[Goose]

So would you rather have electrified line or non electrified line in a war zone.  I suppose you could run regular diesel electric engines and forget about electrification, but do you have enough rolling stock.  Lots of issues for such a big country have to try and manage with such a limited population who can do it.

It is universally true that non-electrified lines are easier to operate unless the traffic density is quite high, both in peace and war.  The the track, the traction (locomotives), and the electric infrastructure (catenary and power conversion system) are required for electric traction. With diesel-electric, the locomotives generate their own electricity. No additional electric infrastructure required. The diesel locomotives require more maintenance than the pure electric ones do (because of the diesel engine and electric generator. They are also less "green", but I don't think Russia cares about that much :-). However, that can be done in a centralized heated facility. Maintenance of the catenary requires people out in the snow over very long distances. It is much harder. Add to that the fact that in war, the catenary is a target that doesn't exist with self-generating locomotives. If any part of the catenary is non-functional, you can't use the line. None of the engines can cross the "dead" area. OTOH, a damaged diesel locomotive can just be coupled to by the replacement. Much easier.

[Goose]

So would you rather have electrified line or non electrified line in a war zone.  I suppose you could run regular diesel electric engines and forget about electrification, but do you have enough rolling stock.  Lots of issues for such a big country have to try and manage with such a limited population who can do it.

It is universally true that non-electrified lines are easier to operate unless the traffic density is quite high, both in peace and war.  The the track, the traction (locomotives), and the electric infrastructure (catenary and power conversion system) are required for electric traction. With diesel-electric, the locomotives generate their own electricity. No additional electric infrastructure required. The diesel locomotives require more maintenance than the pure electric ones do (because of the diesel engine and electric generator. They are also less "green", but I don't think Russia cares about that much :-). However, that can be done in a centralized heated facility. Maintenance of the catenary requires people out in the snow over very long distances. It is much harder. Add to that the fact that in war, the catenary is a target that doesn't exist with self-generating locomotives. If any part of the catenary is non-functional, you can't use the line. None of the engines can cross the "dead" area. OTOH, a damaged diesel locomotive can just be coupled to by the replacement. Much easier.

[TrumpCard]

This is a difficult struggle without much hope of anything better in the near term future:

Belarusian democratic movement in exile

[TrumpCard]

This is a difficult struggle without much hope of anything better in the near term future:

Belarusian democratic movement in exile

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-coun...02776.html

Somewhat interesting article on the offensive. There are a lot of pieces of information in this article, but after reading it I was left with the feeling the "answers" are elusive. To me, it is inconceivable that the Ukrainians (in particular) and NATO (in general) was unaware of the extent of Russian defenses. That aspect of the explanation just doesn't hold water.

It seems that the Ukrainian counteroffensive was somewhat similar in nature to the Dyle Plan in WW II. Nobody in the military really thought it would work, but "what else is there?". Ukraine was indeed fighting using troops that were inadequately trained. Everybody knew that. They were fighting without air superiority. Everybody knew that. They were fighting on many fronts and therefore were not free to move troops around at will. Everybody knew that. These facts made the offensive difficult to execute. Ukraine did make lots of progress in the face of these problems, any one of which could derail the offensive. There were other problems however that may be even more serious.

Ukraine was operating in a politically difficult environment. There people of Ukraine wanted to drive the Russians out. NATO was pushing Ukraine to conduct an offensive while at the same time pointing out the deficiencies of it's troops and capabilities. NATO also was unable/unwilling to provide adequate forces (particularly mine breaching equipment and air power) to overcome Russian defenses "on the bounce". A lot of that problem is caused by the fact that essentially all NATO commanders are 1) not experienced in fighting near-peer competitors (or even well organized, disciplined, military of any kind), and 2) owe their positions to their "military political" abilities, not their ability to lead troops, plan battles and execute logistics. Part of this is the inevitable consequences of a long period (30 years or so) of relative "peace" in Europe. This is exacerbated by the internal political situation in most of the EU, where nobody wants to spend money on defense. To do so is inconvenient and not popular. Therefore, for many years the political parties all said it was unnecessary. Generals who disagreed lost their jobs.

The situation in the US was somewhat different, as "defense" was still given lip service. We had to fight "ISIS", so we re-directed our military to do that, not to fight any real nation-state. It was almost amusing to watch the Navy contort itself to be "relevant" to the "war on terror". The "blueberries" certainly helped camouflage the ships crew. This resulted in lots of officers that were worried about what were arguably the wrong things. The LCS is a great example of a bad idea made worse by tinkering, trying to be all things to all men, and requirements defined without a real military purpose behind them. The fact is that the Navy could do some things in the war on terror that were critical. Naval air was needed in many cases because there were no land-based locations available. However, most of what the Navy does and should do is not relevant to fighting terrorists. To protect their budget, they needed to pretend otherwise, so they did.   IMO the results of the "Charm School" for general officers count for more than whatever the officers accomplished in their former career or their military educational performance. It is all about "politics" of various kinds. This situation resulted in "the west" giving Ukraine a lot of "advice" that caused the Ukrainians to just roll their eyes. 

The west completely failed to understand what Ukraine was up against. Our wonderful "intelligence system" undoubtedly produced the data that clearly showed the problems. However, we didn't prioritize getting mine-breaching systems into Ukraine. This is partly caused by the fact we ourselves have inadequate mine warfare assets, both offensive and defensive. If we were going to send Ukraine forward using "NATO tactics" we owed them our best efforts. They didn't get that. We also knew Ukraine didn't have anywhere near the air assets to execute "NATO style" tactics. The US has never fought without the AO, but we expected Ukraine to do so. To be fair, Ukraine may have underestimated how important air superiority (at least locally) would be. However, their former military doctrine (Russian derived) accepted the fact that was OK. They didn't know better perhaps. NATO absolutely should have. The subsequent F-16 fiasco occurred because Ukraine finally realized that their offensives couldn't work without it. Duh. Well, better late than never.

