[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/sobering-anal...22771.html

I believe this article is probably pretty accurate in it's descriptions of the limitations the Ukraine demonstrates. Granted, confirmation bias is in play :-). Combined arms operations on a medium to large scale can't be "taught" in a 45 day course. It takes lots and lots of practice. As the article points out, even our NATO allies probably could not execute one at the levels required in Ukraine. Stuff happens, things show up late or not at all, some recon is omitted, etc.

The article is complimentary of the troops, NCOs, and company grade officers. This strength is cited as a major advantage Ukraine has over the Russians. The field grade operations get much lower marks. Coordination of various units is lacking in many cases. The article is neither pessimistic nor optimistic. It says there is lots of hard fighting ahead against an enemy that is adapting.

---

The "slows" of our military is not a surprise at least from my viewpoint.  I never saw the concept of a Professional Army, large enough to defend us and our allies as anything but a fools errand.  Simply too expensive.  Times are vastly different, but my first paycheck as a 2nd Lt was tiny by todays standards, but I managed to pay my car insurance, put gas in the car at insanely cheap prices and buy myself a few beers at the O'Club. By the time I made Captain, the pay was a bit better, but working conditions, which included combat, were pretty poor, but they did pay an extra $65 a month for getting shot at.
My point being that if you want a standing military today, capable of defending the Country and our Allies, you are going to have to come up with a better system than what we have today.

A political rant, but the facts are what they are.

The all volunteer aspect of our current military is indeed expensive, and certainly does not at present provide a standing army large enough to do what we are expecting of it in the event of a conflict with China. Addressing this problem is indeed important. However, I fail to understand why the all volunteer aspect would produce "the slows". If anything, a small "professional" force would be expected to react quicker to events because all involved are "career" soldiers and are dedicated to their professional competence :-). 

IMO the problem is that the leadership of our military has declined over the last 20 years or so due to the low priority the military has been given in our government and our society. The politicians wanted "yes men" and they got them. This is unfortunately a recurring theme in US history, and probably in world history for that matter. When society believes "serious" conflict is unlikely, it allows it's military to run down. Often, the serious conflict emerges much faster than the military can be upgraded to meet the need. That gets lots of people killed and prolongs wars (if you are lucky and don't lose on day 1). It also means that you will have to burn through lots of "peacetime generals" before you find ones that can lead and fight.

Your last paragraph tells the tale.  I agree 100 percent.  No matter how you man the army, draft or volunteers, peacetime tends to promote those who do what the people at the top want.  The people at the top tend not to heed the advice of the military, or the military feeds information based what what they know the top wants to hear, which has nothing to do with reality at times.

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/sobering-anal...22771.html

I believe this article is probably pretty accurate in it's descriptions of the limitations the Ukraine demonstrates. Granted, confirmation bias is in play :-). Combined arms operations on a medium to large scale can't be "taught" in a 45 day course. It takes lots and lots of practice. As the article points out, even our NATO allies probably could not execute one at the levels required in Ukraine. Stuff happens, things show up late or not at all, some recon is omitted, etc.

The article is complimentary of the troops, NCOs, and company grade officers. This strength is cited as a major advantage Ukraine has over the Russians. The field grade operations get much lower marks. Coordination of various units is lacking in many cases. The article is neither pessimistic nor optimistic. It says there is lots of hard fighting ahead against an enemy that is adapting.

---

The "slows" of our military is not a surprise at least from my viewpoint.  I never saw the concept of a Professional Army, large enough to defend us and our allies as anything but a fools errand.  Simply too expensive.  Times are vastly different, but my first paycheck as a 2nd Lt was tiny by todays standards, but I managed to pay my car insurance, put gas in the car at insanely cheap prices and buy myself a few beers at the O'Club. By the time I made Captain, the pay was a bit better, but working conditions, which included combat, were pretty poor, but they did pay an extra $65 a month for getting shot at.
My point being that if you want a standing military today, capable of defending the Country and our Allies, you are going to have to come up with a better system than what we have today.

A political rant, but the facts are what they are.

The all volunteer aspect of our current military is indeed expensive, and certainly does not at present provide a standing army large enough to do what we are expecting of it in the event of a conflict with China. Addressing this problem is indeed important. However, I fail to understand why the all volunteer aspect would produce "the slows". If anything, a small "professional" force would be expected to react quicker to events because all involved are "career" soldiers and are dedicated to their professional competence :-). 

IMO the problem is that the leadership of our military has declined over the last 20 years or so due to the low priority the military has been given in our government and our society. The politicians wanted "yes men" and they got them. This is unfortunately a recurring theme in US history, and probably in world history for that matter. When society believes "serious" conflict is unlikely, it allows it's military to run down. Often, the serious conflict emerges much faster than the military can be upgraded to meet the need. That gets lots of people killed and prolongs wars (if you are lucky and don't lose on day 1). It also means that you will have to burn through lots of "peacetime generals" before you find ones that can lead and fight.

Your last paragraph tells the tale.  I agree 100 percent.  No matter how you man the army, draft or volunteers, peacetime tends to promote those who do what the people at the top want.  The people at the top tend not to heed the advice of the military, or the military feeds information based what what they know the top wants to hear, which has nothing to do with reality at times.

[Mick]

IMO the problem is that the leadership of our military has declined over the last 20 years or so due to the low priority the military has been given in our government and our society. The politicians wanted "yes men" and they got them. This is unfortunately a recurring theme in US history, and probably in world history for that matter. When society believes "serious" conflict is unlikely, it allows it's military to run down. Often, the serious conflict emerges much faster than the military can be upgraded to meet the need. That gets lots of people killed and prolongs wars (if you are lucky and don't lose on day 1). It also means that you will have to burn through lots of "peacetime generals" before you find ones that can lead and fight.

G. Michael Hopf: "Hard times create strong men. Strong men create good times. Good times create weak men. And, weak men create hard times.”

[Mick]

IMO the problem is that the leadership of our military has declined over the last 20 years or so due to the low priority the military has been given in our government and our society. The politicians wanted "yes men" and they got them. This is unfortunately a recurring theme in US history, and probably in world history for that matter. When society believes "serious" conflict is unlikely, it allows it's military to run down. Often, the serious conflict emerges much faster than the military can be upgraded to meet the need. That gets lots of people killed and prolongs wars (if you are lucky and don't lose on day 1). It also means that you will have to burn through lots of "peacetime generals" before you find ones that can lead and fight.

G. Michael Hopf: "Hard times create strong men. Strong men create good times. Good times create weak men. And, weak men create hard times.”

[Nan3cy]

IMO the problem is that the leadership of our military has declined over the last 20 years or so due to the low priority the military has been given in our government and our society. The politicians wanted "yes men" and they got them. This is unfortunately a recurring theme in US history, and probably in world history for that matter. When society believes "serious" conflict is unlikely, it allows it's military to run down. Often, the serious conflict emerges much faster than the military can be upgraded to meet the need. That gets lots of people killed and prolongs wars (if you are lucky and don't lose on day 1). It also means that you will have to burn through lots of "peacetime generals" before you find ones that can lead and fight.

