[Goose]

Re: Spanish Civil War

Yes, the tactics and territory gains aren't analagous but that's not what prompted my flashback to 88 years ago. (And no, I'm not THAT old!)

How about an aggressive authoritarian government (Spain/Germany/Italy) working out the kinks in their war machinery while the sympathetic but cautious Western democracies supported the other side half-heartedly and from arms length fearing escalation?  Guernica atrocities, Ebro, and the Siege of Madrid? Three plus years of brutal fighting that ended in victory for the authoritarian side and paved the way for a growingly bellicose and expansionist Germany and Italy?  All of which turned into the prelude for a future great powers conflict in Europe?  

As they say, history doesn't usually repeat itself but it often rhymes.

I certainly hope I'm wrong.

I can see some similarities and two important differences. First, the war in Spain really was a civil war. It started in Spain and there was reason to believe it could remain contained there. Second, while some of the public in the "Western democracies" strongly supported the nationalists (and traveled to Spain to fight), their governments were absolutely dedicated to containing the war and staying out of it. They remained legally and in fact neutral. The UK and France set up the Non-Intervention Agreement which eventually had many signatories. France and the UK, along with most of the democracies really did want to stay completely "neutral" and stay out of what they feared could become a wider war. The Neutrality Patrol was put in place to blockade Spain and ensure outside military aid could not enter Spain. Of course, Germany and Italy joined the Non-Intervention Agreement fully intending not to remain neutral. Their portion of the "Neutrality Patrol" leaked like mad to one participant :-).

I think it is difficult to argue that the Spanish civil war emboldened Germany and Italy. Both were already totalitarian states arming for wars that they fully intended to fight and in Germany's case were actively planning. Italy had already invaded Abyssinia. Germany had already left the League of Nations. Germany and Italy didn't start the Spanish civil war, they merely facilitated it. The JU-52s "bombers" they gave to the nationalists biggest contribution was ferrying Franco's troops from Morocco to the Spanish mainland.  Germany and Italy gained little if anything  strategically from the war. Diplomatically they perhaps developed an understanding that France and the UK really didn't want to fight, but that was hardly news. Franco got lots from them but they got nothing from him.

The Ukraine situation is in no way a civil war. First, Ukraine was invaded by Russia. That by itself makes it impossible to assert it is "an internal matter which the Ukrainians must work out for themselves". That was a reasonable argument about Spain, but not about Ukraine. Second, it was unclear that any particular advantage/disadvantage would accrue by supporting one side or the other in Spain.  Even Germany and Italy didn't think they would get much out of it other than the ability to test out their military (which turned out to be the case). In Ukraine, it was clear that the Western democracies doing nothing would (at a minimum) embolden Russia to believe aggression would not be opposed. It would also require Russia's neighbors to figure out a way to "get along" with Russia, since they couldn't expect outside help.

The administration had to make a choice. Doing nothing had an obvious large downside. Doing "something" had the advantage of preventing that downside from happening, but only if the "something" was adequate to be successful. The administration decided to do "something", but if that turns out to not be successful, the downside is much larger.

You are however exactly correct that Russia is getting the opportunity to learn a lot about how to fight a near-peer competitor, as Germany and Italy did in Spain. Russia is actually getting a much better opportunity in that they are using their entire military as designed. In Spain, Germany and Italy had to be content with a "jury-rigged" air force element often not using their "first line" aircraft. No German mechanized divisions went to Spain. We are learning a bit by our participation, but Russia is learning much, much more. Many of the things they are learning reflect problems in the personnel and organization. They are "fixing" that as best they can. These lessons may in fact be the most important ones.

We have learned, among other things, that Russian GPS jamming is a big problem. It wasn't at the start of the war because Russia couldn't deploy enough of it. They can now. This should in no way be a surprise to us. We have known about much of this capability for over 25 years. So far however, we haven't countered it in Ukraine.

It is also important to realize the very great limitations of generalizing what we see in Ukraine. Ukraine had at they start of the war a very limited air force. This air force suffered major losses at the start of the war. Even best case the Ukrainian air force had almost no capability to strike very deeply into Russia. That would not be the case in a Russia-NATO conflict. Ukraine also allowed Russia to lay vast minefield and build concrete fortification systems with no interference. That also would not happen in a Russia-NATO conflict. The Ukrainian air force couldn't stop them or even make it difficult. They didn't attempt to do so, probably because they knew they didn't have the mass and couldn't sustain the losses. These factors distort everything.

Another difference is the inexplicable lack of sustained aggression by the VKS at the start of the war. Yes, they suffered some losses, perhaps more than they expected. However, these losses were not large enough to explain their disappearance from the sky. Recently the VKS has "recovered" and has become a factor again. They have a new weapon in glide bombs that actually works. However, it would be foolish to assume the VKS would disappear in a fight with NATO.

Drawing lots of "conclusions" from the Ukraine conflict is therefore risky. Many of the "lessons learned" in Spain by the Luftwaffe (particularly about their aircraft's suitability) turned out to be false when fighting the UK. The missions were much longer. They were also fighting an air force, not a happening flying Russian planes that were "bad" to begin with and abysmally maintained. It was a different war with different requirements.

[Goose]

Re: Spanish Civil War

Yes, the tactics and territory gains aren't analagous but that's not what prompted my flashback to 88 years ago. (And no, I'm not THAT old!)

How about an aggressive authoritarian government (Spain/Germany/Italy) working out the kinks in their war machinery while the sympathetic but cautious Western democracies supported the other side half-heartedly and from arms length fearing escalation?  Guernica atrocities, Ebro, and the Siege of Madrid? Three plus years of brutal fighting that ended in victory for the authoritarian side and paved the way for a growingly bellicose and expansionist Germany and Italy?  All of which turned into the prelude for a future great powers conflict in Europe?  

As they say, history doesn't usually repeat itself but it often rhymes.

I certainly hope I'm wrong.

I can see some similarities and two important differences. First, the war in Spain really was a civil war. It started in Spain and there was reason to believe it could remain contained there. Second, while some of the public in the "Western democracies" strongly supported the nationalists (and traveled to Spain to fight), their governments were absolutely dedicated to containing the war and staying out of it. They remained legally and in fact neutral. The UK and France set up the Non-Intervention Agreement which eventually had many signatories. France and the UK, along with most of the democracies really did want to stay completely "neutral" and stay out of what they feared could become a wider war. The Neutrality Patrol was put in place to blockade Spain and ensure outside military aid could not enter Spain. Of course, Germany and Italy joined the Non-Intervention Agreement fully intending not to remain neutral. Their portion of the "Neutrality Patrol" leaked like mad to one participant :-).

I think it is difficult to argue that the Spanish civil war emboldened Germany and Italy. Both were already totalitarian states arming for wars that they fully intended to fight and in Germany's case were actively planning. Italy had already invaded Abyssinia. Germany had already left the League of Nations. Germany and Italy didn't start the Spanish civil war, they merely facilitated it. The JU-52s "bombers" they gave to the nationalists biggest contribution was ferrying Franco's troops from Morocco to the Spanish mainland.  Germany and Italy gained little if anything  strategically from the war. Diplomatically they perhaps developed an understanding that France and the UK really didn't want to fight, but that was hardly news. Franco got lots from them but they got nothing from him.