Ukraine can get F-16s and begin offensives "later". The "bulge" toward the M-14 and Melitopol', purchased with so much blood, is still very valuable and can be exploited. However the "failure" of the Ukrainian offensive is causing some internal political and strategic problems in Ukraine. How serious these problems are is not yet clear, but they could be a game-changer.  Zelenskyy has exhibited great leadership and has enjoyed relative political immunity. That is no longer true. He is in a bit of conflict with his military, which could be very serious. Ukraine needs to regenerate it's manpower, and that also is contentious. Zelenskyy is also trying to root out corruption in his country, which would be difficult in the best of times. He needs to do this to join the EU. However, it makes him lots of enemies in a country that has always has corruption issues. On top of all this, Ukraine's economy is in horrible shape and the Russians are firing missiles into the cities every night. Hard to be politically popular under these conditions. Bottom line, Zelenskyy is viewed in his country as "responsible" for the "failed" offensive. No way around that.

The simple fact is the west has to "do better". Zelenskyy and Ukraine need some "good news" soon that is real. This is no time for debate. That time was back when we decided to help Ukraine. We need them to "win", and need to help make that happen ASAP. The war is not "lost". Ukraine has actually done very well given the hand they were dealt. One more year of war is probably all they are physically capable of. After that, I see no way Ukraine will hold together.

OTOH, Ukraine has overcome large pieces of the Surovikin line. With adequate air power, they can definitely make things difficult for Russia. The incursions on the left bank of the Dnipro are increasing the pressure and causing the Russians to commit manpower in that area they dearly do not want to. It may be Ukraine intends to let Russia make the "first move" and will remain on the defensive in the spring in order to give the F-16 training as much time as possible. That may be fine. This is especially true if it is accompanied with continued operations in Crimea. However, by summer Ukraine must be ready to go.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-coun...02776.html

Somewhat interesting article on the offensive. There are a lot of pieces of information in this article, but after reading it I was left with the feeling the "answers" are elusive. To me, it is inconceivable that the Ukrainians (in particular) and NATO (in general) was unaware of the extent of Russian defenses. That aspect of the explanation just doesn't hold water.

It seems that the Ukrainian counteroffensive was somewhat similar in nature to the Dyle Plan in WW II. Nobody in the military really thought it would work, but "what else is there?". Ukraine was indeed fighting using troops that were inadequately trained. Everybody knew that. They were fighting without air superiority. Everybody knew that. They were fighting on many fronts and therefore were not free to move troops around at will. Everybody knew that. These facts made the offensive difficult to execute. Ukraine did make lots of progress in the face of these problems, any one of which could derail the offensive. There were other problems however that may be even more serious.

Ukraine was operating in a politically difficult environment. There people of Ukraine wanted to drive the Russians out. NATO was pushing Ukraine to conduct an offensive while at the same time pointing out the deficiencies of it's troops and capabilities. NATO also was unable/unwilling to provide adequate forces (particularly mine breaching equipment and air power) to overcome Russian defenses "on the bounce". A lot of that problem is caused by the fact that essentially all NATO commanders are 1) not experienced in fighting near-peer competitors (or even well organized, disciplined, military of any kind), and 2) owe their positions to their "military political" abilities, not their ability to lead troops, plan battles and execute logistics. Part of this is the inevitable consequences of a long period (30 years or so) of relative "peace" in Europe. This is exacerbated by the internal political situation in most of the EU, where nobody wants to spend money on defense. To do so is inconvenient and not popular. Therefore, for many years the political parties all said it was unnecessary. Generals who disagreed lost their jobs.

The situation in the US was somewhat different, as "defense" was still given lip service. We had to fight "ISIS", so we re-directed our military to do that, not to fight any real nation-state. It was almost amusing to watch the Navy contort itself to be "relevant" to the "war on terror". The "blueberries" certainly helped camouflage the ships crew. This resulted in lots of officers that were worried about what were arguably the wrong things. The LCS is a great example of a bad idea made worse by tinkering, trying to be all things to all men, and requirements defined without a real military purpose behind them. The fact is that the Navy could do some things in the war on terror that were critical. Naval air was needed in many cases because there were no land-based locations available. However, most of what the Navy does and should do is not relevant to fighting terrorists. To protect their budget, they needed to pretend otherwise, so they did.   IMO the results of the "Charm School" for general officers count for more than whatever the officers accomplished in their former career or their military educational performance. It is all about "politics" of various kinds. This situation resulted in "the west" giving Ukraine a lot of "advice" that caused the Ukrainians to just roll their eyes. 

The west completely failed to understand what Ukraine was up against. Our wonderful "intelligence system" undoubtedly produced the data that clearly showed the problems. However, we didn't prioritize getting mine-breaching systems into Ukraine. This is partly caused by the fact we ourselves have inadequate mine warfare assets, both offensive and defensive. If we were going to send Ukraine forward using "NATO tactics" we owed them our best efforts. They didn't get that. We also knew Ukraine didn't have anywhere near the air assets to execute "NATO style" tactics. The US has never fought without the AO, but we expected Ukraine to do so. To be fair, Ukraine may have underestimated how important air superiority (at least locally) would be. However, their former military doctrine (Russian derived) accepted the fact that was OK. They didn't know better perhaps. NATO absolutely should have. The subsequent F-16 fiasco occurred because Ukraine finally realized that their offensives couldn't work without it. Duh. Well, better late than never.

