[Softball Fan]

This war will end with a negotiated settlement or unfortunately the scenario in this link.  There's no way Putin will accept unconditional surrender or leaving with no new territory gained.  Putin will probably not fully abide by a treaty he signs.  But that will be true six months from now or six years from now.

https://www.aol.com/news/russias-medvede...27421.html

[Softball Fan]

This war will end with a negotiated settlement or unfortunately the scenario in this link.  There's no way Putin will accept unconditional surrender or leaving with no new territory gained.  Putin will probably not fully abide by a treaty he signs.  But that will be true six months from now or six years from now.

https://www.aol.com/news/russias-medvede...27421.html

[GK3]

This war will end with a negotiated settlement or unfortunately the scenario in this link.  There's no way Putin will accept unconditional surrender or leaving with no new territory gained.  Putin will probably not fully abide by a treaty he signs.  But that will be true six months from now or six years from now.

https://www.aol.com/news/russias-medvede...27421.html

Hard to see what sort of negotiated settlement is possible currently.  Would Putin accept that his invasion gained so little and lost so many lives?  Would Ukraine even accept to returning to the lines that existed before the invasion?
Would Ukraine even consider returning to the borders post Crimean takeover, but before the invasion?  Would Putin accept anything at all but total victory? If Putin goes, then maybe Ukraine accepts something like the status quo before the invasion. 
How long will the Russian populace accept the body bags being returned to the Rodina and how long will the West support the Ukraine. Unknowns, but probably critical to a solution.

[GK3]

This war will end with a negotiated settlement or unfortunately the scenario in this link.  There's no way Putin will accept unconditional surrender or leaving with no new territory gained.  Putin will probably not fully abide by a treaty he signs.  But that will be true six months from now or six years from now.

https://www.aol.com/news/russias-medvede...27421.html

Hard to see what sort of negotiated settlement is possible currently.  Would Putin accept that his invasion gained so little and lost so many lives?  Would Ukraine even accept to returning to the lines that existed before the invasion?
Would Ukraine even consider returning to the borders post Crimean takeover, but before the invasion?  Would Putin accept anything at all but total victory? If Putin goes, then maybe Ukraine accepts something like the status quo before the invasion. 
How long will the Russian populace accept the body bags being returned to the Rodina and how long will the West support the Ukraine. Unknowns, but probably critical to a solution.

[gocard14]

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/202...th-drones/

Old news, but the topic of USVs is an interesting one to me. While USVs seem unlikely to have a brobdingnagian impact in this conflict, they could be integral to a defense of Taiwan to the point where I’m surprised it isn’t a larger push/topic. China will need a large volume of  ships, many civilian to move men and materiel.  For the cost of a half dozen jets, they could get a fleet of likely thousands of USVs that could threaten all shipping in the straight. They could also be easily distributed, launched by small teams with a truck and trailer to make them less susceptible to long range bombardment.

[gocard14]

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/202...th-drones/

Old news, but the topic of USVs is an interesting one to me. While USVs seem unlikely to have a brobdingnagian impact in this conflict, they could be integral to a defense of Taiwan to the point where I’m surprised it isn’t a larger push/topic. China will need a large volume of  ships, many civilian to move men and materiel.  For the cost of a half dozen jets, they could get a fleet of likely thousands of USVs that could threaten all shipping in the straight. They could also be easily distributed, launched by small teams with a truck and trailer to make them less susceptible to long range bombardment.

[dabigv13]

Interesting article and video from CNN on these boats. 

https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/30/europe/uk...index.html

[dabigv13]

Interesting article and video from CNN on these boats. 

https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/30/europe/uk...index.html

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/f-16-pilot-tr...23891.html

The way forward in Ukraine absolutely needs to include a functional defensive air arm. The Ukraine needs to keep Russian air (including helicopters) off their troops. It is also probably essential that Ukraine possess enough offensive tac air to make holes in the Russian defensive fortifications and concentrations. At present, Ukraine is using artillery to accomplish this destruction. That is a "classical" way of accomplishing the task. Unfortunately it is by nature a very resource intensive process that is also relatively "slow". Concentrating enough artillery requires bringing many guns into a relatively small area and keeping them there long enough to accomplish their task. During this time these guns are pretty much fixed targets that the Russians can attack. Very large logistic efforts must be made to deliver the shells necessary to do the requisite damage.