G. Michael Hopf: "Hard times create strong men. Strong men create good times. Good times create weak men. And, weak men create hard times.”

A variation on this is one of my favorite expressions: “Good judgment comes from experience, and experience comes from bad judgment.”

[Nan3cy]

IMO the problem is that the leadership of our military has declined over the last 20 years or so due to the low priority the military has been given in our government and our society. The politicians wanted "yes men" and they got them. This is unfortunately a recurring theme in US history, and probably in world history for that matter. When society believes "serious" conflict is unlikely, it allows it's military to run down. Often, the serious conflict emerges much faster than the military can be upgraded to meet the need. That gets lots of people killed and prolongs wars (if you are lucky and don't lose on day 1). It also means that you will have to burn through lots of "peacetime generals" before you find ones that can lead and fight.

G. Michael Hopf: "Hard times create strong men. Strong men create good times. Good times create weak men. And, weak men create hard times.”

A variation on this is one of my favorite expressions: “Good judgment comes from experience, and experience comes from bad judgment.”

[GK3]

IMO the problem is that the leadership of our military has declined over the last 20 years or so due to the low priority the military has been given in our government and our society. The politicians wanted "yes men" and they got them. This is unfortunately a recurring theme in US history, and probably in world history for that matter. When society believes "serious" conflict is unlikely, it allows it's military to run down. Often, the serious conflict emerges much faster than the military can be upgraded to meet the need. That gets lots of people killed and prolongs wars (if you are lucky and don't lose on day 1). It also means that you will have to burn through lots of "peacetime generals" before you find ones that can lead and fight.

G. Michael Hopf: "Hard times create strong men. Strong men create good times. Good times create weak men. And, weak men create hard times.”

A variation on this is one of my favorite expressions: “Good judgment comes from experience, and experience comes from bad judgment.”

Is this gasoline looking for a match?
https://www.newsweek.com/tensions-heat-b...nd-1814700

Seems more saber rattling on the part of Putin, but wars have started on less.  Elsewhere, Russia continues its aggressive actions against our flights in Syria.  Iran keeps pushing the edge of envelope in the Straits of Hormuz, and Israel's SDF reserve threaten to quit if the judicial changes go through.  Lots of chances for things to wrong in a big way.

One last add. Surprised to see German forces participating in the Australian and US Wargames.

[GK3]

IMO the problem is that the leadership of our military has declined over the last 20 years or so due to the low priority the military has been given in our government and our society. The politicians wanted "yes men" and they got them. This is unfortunately a recurring theme in US history, and probably in world history for that matter. When society believes "serious" conflict is unlikely, it allows it's military to run down. Often, the serious conflict emerges much faster than the military can be upgraded to meet the need. That gets lots of people killed and prolongs wars (if you are lucky and don't lose on day 1). It also means that you will have to burn through lots of "peacetime generals" before you find ones that can lead and fight.

G. Michael Hopf: "Hard times create strong men. Strong men create good times. Good times create weak men. And, weak men create hard times.”

A variation on this is one of my favorite expressions: “Good judgment comes from experience, and experience comes from bad judgment.”

Is this gasoline looking for a match?
https://www.newsweek.com/tensions-heat-b...nd-1814700

Seems more saber rattling on the part of Putin, but wars have started on less.  Elsewhere, Russia continues its aggressive actions against our flights in Syria.  Iran keeps pushing the edge of envelope in the Straits of Hormuz, and Israel's SDF reserve threaten to quit if the judicial changes go through.  Lots of chances for things to wrong in a big way.

One last add. Surprised to see German forces participating in the Australian and US Wargames.

[dabigv13]

I think this will be of interest to many here. Nixon certainly had his failings as a President, but on foreign policy he was one of the greats. This letter is fascinating reading.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-ukraine...r-2b83c050

When Bill Clinton eulogized Richard Nixon on April 27, 1994, he spoke of the former president’s “wise counsel, especially with regard to Russia . . . based on our last phone conversation and the letter he wrote me just a month ago.” For nearly 30 years, the content of that letter remained a secret. Thanks to its declassification this week through Mr. Clinton’s presidential library, it is hidden no longer.

What is most striking about the seven-page, single-spaced letter dated March 21, 1994, is that Nixon anticipated a more belligerent Russia, the rise of someone like Vladimir Putin, and worsening relations between Moscow and Kyiv. Nixon, who was 81, had just returned from a two-week trip to Russia and Ukraine. In 1972 he became the first sitting president to visit Moscow, where he signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. After leaving office he continued to have access to elites in governments and opposition leaders around the world. That Mr. Clinton was a Democrat and Nixon a Republican made no difference. The ultimate Cold Warrior was an elder statesman interested in the contours of the post-Cold War era.

....

Nixon also said that Moscow’s relationship with Kyiv would worsen. Though the dynamic had improved during Yeltsin’s tenure, the situation in Ukraine was “highly explosive.” “If it is allowed to get out of control,” Nixon warned, “it will make Bosnia look like a PTA garden party.”

And the direct link to the letter-

https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/doc...cle_inline

[dabigv13]

I think this will be of interest to many here. Nixon certainly had his failings as a President, but on foreign policy he was one of the greats. This letter is fascinating reading.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-ukraine...r-2b83c050

When Bill Clinton eulogized Richard Nixon on April 27, 1994, he spoke of the former president’s “wise counsel, especially with regard to Russia . . . based on our last phone conversation and the letter he wrote me just a month ago.” For nearly 30 years, the content of that letter remained a secret. Thanks to its declassification this week through Mr. Clinton’s presidential library, it is hidden no longer.

What is most striking about the seven-page, single-spaced letter dated March 21, 1994, is that Nixon anticipated a more belligerent Russia, the rise of someone like Vladimir Putin, and worsening relations between Moscow and Kyiv. Nixon, who was 81, had just returned from a two-week trip to Russia and Ukraine. In 1972 he became the first sitting president to visit Moscow, where he signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. After leaving office he continued to have access to elites in governments and opposition leaders around the world. That Mr. Clinton was a Democrat and Nixon a Republican made no difference. The ultimate Cold Warrior was an elder statesman interested in the contours of the post-Cold War era.

....

Nixon also said that Moscow’s relationship with Kyiv would worsen. Though the dynamic had improved during Yeltsin’s tenure, the situation in Ukraine was “highly explosive.” “If it is allowed to get out of control,” Nixon warned, “it will make Bosnia look like a PTA garden party.”