Ukraine can get F-16s and begin offensives "later". The "bulge" toward the M-14 and Melitopol', purchased with so much blood, is still very valuable and can be exploited. However the "failure" of the Ukrainian offensive is causing some internal political and strategic problems in Ukraine. How serious these problems are is not yet clear, but they could be a game-changer.  Zelenskyy has exhibited great leadership and has enjoyed relative political immunity. That is no longer true. He is in a bit of conflict with his military, which could be very serious. Ukraine needs to regenerate it's manpower, and that also is contentious. Zelenskyy is also trying to root out corruption in his country, which would be difficult in the best of times. He needs to do this to join the EU. However, it makes him lots of enemies in a country that has always has corruption issues. On top of all this, Ukraine's economy is in horrible shape and the Russians are firing missiles into the cities every night. Hard to be politically popular under these conditions. Bottom line, Zelenskyy is viewed in his country as "responsible" for the "failed" offensive. No way around that.

The simple fact is the west has to "do better". Zelenskyy and Ukraine need some "good news" soon that is real. This is no time for debate. That time was back when we decided to help Ukraine. We need them to "win", and need to help make that happen ASAP. The war is not "lost". Ukraine has actually done very well given the hand they were dealt. One more year of war is probably all they are physically capable of. After that, I see no way Ukraine will hold together.

OTOH, Ukraine has overcome large pieces of the Surovikin line. With adequate air power, they can definitely make things difficult for Russia. The incursions on the left bank of the Dnipro are increasing the pressure and causing the Russians to commit manpower in that area they dearly do not want to. It may be Ukraine intends to let Russia make the "first move" and will remain on the defensive in the spring in order to give the F-16 training as much time as possible. That may be fine. This is especially true if it is accompanied with continued operations in Crimea. However, by summer Ukraine must be ready to go.

[shakrat]

Thank you very much for sharing these thoughts, Goose, and for all your other contributions to this thread.

[shakrat]

Thank you very much for sharing these thoughts, Goose, and for all your other contributions to this thread.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-army-unvei...00024.html

"Interesting" article. Here is a quote from Doug Bush, Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.

He added that the rapid development and deployment of this capability serve as a "shining example" of the U.S. Army's aggressive use of new procurement authorities granted by the U.S. Congress to swiftly acquire enhanced equipment for American soldiers.

Orwellian beyond words!!! The PrSM program languished for years as the "long range precision fires" requirement, issued in 2016. Taking 7 YEARS to develop an upgrade to an existing system isn't "swift" in any world I live in. On top of that, this missile isn't even the one the Army intends to use. They were testing "upgrades" to the seeker (of this as of then not yet deployed missile) in 2020. These "upgrades" aren't scheduled for deployment until 2025! Before anybody gets too excited about the range "in excess of 500 kM", consider the weight of the warhead is 91 kg. It better be a "precision" strike (on something not too sturdy) with such a small warhead.

The delay in this program was substantially due to 1) the Army not really knowing what it wanted, 2) constraints on the launch platform and the (ostensible) purpose of the missile, and 3) the changing treaty restrictions on "short range" ballistic missiles. The program started under the assumption the missile must have a range of at most 500 km, which was the treaty limit. Those "in the know" suspected that limit would go away, and steered the program towards a missile with greater range. That of course made it more difficult to build, and still left us with a missile that doesn't (yet) go further. The requirement to use the existing launcher established a very restrictive limit on the size of the missile. It can't be longer or larger in diameter than the existing ATACMS. The added requirement of launching "more than just one missile" from a pod was certainly "nice to have", but this constraint even further restricted the size of the missile.

The main problem however was that the Army was constrained by Air Force vs Army politics to build a "sniper" weapon, one that could take out a single target on short notice with great precision. This missile is great for hitting a "high value target of opportunity" like a terrorist leader on the move or a meeting of senior leadership. However, it is pretty much useless against a large scale target, e.g. a major bridge. The warhead is too small. What a lot of the army actually wanted was a US version of an Iskander, which goes "500 kM" (actually much more, but for political purposes and to "preserve the treaty, we didn't call Russia on it). It carries a warhead of up to 700kg. This missile can really blow up things. The additional problem is that it could carry a nuclear warhead (as the Iskander can). This was considered too destabilizing for the Army to possess, and besides, blowing up bridges is an Air Force job anyway. This "tension" led to slow rolling the program, hoping that somehow the Army could get a missile with a big enough warhead to be "general purpose" tactically useful. That didn't happen.

The Ukrainians are pushing the narrative that since we now have PrSM, we can give them lots of ATACMS. I support giving Ukraine "lots" of ATACMS, but the new PrSM cannot do what the "old" cluster-munition based ATACMS (591 kg warhead) can or even the unitary warhead ATACMS  (214 kg warhead) can. This also means the PrSM cannot do the original ATACMS mission and is NOT a replacement. If we have to go to war with a "peer" competitor, I dearly hope there are enough of the "old" missiles around to fill the gap. Maybe we can borrow some from the Ukrainians :-).

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-army-unvei...00024.html

"Interesting" article. Here is a quote from Doug Bush, Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.

He added that the rapid development and deployment of this capability serve as a "shining example" of the U.S. Army's aggressive use of new procurement authorities granted by the U.S. Congress to swiftly acquire enhanced equipment for American soldiers.

Orwellian beyond words!!! The PrSM program languished for years as the "long range precision fires" requirement, issued in 2016. Taking 7 YEARS to develop an upgrade to an existing system isn't "swift" in any world I live in. On top of that, this missile isn't even the one the Army intends to use. They were testing "upgrades" to the seeker (of this as of then not yet deployed missile) in 2020. These "upgrades" aren't scheduled for deployment until 2025! Before anybody gets too excited about the range "in excess of 500 kM", consider the weight of the warhead is 91 kg. It better be a "precision" strike (on something not too sturdy) with such a small warhead.

The delay in this program was substantially due to 1) the Army not really knowing what it wanted, 2) constraints on the launch platform and the (ostensible) purpose of the missile, and 3) the changing treaty restrictions on "short range" ballistic missiles. The program started under the assumption the missile must have a range of at most 500 km, which was the treaty limit. Those "in the know" suspected that limit would go away, and steered the program towards a missile with greater range. That of course made it more difficult to build, and still left us with a missile that doesn't (yet) go further. The requirement to use the existing launcher established a very restrictive limit on the size of the missile. It can't be longer or larger in diameter than the existing ATACMS. The added requirement of launching "more than just one missile" from a pod was certainly "nice to have", but this constraint even further restricted the size of the missile.

