[TrumpCard]

The fog of war is real. Could these assessments of Bakhmut be more different?
NYT this morning:
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/30/world...ussia.html
ISW last night:
https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status...WU_MYtAAAA

Bakhmut is a very "interesting" battle. All in all, Ukraine has pretty much gotten the best results they could possibly have wanted. The Ukraine has lots of poorly trained but highly motivated infantry that lacks mobility but not courage. Bakhmut is a place where they can use those troops to full advantage without engaging the more mobile, better trained troops they are (supposedly) building up for a "combined arms" assault. These troops have inflicted very heavy casualties on the Wagner troops used in the assault and has apparently destroyed it's military potential. The Russians are now using mostly "regular" troops in that area. Russia is deeply committed, both in "word and deed" to the fight in and near Bakhmut. They are fixed in position and cannot easily disengage. That is good for Ukraine.

There are two factors that are not good for Ukraine. Recently the casualty ratio has become less favorable to Ukraine and has forced them to commit much higher levels of artillery support than they desired/planned for. This has reduced their stock of shells and worn out gun barrels that they wanted to use in their counter-offensive later in the spring. The casualties have also forced Ukraine to commit some "class 1" formations that they probably intended to hold in strategic reserve to exploit gaps created by the Ukrainian offensive. This could limit their ability to exploit advances in the future and is obviously not good. These units are not part of the "combined arms" assault force, but are units that would be needed right behind them to destroy bypassed Russian units and break up attempts to reorganize a defense as the striking force rapidly advances. These units also have a history of finding gaps in the Russian defenses that can be exploited.

The second factor is that Ukraine has created the expectation that they can and will hold Bakhmut. That unfortunately fixes a lot of their forces there, just as it does the Russians. That would be fine if Bakhmut was of great importance in and of itself. However it isn't. Ukraine is now committed to defend a place they otherwise could just walk away from. It is true the terrain around Bakhmut is better than the terrain immediately behind it for defensive purposes, but not by that much. Ukraine can't change their story now. Giving up Bakhmut, while not inherently disastrous, now is politically disastrous. Ukraine is boxed in. and that is never a good thing.

All this makes sense, but it seems like the reporting is not even consistent on whether Ukraine will be able to keep Bakhmut.  NYT is saying that Russia's forces are exhausted and won't be able to take Bakhmut.  ISW is saying that Russia has taken 5% of the city in the last week, is consolidating those gains, and is positioned to take more in the near future.

[TrumpCard]

The fog of war is real. Could these assessments of Bakhmut be more different?
NYT this morning:
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/30/world...ussia.html
ISW last night:
https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status...WU_MYtAAAA

Bakhmut is a very "interesting" battle. All in all, Ukraine has pretty much gotten the best results they could possibly have wanted. The Ukraine has lots of poorly trained but highly motivated infantry that lacks mobility but not courage. Bakhmut is a place where they can use those troops to full advantage without engaging the more mobile, better trained troops they are (supposedly) building up for a "combined arms" assault. These troops have inflicted very heavy casualties on the Wagner troops used in the assault and has apparently destroyed it's military potential. The Russians are now using mostly "regular" troops in that area. Russia is deeply committed, both in "word and deed" to the fight in and near Bakhmut. They are fixed in position and cannot easily disengage. That is good for Ukraine.

There are two factors that are not good for Ukraine. Recently the casualty ratio has become less favorable to Ukraine and has forced them to commit much higher levels of artillery support than they desired/planned for. This has reduced their stock of shells and worn out gun barrels that they wanted to use in their counter-offensive later in the spring. The casualties have also forced Ukraine to commit some "class 1" formations that they probably intended to hold in strategic reserve to exploit gaps created by the Ukrainian offensive. This could limit their ability to exploit advances in the future and is obviously not good. These units are not part of the "combined arms" assault force, but are units that would be needed right behind them to destroy bypassed Russian units and break up attempts to reorganize a defense as the striking force rapidly advances. These units also have a history of finding gaps in the Russian defenses that can be exploited.

The second factor is that Ukraine has created the expectation that they can and will hold Bakhmut. That unfortunately fixes a lot of their forces there, just as it does the Russians. That would be fine if Bakhmut was of great importance in and of itself. However it isn't. Ukraine is now committed to defend a place they otherwise could just walk away from. It is true the terrain around Bakhmut is better than the terrain immediately behind it for defensive purposes, but not by that much. Ukraine can't change their story now. Giving up Bakhmut, while not inherently disastrous, now is politically disastrous. Ukraine is boxed in. and that is never a good thing.