The Ukraine situation is in no way a civil war. First, Ukraine was invaded by Russia. That by itself makes it impossible to assert it is "an internal matter which the Ukrainians must work out for themselves". That was a reasonable argument about Spain, but not about Ukraine. Second, it was unclear that any particular advantage/disadvantage would accrue by supporting one side or the other in Spain.  Even Germany and Italy didn't think they would get much out of it other than the ability to test out their military (which turned out to be the case). In Ukraine, it was clear that the Western democracies doing nothing would (at a minimum) embolden Russia to believe aggression would not be opposed. It would also require Russia's neighbors to figure out a way to "get along" with Russia, since they couldn't expect outside help.

The administration had to make a choice. Doing nothing had an obvious large downside. Doing "something" had the advantage of preventing that downside from happening, but only if the "something" was adequate to be successful. The administration decided to do "something", but if that turns out to not be successful, the downside is much larger.

You are however exactly correct that Russia is getting the opportunity to learn a lot about how to fight a near-peer competitor, as Germany and Italy did in Spain. Russia is actually getting a much better opportunity in that they are using their entire military as designed. In Spain, Germany and Italy had to be content with a "jury-rigged" air force element often not using their "first line" aircraft. No German mechanized divisions went to Spain. We are learning a bit by our participation, but Russia is learning much, much more. Many of the things they are learning reflect problems in the personnel and organization. They are "fixing" that as best they can. These lessons may in fact be the most important ones.

We have learned, among other things, that Russian GPS jamming is a big problem. It wasn't at the start of the war because Russia couldn't deploy enough of it. They can now. This should in no way be a surprise to us. We have known about much of this capability for over 25 years. So far however, we haven't countered it in Ukraine.

It is also important to realize the very great limitations of generalizing what we see in Ukraine. Ukraine had at they start of the war a very limited air force. This air force suffered major losses at the start of the war. Even best case the Ukrainian air force had almost no capability to strike very deeply into Russia. That would not be the case in a Russia-NATO conflict. Ukraine also allowed Russia to lay vast minefield and build concrete fortification systems with no interference. That also would not happen in a Russia-NATO conflict. The Ukrainian air force couldn't stop them or even make it difficult. They didn't attempt to do so, probably because they knew they didn't have the mass and couldn't sustain the losses. These factors distort everything.

Another difference is the inexplicable lack of sustained aggression by the VKS at the start of the war. Yes, they suffered some losses, perhaps more than they expected. However, these losses were not large enough to explain their disappearance from the sky. Recently the VKS has "recovered" and has become a factor again. They have a new weapon in glide bombs that actually works. However, it would be foolish to assume the VKS would disappear in a fight with NATO.

Drawing lots of "conclusions" from the Ukraine conflict is therefore risky. Many of the "lessons learned" in Spain by the Luftwaffe (particularly about their aircraft's suitability) turned out to be false when fighting the UK. The missions were much longer. They were also fighting an air force, not a happening flying Russian planes that were "bad" to begin with and abysmally maintained. It was a different war with different requirements.

[M T]

Getting back to the current day...  Here are pointers to several BBC articles.

BBC: Russia using chemical choking agents in Ukraine, US says. 

Chloropicrin - which the US says Russia has used to "dislodge Ukrainian forces from fortified positions" - is an oily substance which was widely used during World War One. It causes irritation of the lungs, eyes and skin and can cause vomiting, nausea and diarrhoea, according to the US Centre for Disease Control (CDC).
The chemical's use in war is expressly banned under the CWC, and is listed as a choking agent by the OPCW.

BBC article regarding North Korean missiles used by Russia against Ukraine.  

But the missile fired on 2 January, that Ms Kimachuk took apart, was seemingly Pyongyang's most sophisticated short-range missile - the Hwasong 11 - capable of travelling up to 700km (435 miles).
...
It was bursting with the latest foreign technology. Most of the electronic parts had been manufactured in the US and Europe over the past few years. There was even a US computer chip made as recently as March 2023. This meant that North Korea had illicitly procured vital weapons components, snuck them into the country, assembled the missile, and shipped it to Russia in secret, where it had then been transported to the frontline and fired - all in a matter of months.
...
The South Korean government recently observed North Korea has sent 6,700 containers of munitions to Russia, it says that Pyongyang's weapons factories were operating at full-tilt, and Dr Lewis, who has been studying these factories through satellites, reckons they can churn out a few hundred a year.
...
Now that Pyongyang is mass producing these weapons, it will want to sell them to more countries, and if the missiles are good enough for Russia, they will be good enough for others, said Dr Lewis - especially as the Russians are setting the example that it is okay to violate sanctions.
He predicts going forward that North Korea will become a big supplier of missiles to countries in the China-Russia-Iran bloc. In the wake of Iran's assault on Israel this month, the US said it was "incredibly concerned" that North Korea could be working with Iran on its nuclear and ballistic weapons programmes.

BBC: Kyiv can use British weapons inside Russia - Cameron

UK Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron has said it is up to Ukraine to decide how to use British weapons and insisted it has the right to strike targets on Russian territory.
A year ago the UK confirmed it had begun supplying long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles with a range of more than 250km (155 miles).

Ukrainian intelligence officials also believe Russia is gearing up for a summer offensive in the north-eastern regions of Kharkiv and Sumy.
The commander of the national guard, Oleksandr Pivnenko, warned recently that Russia was preparing "unpleasant surprises" and quietly recruiting 30,000 people a month.

BBC:

A crowdfunding campaign in Slovakia to buy artillery shells for Ukraine has exceeded its target of €1m (£850,000), less than 48 hours after it was launched.
The campaign is a response to the Slovak cabinet's refusal to join an initiative by the Czech government to buy up hundreds of thousands of shells for the Ukrainian armed forces.

[M T]

Getting back to the current day...  Here are pointers to several BBC articles.

BBC: Russia using chemical choking agents in Ukraine, US says. 

Chloropicrin - which the US says Russia has used to "dislodge Ukrainian forces from fortified positions" - is an oily substance which was widely used during World War One. It causes irritation of the lungs, eyes and skin and can cause vomiting, nausea and diarrhoea, according to the US Centre for Disease Control (CDC).
The chemical's use in war is expressly banned under the CWC, and is listed as a choking agent by the OPCW.

BBC article regarding North Korean missiles used by Russia against Ukraine.  