Equally significantly, the Russians can detect the beginnings of such an artillery concentration and therefore know where Ukraine intends to attack. This allows the Russians to reinforce their defenses and to build a second line of defenses if necessary. For this reasons, both Russia and Ukraine often use multiple limited objective attacks to hopefully find "soft spots" where they can concentrate their forces. Unfortunately this usually doesn't work and it becomes a slugfest. Even when one side prevails, there are limited gains because the defenders simply fall back to the second line of defense that the slow rate of advance has allowed them to create.

The US discovered the obvious in WW II, namely that it is possible to "concentrate" very large tactical air forces at any given point in the enemy defenses at any time. These forces can deliver the effect of a sustained artillery barrage in a matter of hours. If the enemy cannot deny the airspace to the US forces, they have no chance. While this approach does have its problems (advancing tanks across moonscapes isn't easy), it can work. The enemy has no time to build a second line of defense because he doesn't have days of advance warning. This can create the fluid battlefield that the US (and NATO) want. Ukraine can't do this at present. They have to do it the "old fashioned way" and that is expensive in lives.

My concern here is that (as usual) we are late to the game here in creating a Ukrainian air capability. The article talks about a compressed training period of less than six months, more like four. If we had acted in the summer of 2022 to start training Ukrainian airmen (pilots and support personnel) it would have been reasonable to expect Ukraine to have been able to defend their airspace and cover their troops in summer of 2023. It would have been a real surprise if Ukraine could have developed a "good" tac air capability in a year. It isn't just learning to fly the planes. You need to understand the weapons systems and know as second nature how to employ them. Further, the upper echelons need to learn to plan the missions and arrange for all the details (fuel, weapons, de-confliction, EW support, maintenance standowns, etc.). This isn't something Warsaw pact units did much of, so their upper echelons have no experience doing it. It ain't easy, and the USAF has screwed it up often enough to prove that.

It appears to me that Ukraine is relying on the fact that 1) their airmen are very much above average (may be true, but dubious) and will "learn it all real fast", and 2) the Russians are somewhat inept in the air and Ukraine can compensate for a lack of training and a lack of numbers with superior morale and dedication. They may be right about the Russians not being stellar in the air, but Ukraine also has to understand the number of F-16s they will have is limited. For them, a 3:1 advantage in kill ratio is a loser. They need to be better than that, and IMO doing so in  4 months of training/experience isn't even vaguely possible. It absolutely isn't possible in a European winter where the idea of flying every day is impossible. Simulators are nice, but it isn't the "real thing". Ukraine can't afford a "failure" here, as it is a big logistical and resource intensive effort to integrate a new aircraft and a new set of tactics into your air force. It is NOTHING like learning to use a Patriot, which is mostly automatic anyway.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/f-16-pilot-tr...23891.html

The way forward in Ukraine absolutely needs to include a functional defensive air arm. The Ukraine needs to keep Russian air (including helicopters) off their troops. It is also probably essential that Ukraine possess enough offensive tac air to make holes in the Russian defensive fortifications and concentrations. At present, Ukraine is using artillery to accomplish this destruction. That is a "classical" way of accomplishing the task. Unfortunately it is by nature a very resource intensive process that is also relatively "slow". Concentrating enough artillery requires bringing many guns into a relatively small area and keeping them there long enough to accomplish their task. During this time these guns are pretty much fixed targets that the Russians can attack. Very large logistic efforts must be made to deliver the shells necessary to do the requisite damage.

Equally significantly, the Russians can detect the beginnings of such an artillery concentration and therefore know where Ukraine intends to attack. This allows the Russians to reinforce their defenses and to build a second line of defenses if necessary. For this reasons, both Russia and Ukraine often use multiple limited objective attacks to hopefully find "soft spots" where they can concentrate their forces. Unfortunately this usually doesn't work and it becomes a slugfest. Even when one side prevails, there are limited gains because the defenders simply fall back to the second line of defense that the slow rate of advance has allowed them to create.

The US discovered the obvious in WW II, namely that it is possible to "concentrate" very large tactical air forces at any given point in the enemy defenses at any time. These forces can deliver the effect of a sustained artillery barrage in a matter of hours. If the enemy cannot deny the airspace to the US forces, they have no chance. While this approach does have its problems (advancing tanks across moonscapes isn't easy), it can work. The enemy has no time to build a second line of defense because he doesn't have days of advance warning. This can create the fluid battlefield that the US (and NATO) want. Ukraine can't do this at present. They have to do it the "old fashioned way" and that is expensive in lives.