The main problem however was that the Army was constrained by Air Force vs Army politics to build a "sniper" weapon, one that could take out a single target on short notice with great precision. This missile is great for hitting a "high value target of opportunity" like a terrorist leader on the move or a meeting of senior leadership. However, it is pretty much useless against a large scale target, e.g. a major bridge. The warhead is too small. What a lot of the army actually wanted was a US version of an Iskander, which goes "500 kM" (actually much more, but for political purposes and to "preserve the treaty, we didn't call Russia on it). It carries a warhead of up to 700kg. This missile can really blow up things. The additional problem is that it could carry a nuclear warhead (as the Iskander can). This was considered too destabilizing for the Army to possess, and besides, blowing up bridges is an Air Force job anyway. This "tension" led to slow rolling the program, hoping that somehow the Army could get a missile with a big enough warhead to be "general purpose" tactically useful. That didn't happen.

The Ukrainians are pushing the narrative that since we now have PrSM, we can give them lots of ATACMS. I support giving Ukraine "lots" of ATACMS, but the new PrSM cannot do what the "old" cluster-munition based ATACMS (591 kg warhead) can or even the unitary warhead ATACMS  (214 kg warhead) can. This also means the PrSM cannot do the original ATACMS mission and is NOT a replacement. If we have to go to war with a "peer" competitor, I dearly hope there are enough of the "old" missiles around to fill the gap. Maybe we can borrow some from the Ukrainians :-).

[Griffins78]

1701979294[/url]']
Thank you very much for sharing these thoughts, Goose, and for all your other contributions to this thread.

Agree wholeheartedly! Am completely blown away by the incredible breadth and depth of your amazing knowledge. And then for you to write and share your knowledge and add your insight, experience, and perspective on top to help us understand what’s happening, being said, and decided upon is just so damn impressive. Thank you, Goose, for your extreme generosity and well, for being you.

[Griffins78]

1701979294[/url]']
Thank you very much for sharing these thoughts, Goose, and for all your other contributions to this thread.

Agree wholeheartedly! Am completely blown away by the incredible breadth and depth of your amazing knowledge. And then for you to write and share your knowledge and add your insight, experience, and perspective on top to help us understand what’s happening, being said, and decided upon is just so damn impressive. Thank you, Goose, for your extreme generosity and well, for being you.

[Goose]

1701979294[/url]']
Thank you very much for sharing these thoughts, Goose, and for all your other contributions to this thread.

Agree wholeheartedly! Am completely blown away by the incredible breadth and depth of your amazing knowledge. And then for you to write and share your knowledge and add your insight, experience, and perspective on top to help us understand what’s happening, being said, and decided upon is just so damn impressive. Thank you, Goose, for your extreme generosity and well, for being you.

Thanks guys! Some of this stuff I actually do know :-). Other parts are opinion and I try to clearly separate the two. Probably I don't always succeed in doing so.

I admit I am posting to this thread more regularly because I don't want to see this issue fall off the radar screen (so to speak). What happens in Ukraine is going to make a tremendous difference in the world going forward. The Israel-Hamas war is important too, but almost no matter what happens the "problem" will still exist when the guns stop firing in Gaza. Israel will exist and Hamas will exist. In Ukraine, when the war finally ends, Ukraine will either exist as a stronger country or be subsumed into the Russian Federation. NATO will either be much stronger or no longer have any credibility. Lots of other things will be greatly changed, for better or worse. IMO lots more at stake for the US, NATO, and the world. IMO everybody needs to be "involved".

[Goose]

1701979294[/url]']
Thank you very much for sharing these thoughts, Goose, and for all your other contributions to this thread.

Agree wholeheartedly! Am completely blown away by the incredible breadth and depth of your amazing knowledge. And then for you to write and share your knowledge and add your insight, experience, and perspective on top to help us understand what’s happening, being said, and decided upon is just so damn impressive. Thank you, Goose, for your extreme generosity and well, for being you.

Thanks guys! Some of this stuff I actually do know :-). Other parts are opinion and I try to clearly separate the two. Probably I don't always succeed in doing so.

I admit I am posting to this thread more regularly because I don't want to see this issue fall off the radar screen (so to speak). What happens in Ukraine is going to make a tremendous difference in the world going forward. The Israel-Hamas war is important too, but almost no matter what happens the "problem" will still exist when the guns stop firing in Gaza. Israel will exist and Hamas will exist. In Ukraine, when the war finally ends, Ukraine will either exist as a stronger country or be subsumed into the Russian Federation. NATO will either be much stronger or no longer have any credibility. Lots of other things will be greatly changed, for better or worse. IMO lots more at stake for the US, NATO, and the world. IMO everybody needs to be "involved".

[Griffins78]

Agree - this war is so important and we do need to keep it in front of our minds. There are reasons why some might disagree but the ones doing it for political gamesmanship…

[Griffins78]

Agree - this war is so important and we do need to keep it in front of our minds. There are reasons why some might disagree but the ones doing it for political gamesmanship…

[fullmetal]

Goose, thanks for continuing to share your expertise and context with us.  Agreed that this conflict will have significant historical ramification, and I'm furious at Congress for turning it into a political football.  Unless there's some 3D chess going on behind the scenes, this kind of infighting and lack of will only bodes ill for future peace/stability.

[fullmetal]

Goose, thanks for continuing to share your expertise and context with us.  Agreed that this conflict will have significant historical ramification, and I'm furious at Congress for turning it into a political football.  Unless there's some 3D chess going on behind the scenes, this kind of infighting and lack of will only bodes ill for future peace/stability.