But the missile fired on 2 January, that Ms Kimachuk took apart, was seemingly Pyongyang's most sophisticated short-range missile - the Hwasong 11 - capable of travelling up to 700km (435 miles).
...
It was bursting with the latest foreign technology. Most of the electronic parts had been manufactured in the US and Europe over the past few years. There was even a US computer chip made as recently as March 2023. This meant that North Korea had illicitly procured vital weapons components, snuck them into the country, assembled the missile, and shipped it to Russia in secret, where it had then been transported to the frontline and fired - all in a matter of months.
...
The South Korean government recently observed North Korea has sent 6,700 containers of munitions to Russia, it says that Pyongyang's weapons factories were operating at full-tilt, and Dr Lewis, who has been studying these factories through satellites, reckons they can churn out a few hundred a year.
...
Now that Pyongyang is mass producing these weapons, it will want to sell them to more countries, and if the missiles are good enough for Russia, they will be good enough for others, said Dr Lewis - especially as the Russians are setting the example that it is okay to violate sanctions.
He predicts going forward that North Korea will become a big supplier of missiles to countries in the China-Russia-Iran bloc. In the wake of Iran's assault on Israel this month, the US said it was "incredibly concerned" that North Korea could be working with Iran on its nuclear and ballistic weapons programmes.

BBC: Kyiv can use British weapons inside Russia - Cameron

UK Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron has said it is up to Ukraine to decide how to use British weapons and insisted it has the right to strike targets on Russian territory.
A year ago the UK confirmed it had begun supplying long-range Storm Shadow cruise missiles with a range of more than 250km (155 miles).

Ukrainian intelligence officials also believe Russia is gearing up for a summer offensive in the north-eastern regions of Kharkiv and Sumy.
The commander of the national guard, Oleksandr Pivnenko, warned recently that Russia was preparing "unpleasant surprises" and quietly recruiting 30,000 people a month.

BBC:

A crowdfunding campaign in Slovakia to buy artillery shells for Ukraine has exceeded its target of €1m (£850,000), less than 48 hours after it was launched.
The campaign is a response to the Slovak cabinet's refusal to join an initiative by the Czech government to buy up hundreds of thousands of shells for the Ukrainian armed forces.

[dabigv13]

The U.S. Air Force is buying add-on seekers designed to give Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) precision-guided bombs supplied to Ukraine the ability to zero in on GPS jammers. In effect, this would turn one of the weapons most impacted by this countermeasure into one used to directly attack it. This follows growing reports that Russian jamming is severely degrading the effectiveness of Western-supplied GPS-guided munitions, including JDAM-ERs.

https://www.twz.com/air/jdam-er-winged-b...to-ukraine

[dabigv13]

The U.S. Air Force is buying add-on seekers designed to give Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) precision-guided bombs supplied to Ukraine the ability to zero in on GPS jammers. In effect, this would turn one of the weapons most impacted by this countermeasure into one used to directly attack it. This follows growing reports that Russian jamming is severely degrading the effectiveness of Western-supplied GPS-guided munitions, including JDAM-ERs.

https://www.twz.com/air/jdam-er-winged-b...to-ukraine

[dabigv13]

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/03/us/po...ns-us.html

On the shipment of aid to Ukraine. The first batch from the latest US aid was delivered last Sunday, 4 days after the aid bill was signed. The article goes into some of the logistics of delivering the various types of aid.

[dabigv13]

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/03/us/po...ns-us.html

On the shipment of aid to Ukraine. The first batch from the latest US aid was delivered last Sunday, 4 days after the aid bill was signed. The article goes into some of the logistics of delivering the various types of aid.

[Goose]

The U.S. Air Force is buying add-on seekers designed to give Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) precision-guided bombs supplied to Ukraine the ability to zero in on GPS jammers. In effect, this would turn one of the weapons most impacted by this countermeasure into one used to directly attack it. This follows growing reports that Russian jamming is severely degrading the effectiveness of Western-supplied GPS-guided munitions, including JDAM-ERs.

https://www.twz.com/air/jdam-er-winged-b...to-ukraine

It is indeed gratifying that the USAF is acquiring a home-on-jam capability for the JDAM-ER. Unfortunately the contract gives no information on how many home-on-jam units will be integrated or exactly when (other than the termination date of 1-Oct-2025). This is understandable as part of operational security and the fact much of the contract is CPFF and the deliverables are "undefinitized". However, since these items are not already in inventory and available immediately, it is highly probable delivery is at best many months away and that the resulting package hasn't undergone an opeval. The article points out that SARA provided seekers for a test on the SDB. The lack of a follow-up procurement gives one pause. It may be there was no requirement or that the requirement wasn't high enough priority to be funded. It may also be that the results were not good enough to generate interest to even put in place an evaluation program. One does worry that this procurement will follow a similar track to  the GLSDB. The program was announced with fanfare, all of us got excited, and then the production and testing cycle took about half a year or so. Upon employment, it didn't work. Obviously we need to do something, and this is something. Let's hope the USAF is also following this program and doing all the "rapid OT&E" possible to ensure it will work upon first delivery. Their record in this regard is not stellar.

The cited article's comments about the HARM missile also gives one pause. https://ausairpower.net/API-AGM-88-HARM.html. Note this is from 1998 (last update in 2014) and is not in any way "news". There is no doubt whatsoever that the AGM-88C covers the range.

A dielectric radome covers the fixed dual mode planar spiral high band antenna, which is supplemented by an eight element low band antenna array.

The receiver employs Crystal Video Receiver (CVR) and Superheterodyne techniques, subject to frequency band. Reports indicate that the receiver processor is capable of sorting threat pulse trains in high density environments, from the C through to the J bands (0.5-20 GHz).

1.575 GHz and 1.227 GHz are definitely in band and the 8 element low band antenna and superhet channel are not present as decoration. They got added for several very good reasons. Low band jammers and communication signals was certainly one. It would be legitimate to question how well the HARM is able to target the specific jamming techniques used by Ruissia against GPS at present, but those questions apply equally to any notional new system. Russia may also have "reserve modes" we haven't seen yet but homing on such signals is what HARM is already designed to do. Hard to imagine why a new seeker would be required. GPS jamming is not hard to find. At least we can test HARMs against replicas of the Russian jamming waveforms right now, today.

Given that Ukraine has HARM missiles, one wonders why we haven't heard at least something about their employment against GPS jammers, good or bad. I can't explain this. We certainly learned about the GLSDBs, although not in "real time". It might be the HARMs (and JDAM-ERs with HOJ packages) are being reserved for F-16 usage.

[Goose]

The U.S. Air Force is buying add-on seekers designed to give Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) precision-guided bombs supplied to Ukraine the ability to zero in on GPS jammers. In effect, this would turn one of the weapons most impacted by this countermeasure into one used to directly attack it. This follows growing reports that Russian jamming is severely degrading the effectiveness of Western-supplied GPS-guided munitions, including JDAM-ERs.

https://www.twz.com/air/jdam-er-winged-b...to-ukraine

It is indeed gratifying that the USAF is acquiring a home-on-jam capability for the JDAM-ER. Unfortunately the contract gives no information on how many home-on-jam units will be integrated or exactly when (other than the termination date of 1-Oct-2025). This is understandable as part of operational security and the fact much of the contract is CPFF and the deliverables are "undefinitized". However, since these items are not already in inventory and available immediately, it is highly probable delivery is at best many months away and that the resulting package hasn't undergone an opeval. The article points out that SARA provided seekers for a test on the SDB. The lack of a follow-up procurement gives one pause. It may be there was no requirement or that the requirement wasn't high enough priority to be funded. It may also be that the results were not good enough to generate interest to even put in place an evaluation program. One does worry that this procurement will follow a similar track to  the GLSDB. The program was announced with fanfare, all of us got excited, and then the production and testing cycle took about half a year or so. Upon employment, it didn't work. Obviously we need to do something, and this is something. Let's hope the USAF is also following this program and doing all the "rapid OT&E" possible to ensure it will work upon first delivery. Their record in this regard is not stellar.