All this makes sense, but it seems like the reporting is not even consistent on whether Ukraine will be able to keep Bakhmut.  NYT is saying that Russia's forces are exhausted and won't be able to take Bakhmut.  ISW is saying that Russia has taken 5% of the city in the last week, is consolidating those gains, and is positioned to take more in the near future.

[Goose]

All this makes sense, but it seems like the reporting is not even consistent on whether Ukraine will be able to keep Bakhmut.  NYT is saying that Russia's forces are exhausted and won't be able to take Bakhmut.  ISW is saying that Russia has taken 5% of the city in the last week, is consolidating those gains, and is positioned to take more in the near future.

Nobody really knows, because it depends on decisions that have not yet been made. Wagner is exhausted and cannot source "human wave" attacks into Bakhmut anymore. That part is pretty definite. Russia has committed "regular" infantry that is using the same tactics used in Donbas previously. Use massive artillery barrages to destroy completely a part of the city, and then advance troops into the resulting wasteland. Russia has shown this can work when they have an adequate artillery advantage. That is why (in large part at least) Ukraine is being forced to commit more of their artillery to the battle, which they really don't want to do. The questions are 1) does Russia have enough artillery/shells to do the job, 2) can Ukraine degrade the Russian artillery so much they can't do the job in any case, 3) how much artillery can Ukraine actually commit without "messing up" their own offensive plans, 4) will a Ukrainian offensive make continued attack into Bakhmut impossible?

Ukraine has spent a lot of their recent offensive force pushing back the Russians from their supply line into Bakhmut. This was undoubtedly their priority when they increased the troop commitment there. Russia is going real slow now, probably due to the fact they can only muster so much artillery. It might take months, but Ukraine has to counter this eventually or they will be forced out of Bakhmut. How Ukraine intends to do this is TBD, and that is the crux of the issue. It may be they will move from attacking on the flanks to attacking in the center with the troops they have. Short term, that is my guess, but it is exactly that. Long term, nobody knows, and Ukraine will keep it that way as long as possible. Lets just hope Ukraine has a plan and that it works. If they do not, it will be a problem :-).

[Goose]

All this makes sense, but it seems like the reporting is not even consistent on whether Ukraine will be able to keep Bakhmut.  NYT is saying that Russia's forces are exhausted and won't be able to take Bakhmut.  ISW is saying that Russia has taken 5% of the city in the last week, is consolidating those gains, and is positioned to take more in the near future.

Nobody really knows, because it depends on decisions that have not yet been made. Wagner is exhausted and cannot source "human wave" attacks into Bakhmut anymore. That part is pretty definite. Russia has committed "regular" infantry that is using the same tactics used in Donbas previously. Use massive artillery barrages to destroy completely a part of the city, and then advance troops into the resulting wasteland. Russia has shown this can work when they have an adequate artillery advantage. That is why (in large part at least) Ukraine is being forced to commit more of their artillery to the battle, which they really don't want to do. The questions are 1) does Russia have enough artillery/shells to do the job, 2) can Ukraine degrade the Russian artillery so much they can't do the job in any case, 3) how much artillery can Ukraine actually commit without "messing up" their own offensive plans, 4) will a Ukrainian offensive make continued attack into Bakhmut impossible?

Ukraine has spent a lot of their recent offensive force pushing back the Russians from their supply line into Bakhmut. This was undoubtedly their priority when they increased the troop commitment there. Russia is going real slow now, probably due to the fact they can only muster so much artillery. It might take months, but Ukraine has to counter this eventually or they will be forced out of Bakhmut. How Ukraine intends to do this is TBD, and that is the crux of the issue. It may be they will move from attacking on the flanks to attacking in the center with the troops they have. Short term, that is my guess, but it is exactly that. Long term, nobody knows, and Ukraine will keep it that way as long as possible. Lets just hope Ukraine has a plan and that it works. If they do not, it will be a problem :-).

[82 Card]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ap/status/1640392765489004547?s=61&t=uOULmTXhVLkcXRmnxXcClQ[/tweet]



I think Turkey is the last country left to ratify.