My concern here is that (as usual) we are late to the game here in creating a Ukrainian air capability. The article talks about a compressed training period of less than six months, more like four. If we had acted in the summer of 2022 to start training Ukrainian airmen (pilots and support personnel) it would have been reasonable to expect Ukraine to have been able to defend their airspace and cover their troops in summer of 2023. It would have been a real surprise if Ukraine could have developed a "good" tac air capability in a year. It isn't just learning to fly the planes. You need to understand the weapons systems and know as second nature how to employ them. Further, the upper echelons need to learn to plan the missions and arrange for all the details (fuel, weapons, de-confliction, EW support, maintenance standowns, etc.). This isn't something Warsaw pact units did much of, so their upper echelons have no experience doing it. It ain't easy, and the USAF has screwed it up often enough to prove that.

It appears to me that Ukraine is relying on the fact that 1) their airmen are very much above average (may be true, but dubious) and will "learn it all real fast", and 2) the Russians are somewhat inept in the air and Ukraine can compensate for a lack of training and a lack of numbers with superior morale and dedication. They may be right about the Russians not being stellar in the air, but Ukraine also has to understand the number of F-16s they will have is limited. For them, a 3:1 advantage in kill ratio is a loser. They need to be better than that, and IMO doing so in  4 months of training/experience isn't even vaguely possible. It absolutely isn't possible in a European winter where the idea of flying every day is impossible. Simulators are nice, but it isn't the "real thing". Ukraine can't afford a "failure" here, as it is a big logistical and resource intensive effort to integrate a new aircraft and a new set of tactics into your air force. It is NOTHING like learning to use a Patriot, which is mostly automatic anyway.

[gocard14]

Some interesting news coming out about a home-grown Ukrainian "flying bomb" or cruise missle, the "Trembita" 

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/j...mbita-bomb

It is basically a WW2 style V1 rocket with a simple pulse-jet engine that has no moving parts and runs on gasoline.  Small payload and short range (140km), but incredibly cheap at 10k for one with guidance systems and 3k for a decoy, reportedly hoping to make 1000 of them a month. 

Like the Shahed, this would be a cheap way to overwhelm air defenses and force the Russians to waste expensive missiles to shoot them down.

Just another thing that shows in modern warfare (at least in this war), many/simple/cheap may be better then few/complex/expensive.

[gocard14]

Some interesting news coming out about a home-grown Ukrainian "flying bomb" or cruise missle, the "Trembita" 

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/j...mbita-bomb

It is basically a WW2 style V1 rocket with a simple pulse-jet engine that has no moving parts and runs on gasoline.  Small payload and short range (140km), but incredibly cheap at 10k for one with guidance systems and 3k for a decoy, reportedly hoping to make 1000 of them a month. 

Like the Shahed, this would be a cheap way to overwhelm air defenses and force the Russians to waste expensive missiles to shoot them down.

Just another thing that shows in modern warfare (at least in this war), many/simple/cheap may be better then few/complex/expensive.

[TrumpCard]

Thanks to all contributing to this thread. It’s the main reason I still read here. The sports stuff is losing its magic.

[TrumpCard]

Thanks to all contributing to this thread. It’s the main reason I still read here. The sports stuff is losing its magic.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-situa...10506.html

As one might expect, training on the F-16 isn't quite as simple as originally suggested. That said, training on the F-16 in Europe is IMO outstandingly stupid. The US has a much larger training establishment and many more qualified instructors. We also have good weather in the southwest to allow flying almost every day even in the winter. We don't need to "set up a training establishment". We have one.

The article does correctly question what level of training will be required for the F-16 pilots to be combat effective. That is a very valid concern. Whatever that level may be, starting sooner rather than later is imperative. Ukraine might not survive another 12 months in this war. Both they and the "west" need to be prudent in not expecting too much too fast in the pilot training effort. That said, pissing away months getting started makes no sense. If they need improved English proficiency, bring them to the US and train them on that starting now. That takes no real changes as we already have such programs for foreign military personnel. Lets get on with it!

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-situa...10506.html

As one might expect, training on the F-16 isn't quite as simple as originally suggested. That said, training on the F-16 in Europe is IMO outstandingly stupid. The US has a much larger training establishment and many more qualified instructors. We also have good weather in the southwest to allow flying almost every day even in the winter. We don't need to "set up a training establishment". We have one.

The article does correctly question what level of training will be required for the F-16 pilots to be combat effective. That is a very valid concern. Whatever that level may be, starting sooner rather than later is imperative. Ukraine might not survive another 12 months in this war. Both they and the "west" need to be prudent in not expecting too much too fast in the pilot training effort. That said, pissing away months getting started makes no sense. If they need improved English proficiency, bring them to the US and train them on that starting now. That takes no real changes as we already have such programs for foreign military personnel. Lets get on with it!