And the direct link to the letter-

https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/doc...cle_inline

[Goose]

I think this will be of interest to many here. Nixon certainly had his failings as a President, but on foreign policy he was one of the greats. This letter is fascinating reading.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-ukraine...r-2b83c050

When Bill Clinton eulogized Richard Nixon on April 27, 1994, he spoke of the former president’s “wise counsel, especially with regard to Russia . . . based on our last phone conversation and the letter he wrote me just a month ago.” For nearly 30 years, the content of that letter remained a secret. Thanks to its declassification this week through Mr. Clinton’s presidential library, it is hidden no longer.

What is most striking about the seven-page, single-spaced letter dated March 21, 1994, is that Nixon anticipated a more belligerent Russia, the rise of someone like Vladimir Putin, and worsening relations between Moscow and Kyiv. Nixon, who was 81, had just returned from a two-week trip to Russia and Ukraine. In 1972 he became the first sitting president to visit Moscow, where he signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. After leaving office he continued to have access to elites in governments and opposition leaders around the world. That Mr. Clinton was a Democrat and Nixon a Republican made no difference. The ultimate Cold Warrior was an elder statesman interested in the contours of the post-Cold War era.

....

Nixon also said that Moscow’s relationship with Kyiv would worsen. Though the dynamic had improved during Yeltsin’s tenure, the situation in Ukraine was “highly explosive.” “If it is allowed to get out of control,” Nixon warned, “it will make Bosnia look like a PTA garden party.”

And the direct link to the letter-

https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/doc...cle_inline

Nixon was indeed prescient in his understanding of the situation. The first Bush administration was also pretty worried about Ukraine and Belarus not joining the Russian Federation and tried to steer them away from that. This was at least partially caused by their attachment to Gorbachev, as Nixion points out. However, it wasn't just because Bush "liked" him. The problem was that they couldn't find a reliable alternative. At that time, Yeltsin wasn't by any means a "sure thing".

Some have said that only the KGB understood the Russian economic situation in 1991. In reality, nobody did. It was much more convoluted and much worse than anybody thought. Ukraine and Belarus thought they could go their own way and would receive financial assistance from the US and the FRG on a par with what Poland and the Baltic states received. It couldn't be done. Germany had a big and open-ended cost of reunification. They had also paid for the Russian troops to leave Europe and had paid to build barracks in Russia to house them. They had also paid lots of money to support Poland and the Baltics. The US had also supported Poland and the Baltics, and at a lower level the rest of the Warsaw pact nations. No way the Congress was going to pony up a much larger amount to support Ukraine and Belarus.

These are much larger countries than Poland and the Baltics. Helping them convert their economies to the free market at the same scale was impossible. Both these countries were integrated deeply into the economy of the USSR. Pulling them apart was going to be very traumatic at best, to all three countries. Many of the "pundits" recognized there was significant nationalist sentiment in Ukraine and Belarus, but that their common economic interests with Russia would probably preclude them not joining the Russian Federation. Gorbachev certainly believed that was the case. The politicians in Ukraine and Belarus began to believe it would be to their personal advantage to become independent. They also believed (arguably without good reason) that the US would give them the money to do it. Bush's "Chicken Kiev" speech was part of an attempt to say "No, we won't", but it didn't "take". Part of the problem was that the "independence" faction simply didn't want to deal with the complexity of their task. Becoming independent may have been a sociological inevitability, but more attention to the mechanics of doing so was sorely needed.

For these reasons, Clinton had limited cards to play, although he didn't play the cards he had very well (or at all really). The US basically stayed out of it. There were initiatives by the US military to embed themselves deeply in both the military and commercial activity of all three resultant states, but the administration eventually terminated all of them (that I was aware of). Nixon saw the potential problems, but he was not alone in that. The appropriate responses to the situation were unclear in many cases, but the US took the decision to do nothing at all. I can see why Clinton might regret that choice.

[Goose]

I think this will be of interest to many here. Nixon certainly had his failings as a President, but on foreign policy he was one of the greats. This letter is fascinating reading.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-ukraine...r-2b83c050

When Bill Clinton eulogized Richard Nixon on April 27, 1994, he spoke of the former president’s “wise counsel, especially with regard to Russia . . . based on our last phone conversation and the letter he wrote me just a month ago.” For nearly 30 years, the content of that letter remained a secret. Thanks to its declassification this week through Mr. Clinton’s presidential library, it is hidden no longer.

What is most striking about the seven-page, single-spaced letter dated March 21, 1994, is that Nixon anticipated a more belligerent Russia, the rise of someone like Vladimir Putin, and worsening relations between Moscow and Kyiv. Nixon, who was 81, had just returned from a two-week trip to Russia and Ukraine. In 1972 he became the first sitting president to visit Moscow, where he signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. After leaving office he continued to have access to elites in governments and opposition leaders around the world. That Mr. Clinton was a Democrat and Nixon a Republican made no difference. The ultimate Cold Warrior was an elder statesman interested in the contours of the post-Cold War era.

....

Nixon also said that Moscow’s relationship with Kyiv would worsen. Though the dynamic had improved during Yeltsin’s tenure, the situation in Ukraine was “highly explosive.” “If it is allowed to get out of control,” Nixon warned, “it will make Bosnia look like a PTA garden party.”

And the direct link to the letter-

https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/doc...cle_inline

Nixon was indeed prescient in his understanding of the situation. The first Bush administration was also pretty worried about Ukraine and Belarus not joining the Russian Federation and tried to steer them away from that. This was at least partially caused by their attachment to Gorbachev, as Nixion points out. However, it wasn't just because Bush "liked" him. The problem was that they couldn't find a reliable alternative. At that time, Yeltsin wasn't by any means a "sure thing".

Some have said that only the KGB understood the Russian economic situation in 1991. In reality, nobody did. It was much more convoluted and much worse than anybody thought. Ukraine and Belarus thought they could go their own way and would receive financial assistance from the US and the FRG on a par with what Poland and the Baltic states received. It couldn't be done. Germany had a big and open-ended cost of reunification. They had also paid for the Russian troops to leave Europe and had paid to build barracks in Russia to house them. They had also paid lots of money to support Poland and the Baltics. The US had also supported Poland and the Baltics, and at a lower level the rest of the Warsaw pact nations. No way the Congress was going to pony up a much larger amount to support Ukraine and Belarus.

These are much larger countries than Poland and the Baltics. Helping them convert their economies to the free market at the same scale was impossible. Both these countries were integrated deeply into the economy of the USSR. Pulling them apart was going to be very traumatic at best, to all three countries. Many of the "pundits" recognized there was significant nationalist sentiment in Ukraine and Belarus, but that their common economic interests with Russia would probably preclude them not joining the Russian Federation. Gorbachev certainly believed that was the case. The politicians in Ukraine and Belarus began to believe it would be to their personal advantage to become independent. They also believed (arguably without good reason) that the US would give them the money to do it. Bush's "Chicken Kiev" speech was part of an attempt to say "No, we won't", but it didn't "take". Part of the problem was that the "independence" faction simply didn't want to deal with the complexity of their task. Becoming independent may have been a sociological inevitability, but more attention to the mechanics of doing so was sorely needed.