Sweden will be a bit harder, but things should get easier after the elections in May.



BC

NYT just posted:

Finland Clears Last Hurdle to Join NATO, Reshaping Balance of Power



Turkey’s Parliament approved Finland’s bid to join NATO, greatly enlarging the alliance’s border with Russia in a strategic defeat for Moscow.

It's also on Reuters at: Turkish parliament ratifies Finland's NATO accession as Sweden kept waiting

To mark the occasion
The Finish National Anthem.

[82 Card]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ap/status/1640392765489004547?s=61&t=uOULmTXhVLkcXRmnxXcClQ[/tweet]



I think Turkey is the last country left to ratify.



Sweden will be a bit harder, but things should get easier after the elections in May.



BC

NYT just posted:

Finland Clears Last Hurdle to Join NATO, Reshaping Balance of Power



Turkey’s Parliament approved Finland’s bid to join NATO, greatly enlarging the alliance’s border with Russia in a strategic defeat for Moscow.

It's also on Reuters at: Turkish parliament ratifies Finland's NATO accession as Sweden kept waiting

To mark the occasion
The Finish National Anthem.

[gocard14]

Big takeaway from this era of drone warfare: Close your hatch!

Can’t say how many drone videos I’ve seen dropping an explosive in an open Russian tank/bmp hatch.

[gocard14]

Big takeaway from this era of drone warfare: Close your hatch!

Can’t say how many drone videos I’ve seen dropping an explosive in an open Russian tank/bmp hatch.

[dabigv13]

Those are usually abandoned vehicles that would be too difficult to recover, I believe.

[dabigv13]

Those are usually abandoned vehicles that would be too difficult to recover, I believe.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/long-range-us...18138.html

I cannot find any "program of record" where the US purchased any GLSDBs. I have seen articles saying that such a program COULD be put in place, but no record of it being done. The existing HIMARS are not certified to launch them, even if they existed. So why do we keep seeing references to them as being already delivered in Ukraine? Why does Russia claim they have "already shot one down"? IMO it is all BS, and Ukraine is quite a ways off (in time) from getting these weapons. Has anybody got references to the US buying these weapons, or better still of them being delivered? It would indeed be great if true, I just have no reason to believe it is.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/long-range-us...18138.html

I cannot find any "program of record" where the US purchased any GLSDBs. I have seen articles saying that such a program COULD be put in place, but no record of it being done. The existing HIMARS are not certified to launch them, even if they existed. So why do we keep seeing references to them as being already delivered in Ukraine? Why does Russia claim they have "already shot one down"? IMO it is all BS, and Ukraine is quite a ways off (in time) from getting these weapons. Has anybody got references to the US buying these weapons, or better still of them being delivered? It would indeed be great if true, I just have no reason to believe it is.

[gocard14]

Ukraine reportedly getting 100 Rosomak APCs (Or wheeled IFV) from Poland. Notable (in addition to being modern vehicles) for being amphibious, which could aid operations to secure river crossings.

[gocard14]

Ukraine reportedly getting 100 Rosomak APCs (Or wheeled IFV) from Poland. Notable (in addition to being modern vehicles) for being amphibious, which could aid operations to secure river crossings.

[Treefence]

Ukraine reportedly getting 100 Rosomak APCs (Or wheeled IFV) from Poland. Notable (in addition to being modern vehicles) for being amphibious, which could aid operations to secure river crossings.

I believe these are being purchased, and likely will have to be manufactured first, so these might take a while to get to Ukraine.

[Treefence]

Ukraine reportedly getting 100 Rosomak APCs (Or wheeled IFV) from Poland. Notable (in addition to being modern vehicles) for being amphibious, which could aid operations to secure river crossings.

I believe these are being purchased, and likely will have to be manufactured first, so these might take a while to get to Ukraine.

[M T]

Ukraine reportedly getting 100 Rosomak APCs (Or wheeled IFV) from Poland. Notable (in addition to being modern vehicles) for being amphibious, which could aid operations to secure river crossings.

I believe these are being purchased, and likely will have to be manufactured first, so these might take a while to get to Ukraine.

It isn't clear whether this is what will happen, but this article considers the possibility of transfer of current equipment

In fact, it doesn't even matter that much, what type of vehicle Ukraine will receive – as long as the supply comes directly from the stocks of the Polish Armed Forces, and the Ukrainian funds are used to buy replenishment. This scheme would speed up the transfer. Although it is unclear whether Poland would agree to that because the country has already significantly exhausted its armor arsenal by sending tanks and IFVs to Ukraine.