[Goose]

https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-t...-kupiansk/

For a long time Ukraine fought to defend Bakhmut despite the fact it had no obvious strategic value. Kupiansk is a different story. Ukraine needs to keep Kupiansk, period. It is a critical link in the Russian GLOCs and Ukraine holding it really puts a hurt on Russia. Ukraine needs to keep it, come what may.

[Goose]

https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-t...-kupiansk/

For a long time Ukraine fought to defend Bakhmut despite the fact it had no obvious strategic value. Kupiansk is a different story. Ukraine needs to keep Kupiansk, period. It is a critical link in the Russian GLOCs and Ukraine holding it really puts a hurt on Russia. Ukraine needs to keep it, come what may.

[M T]

The above link lead to two articles that seem of interest...

Another Russian General that probably hopes for a windowless room so he can't accidentally fall out of it.

I missed that Russia boarded a Turkish (Palau-flagged) ship in international waters.
 
Later coverage included this statement

"If Russia starts seizing vessels or seeks to scare them away, I think it likely NATO will respond by supporting a humanitarian corridor for shipping," [ex-US Admiral] Stavridis said. The alliance could protect vessels going to and from the Ukrainian port of Odesa "with NATO combat aircraft overhead and possibly NATO warships in escort."

Such a corridor opens the possibility of aggressive actions (that Russian aircraft have done) leading to a direct NATO - Russia event, and the consequences downstream of that.

[M T]

The above link lead to two articles that seem of interest...

Another Russian General that probably hopes for a windowless room so he can't accidentally fall out of it.

I missed that Russia boarded a Turkish (Palau-flagged) ship in international waters.
 
Later coverage included this statement

"If Russia starts seizing vessels or seeks to scare them away, I think it likely NATO will respond by supporting a humanitarian corridor for shipping," [ex-US Admiral] Stavridis said. The alliance could protect vessels going to and from the Ukrainian port of Odesa "with NATO combat aircraft overhead and possibly NATO warships in escort."

Such a corridor opens the possibility of aggressive actions (that Russian aircraft have done) leading to a direct NATO - Russia event, and the consequences downstream of that.

[Mudhead]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-situa...10506.html

As one might expect, training on the F-16 isn't quite as simple as originally suggested. That said, training on the F-16 in Europe is IMO outstandingly stupid. The US has a much larger training establishment and many more qualified instructors. We also have good weather in the southwest to allow flying almost every day even in the winter. We don't need to "set up a training establishment". We have one.

The article does correctly question what level of training will be required for the F-16 pilots to be combat effective. That is a very valid concern. Whatever that level may be, starting sooner rather than later is imperative. Ukraine might not survive another 12 months in this war. Both they and the "west" need to be prudent in not expecting too much too fast in the pilot training effort. That said, pissing away months getting started makes no sense. If they need improved English proficiency, bring them to the US and train them on that starting now. That takes no real changes as we already have such programs for foreign military personnel. Lets get on with it!

I may be dreaming but it seems like some decent AI and few more Mpus and pilot “training” coukd be accelerated. We know the F16, qw know the missions the Ikranians have to fly and we know the threats. Granted, it’s a bit more like a smart drone but coukd t we boost pilot proficiency with some software smarts?

This is not an informed suggestion, more of a question to those who might know.

[Mudhead]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-situa...10506.html

As one might expect, training on the F-16 isn't quite as simple as originally suggested. That said, training on the F-16 in Europe is IMO outstandingly stupid. The US has a much larger training establishment and many more qualified instructors. We also have good weather in the southwest to allow flying almost every day even in the winter. We don't need to "set up a training establishment". We have one.

The article does correctly question what level of training will be required for the F-16 pilots to be combat effective. That is a very valid concern. Whatever that level may be, starting sooner rather than later is imperative. Ukraine might not survive another 12 months in this war. Both they and the "west" need to be prudent in not expecting too much too fast in the pilot training effort. That said, pissing away months getting started makes no sense. If they need improved English proficiency, bring them to the US and train them on that starting now. That takes no real changes as we already have such programs for foreign military personnel. Lets get on with it!

I may be dreaming but it seems like some decent AI and few more Mpus and pilot “training” coukd be accelerated. We know the F16, qw know the missions the Ikranians have to fly and we know the threats. Granted, it’s a bit more like a smart drone but coukd t we boost pilot proficiency with some software smarts?