For these reasons, Clinton had limited cards to play, although he didn't play the cards he had very well (or at all really). The US basically stayed out of it. There were initiatives by the US military to embed themselves deeply in both the military and commercial activity of all three resultant states, but the administration eventually terminated all of them (that I was aware of). Nixon saw the potential problems, but he was not alone in that. The appropriate responses to the situation were unclear in many cases, but the US took the decision to do nothing at all. I can see why Clinton might regret that choice.

[GK3]

I think this will be of interest to many here. Nixon certainly had his failings as a President, but on foreign policy he was one of the greats. This letter is fascinating reading.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-ukraine...r-2b83c050

When Bill Clinton eulogized Richard Nixon on April 27, 1994, he spoke of the former president’s “wise counsel, especially with regard to Russia . . . based on our last phone conversation and the letter he wrote me just a month ago.” For nearly 30 years, the content of that letter remained a secret. Thanks to its declassification this week through Mr. Clinton’s presidential library, it is hidden no longer.

What is most striking about the seven-page, single-spaced letter dated March 21, 1994, is that Nixon anticipated a more belligerent Russia, the rise of someone like Vladimir Putin, and worsening relations between Moscow and Kyiv. Nixon, who was 81, had just returned from a two-week trip to Russia and Ukraine. In 1972 he became the first sitting president to visit Moscow, where he signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. After leaving office he continued to have access to elites in governments and opposition leaders around the world. That Mr. Clinton was a Democrat and Nixon a Republican made no difference. The ultimate Cold Warrior was an elder statesman interested in the contours of the post-Cold War era.

....

Nixon also said that Moscow’s relationship with Kyiv would worsen. Though the dynamic had improved during Yeltsin’s tenure, the situation in Ukraine was “highly explosive.” “If it is allowed to get out of control,” Nixon warned, “it will make Bosnia look like a PTA garden party.”

And the direct link to the letter-

https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/doc...cle_inline

Thank  you for posting that letter.  Fascinating reading and worth reading a second time.

[GK3]

I think this will be of interest to many here. Nixon certainly had his failings as a President, but on foreign policy he was one of the greats. This letter is fascinating reading.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-ukraine...r-2b83c050

When Bill Clinton eulogized Richard Nixon on April 27, 1994, he spoke of the former president’s “wise counsel, especially with regard to Russia . . . based on our last phone conversation and the letter he wrote me just a month ago.” For nearly 30 years, the content of that letter remained a secret. Thanks to its declassification this week through Mr. Clinton’s presidential library, it is hidden no longer.

What is most striking about the seven-page, single-spaced letter dated March 21, 1994, is that Nixon anticipated a more belligerent Russia, the rise of someone like Vladimir Putin, and worsening relations between Moscow and Kyiv. Nixon, who was 81, had just returned from a two-week trip to Russia and Ukraine. In 1972 he became the first sitting president to visit Moscow, where he signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. After leaving office he continued to have access to elites in governments and opposition leaders around the world. That Mr. Clinton was a Democrat and Nixon a Republican made no difference. The ultimate Cold Warrior was an elder statesman interested in the contours of the post-Cold War era.

....

Nixon also said that Moscow’s relationship with Kyiv would worsen. Though the dynamic had improved during Yeltsin’s tenure, the situation in Ukraine was “highly explosive.” “If it is allowed to get out of control,” Nixon warned, “it will make Bosnia look like a PTA garden party.”

And the direct link to the letter-

https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/doc...cle_inline

Thank  you for posting that letter.  Fascinating reading and worth reading a second time.

[81alum]

When did Nixon take this world-tour of a trip to which he refers?  He died in April 1994, so this letter is dated just days before his death.

Who accompanied him on this trip?  Did his old advisor Kissinger travel with him?  I ask because I have always wondered how much of Nixon's foreign policy expertise was really his own, and how much was Kissinger.  Somewhere I also saw a reference to a controversy about Dmitri Simes's role.  I could easily see Simes offering some trenchant analysis of the situation in Russia in 1994.

[81alum]

When did Nixon take this world-tour of a trip to which he refers?  He died in April 1994, so this letter is dated just days before his death.

Who accompanied him on this trip?  Did his old advisor Kissinger travel with him?  I ask because I have always wondered how much of Nixon's foreign policy expertise was really his own, and how much was Kissinger.  Somewhere I also saw a reference to a controversy about Dmitri Simes's role.  I could easily see Simes offering some trenchant analysis of the situation in Russia in 1994.

[dabigv13]

The trip was taken in the March of 94 just before he wrote the letter. In the arena, right until the end.

Contemporaneous LA Times article on the trip. Kissinger is not mentioned. Nixon sought Kissinger's counsel but Kissinger liked to inflate the public perception of his own influence.

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-...story.html

[dabigv13]

The trip was taken in the March of 94 just before he wrote the letter. In the arena, right until the end.

Contemporaneous LA Times article on the trip. Kissinger is not mentioned. Nixon sought Kissinger's counsel but Kissinger liked to inflate the public perception of his own influence.

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-...story.html

[81alum]

Apparently, according to the NYT and the US government, the "real" counteroffensive is now on.  The Russian Defense Ministry's spokesperson agrees.  So it looks like the long wind-up is over and the pitch is on the way.

The assault involves more than 100 Leopards and Bradleys and the foreign-trained troops that had been held in reserve are now pouring in.  The thrust appears to be in the Southeast, with Tokmak being the first objective and Melitopol the follow-up.

Mines, artillery, and "withering air strikes" seem to be the main impediments.

The ISW map does not seem to show much progress, and I note that Tokmak seems to be heavily fortified according to ISW.

Thoughts?  Any chance this is a feint and a second thrust will only appear after Russia rushes every spare resource to Tokmak?

[81alum]

Apparently, according to the NYT and the US government, the "real" counteroffensive is now on.  The Russian Defense Ministry's spokesperson agrees.  So it looks like the long wind-up is over and the pitch is on the way.

The assault involves more than 100 Leopards and Bradleys and the foreign-trained troops that had been held in reserve are now pouring in.  The thrust appears to be in the Southeast, with Tokmak being the first objective and Melitopol the follow-up.

Mines, artillery, and "withering air strikes" seem to be the main impediments.

The ISW map does not seem to show much progress, and I note that Tokmak seems to be heavily fortified according to ISW.

Thoughts?  Any chance this is a feint and a second thrust will only appear after Russia rushes every spare resource to Tokmak?

[Goose]

Apparently, according to the NYT and the US government, the "real" counteroffensive is now on.  The Russian Defense Ministry's spokesperson agrees.  So it looks like the long wind-up is over and the pitch is on the way.

