motivated infantry that lacks mobility but not courage. Bakhmut is a place where they can use those troops to full advantage without engaging the more mobile, better trained troops they are (supposedly) building up for a "combined arms" assault. These troops have inflicted very heavy casualties on the Wagner troops used in the assault and has apparently destroyed it's military potential. The Russians are now using mostly "regular" troops in that area. Russia is deeply committed, both in "word and deed" to the fight in and near Bakhmut. They are fixed in position and cannot easily disengage. That is good for Ukraine.

There are two factors that are not good for Ukraine. Recently the casualty ratio has become less favorable to Ukraine and has forced them to commit much higher levels of artillery support than they desired/planned for. This has reduced their stock of shells and worn out gun barrels that they wanted to use in their counter-offensive later in the spring. The casualties have also forced Ukraine to commit some "class 1" formations that they probably intended to hold in strategic reserve to exploit gaps created by the Ukrainian offensive. This could limit their ability to exploit advances in the future and is obviously not good. These units are not part of the "combined arms" assault force, but are units that would be needed right behind them to destroy bypassed Russian units and break up attempts to reorganize a defense as the striking force rapidly advances. These units also have a history of finding gaps in the Russian defenses that can be exploited.

The second factor is that Ukraine has created the expectation that they can and will hold Bakhmut. That unfortunately fixes a lot of their forces there, just as it does the Russians. That would be fine if Bakhmut was of great importance in and of itself. However it isn't. Ukraine is now committed to defend a place they otherwise could just walk away from. It is true the terrain around Bakhmut is better than the terrain immediately behind it for defensive purposes, but not by that much. Ukraine can't change their story now. Giving up Bakhmut, while not inherently disastrous, now is politically disastrous. Ukraine is boxed in. and that is never a good thing.