[TrumpCard]

I have not heard much about Russian "filtration" operations recently.  
Articles like this one, from the middle of last year, were so ominous:
https://www.state.gov/russias-filtration...-citizens/
Then I saw a few articles like this earlier in 2023, which scaled down the numbers by an order of magnitude:
https://www.reuters.com/world/us-imposes...023-08-24/
I'm curious whether you all have seen recent estimates of the number of affected Ukrainians and whether you've seen articles about any attempts to repatriate the victims.  Thanks in advance if you have.

[TrumpCard]

I have not heard much about Russian "filtration" operations recently.  
Articles like this one, from the middle of last year, were so ominous:
https://www.state.gov/russias-filtration...-citizens/
Then I saw a few articles like this earlier in 2023, which scaled down the numbers by an order of magnitude:
https://www.reuters.com/world/us-imposes...023-08-24/
I'm curious whether you all have seen recent estimates of the number of affected Ukrainians and whether you've seen articles about any attempts to repatriate the victims.  Thanks in advance if you have.

[Mick]

Some economic/population points on Russia in the wake of the Ukraine war:

1. Russia's economy would be 5% larger without the invasion of Ukraine.
2. Moscow spends over $100 billion defense, nearly a third of its total expenditures.
3. The Russian population is voting with their feet and leaving Russia at record rates. Emigration hit 668,000 in 2022, a 71% increase over the average of the prior five years.

[Mick]

Some economic/population points on Russia in the wake of the Ukraine war:

1. Russia's economy would be 5% larger without the invasion of Ukraine.
2. Moscow spends over $100 billion defense, nearly a third of its total expenditures.
3. The Russian population is voting with their feet and leaving Russia at record rates. Emigration hit 668,000 in 2022, a 71% increase over the average of the prior five years.

[TrumpCard]

If we’re just looking at the economics, Russia’s GDP declined by $100 billion, and Russia appears likely to succeed in stealing 30,000+ square miles of Ukraine’s heartland. That’s an economic positive. You have to consider the human toll to explain the main reason the invasion was horrific. Putin doesn’t care about the human toll. Neither do the many Russians keeping Putin in power.

[TrumpCard]

If we’re just looking at the economics, Russia’s GDP declined by $100 billion, and Russia appears likely to succeed in stealing 30,000+ square miles of Ukraine’s heartland. That’s an economic positive. You have to consider the human toll to explain the main reason the invasion was horrific. Putin doesn’t care about the human toll. Neither do the many Russians keeping Putin in power.

[Mick]

If we’re just looking at the economics, Russia’s GDP declined by $100 billion, and Russia appears likely to succeed in stealing 30,000+ square miles of Ukraine’s heartland. That’s an economic positive. You have to consider the human toll to explain the main reason the invasion was horrific. Putin doesn’t care about the human toll. Neither do the many Russians keeping Putin in power.

And speaking of Russian stealing that which belongs to Ukraine, they have apparently stolen a large chunk of Ukrainian population. I would imagine that would go a long way to alleviate the Russian population crash. This Economist article is behind a paywall. Gist is the life expectancy of the average Russian male is about the same as the average Haitian male. Because of war, emigration, disease/COVID, etc., Russia has lost millions more in population than they would otherwise normally expect...and this was in the midst of a dramatically falling birthrate.

Russia’s population nightmare is going to get even worse (economist.com)

[Mick]

If we’re just looking at the economics, Russia’s GDP declined by $100 billion, and Russia appears likely to succeed in stealing 30,000+ square miles of Ukraine’s heartland. That’s an economic positive. You have to consider the human toll to explain the main reason the invasion was horrific. Putin doesn’t care about the human toll. Neither do the many Russians keeping Putin in power.

And speaking of Russian stealing that which belongs to Ukraine, they have apparently stolen a large chunk of Ukrainian population. I would imagine that would go a long way to alleviate the Russian population crash. This Economist article is behind a paywall. Gist is the life expectancy of the average Russian male is about the same as the average Haitian male. Because of war, emigration, disease/COVID, etc., Russia has lost millions more in population than they would otherwise normally expect...and this was in the midst of a dramatically falling birthrate.

Russia’s population nightmare is going to get even worse (economist.com)

[82lsju]

Japan says it will send Patriot air defence missiles to the US after changing its arms export rules, in a shift away from its pacifist policies.

The White House has welcomed the move, which could free up the US to send its own stockpile to Ukraine.
...
Tokyo previously only allowed for components of licensed equipment to be sent from Japan to the nation where the manufacturing licence originated. But under the new rules it can ship finished goods too.

Shortly after the government announced this change on Friday, the foreign ministry said it would ship Patriot missiles to the US to "further strengthen the Japan-US alliance".

It added that the missiles could only be sent to the US, and would require Japan's approval to be sent to a third country. Japan still bans the export of weapons to countries at war.

This could mean that Japan-made Patriot missiles may replenish the US' stockpile, while Washington sends US-made ones to Ukraine.

In Japan, the Patriot missiles are manufactured by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries under licence from US defence contractors Lockheed Martin and RTX.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67798740

[82lsju]

Japan says it will send Patriot air defence missiles to the US after changing its arms export rules, in a shift away from its pacifist policies.

The White House has welcomed the move, which could free up the US to send its own stockpile to Ukraine.
...
Tokyo previously only allowed for components of licensed equipment to be sent from Japan to the nation where the manufacturing licence originated. But under the new rules it can ship finished goods too.

Shortly after the government announced this change on Friday, the foreign ministry said it would ship Patriot missiles to the US to "further strengthen the Japan-US alliance".

It added that the missiles could only be sent to the US, and would require Japan's approval to be sent to a third country. Japan still bans the export of weapons to countries at war.

This could mean that Japan-made Patriot missiles may replenish the US' stockpile, while Washington sends US-made ones to Ukraine.