The assault involves more than 100 Leopards and Bradleys and the foreign-trained troops that had been held in reserve are now pouring in.  The thrust appears to be in the Southeast, with Tokmak being the first objective and Melitopol the follow-up.

Mines, artillery, and "withering air strikes" seem to be the main impediments.

The ISW map does not seem to show much progress, and I note that Tokmak seems to be heavily fortified according to ISW.

Thoughts?  Any chance this is a feint and a second thrust will only appear after Russia rushes every spare resource to Tokmak?

IMO it is not a feint, but rather that the Ukrainians have a multi-level decision tree in their plan. That is definitely their style and in this situation probably a good idea. For a long time I (and many others) have expected Ukraine to strike toward Melitopol. That is surprising nobody. Their ostensible target is Berdyans'k, and if they get there we will all be ecstatic. If this thrust is going pretty well but needs more combat power, Ukraine may commit their remaining reserves to that effort. If they can take Melitopol it cuts the land bridge because the M14 and the railroad will be blocked. That is their #1 objective.

If Russia pulls a lot of troops out of Crimea/South Kherson Oblast to attack the flanks of the thrust to Melitopol, Ukraine IMO will attack out of Kherson/Kakhovka with their reserves. This will be behind the Russian line of attack and on it's left flank. It could really be very successful if Russia is too thin on the ground. It will hit the Russians outside of the fortifications and on the move, exactly what Ukraine wants. No minefields! Ukraine really wants a foothold in Crimea (for political reasons) if they can get it. It would also isolate lots of Russians with no means of resupply or retreat. If one believes the Russian morale isn't good, they may surrender in droves. This is Ukraine's "fondest dream". This attack will happen, but if things don't go well on the Melitopol axis, it may be in 2024.

Ukraine is also planning to do "something" near Bakhmut. It will not involve "lots" of the NATO trained troops, but you can take it to the bank that this is in the plan. The question is not if, but exactly what and when. Russia will be politically compelled to defend there, and it could eat up a lot of Russian combat power. The only current issue is holding the lines at Kreminna while this happens.

[Goose]

Apparently, according to the NYT and the US government, the "real" counteroffensive is now on.  The Russian Defense Ministry's spokesperson agrees.  So it looks like the long wind-up is over and the pitch is on the way.

The assault involves more than 100 Leopards and Bradleys and the foreign-trained troops that had been held in reserve are now pouring in.  The thrust appears to be in the Southeast, with Tokmak being the first objective and Melitopol the follow-up.

Mines, artillery, and "withering air strikes" seem to be the main impediments.

The ISW map does not seem to show much progress, and I note that Tokmak seems to be heavily fortified according to ISW.

Thoughts?  Any chance this is a feint and a second thrust will only appear after Russia rushes every spare resource to Tokmak?

IMO it is not a feint, but rather that the Ukrainians have a multi-level decision tree in their plan. That is definitely their style and in this situation probably a good idea. For a long time I (and many others) have expected Ukraine to strike toward Melitopol. That is surprising nobody. Their ostensible target is Berdyans'k, and if they get there we will all be ecstatic. If this thrust is going pretty well but needs more combat power, Ukraine may commit their remaining reserves to that effort. If they can take Melitopol it cuts the land bridge because the M14 and the railroad will be blocked. That is their #1 objective.

If Russia pulls a lot of troops out of Crimea/South Kherson Oblast to attack the flanks of the thrust to Melitopol, Ukraine IMO will attack out of Kherson/Kakhovka with their reserves. This will be behind the Russian line of attack and on it's left flank. It could really be very successful if Russia is too thin on the ground. It will hit the Russians outside of the fortifications and on the move, exactly what Ukraine wants. No minefields! Ukraine really wants a foothold in Crimea (for political reasons) if they can get it. It would also isolate lots of Russians with no means of resupply or retreat. If one believes the Russian morale isn't good, they may surrender in droves. This is Ukraine's "fondest dream". This attack will happen, but if things don't go well on the Melitopol axis, it may be in 2024.

Ukraine is also planning to do "something" near Bakhmut. It will not involve "lots" of the NATO trained troops, but you can take it to the bank that this is in the plan. The question is not if, but exactly what and when. Russia will be politically compelled to defend there, and it could eat up a lot of Russian combat power. The only current issue is holding the lines at Kreminna while this happens.

[Mick]

Ukraine is also planning to do "something" near Bakhmut. It will not involve "lots" of the NATO trained troops, but you can take it to the bank that this is in the plan. The question is not if, but exactly what and when. Russia will be politically compelled to defend there, and it could eat up a lot of Russian combat power. The only current issue is holding the lines at Kreminna while this happens.

Planned and done, looks like. Ukrainian forces have taken over Klishchiivka and Andriivka, south of Bakhmut.

https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/179...imir-putin

[Mick]

Ukraine is also planning to do "something" near Bakhmut. It will not involve "lots" of the NATO trained troops, but you can take it to the bank that this is in the plan. The question is not if, but exactly what and when. Russia will be politically compelled to defend there, and it could eat up a lot of Russian combat power. The only current issue is holding the lines at Kreminna while this happens.

Planned and done, looks like. Ukrainian forces have taken over Klishchiivka and Andriivka, south of Bakhmut.

https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/179...imir-putin

[Goose]

Ukraine is also planning to do "something" near Bakhmut. It will not involve "lots" of the NATO trained troops, but you can take it to the bank that this is in the plan. The question is not if, but exactly what and when. Russia will be politically compelled to defend there, and it could eat up a lot of Russian combat power. The only current issue is holding the lines at Kreminna while this happens.

Planned and done, looks like. Ukrainian forces have taken over Klishchiivka and Andriivka, south of Bakhmut.

https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/179...imir-putin

IMO Planned and not (yet) done. Ukraine has set up a situation where they can cut off a lot of Russians in Bakhmut. They are continuing to increase the depth of their forces that have Bakhmut surrounded on 3 sides. At some point, they are going to close that fourth side, or try to. By all rights, Russia should have evacuated that salient long ago, but politically they can't do it. The Ukrainians are making the enclosed pocket bigger and deeper. At some point, Ukraine will decide they can't extend themselves anymore and will try to pinch off the last opening. That may happen only when Ukraine thinks Russia is finally going to "do the right thing". So far, the Russians have not.

[Goose]

Ukraine is also planning to do "something" near Bakhmut. It will not involve "lots" of the NATO trained troops, but you can take it to the bank that this is in the plan. The question is not if, but exactly what and when. Russia will be politically compelled to defend there, and it could eat up a lot of Russian combat power. The only current issue is holding the lines at Kreminna while this happens.