The cited article's comments about the HARM missile also gives one pause. https://ausairpower.net/API-AGM-88-HARM.html. Note this is from 1998 (last update in 2014) and is not in any way "news". There is no doubt whatsoever that the AGM-88C covers the range.

A dielectric radome covers the fixed dual mode planar spiral high band antenna, which is supplemented by an eight element low band antenna array.

The receiver employs Crystal Video Receiver (CVR) and Superheterodyne techniques, subject to frequency band. Reports indicate that the receiver processor is capable of sorting threat pulse trains in high density environments, from the C through to the J bands (0.5-20 GHz).

1.575 GHz and 1.227 GHz are definitely in band and the 8 element low band antenna and superhet channel are not present as decoration. They got added for several very good reasons. Low band jammers and communication signals was certainly one. It would be legitimate to question how well the HARM is able to target the specific jamming techniques used by Ruissia against GPS at present, but those questions apply equally to any notional new system. Russia may also have "reserve modes" we haven't seen yet but homing on such signals is what HARM is already designed to do. Hard to imagine why a new seeker would be required. GPS jamming is not hard to find. At least we can test HARMs against replicas of the Russian jamming waveforms right now, today.

Given that Ukraine has HARM missiles, one wonders why we haven't heard at least something about their employment against GPS jammers, good or bad. I can't explain this. We certainly learned about the GLSDBs, although not in "real time". It might be the HARMs (and JDAM-ERs with HOJ packages) are being reserved for F-16 usage.

[TrumpCard]

This is old news from 2023, but it’s new to me, and I don’t recall seeing it posted here. Apparently, USAID is working on a fix to make Ukrainian rail compatible with Polish rail so as to facilitate transportation of goods. I don’t know how long this will take, but it’s encouraging that people are working on the issue. 

https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/p...il-network

[TrumpCard]

This is old news from 2023, but it’s new to me, and I don’t recall seeing it posted here. Apparently, USAID is working on a fix to make Ukrainian rail compatible with Polish rail so as to facilitate transportation of goods. I don’t know how long this will take, but it’s encouraging that people are working on the issue. 

https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/p...il-network

[Goose]

This is old news from 2023, but it’s new to me, and I don’t recall seeing it posted here. Apparently, USAID is working on a fix to make Ukrainian rail compatible with Polish rail so as to facilitate transportation of goods. I don’t know how long this will take, but it’s encouraging that people are working on the issue. 

https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/p...il-network

We did talk about this a bit back in July of 2023. https://thecardboard.org/board/showthrea...1&page=185 Post 3687. Polish rail contains both broad (1520) and standard (1435) gauge. Going forward, Poland will be 1435 mm, but is not universally there yet and won't be for a while. Lviv already has a 1520 mm track that runs into Poland and interchanges there. The dual gauge solution will allow the gauge change to take place inside Ukraine rather than inside Poland. The rest of Ukraine's rail system will still be 1520 mm and a gauge change will still be required. Unless the transloading from trucks to rail can be done in Liviv instead of further east, this change will therefore not of itself help much. It is also still true (and forever will be true) that shipping large bulk cargo (like grain) is cheaper by ship than by land. Going from Ukraine by rail to Baltic (or even further west) ports is an expense that renders Ukrainian grain noncompetitive in the wider world. Too long an overland route to be viable (and BNSF doesn't operate in Europe :-) Going by rail to places in Europe OTOH can be economically feasible. Of course, if Ukraine does that they will have EU farmers blocking the tracks (as they did the roads) over "unfair competition".

[Goose]

This is old news from 2023, but it’s new to me, and I don’t recall seeing it posted here. Apparently, USAID is working on a fix to make Ukrainian rail compatible with Polish rail so as to facilitate transportation of goods. I don’t know how long this will take, but it’s encouraging that people are working on the issue. 

https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/p...il-network

We did talk about this a bit back in July of 2023. https://thecardboard.org/board/showthrea...1&page=185 Post 3687. Polish rail contains both broad (1520) and standard (1435) gauge. Going forward, Poland will be 1435 mm, but is not universally there yet and won't be for a while. Lviv already has a 1520 mm track that runs into Poland and interchanges there. The dual gauge solution will allow the gauge change to take place inside Ukraine rather than inside Poland. The rest of Ukraine's rail system will still be 1520 mm and a gauge change will still be required. Unless the transloading from trucks to rail can be done in Liviv instead of further east, this change will therefore not of itself help much. It is also still true (and forever will be true) that shipping large bulk cargo (like grain) is cheaper by ship than by land. Going from Ukraine by rail to Baltic (or even further west) ports is an expense that renders Ukrainian grain noncompetitive in the wider world. Too long an overland route to be viable (and BNSF doesn't operate in Europe :-) Going by rail to places in Europe OTOH can be economically feasible. Of course, if Ukraine does that they will have EU farmers blocking the tracks (as they did the roads) over "unfair competition".

[Goose]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eqxfNAEkQo8

I debated whether to post this or not. It is long and probably boring in many parts to non-geeks. That said it does provide insight into the genesis of the HARM and AARGM development. There is a pretty good basic explanation of the HARM seeker. While the video is mostly about SHRIKE, it provides lots of insight into the process of developing, building, and testing anti-radiation missiles.

The video also contains strong "hints" of what we call "electro-politics". These currents are almost as interesting as the technology of anti-radiation missiles themselves. The comments in the video about the HARM program as it was executed "making every possible mistake at least once" is IMO very much from the NOTS/NAWS/NAWC/NAWS point of view, but is not without merit :-). The AARGM development is "too recent" to allow such comments to be made, but the back stories there are even more interesting. Despite all this, somehow a very effective weapon was developed. That is why Ukraine's lack of any success at all in eliminating Russian GPS jamming (at least locally and possibly only transiently) is baffling.

The target discrimination test near the end of the video involving a P-15  "Squad Eye" is interesting and the success of that test against a signal even lower in frequency than a GPS jammer (P band) shows that the HARM is capable in the "low band". https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/1...48.en.html. Some may remember the shootdown of an F-117 in the Bosnia "war". That event was caused by, among many other factors, the fact the HARM carrying SEAD aircraft were not operating due to weather. The P-18 "Spoon Rest" operates below the supported frequency range of the HARM, but is unable to provide adequate resolution for a firing solution.