Elsewhere I saw that the plant has produced 900 vehicles since 2008.  That would mean years to get 100 new ones.

Interesting way to beef up the military budget:  Get funds committed to Ukraine which then pays for new equipment (manufactured in Poland) to replace equipment sent to the Ukraine.  The Polish military gets a benefit; the Polish economy gets a benefit;  Finland's economy gets a benefit (the vehicles are licensed from Finland, if I read correctly); Ukraine gets a benefit;  Russia gets drained a bit more.

[M T]

Ukraine reportedly getting 100 Rosomak APCs (Or wheeled IFV) from Poland. Notable (in addition to being modern vehicles) for being amphibious, which could aid operations to secure river crossings.

I believe these are being purchased, and likely will have to be manufactured first, so these might take a while to get to Ukraine.

It isn't clear whether this is what will happen, but this article considers the possibility of transfer of current equipment

In fact, it doesn't even matter that much, what type of vehicle Ukraine will receive – as long as the supply comes directly from the stocks of the Polish Armed Forces, and the Ukrainian funds are used to buy replenishment. This scheme would speed up the transfer. Although it is unclear whether Poland would agree to that because the country has already significantly exhausted its armor arsenal by sending tanks and IFVs to Ukraine.

Elsewhere I saw that the plant has produced 900 vehicles since 2008.  That would mean years to get 100 new ones.

Interesting way to beef up the military budget:  Get funds committed to Ukraine which then pays for new equipment (manufactured in Poland) to replace equipment sent to the Ukraine.  The Polish military gets a benefit; the Polish economy gets a benefit;  Finland's economy gets a benefit (the vehicles are licensed from Finland, if I read correctly); Ukraine gets a benefit;  Russia gets drained a bit more.

[gocard14]

Ukraine reportedly getting 100 Rosomak APCs (Or wheeled IFV) from Poland. Notable (in addition to being modern vehicles) for being amphibious, which could aid operations to secure river crossings.

I believe these are being purchased, and likely will have to be manufactured first, so these might take a while to get to Ukraine.

It isn't clear whether this is what will happen, but this article considers the possibility of transfer of current equipment

In fact, it doesn't even matter that much, what type of vehicle Ukraine will receive – as long as the supply comes directly from the stocks of the Polish Armed Forces, and the Ukrainian funds are used to buy replenishment. This scheme would speed up the transfer. Although it is unclear whether Poland would agree to that because the country has already significantly exhausted its armor arsenal by sending tanks and IFVs to Ukraine.

Elsewhere I saw that the plant has produced 900 vehicles since 2008.  That would mean years to get 100 new ones.

Interesting way to beef up the military budget:  Get funds committed to Ukraine which then pays for new equipment (manufactured in Poland) to replace equipment sent to the Ukraine.  The Polish military gets a benefit; the Polish economy gets a benefit;  Finland's economy gets a benefit (the vehicles are licensed from Finland, if I read correctly); Ukraine gets a benefit;  Russia gets drained a bit more.

It is also a bit of war game theory going on for Poland. 

Giving Ukraine even more of their current capability (they have already been one of if not the biggest donator relative to country size) could weaken their current  military in the short term. 

On the other hand, it provides a lot of benefits: 
1. It is more likely to keep the russian army away from Poland's border, so ironically weakening their military may make it less likely the military is needed. 
2. It could strengthen/modernize their military in the long term, by using western funds to buy new systems to replace those sent to Ukraine
3. Poland has the benefit of NATO deterrence which Ukraine does not, so even if the polish military is weakened they are much more threatening to attack. 
4. As part of 3, if the goal is maximum degredation of Russian military capacity, getting as much NATO equipment into the fight without directly involving NATO is the best bet

[gocard14]

Ukraine reportedly getting 100 Rosomak APCs (Or wheeled IFV) from Poland. Notable (in addition to being modern vehicles) for being amphibious, which could aid operations to secure river crossings.

I believe these are being purchased, and likely will have to be manufactured first, so these might take a while to get to Ukraine.