Planned and done, looks like. Ukrainian forces have taken over Klishchiivka and Andriivka, south of Bakhmut.

https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/179...imir-putin

IMO Planned and not (yet) done. Ukraine has set up a situation where they can cut off a lot of Russians in Bakhmut. They are continuing to increase the depth of their forces that have Bakhmut surrounded on 3 sides. At some point, they are going to close that fourth side, or try to. By all rights, Russia should have evacuated that salient long ago, but politically they can't do it. The Ukrainians are making the enclosed pocket bigger and deeper. At some point, Ukraine will decide they can't extend themselves anymore and will try to pinch off the last opening. That may happen only when Ukraine thinks Russia is finally going to "do the right thing". So far, the Russians have not.

[dabigv13]

Ukraine has advanced on both of their prior main axes of attack.

Here on the Orikhiv - Melitopol axis, they are starting to approach the antitank ditches of a main defense line between Robotyne and Verbove.

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/16845...66274?s=20[/tweet]

Previously it was mostly mines. However if they can breach this, they will possibly be able to make bigger gains as the rear will have less prepared minefields, though Russia does have fall back fortifications and can remotely deploy mines as they have done before.

On the Velyka Novosilka - Mariupol axis, Ukraine may have take the town of Staromaiorske and Urozhaine could be next.

This is a pretty gnarly video from near Robotyne.

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/Teoyaomiquu/status/1...85697?s=20[/tweet]

Here a Ukrainian vehicle is pushing a burning Ukrainian BMP out of the way.

[dabigv13]

Ukraine has advanced on both of their prior main axes of attack.

Here on the Orikhiv - Melitopol axis, they are starting to approach the antitank ditches of a main defense line between Robotyne and Verbove.

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/16845...66274?s=20[/tweet]

Previously it was mostly mines. However if they can breach this, they will possibly be able to make bigger gains as the rear will have less prepared minefields, though Russia does have fall back fortifications and can remotely deploy mines as they have done before.

On the Velyka Novosilka - Mariupol axis, Ukraine may have take the town of Staromaiorske and Urozhaine could be next.

This is a pretty gnarly video from near Robotyne.

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/Teoyaomiquu/status/1...85697?s=20[/tweet]

Here a Ukrainian vehicle is pushing a burning Ukrainian BMP out of the way.

[81alum]

General Barry McCaffrey was just on cable news indicating that the offensive "is not going very well."  Difficulties in coordinating a combined-arms attack, the slowness of getting through the mine fields, etc.  The armor, he said, is best suited for exploiting after a sudden, surprise attack, and the presence of thousands of overhead drones has fundamentally changed the battlefield, making surprise much harder--or impossible--to achieve.

Of course this war is of interest because of the clash between the two nations, but it also is of interest in what it says about the evolution and future of warfare.  The cheapness of mines and ubiquitous of drones may be turning the tide of war back to defense.

Looking at ISW's interactive map is eye-opening.  All the talk about the "offensive" and the land that shows up as changing hands are little slivers on a massive front. 

https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a...1cf64bd375

[81alum]

General Barry McCaffrey was just on cable news indicating that the offensive "is not going very well."  Difficulties in coordinating a combined-arms attack, the slowness of getting through the mine fields, etc.  The armor, he said, is best suited for exploiting after a sudden, surprise attack, and the presence of thousands of overhead drones has fundamentally changed the battlefield, making surprise much harder--or impossible--to achieve.

Of course this war is of interest because of the clash between the two nations, but it also is of interest in what it says about the evolution and future of warfare.  The cheapness of mines and ubiquitous of drones may be turning the tide of war back to defense.

Looking at ISW's interactive map is eye-opening.  All the talk about the "offensive" and the land that shows up as changing hands are little slivers on a massive front. 

https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a...1cf64bd375

[Goose]

General Barry McCaffrey was just on cable news indicating that the offensive "is not going very well."  Difficulties in coordinating a combined-arms attack, the slowness of getting through the mine fields, etc.  The armor, he said, is best suited for exploiting after a sudden, surprise attack, and the presence of thousands of overhead drones has fundamentally changed the battlefield, making surprise much harder--or impossible--to achieve.

Of course this war is of interest because of the clash between the two nations, but it also is of interest in what it says about the evolution and future of warfare.  The cheapness of mines and ubiquitous of drones may be turning the tide of war back to defense.

Looking at ISW's interactive map is eye-opening.  All the talk about the "offensive" and the land that shows up as changing hands are little slivers on a massive front. 

https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a...1cf64bd375

Mines are a very old and very familiar weapon. Achieving strategic surprise has always been difficult. It is especially difficult if you are "in contact" everywhere along a very long front. The presence of aerial reconnaissance since WWI has made it difficult to concentrate large bodies of troops/material undetected. That isn't new. The effects of the large number of drones in Ukraine are mostly tactical, close to the FEBA. Achieving tactical surprise is much more difficult. However, the converse is also true. Achieving defensive concealment is (or ought to be) also more difficult.

Perhaps the best "modern" comparison would be the "breakout" from the beachhead after D day or the Russian advance into East Prussia. In both cases the forces were in close contact all along the line. The Russians didn't achieve surprise. They concentrated their artillery and pulverized what was in front of them. The British tried repeated armored attacks around Caen. Heavy casualties on both sides but no breakthrough. Similarly, the US troops fought their way through the bocage country field by field. The daily land captured was minuscule. Finally, the US used strategic air power to pulverize the wired-in, dug-in resistance in front of them. Then and only then the 3rd Army rolled it's tanks into open country and started to move fast.

Ukraine is apparently right now attempting to use it's artillery to force it's way through. The "fault" many NATO people find in Ukraine's approach is that they like to use probing attacks to see what they are dealing with. This gives the enemy tactical warning and allows him to start his response before he is struck with the full weight of the attack. Ukraine also hasn't demonstrated the ability to concentrate forces quickly. The idea is that yes, your enemy sees what you are doing but your highly trained professionals are moving faster than the Russian response possibly can and achieve tactical superiority, even if the Russians make no mistakes and interpret your objectives correctly.

Well, guess what? 45 days of training for the striking forces can't produce that and Ukraine also has to rely on a lot of support elements that have no such training. As others have said, it is probable that most NATO troops couldn't do it either. As an aside, Ukraine hasn't demonstrated a great ability to use drones to locate Russian ambushes while the Ukrainian armor is "on the move". They run into defended artillery-laid minefields. IMO this is a failing that the US Army largely shares. This is a "lesson learned".

IF Ukraine can get through the first layer of the Russian defense and get some maneuvering room they may be able to achieve tactical surprise by moving fast and showing up sooner that the Russians can respond. I hope they plan to bypass as many strongly defended points as possible. Battering their way to Melitopol village by village is going to be expensive. I hope that isn't their intention, but I fear it well may be.

[Goose]

General Barry McCaffrey was just on cable news indicating that the offensive "is not going very well."  Difficulties in coordinating a combined-arms attack, the slowness of getting through the mine fields, etc.  The armor, he said, is best suited for exploiting after a sudden, surprise attack, and the presence of thousands of overhead drones has fundamentally changed the battlefield, making surprise much harder--or impossible--to achieve.