[Goose]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eqxfNAEkQo8

I debated whether to post this or not. It is long and probably boring in many parts to non-geeks. That said it does provide insight into the genesis of the HARM and AARGM development. There is a pretty good basic explanation of the HARM seeker. While the video is mostly about SHRIKE, it provides lots of insight into the process of developing, building, and testing anti-radiation missiles.

The video also contains strong "hints" of what we call "electro-politics". These currents are almost as interesting as the technology of anti-radiation missiles themselves. The comments in the video about the HARM program as it was executed "making every possible mistake at least once" is IMO very much from the NOTS/NAWS/NAWC/NAWS point of view, but is not without merit :-). The AARGM development is "too recent" to allow such comments to be made, but the back stories there are even more interesting. Despite all this, somehow a very effective weapon was developed. That is why Ukraine's lack of any success at all in eliminating Russian GPS jamming (at least locally and possibly only transiently) is baffling.

The target discrimination test near the end of the video involving a P-15  "Squad Eye" is interesting and the success of that test against a signal even lower in frequency than a GPS jammer (P band) shows that the HARM is capable in the "low band". https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/1...48.en.html. Some may remember the shootdown of an F-117 in the Bosnia "war". That event was caused by, among many other factors, the fact the HARM carrying SEAD aircraft were not operating due to weather. The P-18 "Spoon Rest" operates below the supported frequency range of the HARM, but is unable to provide adequate resolution for a firing solution.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/putins-crimea...56551.html
If this is true, it is "interesting". While the new rail line through occupied Ukrainian territory will ultimately allow supplying Russian military units from the north-east, it isn't finished yet and it will definitely be easily within both ATACMS range and F-16 range. Both ammunition and food can and undoubtedly do travel to Crimea by rail, but apparently military hardware has not done so recently. Possibly this means all of Russia's new and replacement resources are being committed almost exclusively to the offensive in the north, leaving the south-east weakened and Crimea more vulnerable. Something to think about.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/putins-crimea...56551.html
If this is true, it is "interesting". While the new rail line through occupied Ukrainian territory will ultimately allow supplying Russian military units from the north-east, it isn't finished yet and it will definitely be easily within both ATACMS range and F-16 range. Both ammunition and food can and undoubtedly do travel to Crimea by rail, but apparently military hardware has not done so recently. Possibly this means all of Russia's new and replacement resources are being committed almost exclusively to the offensive in the north, leaving the south-east weakened and Crimea more vulnerable. Something to think about.

[TrumpCard]

Interesting poll results on support for Ukraine:

https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/...raine-war/

[TrumpCard]

Interesting poll results on support for Ukraine:

https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/...raine-war/

[GK3]

Interesting poll results on support for Ukraine:

https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/...raine-war/

I do not find it odd that the younger generation sees less threat from Russia.  Us less young types who were born a long time ago have not forgotten the Cold War or our personal service in the military during that period.  Europe is far closer to the Bear and probably far more concerned than we are, but they have let their military degrade to such a point that without us, it would be very messy.

[GK3]

Interesting poll results on support for Ukraine:

https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/...raine-war/

I do not find it odd that the younger generation sees less threat from Russia.  Us less young types who were born a long time ago have not forgotten the Cold War or our personal service in the military during that period.  Europe is far closer to the Bear and probably far more concerned than we are, but they have let their military degrade to such a point that without us, it would be very messy.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-sends...29542.html

This is "interesting" for at least two reasons. One reason is that Russia can employ their greater numbers by stretching the battlespace as much as they can. This forces Ukraine to spread their less-numerous troops in less depth, creating the greater possibility of a breakthrough. The other reason is that in the north Ukraine lacks strategic depth. Major population centers are very close to the border, so regrouping via strategic retreat is in many places not an option. Russia has been slow to take advantage of this geometric advantage.  They attempted it early in the war but their incompetent execution allowed Ukraine to hold the line. Russia is unquestionably a better army now than then. Further west Ukraine is somewhat protected by Belarus. Russia probably doesn't have blanket permission to attack through Belarus and may not want to involve Belarus in the war directly. That isn't for sure though and this contingency further stretches Ukraine.

Ukraine has (finally) passed a "more inclusive" draft law, but it will take 90 days (best case) or so to deliver many more useful soldiers. Ukraine also has to refill their logistics pipeline with the newly arriving ammunition. That won't take anywhere near 90 days but is a factor for a few weeks at least. Russia has a window of opportunity here. Let's hope Ukraine can weather this interval.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-sends...29542.html

This is "interesting" for at least two reasons. One reason is that Russia can employ their greater numbers by stretching the battlespace as much as they can. This forces Ukraine to spread their less-numerous troops in less depth, creating the greater possibility of a breakthrough. The other reason is that in the north Ukraine lacks strategic depth. Major population centers are very close to the border, so regrouping via strategic retreat is in many places not an option. Russia has been slow to take advantage of this geometric advantage.  They attempted it early in the war but their incompetent execution allowed Ukraine to hold the line. Russia is unquestionably a better army now than then. Further west Ukraine is somewhat protected by Belarus. Russia probably doesn't have blanket permission to attack through Belarus and may not want to involve Belarus in the war directly. That isn't for sure though and this contingency further stretches Ukraine.

Ukraine has (finally) passed a "more inclusive" draft law, but it will take 90 days (best case) or so to deliver many more useful soldiers. Ukraine also has to refill their logistics pipeline with the newly arriving ammunition. That won't take anywhere near 90 days but is a factor for a few weeks at least. Russia has a window of opportunity here. Let's hope Ukraine can weather this interval.

[dabigv13]

Russia is unquestionably a better army now than then.

Uhhhh I very much question that. Russia is a much worse army now than they were at the start of the war. Their troops are fewer in number and more poorly trained. They are using poorer quality and less numerous equipment. Their best precision munitions have almost no stockpiles and are pretty much being used as they are produced.

They are better at using their poorly equipped and poorly trained military now than a year ago, perhaps.

Ukraine's army is worse off now too though. This attack on Kharkiv is probably mostly to occupy Ukrainian reserves and prevent their deployment to the Donbas. Russia has a lot of men near Belgorod but Ukrainian defensive lines are stronger here than almost anywhere else. Russia doesn't seem to have made much progress thus far.

[dabigv13]

Russia is unquestionably a better army now than then.

Uhhhh I very much question that. Russia is a much worse army now than they were at the start of the war. Their troops are fewer in number and more poorly trained. They are using poorer quality and less numerous equipment. Their best precision munitions have almost no stockpiles and are pretty much being used as they are produced.

They are better at using their poorly equipped and poorly trained military now than a year ago, perhaps.

Ukraine's army is worse off now too though. This attack on Kharkiv is probably mostly to occupy Ukrainian reserves and prevent their deployment to the Donbas. Russia has a lot of men near Belgorod but Ukrainian defensive lines are stronger here than almost anywhere else. Russia doesn't seem to have made much progress thus far.

[Goose]

Russia is unquestionably a better army now than then.