In Japan, the Patriot missiles are manufactured by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries under licence from US defence contractors Lockheed Martin and RTX.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67798740

[dabigv13]

On the topic of Patriots, Ukraine announced an Odessa based air defense unit shot down 3 Su-34s today. Russian sources seeming to corroborate. 

While Ukraine didn't announce the type of interceptors, it's widely assumed to be Patriots, similar to prior multiple shoot down events where Ukraine has moved a Patriot system closer to the front line.

The system has made a good showing in this war with the newer Pac-2 and Pac-3 interceptors.

[dabigv13]

On the topic of Patriots, Ukraine announced an Odessa based air defense unit shot down 3 Su-34s today. Russian sources seeming to corroborate. 

While Ukraine didn't announce the type of interceptors, it's widely assumed to be Patriots, similar to prior multiple shoot down events where Ukraine has moved a Patriot system closer to the front line.

The system has made a good showing in this war with the newer Pac-2 and Pac-3 interceptors.

[Goose]

The system has made a good showing in this war with the newer Pac-2 and Pac-3 interceptors.

True. What hasn't made a good showing so far is Russian ECM, or for that matter Russian RWR equipment. That is strange, as the RWRs aren't THAT bad. Unfortunately Ukraine seems to suffer from similar problems. The F-16s may alleviate the problem to a great degree.

[Goose]

The system has made a good showing in this war with the newer Pac-2 and Pac-3 interceptors.

True. What hasn't made a good showing so far is Russian ECM, or for that matter Russian RWR equipment. That is strange, as the RWRs aren't THAT bad. Unfortunately Ukraine seems to suffer from similar problems. The F-16s may alleviate the problem to a great degree.

[TrumpCard]

The way things are going with funding from the West, this offer is one that the Ukrainians may not be able to refuse, but also one they are not able to accept:

Supposed Cease Fire Offer

[TrumpCard]

The way things are going with funding from the West, this offer is one that the Ukrainians may not be able to refuse, but also one they are not able to accept:

Supposed Cease Fire Offer

[81alum]

The way things are going with funding from the West, this offer is one that the Ukrainians may not be able to refuse, but also one they are not able to accept:

Supposed Cease Fire Offer

I'm sure he would be happy to stop the war if he is allowed to keep the 20% of Ukraine he has seized--especially Crimea.  Of course, the war would stop just for long enough for him to harden his gains, rearm, wait for a lull, and strike again--maybe Ukraine, maybe some other bordering state. 

On the other hand, the prospect of taking back the invaded territories gets more and more remote.  A peace settlement based on the current boundaries would probably only be acceptable to the Ukrainians if they had an absolute guarantee of protection for what is left of their country--which would mean NATO membership.  And with Hungary becoming a pro-Putin autocracy, that will never ever happen.

Under these circumstances, the only way I see a successful outcome is if the West vigorously delivers copious amounts of aid and equipment for years to come, making Russia break before Ukraine breaks.  That prospect also looks more and more bleak.

In short, the heady optimism of the first year--when Ukraine turned aside an invasion by a massive army and even recaptured enormous chunks of territory--is long gone.  I am not despairing, but it is hard to see this turning out well for a valiant people whose fortitude and love of freedom is not sufficiently recognized.

[81alum]

The way things are going with funding from the West, this offer is one that the Ukrainians may not be able to refuse, but also one they are not able to accept:

Supposed Cease Fire Offer

I'm sure he would be happy to stop the war if he is allowed to keep the 20% of Ukraine he has seized--especially Crimea.  Of course, the war would stop just for long enough for him to harden his gains, rearm, wait for a lull, and strike again--maybe Ukraine, maybe some other bordering state. 

On the other hand, the prospect of taking back the invaded territories gets more and more remote.  A peace settlement based on the current boundaries would probably only be acceptable to the Ukrainians if they had an absolute guarantee of protection for what is left of their country--which would mean NATO membership.  And with Hungary becoming a pro-Putin autocracy, that will never ever happen.

Under these circumstances, the only way I see a successful outcome is if the West vigorously delivers copious amounts of aid and equipment for years to come, making Russia break before Ukraine breaks.  That prospect also looks more and more bleak.

In short, the heady optimism of the first year--when Ukraine turned aside an invasion by a massive army and even recaptured enormous chunks of territory--is long gone.  I am not despairing, but it is hard to see this turning out well for a valiant people whose fortitude and love of freedom is not sufficiently recognized.

[Goose]

The way things are going with funding from the West, this offer is one that the Ukrainians may not be able to refuse, but also one they are not able to accept:

Supposed Cease Fire Offer

I'm sure he would be happy to stop the war if he is allowed to keep the 20% of Ukraine he has seized--especially Crimea.  Of course, the war would stop just for long enough for him to harden his gains, rearm, wait for a lull, and strike again--maybe Ukraine, maybe some other bordering state. 

On the other hand, the prospect of taking back the invaded territories gets more and more remote.  A peace settlement based on the current boundaries would probably only be acceptable to the Ukrainians if they had an absolute guarantee of protection for what is left of their country--which would mean NATO membership.  And with Hungary becoming a pro-Putin autocracy, that will never ever happen.

Under these circumstances, the only way I see a successful outcome is if the West vigorously delivers copious amounts of aid and equipment for years to come, making Russia break before Ukraine breaks.  That prospect also looks more and more bleak.

In short, the heady optimism of the first year--when Ukraine turned aside an invasion by a massive army and even recaptured enormous chunks of territory--is long gone.  I am not despairing, but it is hard to see this turning out well for a valiant people whose fortitude and love of freedom is not sufficiently recognized.