Of course this war is of interest because of the clash between the two nations, but it also is of interest in what it says about the evolution and future of warfare.  The cheapness of mines and ubiquitous of drones may be turning the tide of war back to defense.

Looking at ISW's interactive map is eye-opening.  All the talk about the "offensive" and the land that shows up as changing hands are little slivers on a massive front. 

https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a...1cf64bd375

Mines are a very old and very familiar weapon. Achieving strategic surprise has always been difficult. It is especially difficult if you are "in contact" everywhere along a very long front. The presence of aerial reconnaissance since WWI has made it difficult to concentrate large bodies of troops/material undetected. That isn't new. The effects of the large number of drones in Ukraine are mostly tactical, close to the FEBA. Achieving tactical surprise is much more difficult. However, the converse is also true. Achieving defensive concealment is (or ought to be) also more difficult.

Perhaps the best "modern" comparison would be the "breakout" from the beachhead after D day or the Russian advance into East Prussia. In both cases the forces were in close contact all along the line. The Russians didn't achieve surprise. They concentrated their artillery and pulverized what was in front of them. The British tried repeated armored attacks around Caen. Heavy casualties on both sides but no breakthrough. Similarly, the US troops fought their way through the bocage country field by field. The daily land captured was minuscule. Finally, the US used strategic air power to pulverize the wired-in, dug-in resistance in front of them. Then and only then the 3rd Army rolled it's tanks into open country and started to move fast.

Ukraine is apparently right now attempting to use it's artillery to force it's way through. The "fault" many NATO people find in Ukraine's approach is that they like to use probing attacks to see what they are dealing with. This gives the enemy tactical warning and allows him to start his response before he is struck with the full weight of the attack. Ukraine also hasn't demonstrated the ability to concentrate forces quickly. The idea is that yes, your enemy sees what you are doing but your highly trained professionals are moving faster than the Russian response possibly can and achieve tactical superiority, even if the Russians make no mistakes and interpret your objectives correctly.

Well, guess what? 45 days of training for the striking forces can't produce that and Ukraine also has to rely on a lot of support elements that have no such training. As others have said, it is probable that most NATO troops couldn't do it either. As an aside, Ukraine hasn't demonstrated a great ability to use drones to locate Russian ambushes while the Ukrainian armor is "on the move". They run into defended artillery-laid minefields. IMO this is a failing that the US Army largely shares. This is a "lesson learned".

IF Ukraine can get through the first layer of the Russian defense and get some maneuvering room they may be able to achieve tactical surprise by moving fast and showing up sooner that the Russians can respond. I hope they plan to bypass as many strongly defended points as possible. Battering their way to Melitopol village by village is going to be expensive. I hope that isn't their intention, but I fear it well may be.

[Softball Fan]

 ...the presence of thousands of overhead drones...

https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a...1cf64bd375

I haven't been following the war at all.  Does Russia literally have thousands of drones in the air?  Or is that meant to be metaphorical?  If they do have a thousand drones flying around, is each one controlled individually by a soldier.   They can't be flying autonomously.  The U. S. has that capability but I doubt Russia or Iran have AI controlled drones.

[Softball Fan]

 ...the presence of thousands of overhead drones...

https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a...1cf64bd375

I haven't been following the war at all.  Does Russia literally have thousands of drones in the air?  Or is that meant to be metaphorical?  If they do have a thousand drones flying around, is each one controlled individually by a soldier.   They can't be flying autonomously.  The U. S. has that capability but I doubt Russia or Iran have AI controlled drones.

[fullmetal]

The Russians have doubled down on their use of mines, to good effect, blunting the advantages of Ukrainian armor as 81alum mentions.  Goose's analysis is spot on.

The use of stacked mines to destroy mine-clearing equipment seems to be a novel Russian tactic.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66306150

[fullmetal]

The Russians have doubled down on their use of mines, to good effect, blunting the advantages of Ukrainian armor as 81alum mentions.  Goose's analysis is spot on.

The use of stacked mines to destroy mine-clearing equipment seems to be a novel Russian tactic.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66306150

[81alum]

 ...the presence of thousands of overhead drones...

https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a...1cf64bd375

I haven't been following the war at all.  Does Russia literally have thousands of drones in the air?  Or is that meant to be metaphorical?  If they do have a thousand drones flying around, is each one controlled individually by a soldier.   They can't be flying autonomously.  The U. S. has that capability but I doubt Russia or Iran have AI controlled drones.

I am talking not about expensive military-grade drones but drones you can buy from Amazon.  And yes, nearly all small units of soldiers on both sides have one or more of those now.  There are indeed "thousands."  Some of them have been modified to be able to drop a grenade, but mostly they are used as a cheap way of getting intelligence.  Remember in WWI the use of mirrored tubes that enabled troops to look above trenches without getting their heads blown off?  Now there are drones.  China has sold Russia more than $100 million worth of these cheap "dual use" drones since the war began.  Amazon drones (for comparison) vary from $30 to $1500.  A hundred million buys a lot of them.
https://www.politico.eu/article/china-fi...hai-h-win/

---

Mines are a very old and very familiar weapon.

No doubt.  But from what various analysts have said--all far more knowledgeable than me--the quantity, depth, sophistication, and downright cheapness of mines today gives them a different order of magnitude of influence on the battlefield than in the past.  It might also be the doctrine behind their usage--their use in greater depth, and the mixture of different varieties.  Mines to stop tanks.  And mines to stop de-miners.

Interesting that you mentioned the bocage fighting before the Normandy breakout.  What if this offensive is the equivalent of bocage fighting all the way to the Sea of Azov?  Can there be a breakout when mines can be laid almost as fast as Ukrainian troops seem to move?

[81alum]

 ...the presence of thousands of overhead drones...

https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a...1cf64bd375

I haven't been following the war at all.  Does Russia literally have thousands of drones in the air?  Or is that meant to be metaphorical?  If they do have a thousand drones flying around, is each one controlled individually by a soldier.   They can't be flying autonomously.  The U. S. has that capability but I doubt Russia or Iran have AI controlled drones.

I am talking not about expensive military-grade drones but drones you can buy from Amazon.  And yes, nearly all small units of soldiers on both sides have one or more of those now.  There are indeed "thousands."  Some of them have been modified to be able to drop a grenade, but mostly they are used as a cheap way of getting intelligence.  Remember in WWI the use of mirrored tubes that enabled troops to look above trenches without getting their heads blown off?  Now there are drones.  China has sold Russia more than $100 million worth of these cheap "dual use" drones since the war began.  Amazon drones (for comparison) vary from $30 to $1500.  A hundred million buys a lot of them.
https://www.politico.eu/article/china-fi...hai-h-win/

---

Mines are a very old and very familiar weapon.