Uhhhh I very much question that. Russia is a much worse army now than they were at the start of the war. Their troops are fewer in number and more poorly trained. They are using poorer quality and less numerous equipment. Their best precision munitions have almost no stockpiles and are pretty much being used as they are produced.

They are better at using their poorly equipped and poorly trained military now than a year ago, perhaps.

Your first points reflects not how "good" the Russian military is, but rather its size and equipment. These factors do matter. However, having lots of equipment you can't competently employ is of little use. Russia has already made that mistake and it is a "sunk cost". These factors may result in Russia losing the war, but are not a reflection on how the Russians are using their reduced assets.

Russia is clearly using their troops much more effectively now. They made a lot of mistakes early on and asked their forces to do things they simply couldn't execute. They don't do that now, after paying in blood for stupidity. The BTG is a thing of the past. There is not as much churn in the leadership positions because they have identified their effective leaders. Their ability to plan what the can execute and exploit success is much better. They don't line up large conveys of military assets to be destroyed. They don't routinely make "stupid" mistakes, which they clearly did early in the war. They also aren't relying on mercenary troops that are of questionable loyalty to the government. Casualties are high, but not so high they can't be replaced, at least for a few years. The VKS is finally being used effectively to support ground offensives. Possibly most importantly Russia has mounted a very, very effective GPS jamming capability that is very seriously degrading Ukrainian precision guided weapons over large areas. Obviously, this is "of immense proportions" because precision weapons were a way for Ukraine to compensate for smaller numbers.

Ukraine's army is worse off now too though. This attack on Kharkiv is probably mostly to occupy Ukrainian reserves and prevent their deployment to the Donbas. Russia has a lot of men near Belgorod but Ukrainian defensive lines are stronger here than almost anywhere else. Russia doesn't seem to have made much progress thus far.

Agree with this analysis. The primary purpose of this attack is to "fix" Ukrainian assets in place. There are a couple of ways to look at this. One is that Russia is using this attack for a dual purpose. It does fix the Ukrainians in place, but it is also a good way to "blood" newly raised troops that will be transferred elsewhere soon to make way for the new class of contract. Historically, Russia has done this a lot.

It is arguable that "fixing" the Ukrainian troops in place isn't necessary, because Ukraine has kept these areas strong even without actual attacks. This makes the "blooding" aspect more probable. I don't know the composition of these units so I can't confirm this factor. Arguably, Russia shouldn't have executed an attack to fix the Ukrainians unless and until Ukraine started to transfer troops elsewhere. That creates a "double whammy". You hit units that are moving (which is easier than dug in defenders). A breakthrough is possible, but even if it doesn't happen Russia would do damage. This is the argument that if your opponent is doing what you want, don't disturb him.

[Goose]

Russia is unquestionably a better army now than then.

Uhhhh I very much question that. Russia is a much worse army now than they were at the start of the war. Their troops are fewer in number and more poorly trained. They are using poorer quality and less numerous equipment. Their best precision munitions have almost no stockpiles and are pretty much being used as they are produced.

They are better at using their poorly equipped and poorly trained military now than a year ago, perhaps.

Your first points reflects not how "good" the Russian military is, but rather its size and equipment. These factors do matter. However, having lots of equipment you can't competently employ is of little use. Russia has already made that mistake and it is a "sunk cost". These factors may result in Russia losing the war, but are not a reflection on how the Russians are using their reduced assets.

Russia is clearly using their troops much more effectively now. They made a lot of mistakes early on and asked their forces to do things they simply couldn't execute. They don't do that now, after paying in blood for stupidity. The BTG is a thing of the past. There is not as much churn in the leadership positions because they have identified their effective leaders. Their ability to plan what the can execute and exploit success is much better. They don't line up large conveys of military assets to be destroyed. They don't routinely make "stupid" mistakes, which they clearly did early in the war. They also aren't relying on mercenary troops that are of questionable loyalty to the government. Casualties are high, but not so high they can't be replaced, at least for a few years. The VKS is finally being used effectively to support ground offensives. Possibly most importantly Russia has mounted a very, very effective GPS jamming capability that is very seriously degrading Ukrainian precision guided weapons over large areas. Obviously, this is "of immense proportions" because precision weapons were a way for Ukraine to compensate for smaller numbers.

Ukraine's army is worse off now too though. This attack on Kharkiv is probably mostly to occupy Ukrainian reserves and prevent their deployment to the Donbas. Russia has a lot of men near Belgorod but Ukrainian defensive lines are stronger here than almost anywhere else. Russia doesn't seem to have made much progress thus far.

Agree with this analysis. The primary purpose of this attack is to "fix" Ukrainian assets in place. There are a couple of ways to look at this. One is that Russia is using this attack for a dual purpose. It does fix the Ukrainians in place, but it is also a good way to "blood" newly raised troops that will be transferred elsewhere soon to make way for the new class of contract. Historically, Russia has done this a lot.

It is arguable that "fixing" the Ukrainian troops in place isn't necessary, because Ukraine has kept these areas strong even without actual attacks. This makes the "blooding" aspect more probable. I don't know the composition of these units so I can't confirm this factor. Arguably, Russia shouldn't have executed an attack to fix the Ukrainians unless and until Ukraine started to transfer troops elsewhere. That creates a "double whammy". You hit units that are moving (which is easier than dug in defenders). A breakthrough is possible, but even if it doesn't happen Russia would do damage. This is the argument that if your opponent is doing what you want, don't disturb him.

[dabigv13]

Some interesting recent videos.

Russian assault golf carts meeting grisly ends. IMHO if Russian army is better now than in 2022 they wouldn't be using cheap Chinese ATVs for assaulting across open ground but I'm not an expert.

https://x.com/RALee85/status/1789033774136557572

Uncommonly seen video of disbursement of cluster munitions from an ATACMS on a fuel depot in Luhansk

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1789023257577865556

New aid packages seem to have provided for 100+ Bradleys and 100+ M113s.

https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/178...7458862493

[dabigv13]

Some interesting recent videos.

Russian assault golf carts meeting grisly ends. IMHO if Russian army is better now than in 2022 they wouldn't be using cheap Chinese ATVs for assaulting across open ground but I'm not an expert.

https://x.com/RALee85/status/1789033774136557572

Uncommonly seen video of disbursement of cluster munitions from an ATACMS on a fuel depot in Luhansk

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1789023257577865556

New aid packages seem to have provided for 100+ Bradleys and 100+ M113s.

https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/178...7458862493

[Goose]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/r...-advantage

Not a brand new article, but still relevant IMO.

[Goose]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/r...-advantage

Not a brand new article, but still relevant IMO.

[GK3]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/r...-advantage

Not a brand new article, but still relevant IMO.

In theory Ukraine is flying "wild weasal" missions using US provided HARM misseles.

https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraines...war-2024-5

[GK3]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/r...-advantage

Not a brand new article, but still relevant IMO.

In theory Ukraine is flying "wild weasal" missions using US provided HARM misseles.

https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraines...war-2024-5

[Goose]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/r...-advantage

Not a brand new article, but still relevant IMO.