This is not an informed suggestion, more of a question to those who might know.

[M T]

I may be dreaming but it seems like some decent AI and few more Mpus and pilot “training” coukd be accelerated. We know the F16, qw know the missions the Ikranians have to fly and we know the threats. Granted, it’s a bit more like a smart drone but coukd t we boost pilot proficiency with some software smarts?

This is not an informed suggestion, more of a question to those who might know.

I lived through the boom and bust of AI fifty years ago.  I do hope it is different this time, but I personally believe the boom is ahead of the reality. It seems the dream that AI can do anything has risen from the grave.

[M T]

I may be dreaming but it seems like some decent AI and few more Mpus and pilot “training” coukd be accelerated. We know the F16, qw know the missions the Ikranians have to fly and we know the threats. Granted, it’s a bit more like a smart drone but coukd t we boost pilot proficiency with some software smarts?

This is not an informed suggestion, more of a question to those who might know.

I lived through the boom and bust of AI fifty years ago.  I do hope it is different this time, but I personally believe the boom is ahead of the reality. It seems the dream that AI can do anything has risen from the grave.

[Goose]

I may be dreaming but it seems like some decent AI and few more Mpus and pilot “training” coukd be accelerated. We know the F16, qw know the missions the Ikranians have to fly and we know the threats. Granted, it’s a bit more like a smart drone but coukd t we boost pilot proficiency with some software smarts?

This is not an informed suggestion, more of a question to those who might know.

I lived through the boom and bust of AI fifty years ago.  I do hope it is different this time, but I personally believe the boom is ahead of the reality.  It seems the dream that AI can do anything has risen from the grave.

Perhaps it is generational, but "me too". As far as using AI in a fighter aircraft, the US does not yet know how to do it. We are, and have been trying. We can do some things with it. Interestingly, the QF-16 drones used in air-to-air training can be used that way.
https://www.popularmechanics.com/militar...-16-drone/
https://defensescoop.com/2023/02/14/ai-a...ghter-jet/

It is happening, but it is far from ready for prime time, even best case. Of the many problems being targeted by AI, flying a fighter aircraft is one of the easier ones conceptually. So far, nobody has anything close to a practical beta model for general use.

[Goose]

I may be dreaming but it seems like some decent AI and few more Mpus and pilot “training” coukd be accelerated. We know the F16, qw know the missions the Ikranians have to fly and we know the threats. Granted, it’s a bit more like a smart drone but coukd t we boost pilot proficiency with some software smarts?

This is not an informed suggestion, more of a question to those who might know.

I lived through the boom and bust of AI fifty years ago.  I do hope it is different this time, but I personally believe the boom is ahead of the reality.  It seems the dream that AI can do anything has risen from the grave.

Perhaps it is generational, but "me too". As far as using AI in a fighter aircraft, the US does not yet know how to do it. We are, and have been trying. We can do some things with it. Interestingly, the QF-16 drones used in air-to-air training can be used that way.
https://www.popularmechanics.com/militar...-16-drone/
https://defensescoop.com/2023/02/14/ai-a...ghter-jet/

It is happening, but it is far from ready for prime time, even best case. Of the many problems being targeted by AI, flying a fighter aircraft is one of the easier ones conceptually. So far, nobody has anything close to a practical beta model for general use.

[M T]

LA Times:  The US has approved the Netherlands to send F-16's to Ukraine.  The timeline of any such delivery was not in the article.
It seems this is just another step along the path.  This doesn't imply that Ukraine pilots are ready to fly the planes in combat.

While the full utilization of the planes is for air cover at the front lines, could they be used behind the lines to good purpose at low risk while the pilots continue training for combat?   They're going to be targets for Russia whether they are on the ground or in the air.

[M T]

LA Times:  The US has approved the Netherlands to send F-16's to Ukraine.  The timeline of any such delivery was not in the article.
It seems this is just another step along the path.  This doesn't imply that Ukraine pilots are ready to fly the planes in combat.

While the full utilization of the planes is for air cover at the front lines, could they be used behind the lines to good purpose at low risk while the pilots continue training for combat?   They're going to be targets for Russia whether they are on the ground or in the air.

[Goose]

While the full utilization of the planes is for air cover at the front lines, could they be used behind the lines to good purpose at low risk while the pilots continue training for combat?   They're going to be targets for Russia whether they are on the ground or in the air.