It isn't clear whether this is what will happen, but this article considers the possibility of transfer of current equipment

In fact, it doesn't even matter that much, what type of vehicle Ukraine will receive – as long as the supply comes directly from the stocks of the Polish Armed Forces, and the Ukrainian funds are used to buy replenishment. This scheme would speed up the transfer. Although it is unclear whether Poland would agree to that because the country has already significantly exhausted its armor arsenal by sending tanks and IFVs to Ukraine.

Elsewhere I saw that the plant has produced 900 vehicles since 2008.  That would mean years to get 100 new ones.

Interesting way to beef up the military budget:  Get funds committed to Ukraine which then pays for new equipment (manufactured in Poland) to replace equipment sent to the Ukraine.  The Polish military gets a benefit; the Polish economy gets a benefit;  Finland's economy gets a benefit (the vehicles are licensed from Finland, if I read correctly); Ukraine gets a benefit;  Russia gets drained a bit more.

It is also a bit of war game theory going on for Poland. 

Giving Ukraine even more of their current capability (they have already been one of if not the biggest donator relative to country size) could weaken their current  military in the short term. 

On the other hand, it provides a lot of benefits: 
1. It is more likely to keep the russian army away from Poland's border, so ironically weakening their military may make it less likely the military is needed. 
2. It could strengthen/modernize their military in the long term, by using western funds to buy new systems to replace those sent to Ukraine
3. Poland has the benefit of NATO deterrence which Ukraine does not, so even if the polish military is weakened they are much more threatening to attack. 
4. As part of 3, if the goal is maximum degredation of Russian military capacity, getting as much NATO equipment into the fight without directly involving NATO is the best bet

[TrumpCard]

No brainer. Russia ain’t attacking Poland in the foreseeable future. Poland will be okay in the short term unless Germany attacks from the other flank... ;-)

[TrumpCard]

No brainer. Russia ain’t attacking Poland in the foreseeable future. Poland will be okay in the short term unless Germany attacks from the other flank... ;-)

[Goose]

No brainer. Russia ain’t attacking Poland in the foreseeable future. Poland will be okay in the short term unless Germany attacks from the other flank... ;-)

If that happens, I would take Poland and give the points :-).

[Goose]

No brainer. Russia ain’t attacking Poland in the foreseeable future. Poland will be okay in the short term unless Germany attacks from the other flank... ;-)

If that happens, I would take Poland and give the points :-).

[Mick]

No brainer. Russia ain’t attacking Poland in the foreseeable future. Poland will be okay in the short term unless Germany attacks from the other flank... ;-)

If that happens, I would take Poland and give the points :-).

We'll see if Germany wins the coin toss on September 1...

[Mick]

No brainer. Russia ain’t attacking Poland in the foreseeable future. Poland will be okay in the short term unless Germany attacks from the other flank... ;-)

If that happens, I would take Poland and give the points :-).

We'll see if Germany wins the coin toss on September 1...

[Mick]

Putin stacking up the body count of high-level advisors, now at 40 since the invasion of Ukraine commenced:

Russian energy giant boss found dead in Siberian cell in 40th mystery death of oligarchs and Putin officials 

[Mick]

Putin stacking up the body count of high-level advisors, now at 40 since the invasion of Ukraine commenced:

Russian energy giant boss found dead in Siberian cell in 40th mystery death of oligarchs and Putin officials 

[fullmetal]

Made those deals with the devil...devil always gets his due.

[fullmetal]

Made those deals with the devil...devil always gets his due.

[Goose]

https://us.yahoo.com/news/western-countr...00627.html

Lots of this article is restating "the obvious" but unfortunately I don't think most of "the West" gets it. Ukraine has certainly at least started to realize the issues and is understandably concerned about the near future. The fact is the Ukraine has scads of motivated and professional infantry with limited or no mobility. The 20,000 troops they will be committing to their next offensive is better equipped to move troops, but is still inadequately equipped to move it's entire compliment rapidly. This isn't good, and can lead to an offensive that starts well and subsequently stalls. Such an outcome will have big morale consequences, both in Ukraine and in "the West". It also makes commanders risk averse because they cannot quickly reinforce success. Why risk defeat if the best possible outcome is only a small gain? Combined arms doesn't work if you supporting infantry is 20 km behind your spearhead and walking.