In theory Ukraine is flying "wild weasal" missions using US provided HARM misseles.

https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraines...war-2024-5

I kind of laughed as I read that article. What are the using for their AN/APR-47 (or even APR-38)? Where is the EWO? Their aircraft hardware configuration is not capable of executing a "Wild Weasel" mission.  They are launching HARMs. Almost all US tactical aircraft launch HARMs. That doesn't by any means make them "Wild Weasels". Further, what strike packages are these alleged "Weasels" protecting? AFAIK Ukraine hasn't done much tactical bombing that was protected by special-purpose SEAD aircraft. This article gives some some background on the USAF Wild Weasel efforts. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/articl...e-missile/ Even from the very first the EWO had unique special purpose hardware to geolocate the targets. The "Bear" was an essential part of the mission. The electronic equipment became monotonically more capable over the years, but also more complex. The second crew member was essential to its operation.

This is not to say that the Ukraine isn't doing "good work" with the HARMs, but that doesn't bring them into the "Wild Weasel" domain. Today, the US has no "Weasels". The development of stealth aircraft was specifically directed towards making such operations unnecessary. The F-35 has highly automated systems that (in theory) allows it to target HARMs carried by non-stealth 4th generation aircraft at a safe distance. The USAF has finally realized that a "safe distance" from an S-400 is a long way, so AARGM-ER is now a thing. Obviously Ukraine isn't going to get any of that. The F-35 itself cannot presently launch the HARM. https://www.naval-technology.com/news/lo...s/?cf-view, so I guess we really need to hope that the F-35 hand-off works in "real life" as well as it does at Nellis. The original theory was that the F-35 could get so close to the threat radar (without being targeted) that it could just use conventional bombs to destroy it. It appears that is being rethought.

Here is an article I found interesting regarding the development of the F-4G, the "Last Weasel", the version used in Iraq.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pu.../P7661.pdf

[Goose]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/r...-advantage

Not a brand new article, but still relevant IMO.

In theory Ukraine is flying "wild weasal" missions using US provided HARM misseles.

https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraines...war-2024-5

I kind of laughed as I read that article. What are the using for their AN/APR-47 (or even APR-38)? Where is the EWO? Their aircraft hardware configuration is not capable of executing a "Wild Weasel" mission.  They are launching HARMs. Almost all US tactical aircraft launch HARMs. That doesn't by any means make them "Wild Weasels". Further, what strike packages are these alleged "Weasels" protecting? AFAIK Ukraine hasn't done much tactical bombing that was protected by special-purpose SEAD aircraft. This article gives some some background on the USAF Wild Weasel efforts. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/articl...e-missile/ Even from the very first the EWO had unique special purpose hardware to geolocate the targets. The "Bear" was an essential part of the mission. The electronic equipment became monotonically more capable over the years, but also more complex. The second crew member was essential to its operation.

This is not to say that the Ukraine isn't doing "good work" with the HARMs, but that doesn't bring them into the "Wild Weasel" domain. Today, the US has no "Weasels". The development of stealth aircraft was specifically directed towards making such operations unnecessary. The F-35 has highly automated systems that (in theory) allows it to target HARMs carried by non-stealth 4th generation aircraft at a safe distance. The USAF has finally realized that a "safe distance" from an S-400 is a long way, so AARGM-ER is now a thing. Obviously Ukraine isn't going to get any of that. The F-35 itself cannot presently launch the HARM. https://www.naval-technology.com/news/lo...s/?cf-view, so I guess we really need to hope that the F-35 hand-off works in "real life" as well as it does at Nellis. The original theory was that the F-35 could get so close to the threat radar (without being targeted) that it could just use conventional bombs to destroy it. It appears that is being rethought.

Here is an article I found interesting regarding the development of the F-4G, the "Last Weasel", the version used in Iraq.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pu.../P7661.pdf

[GK3]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/r...-advantage

Not a brand new article, but still relevant IMO.

In theory Ukraine is flying "wild weasal" missions using US provided HARM misseles.

https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraines...war-2024-5

I kind of laughed as I read that article. What are the using for their AN/APR-47 (or even APR-38)? Where is the EWO? Their aircraft hardware configuration is not capable of executing a "Wild Weasel" mission.  They are launching HARMs. Almost all US tactical aircraft launch HARMs. That doesn't by any means make them "Wild Weasels". Further, what strike packages are these alleged "Weasels" protecting? AFAIK Ukraine hasn't done much tactical bombing that was protected by special-purpose SEAD aircraft. This article gives some some background on the USAF Wild Weasel efforts. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/articl...e-missile/ Even from the very first the EWO had unique special purpose hardware to geolocate the targets. The "Bear" was an essential part of the mission. The electronic equipment became monotonically more capable over the years, but also more complex. The second crew member was essential to its operation.

This is not to say that the Ukraine isn't doing "good work" with the HARMs, but that doesn't bring them into the "Wild Weasel" domain. Today, the US has no "Weasels". The development of stealth aircraft was specifically directed towards making such operations unnecessary. The F-35 has highly automated systems that (in theory) allows it to target HARMs carried by non-stealth 4th generation aircraft at a safe distance. The USAF has finally realized that a "safe distance" from an S-400 is a long way, so AARGM-ER is now a thing. Obviously Ukraine isn't going to get any of that. The F-35 itself cannot presently launch the HARM. https://www.naval-technology.com/news/lo...s/?cf-view, so I guess we really need to hope that the F-35 hand-off works in "real life" as well as it does at Nellis. The original theory was that the F-35 could get so close to the threat radar (without being targeted) that it could just use conventional bombs to destroy it. It appears that is being rethought.

Here is an article I found interesting regarding the development of the F-4G, the "Last Weasel", the version used in Iraq.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pu.../P7661.pdf

Thanks for the article and clarifying a lot of stuff I didn't understand.  Since we apparently have no Weasels any longer, does that mean the the whole concept is destined for the junk pile? Is there an alternative solution?  Can we figure out a way for drones of some type to fill the same mission?

[GK3]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/r...-advantage

Not a brand new article, but still relevant IMO.

In theory Ukraine is flying "wild weasal" missions using US provided HARM misseles.

https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraines...war-2024-5

I kind of laughed as I read that article. What are the using for their AN/APR-47 (or even APR-38)? Where is the EWO? Their aircraft hardware configuration is not capable of executing a "Wild Weasel" mission.  They are launching HARMs. Almost all US tactical aircraft launch HARMs. That doesn't by any means make them "Wild Weasels". Further, what strike packages are these alleged "Weasels" protecting? AFAIK Ukraine hasn't done much tactical bombing that was protected by special-purpose SEAD aircraft. This article gives some some background on the USAF Wild Weasel efforts. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/articl...e-missile/ Even from the very first the EWO had unique special purpose hardware to geolocate the targets. The "Bear" was an essential part of the mission. The electronic equipment became monotonically more capable over the years, but also more complex. The second crew member was essential to its operation.