No doubt.  But from what various analysts have said--all far more knowledgeable than me--the quantity, depth, sophistication, and downright cheapness of mines today gives them a different order of magnitude of influence on the battlefield than in the past.  It might also be the doctrine behind their usage--their use in greater depth, and the mixture of different varieties.  Mines to stop tanks.  And mines to stop de-miners.

Interesting that you mentioned the bocage fighting before the Normandy breakout.  What if this offensive is the equivalent of bocage fighting all the way to the Sea of Azov?  Can there be a breakout when mines can be laid almost as fast as Ukrainian troops seem to move?

[Goose]

I am talking not about expensive military-grade drones but drones you can buy from Amazon.  And yes, nearly all small units of soldiers on both sides have one or more of those now.  There are indeed "thousands."  Some of them have been modified to be able to drop a grenade, but mostly they are used as a cheap way of getting intelligence.  Remember in WWI the use of mirrored tubes that enabled troops to look above trenches without getting their heads blown off?  Now there are drones.  China has sold Russia more than $100 million worth of these cheap "dual use" drones since the war began.  Amazon drones (for comparison) vary from $30 to $1500.  A hundred million buys a lot of them.
https://www.politico.eu/article/china-fi...hai-h-win/

All true. One of Ukraine's big problems is that you can't control or view the video from these drones when you are inside an IFV. The antennas don't work inside a can, and the comms antennas of the IFV don't interface to the controllers. If you are a dismount, it's fine.

Mines are a very old and very familiar weapon.

No doubt.  But from what various analysts have said--all far more knowledgeable than me--the quantity, depth, sophistication, and downright cheapness of mines today gives them a different order of magnitude of influence on the battlefield than in the past.

There is some truth to that. The main difference is that many "modern" mines are plastic and contain no metallic parts. Finding them with a conventional metal detector doesn't work. You need ground penetrating radar instead. The US has some of these, but I doubt Ukraine has much. That said, line charges/mine plows don't care what the mines are made of.  I think the thing that is throwing these analysts is that they just didn't understand that Russia has a virtually infinite supply of mines and the have had six months or more to lay them. What we see in Ukraine is actually very similar to what the US has done in Korea. We are vastly outnumbered so we have mined the heck out of it. None of this is really a surprise. We just haven't faced anybody who had the wherewithal and the time to do this type of minefield defense. Certainly in both WW I and WW II the Germans made extensive and successful use of mines. Their problem was they just didn't have enough of them. Russia has had many years to build many mines.

It might also be the doctrine behind their usage--their use in greater depth, and the mixture of different varieties.  Mines to stop tanks.  And mines to stop de-miners.

All old hat. The Germans used to put bouncing Bettys under/around their anti-tank mines. Take a look at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-mine. Like many things in this war, Russia is reverting to what they do well. The Russians do have some rather novel anti-personnel mines that are plastic, liquid explosives, and can be dispersed by artillery. For troops advancing on foot, these can be a real problem because they are hard to see and can be spread in areas where the de-mining has already been done.

Interesting that you mentioned the bocage fighting before the Normandy breakout.  What if this offensive is the equivalent of bocage fighting all the way to the Sea of Azov?  Can there be a breakout when mines can be laid almost as fast as Ukrainian troops seem to move?

The minefields that are causing the Ukrainians grief are not hastily laid by retreating Russians. These are prepared and defended minefields. They are not of unlimited scope. It is possible to get "through" them, and right now Russia isn't out there laying more minefields. Too dangerous. The mines the Russians will sow while retreating will be a problem but nothing like the current situation. The Russians do have at least two significant lines of defense between where Ukraine is now and Melitopol. Hopefully Ukraine will have some momentum and get through the second one faster. The lines of retreat can't be mined real well, so that should help.

[Goose]

I am talking not about expensive military-grade drones but drones you can buy from Amazon.  And yes, nearly all small units of soldiers on both sides have one or more of those now.  There are indeed "thousands."  Some of them have been modified to be able to drop a grenade, but mostly they are used as a cheap way of getting intelligence.  Remember in WWI the use of mirrored tubes that enabled troops to look above trenches without getting their heads blown off?  Now there are drones.  China has sold Russia more than $100 million worth of these cheap "dual use" drones since the war began.  Amazon drones (for comparison) vary from $30 to $1500.  A hundred million buys a lot of them.
https://www.politico.eu/article/china-fi...hai-h-win/

All true. One of Ukraine's big problems is that you can't control or view the video from these drones when you are inside an IFV. The antennas don't work inside a can, and the comms antennas of the IFV don't interface to the controllers. If you are a dismount, it's fine.

Mines are a very old and very familiar weapon.

No doubt.  But from what various analysts have said--all far more knowledgeable than me--the quantity, depth, sophistication, and downright cheapness of mines today gives them a different order of magnitude of influence on the battlefield than in the past.

There is some truth to that. The main difference is that many "modern" mines are plastic and contain no metallic parts. Finding them with a conventional metal detector doesn't work. You need ground penetrating radar instead. The US has some of these, but I doubt Ukraine has much. That said, line charges/mine plows don't care what the mines are made of.  I think the thing that is throwing these analysts is that they just didn't understand that Russia has a virtually infinite supply of mines and the have had six months or more to lay them. What we see in Ukraine is actually very similar to what the US has done in Korea. We are vastly outnumbered so we have mined the heck out of it. None of this is really a surprise. We just haven't faced anybody who had the wherewithal and the time to do this type of minefield defense. Certainly in both WW I and WW II the Germans made extensive and successful use of mines. Their problem was they just didn't have enough of them. Russia has had many years to build many mines.

It might also be the doctrine behind their usage--their use in greater depth, and the mixture of different varieties.  Mines to stop tanks.  And mines to stop de-miners.

All old hat. The Germans used to put bouncing Bettys under/around their anti-tank mines. Take a look at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-mine. Like many things in this war, Russia is reverting to what they do well. The Russians do have some rather novel anti-personnel mines that are plastic, liquid explosives, and can be dispersed by artillery. For troops advancing on foot, these can be a real problem because they are hard to see and can be spread in areas where the de-mining has already been done.

Interesting that you mentioned the bocage fighting before the Normandy breakout.  What if this offensive is the equivalent of bocage fighting all the way to the Sea of Azov?  Can there be a breakout when mines can be laid almost as fast as Ukrainian troops seem to move?

The minefields that are causing the Ukrainians grief are not hastily laid by retreating Russians. These are prepared and defended minefields. They are not of unlimited scope. It is possible to get "through" them, and right now Russia isn't out there laying more minefields. Too dangerous. The mines the Russians will sow while retreating will be a problem but nothing like the current situation. The Russians do have at least two significant lines of defense between where Ukraine is now and Melitopol. Hopefully Ukraine will have some momentum and get through the second one faster. The lines of retreat can't be mined real well, so that should help.