[Goose]

https://us.yahoo.com/news/western-countr...00627.html

Lots of this article is restating "the obvious" but unfortunately I don't think most of "the West" gets it. Ukraine has certainly at least started to realize the issues and is understandably concerned about the near future. The fact is the Ukraine has scads of motivated and professional infantry with limited or no mobility. The 20,000 troops they will be committing to their next offensive is better equipped to move troops, but is still inadequately equipped to move it's entire compliment rapidly. This isn't good, and can lead to an offensive that starts well and subsequently stalls. Such an outcome will have big morale consequences, both in Ukraine and in "the West". It also makes commanders risk averse because they cannot quickly reinforce success. Why risk defeat if the best possible outcome is only a small gain? Combined arms doesn't work if you supporting infantry is 20 km behind your spearhead and walking.

[GK3]

Made those deals with the devil...devil always gets his due.

Being in the Gas Business seems particularly dangerous.

[GK3]

Made those deals with the devil...devil always gets his due.

Being in the Gas Business seems particularly dangerous.

[GK3]

Made those deals with the devil...devil always gets his due.

Being in the Gas Business seems particularly dangerous.

The Russian People are to me, an enigma.  How can a country which has produced so many unique and gifted intellects, stumble from one oppressor to another? The Czars were replaced by Lenin and Stalin and now they have been replaced by Putin. There is a lot of interesting material here, if you have access. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2501050
There is also food for thought here: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/860241

[GK3]

Made those deals with the devil...devil always gets his due.

Being in the Gas Business seems particularly dangerous.

The Russian People are to me, an enigma.  How can a country which has produced so many unique and gifted intellects, stumble from one oppressor to another? The Czars were replaced by Lenin and Stalin and now they have been replaced by Putin. There is a lot of interesting material here, if you have access. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2501050
There is also food for thought here: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/860241

[dabigv13]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/AricToler/status/1644409001088622616?s=20[/tweet]

You may have read some reporting on a leak of US/NATO/Ukraine documents recently. Read through Aric Toler of Bellingcat's thread looking into this above. Seems the documents were first posted on some video game chat program. There are no "war plans" per se related to the upcoming offensive, but there are some slides about for instance Ukrainian SAMs, their expenditure rate and expected date they may run out. The veracity is unclear. Someone a month after the initial disclosure edited the casualty figures to make them look worse for Ukraine and better for Russia, which was referenced in some reporting about this, but doesn't seem to be a hack from Russia as the documents were initially leaked just a couple days after their inception and that edit was only very recent.

If the Ukrainian air defense slides are legitimate, anticipation is Ukraine will be out of their primary air defense missiles within the next month or so (S300/SA-10 Buk/SA-11).

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/War_cube_/status/1644391395841409045?s=20[/tweet]

Here's an NYT article

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/04/07/...=url-share

[dabigv13]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/AricToler/status/1644409001088622616?s=20[/tweet]

You may have read some reporting on a leak of US/NATO/Ukraine documents recently. Read through Aric Toler of Bellingcat's thread looking into this above. Seems the documents were first posted on some video game chat program. There are no "war plans" per se related to the upcoming offensive, but there are some slides about for instance Ukrainian SAMs, their expenditure rate and expected date they may run out. The veracity is unclear. Someone a month after the initial disclosure edited the casualty figures to make them look worse for Ukraine and better for Russia, which was referenced in some reporting about this, but doesn't seem to be a hack from Russia as the documents were initially leaked just a couple days after their inception and that edit was only very recent.

If the Ukrainian air defense slides are legitimate, anticipation is Ukraine will be out of their primary air defense missiles within the next month or so (S300/SA-10 Buk/SA-11).

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/War_cube_/status/1644391395841409045?s=20[/tweet]

Here's an NYT article

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/04/07/...=url-share

[Goose]

Does anybody have any information on the HAWK batteries that the US and several NATO nations were supposedly sending to Ukraine? Dit it happen, and if so are they useful? The "running out of AA missiles" issue is real, and the HAWKs were supposed to help fill the gap. I have basically seen nothing on this. The HAWKs were supposed to reduce the need for BUKs and to some extent S-300s.

[Goose]

Does anybody have any information on the HAWK batteries that the US and several NATO nations were supposedly sending to Ukraine? Dit it happen, and if so are they useful? The "running out of AA missiles" issue is real, and the HAWKs were supposed to help fill the gap. I have basically seen nothing on this. The HAWKs were supposed to reduce the need for BUKs and to some extent S-300s.