I don't necessarily agree that the prospect of taking back the occupied territories is becoming "more remote". IMO it was always a heavy lift, and the "heady optimism" of the first year of the war was exactly that. Ukraine did some hard fighting around Kupyansk, but when they broke through, they hit air. Their recapturing enormous chunks of territory was never due to the Ukraine massively defeating the Russians, but rather Ukraine fighting "smart" and taking advantage of Russians abject stupidity (or possibly total lack of troops). The telling event is that while Ukraine drove the Russians back around Kherson city, they allowed the Russians to retain that city for MONTHS. The Russians then retreated in relatively good order. That should never have been allowed. Ukraine apparently just didn't have the combat power to prevent it. After that, the Ukrainians allowed the Russians to build the Surovikin Line. Probably the Ukraine didn't have the combat power to prevent that either, but it does seem Ukraine under-estimated how much of a problem it would cause them.

All that said, Ukraine has made significant progress in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and is now making (belated) progress across the Dnipro river in Kherson Oblast. This is stretching Russian resources significantly. It is possible that the Ukrainian air force can cover a concentrated offensive that will break through the Russian defenses quickly enough that Russia is unable to react in time to prevent Ukraine cutting the land bridge. Ukraine is also working hard to threaten the lines of supply into Crimea over the Kerch bridge. If Ukraine can cut that supply line, the entire Russian southern front will collapse. Russia has shown a desire to keep attacking in Donbas, perhaps to draw Ukrainian strength away from the south. However, the side effect has been big losses of Russian troops and the retention of much Russian troop strength in the north. Ukraine has an opportunity to really change the war. It won't be easy, but it is possible. Russia knows this. To what extent they can stop it is TBD.

If Ukraine succeeds in the south, they can probably then play defense and force the Russians to give up the battle. Cutting Russia off from the Sea of Azov and having no fleet base in Crimea would be serious military (and political) setbacks. If the Ukraine cannot accomplish this (or something substantially similar) next year, IMO Ukraine will basically fall apart. Condemning Ukraine to an apparently endless war that cannot be won is politically impossible for Ukraine. Putin may want a "cease fire" because it would ensure the worst doesn't happen for him. Such an offer would also attract supporters in the EU and US who would just prefer the whole thing would "go away". Russia could then rely on Ukraine's strategic position deteriorating as Russia brings in more troops. Right now, Ukraine has it's problems and Russia has it's problems. A functioning Ukrainian air force could tip the balance, but Putin undoubtedly believes that given time, he can bring up enough troops that any notional Ukrainian breakthrough can be contained. A cease fire gives him time.

[Goose]

The way things are going with funding from the West, this offer is one that the Ukrainians may not be able to refuse, but also one they are not able to accept:

Supposed Cease Fire Offer

I'm sure he would be happy to stop the war if he is allowed to keep the 20% of Ukraine he has seized--especially Crimea.  Of course, the war would stop just for long enough for him to harden his gains, rearm, wait for a lull, and strike again--maybe Ukraine, maybe some other bordering state. 

On the other hand, the prospect of taking back the invaded territories gets more and more remote.  A peace settlement based on the current boundaries would probably only be acceptable to the Ukrainians if they had an absolute guarantee of protection for what is left of their country--which would mean NATO membership.  And with Hungary becoming a pro-Putin autocracy, that will never ever happen.

Under these circumstances, the only way I see a successful outcome is if the West vigorously delivers copious amounts of aid and equipment for years to come, making Russia break before Ukraine breaks.  That prospect also looks more and more bleak.

In short, the heady optimism of the first year--when Ukraine turned aside an invasion by a massive army and even recaptured enormous chunks of territory--is long gone.  I am not despairing, but it is hard to see this turning out well for a valiant people whose fortitude and love of freedom is not sufficiently recognized.

I don't necessarily agree that the prospect of taking back the occupied territories is becoming "more remote". IMO it was always a heavy lift, and the "heady optimism" of the first year of the war was exactly that. Ukraine did some hard fighting around Kupyansk, but when they broke through, they hit air. Their recapturing enormous chunks of territory was never due to the Ukraine massively defeating the Russians, but rather Ukraine fighting "smart" and taking advantage of Russians abject stupidity (or possibly total lack of troops). The telling event is that while Ukraine drove the Russians back around Kherson city, they allowed the Russians to retain that city for MONTHS. The Russians then retreated in relatively good order. That should never have been allowed. Ukraine apparently just didn't have the combat power to prevent it. After that, the Ukrainians allowed the Russians to build the Surovikin Line. Probably the Ukraine didn't have the combat power to prevent that either, but it does seem Ukraine under-estimated how much of a problem it would cause them.

All that said, Ukraine has made significant progress in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and is now making (belated) progress across the Dnipro river in Kherson Oblast. This is stretching Russian resources significantly. It is possible that the Ukrainian air force can cover a concentrated offensive that will break through the Russian defenses quickly enough that Russia is unable to react in time to prevent Ukraine cutting the land bridge. Ukraine is also working hard to threaten the lines of supply into Crimea over the Kerch bridge. If Ukraine can cut that supply line, the entire Russian southern front will collapse. Russia has shown a desire to keep attacking in Donbas, perhaps to draw Ukrainian strength away from the south. However, the side effect has been big losses of Russian troops and the retention of much Russian troop strength in the north. Ukraine has an opportunity to really change the war. It won't be easy, but it is possible. Russia knows this. To what extent they can stop it is TBD.

If Ukraine succeeds in the south, they can probably then play defense and force the Russians to give up the battle. Cutting Russia off from the Sea of Azov and having no fleet base in Crimea would be serious military (and political) setbacks. If the Ukraine cannot accomplish this (or something substantially similar) next year, IMO Ukraine will basically fall apart. Condemning Ukraine to an apparently endless war that cannot be won is politically impossible for Ukraine. Putin may want a "cease fire" because it would ensure the worst doesn't happen for him. Such an offer would also attract supporters in the EU and US who would just prefer the whole thing would "go away". Russia could then rely on Ukraine's strategic position deteriorating as Russia brings in more troops. Right now, Ukraine has it's problems and Russia has it's problems. A functioning Ukrainian air force could tip the balance, but Putin undoubtedly believes that given time, he can bring up enough troops that any notional Ukrainian breakthrough can be contained. A cease fire gives him time.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/patriot-syste...00481.html

Not new news, posted for reference. The SU-34s were ostensibly dropping guided glide bombs. To get maximum range, the SU-34 would have to get up pretty high. However, the "normal" flight profile over "friendly" territory would be stay low as long as possible, climb to altitude as fast as possible, release the weapons, and then go low as fast as possible. The Patriot, located 100+ km distant, would have to get a lock as the SU-34 climbed to altitude and complete the intercept before the SU-34 was low enough the Patriot could no longer "see" it. This is assuming a PAC-2 missile which is SARH.