The main "obvious" use behind the lines would be killing Iranian drones. Jets can do this quite well. The problem is that these operations take place at low altitude and require significant skill at flying "low and slow". With inexperienced pilots a lot of accidents are probable. This isn't "easy duty". Flying at all in Ukraine carries significant risk. It also puts a strain on logistics. Therefore, to do it at all should produce proportional reward. Unlikely that can be done short of combat.

In fact, Ukraine is being give a significant "gift" by having a sanctuary in NATO territory to train it's pilots. It should take advantage of this as much as possible. Nobody should return to Ukraine until they are actually ready to enter the fight. Training pilots is both time consuming and expensive. Despite great pressure to get them into the fight, experience has shown that there are minimum levels of proficiency below which attrition will be prohibitive. Even with such training, "new guys" generally have a significantly higher loss rate despite the fact they are "coddled" early on. The enemy is trying to kill you and the jet is trying to kill you. Many actions have to be automatic and immediate when a problem arises. If the pilots are not well trained, lots of them will die due to the ubiquitous "pilot error". Even if they are well trained, some will.

UPDATE: https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-makin...00277.html
The US has offered to help train pilots if "more capacity is needed". Well, for sure it is. Get these guys to the US and provide them with the normally good desert weather so they can fly every day in the winter. Have enough pilots in one place that they can practice working together. We have the facilities to do this and they are operational. Let's use them!
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-makin...00277.html

[Goose]

While the full utilization of the planes is for air cover at the front lines, could they be used behind the lines to good purpose at low risk while the pilots continue training for combat?   They're going to be targets for Russia whether they are on the ground or in the air.

The main "obvious" use behind the lines would be killing Iranian drones. Jets can do this quite well. The problem is that these operations take place at low altitude and require significant skill at flying "low and slow". With inexperienced pilots a lot of accidents are probable. This isn't "easy duty". Flying at all in Ukraine carries significant risk. It also puts a strain on logistics. Therefore, to do it at all should produce proportional reward. Unlikely that can be done short of combat.

In fact, Ukraine is being give a significant "gift" by having a sanctuary in NATO territory to train it's pilots. It should take advantage of this as much as possible. Nobody should return to Ukraine until they are actually ready to enter the fight. Training pilots is both time consuming and expensive. Despite great pressure to get them into the fight, experience has shown that there are minimum levels of proficiency below which attrition will be prohibitive. Even with such training, "new guys" generally have a significantly higher loss rate despite the fact they are "coddled" early on. The enemy is trying to kill you and the jet is trying to kill you. Many actions have to be automatic and immediate when a problem arises. If the pilots are not well trained, lots of them will die due to the ubiquitous "pilot error". Even if they are well trained, some will.

UPDATE: https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-makin...00277.html
The US has offered to help train pilots if "more capacity is needed". Well, for sure it is. Get these guys to the US and provide them with the normally good desert weather so they can fly every day in the winter. Have enough pilots in one place that they can practice working together. We have the facilities to do this and they are operational. Let's use them!
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-makin...00277.html

[Goose]

It is getting near the end of the "fighting season" in Ukraine. Ukraine is unfortunately well short of it's primary objective, Melitopol. While it is unwise to underestimate them, it looks like Ukraine is not going to cut the land bridge this year, at least as of now. Obviously, this isn't good. It is also clear that Ukraine has suffered significant losses in personnel. Attacking across the vast minefields Russia put in place is not ever going to be "safe", and so far Ukraine has been smart about how they have proceeded. Ukraine still has some time, and they have been putting a lot of pressure on Russian logistics. As many others have written, Russia must defend everywhere, and Ukraine only needs to break through in one place. Let's hope they can.

Ukraine may have to start addressing morale issues going forward, as their progress to date isn't stunning. However, I will believe this year's offensive is officially over only when Ukraine closes the back door on Bakhmut. That is their consolation prize if all else fails. They haven't claimed it yet.

[Goose]

It is getting near the end of the "fighting season" in Ukraine. Ukraine is unfortunately well short of it's primary objective, Melitopol. While it is unwise to underestimate them, it looks like Ukraine is not going to cut the land bridge this year, at least as of now. Obviously, this isn't good. It is also clear that Ukraine has suffered significant losses in personnel. Attacking across the vast minefields Russia put in place is not ever going to be "safe", and so far Ukraine has been smart about how they have proceeded. Ukraine still has some time, and they have been putting a lot of pressure on Russian logistics. As many others have written, Russia must defend everywhere, and Ukraine only needs to break through in one place. Let's hope they can.

Ukraine may have to start addressing morale issues going forward, as their progress to date isn't stunning. However, I will believe this year's offensive is officially over only when Ukraine closes the back door on Bakhmut. That is their consolation prize if all else fails. They haven't claimed it yet.