If the SU-34 was flown "correctly", it should be almost impossible for a Patriot to shoot it down. It takes a while to go from low to high, but not long at all in the other direction. The radar horizon for a patriot to detect an aircraft at a distance of 100 km is 522 meters, or 1,726 ft. Assume the SU-34 wants to lob it's bombs at 30,000 ft. Supposedly, the SU-34 climes at a rate of 45,275 feet / minute. That is undoubtedly a "clean" aircraft and may be a "marketing" number, but even if it is an exageration, the aircraft should reached altitude in about 37 seconds. The time the aircraft would be visible would be around a minute.  The SM-2 goes about 83 km per minute. It would not reach the SU-34 even if it were fired immediately. However, getting a firing "solution" isn't instantaneous and would just add to the time. Obviously, sometimes things go wrong and the jet just doesn't perform or the pilot is slow to release or whatever. All that aside, it would take an umbelieveable performance by the Patriot battery to take down a correctly flown mission.

On top of that, as soon as the Patriot search radar is detected by the aircraft RWR (which should be slightly before the Patriot can detect the SU-34), the pilot should know he could/will be detected and consider his options. One option is to dive away immediately and live to fight another day. Another is to continue with the mission (but be highly motivated to fly it very precisely). When the illuminator is detected, wait 5 seconds or so, then turn on your ECM. The Russians supposedly use DRFMs on the SU-34 to send back a modified (in amplitude) copy of the illuminator signal. At the very least, that will mess up the missile a bit. (If you loose the illuminator, the ECM is smart enough to stop jamming what it can't see) Then, after you drop the bombs and dive, fire off a bunch of chaff to confuse the issue even more. Dive like mad. If the illuminator still holds you after a few seconds, flatten out and find the missile with your own radar. If you can't see it, dive again. If you can see it, begin your missile evasion manuver sequence. Good luck.

So, how did 3 SU-34s get shot down? The missions weren't flown "professionally", first of all. It they had been, it would take a miracle for the Patriot to hit you. More importantly, either the RWR didn't work or the pilot didn't respond appropraitely. If you are in an area where there isn't supposed to be an MPQ-65 and your RWR sees one, I would get out of Dodge. Come back tomorrow when you hsve a plan and are prepared to react to the threat. If you feel you must continue, yell like hell to your buddies and fly like you mean it, because for sure the Patriot will.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/patriot-syste...00481.html

Not new news, posted for reference. The SU-34s were ostensibly dropping guided glide bombs. To get maximum range, the SU-34 would have to get up pretty high. However, the "normal" flight profile over "friendly" territory would be stay low as long as possible, climb to altitude as fast as possible, release the weapons, and then go low as fast as possible. The Patriot, located 100+ km distant, would have to get a lock as the SU-34 climbed to altitude and complete the intercept before the SU-34 was low enough the Patriot could no longer "see" it. This is assuming a PAC-2 missile which is SARH.

If the SU-34 was flown "correctly", it should be almost impossible for a Patriot to shoot it down. It takes a while to go from low to high, but not long at all in the other direction. The radar horizon for a patriot to detect an aircraft at a distance of 100 km is 522 meters, or 1,726 ft. Assume the SU-34 wants to lob it's bombs at 30,000 ft. Supposedly, the SU-34 climes at a rate of 45,275 feet / minute. That is undoubtedly a "clean" aircraft and may be a "marketing" number, but even if it is an exageration, the aircraft should reached altitude in about 37 seconds. The time the aircraft would be visible would be around a minute.  The SM-2 goes about 83 km per minute. It would not reach the SU-34 even if it were fired immediately. However, getting a firing "solution" isn't instantaneous and would just add to the time. Obviously, sometimes things go wrong and the jet just doesn't perform or the pilot is slow to release or whatever. All that aside, it would take an umbelieveable performance by the Patriot battery to take down a correctly flown mission.

On top of that, as soon as the Patriot search radar is detected by the aircraft RWR (which should be slightly before the Patriot can detect the SU-34), the pilot should know he could/will be detected and consider his options. One option is to dive away immediately and live to fight another day. Another is to continue with the mission (but be highly motivated to fly it very precisely). When the illuminator is detected, wait 5 seconds or so, then turn on your ECM. The Russians supposedly use DRFMs on the SU-34 to send back a modified (in amplitude) copy of the illuminator signal. At the very least, that will mess up the missile a bit. (If you loose the illuminator, the ECM is smart enough to stop jamming what it can't see) Then, after you drop the bombs and dive, fire off a bunch of chaff to confuse the issue even more. Dive like mad. If the illuminator still holds you after a few seconds, flatten out and find the missile with your own radar. If you can't see it, dive again. If you can see it, begin your missile evasion manuver sequence. Good luck.

So, how did 3 SU-34s get shot down? The missions weren't flown "professionally", first of all. It they had been, it would take a miracle for the Patriot to hit you. More importantly, either the RWR didn't work or the pilot didn't respond appropraitely. If you are in an area where there isn't supposed to be an MPQ-65 and your RWR sees one, I would get out of Dodge. Come back tomorrow when you hsve a plan and are prepared to react to the threat. If you feel you must continue, yell like hell to your buddies and fly like you mean it, because for sure the Patriot will.