[81alum]

It is getting near the end of the "fighting season" in Ukraine. Ukraine is unfortunately well short of it's primary objective, Melitopol. While it is unwise to underestimate them, it looks like Ukraine is not going to cut the land bridge this year, at least as of now. Obviously, this isn't good. It is also clear that Ukraine has suffered significant losses in personnel. Attacking across the vast minefields Russia put in place is not ever going to be "safe", and so far Ukraine has been smart about how they have proceeded. Ukraine still has some time, and they have been putting a lot of pressure on Russian logistics. As many others have written, Russia must defend everywhere, and Ukraine only needs to break through in one place. Let's hope they can.

Ukraine may have to start addressing morale issues going forward, as their progress to date isn't stunning. However, I will believe this year's offensive is officially over only when Ukraine closes the back door on Bakhmut. That is their consolation prize if all else fails. They haven't claimed it yet.

Given the tools the two sides have to work with, it sure feels like WWI, with enormous expenditures of men and material to make little bulges in the lines.  Very disheartening.  And if it was difficult to make progress this season, imagine what it will be like after another year for the Russians to dig even deeper, deploy more mines, and replenish their artillery shells.

[81alum]

It is getting near the end of the "fighting season" in Ukraine. Ukraine is unfortunately well short of it's primary objective, Melitopol. While it is unwise to underestimate them, it looks like Ukraine is not going to cut the land bridge this year, at least as of now. Obviously, this isn't good. It is also clear that Ukraine has suffered significant losses in personnel. Attacking across the vast minefields Russia put in place is not ever going to be "safe", and so far Ukraine has been smart about how they have proceeded. Ukraine still has some time, and they have been putting a lot of pressure on Russian logistics. As many others have written, Russia must defend everywhere, and Ukraine only needs to break through in one place. Let's hope they can.

Ukraine may have to start addressing morale issues going forward, as their progress to date isn't stunning. However, I will believe this year's offensive is officially over only when Ukraine closes the back door on Bakhmut. That is their consolation prize if all else fails. They haven't claimed it yet.

Given the tools the two sides have to work with, it sure feels like WWI, with enormous expenditures of men and material to make little bulges in the lines.  Very disheartening.  And if it was difficult to make progress this season, imagine what it will be like after another year for the Russians to dig even deeper, deploy more mines, and replenish their artillery shells.

[Goose]

It is getting near the end of the "fighting season" in Ukraine. Ukraine is unfortunately well short of it's primary objective, Melitopol. While it is unwise to underestimate them, it looks like Ukraine is not going to cut the land bridge this year, at least as of now. Obviously, this isn't good. It is also clear that Ukraine has suffered significant losses in personnel. Attacking across the vast minefields Russia put in place is not ever going to be "safe", and so far Ukraine has been smart about how they have proceeded. Ukraine still has some time, and they have been putting a lot of pressure on Russian logistics. As many others have written, Russia must defend everywhere, and Ukraine only needs to break through in one place. Let's hope they can.

Ukraine may have to start addressing morale issues going forward, as their progress to date isn't stunning. However, I will believe this year's offensive is officially over only when Ukraine closes the back door on Bakhmut. That is their consolation prize if all else fails. They haven't claimed it yet.

Given the tools the two sides have to work with, it sure feels like WWI, with enormous expenditures of men and material to make little bulges in the lines.  Very disheartening.  And if it was difficult to make progress this season, imagine what it will be like after another year for the Russians to dig even deeper, deploy more mines, and replenish their artillery shells.

It is correct that there are many WWI aspects of this war. However, things like drones are adding some interesting "side effects". Ukraine is clearly of the opinion that if it has an effective air force they can break the stalemate. Clearing minefields and taking trenches is much easier if they have been bombed continuously while the battle is fought. Artillery can do this, but is difficult to concentrate quickly and undetected. Aircraft can concentrate in minutes from disparate directions. This makes it much easier to overwhelm a defensive position before support can be rushed to the spot. In this I think there is much merit. The question is how long can Ukraine hold on while creating such an air force.

Russia and Ukraine both have economic and political constraints that can end the war too. WWI ended mostly because Germany couldn't continue. They were out of food and also out of nitrates for explosives. The Kaiserschlacht offensive was a desperate attempt to win before Germany collapsed. The arrival of US troops sealed the deal, but Germany was done for by then. That is why their army basically fell apart. Russia has been attacking Ukraine's civilian economy all along. Ukraine is now doing some of that to Russia, particularly in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Ukraine is also showing the Russian people that they are not immune in this war. Maybe some of these efforts will have significant results. Who Knows?

[Goose]

It is getting near the end of the "fighting season" in Ukraine. Ukraine is unfortunately well short of it's primary objective, Melitopol. While it is unwise to underestimate them, it looks like Ukraine is not going to cut the land bridge this year, at least as of now. Obviously, this isn't good. It is also clear that Ukraine has suffered significant losses in personnel. Attacking across the vast minefields Russia put in place is not ever going to be "safe", and so far Ukraine has been smart about how they have proceeded. Ukraine still has some time, and they have been putting a lot of pressure on Russian logistics. As many others have written, Russia must defend everywhere, and Ukraine only needs to break through in one place. Let's hope they can.

Ukraine may have to start addressing morale issues going forward, as their progress to date isn't stunning. However, I will believe this year's offensive is officially over only when Ukraine closes the back door on Bakhmut. That is their consolation prize if all else fails. They haven't claimed it yet.

Given the tools the two sides have to work with, it sure feels like WWI, with enormous expenditures of men and material to make little bulges in the lines.  Very disheartening.  And if it was difficult to make progress this season, imagine what it will be like after another year for the Russians to dig even deeper, deploy more mines, and replenish their artillery shells.

It is correct that there are many WWI aspects of this war. However, things like drones are adding some interesting "side effects". Ukraine is clearly of the opinion that if it has an effective air force they can break the stalemate. Clearing minefields and taking trenches is much easier if they have been bombed continuously while the battle is fought. Artillery can do this, but is difficult to concentrate quickly and undetected. Aircraft can concentrate in minutes from disparate directions. This makes it much easier to overwhelm a defensive position before support can be rushed to the spot. In this I think there is much merit. The question is how long can Ukraine hold on while creating such an air force.

Russia and Ukraine both have economic and political constraints that can end the war too. WWI ended mostly because Germany couldn't continue. They were out of food and also out of nitrates for explosives. The Kaiserschlacht offensive was a desperate attempt to win before Germany collapsed. The arrival of US troops sealed the deal, but Germany was done for by then. That is why their army basically fell apart. Russia has been attacking Ukraine's civilian economy all along. Ukraine is now doing some of that to Russia, particularly in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Ukraine is also showing the Russian people that they are not immune in this war. Maybe some of these efforts will have significant results. Who Knows?

[Goose]

https://www.businessinsider.com/us-suppl...ort-2023-8

Deploying a unit based on Strykers should mean you have a road that you intend to rapidly exploit to outmaneuver your opponent. That is what wheeled APCs are good at. Bradleys are better for cross-country operations. While it may "normally"  be assumed that Strykers are intended to operate on roads, in Ukraine, that isn't certain. Let's hope this unit is "fit for purpose", whatever that purpose may be.

[Goose]

https://www.businessinsider.com/us-suppl...ort-2023-8

Deploying a unit based on Strykers should mean you have a road that you intend to rapidly exploit to outmaneuver your opponent. That is what wheeled APCs are good at. Bradleys are better for cross-country operations. While it may "normally"  be assumed that Strykers are intended to operate on roads, in Ukraine, that isn't certain. Let's hope this unit is "fit for purpose", whatever that purpose may be.

[dabigv13]

Netherlands and Denmark announced the donation of their F16's today, as expected.

Good article on road ahead now.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/uk...neral-says

But even if Ukraine does get F-16s next year, it won't likely have enough pilots who can fly them into combat to anywhere near their potential before 2027, Hecker said.

“You can get proficient on some weapons systems fairly quickly. “It takes a while to build a couple of squadrons of F-16s and to get their readiness high enough and their proficiency high enough. This could be four or five years down the road.”

Seems that even if they had been fast tracked from the start, they would not really have made a substantial difference in the current offensive. Still will be a good capability to have at some point obviously.

[dabigv13]

Netherlands and Denmark announced the donation of their F16's today, as expected.

Good article on road ahead now.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/uk...neral-says

But even if Ukraine does get F-16s next year, it won't likely have enough pilots who can fly them into combat to anywhere near their potential before 2027, Hecker said.

“You can get proficient on some weapons systems fairly quickly. “It takes a while to build a couple of squadrons of F-16s and to get their readiness high enough and their proficiency high enough. This could be four or five years down the road.”

Seems that even if they had been fast tracked from the start, they would not really have made a substantial difference in the current offensive. Still will be a good capability to have at some point obviously.