This is not to say that the Ukraine isn't doing "good work" with the HARMs, but that doesn't bring them into the "Wild Weasel" domain. Today, the US has no "Weasels". The development of stealth aircraft was specifically directed towards making such operations unnecessary. The F-35 has highly automated systems that (in theory) allows it to target HARMs carried by non-stealth 4th generation aircraft at a safe distance. The USAF has finally realized that a "safe distance" from an S-400 is a long way, so AARGM-ER is now a thing. Obviously Ukraine isn't going to get any of that. The F-35 itself cannot presently launch the HARM. https://www.naval-technology.com/news/lo...s/?cf-view, so I guess we really need to hope that the F-35 hand-off works in "real life" as well as it does at Nellis. The original theory was that the F-35 could get so close to the threat radar (without being targeted) that it could just use conventional bombs to destroy it. It appears that is being rethought.

Here is an article I found interesting regarding the development of the F-4G, the "Last Weasel", the version used in Iraq.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pu.../P7661.pdf

Thanks for the article and clarifying a lot of stuff I didn't understand.  Since we apparently have no Weasels any longer, does that mean the the whole concept is destined for the junk pile? Is there an alternative solution?  Can we figure out a way for drones of some type to fill the same mission?

[Goose]

Thanks for the article and clarifying a lot of stuff I didn't understand.  Since we apparently have no Weasels any longer, does that mean the the whole concept is destined for the junk pile? Is there an alternative solution?  Can we figure out a way for drones of some type to fill the same mission?

The TL;DR version is this: The USAF had a two-pronged approach to enemy IADS from 1970 to about 1985-86. The "conventional" approach was more and better EA (jammers), more and better anti-radiation missiles, and better ELINT capabilities. A lot of the conventional approach was executed (somewhat unevenly). It "worked" but 1) it could not guarantee absolute protection. There would be losses and nobody knew how bad those losses would be. 2) It was expensive. Replacements would be needed for the EB-66 type aircraft. More "Wild Weasels" would be needed to protect strike packages. Increased automation would be needed, and that too was expensive.

The other approach was the "stealth aircraft" approach. It was a magic bullet. The enemy IADS at one stroke became totally ineffective because they couldn't "see" much and what they could see they couldn't target. The big question was "Does it work?" and by 1985-86 the USAF was confident it did. While some "residual" work went on with the first approach, it was heavily deprecated. The solution was to make the USAF essentially 100% stealth. This approach had other big advantages.  Stealth also basically "won" the air-to-air battle because the enemy would be wiped out in BVR engagements before they knew what hit them. Stealth also didn't require the continued costly spiral development of equipment to counter improvements in enemy radar and missile technology.

Stealth also removed the need for Weasels to take on the high-risk mission of "trolling" for enemy radars to kill them. The YGBSM is indeed a good commentary on the Weasel mission.  As Desert Shield/Desert Storm amply demonstrated carrying 4 HARMS per Weasel wasn't NEAR enough. The F-117s "proved" they didn't need EA. Kosovo later disproved that, but by then it was academic. Thus the end of Weasels. Thus also the end of any special purpose EA in the USAF. They never "liked" it anyway. The ELINT mission survives in the USAF. The USN is in a different situation, so they have the EA-18G, which is the only such assent in US inventory today. Ostensibly, the USAF will "borrow" EA-18G units if they need them. It has been done, but I expect in a "real war" the USN would suddenly be too busy :-). The USN OTOH will loose their dedicated ELINT capability with the final demise of VQ-1 in 2025. The slack is supposedly going to be taken up by a mixture of P-8s and drones. The P-8 has an ESM system, the AN/ALQ-240. It is much better than the ALR-66 the P-3C used, but it is very unlikely (IMO) that the ELINT mission will be high enough priority to actually replace VQ-1. There is a unit in JAX that has the task of preserving the Navy ELINT culture. Good luck with that.

The "100% stealth" plan quite possibly would have been executed had the cold war continued and military spending remained in the 4-5% of GDP range. However, without the "peer" enemy with an continually improving IADS, spending all that money (for either approach) wasn't deemed appropriate by the NCA. The "peace dividend" put paid to 100% stealth, even if it were ever possible. The cost of stealth also escalated greatly due to USAF gross mismanagement and the corporate culture generated by consolidation in the defense industry. It was also not helped by Congress intervening (once again, see TFX) to demand a single stealth platform meet all the needs of all the services. Whether that was possible at reasonable cost is arguable, but it certainly wasn't possible in the absence of clear-eyed "supervision" to ensure the program philosophical goals were being met. That didn't happen. The F-35 is a good airplane, but IMO it is vastly more expensive than it needed to be and not affordable enough to come anywhere near the 100% stealth goal. Once again, the adopted solution did not meet the objectives of the program. Nobody said anything (and "survived" anyway). The Emperor had no clothes, but at least had underwear. That was deemed "good enough".

The USAF eventually figured out that their "magic bullet" wasn't the whole answer if they didn't have enough of them and couldn't get the money to execute the "original" intent. Thus the "two tier" approach we have today with "lots" of 4th generation aircraft and "some" F-35s to lead the strike. The plan is that the F-35 gets well inside the IADS and destroys it, either by the F-35s own kinetic effects or by using "network centric" handoffs to 4th generation aircraft loitering outside the effective IADS range. This approach probably will "work". The Israelis have used it to good effect with their F-35Is. It clearly isn't perfect however. They have lost some 4th generation aircraft to SAM sites that went undetected. They are also not playing the "first team".

There will be no "successor" to the F-35 as such, because the USAF undoubtedly will be switching to autonomous unmanned stealth drones for the next generation "fighter". The development has been underway for a while. It continues now at a much more visible level. Politically, it will be a very hard sell in the USAF, which is run by pilots. It is also going to be very expensive. The B-21 at least was designed with the "high-low" mix well understood. It is a "bomber", but is morphing into a "super F-35" that can "do it all", including ELINT, battle management, and weapons designation/handoff. The pitifully few we will procure (if the program survives) will be great aircraft. Both of them :-).

[Goose]

Thanks for the article and clarifying a lot of stuff I didn't understand.  Since we apparently have no Weasels any longer, does that mean the the whole concept is destined for the junk pile? Is there an alternative solution?  Can we figure out a way for drones of some type to fill the same mission?

The TL;DR version is this: The USAF had a two-pronged approach to enemy IADS from 1970 to about 1985-86. The "conventional" approach was more and better EA (jammers), more and better anti-radiation missiles, and better ELINT capabilities. A lot of the conventional approach was executed (somewhat unevenly). It "worked" but 1) it could not guarantee absolute protection. There would be losses and nobody knew how bad those losses would be. 2) It was expensive. Replacements would be needed for the EB-66 type aircraft. More "Wild Weasels" would be needed to protect strike packages. Increased automation would be needed, and that too was expensive.

The other approach was the "stealth aircraft" approach. It was a magic bullet. The enemy IADS at one stroke became totally ineffective because they couldn't "see" much and what they could see they couldn't target. The big question was "Does it work?" and by 1985-86 the USAF was confident it did. While some "residual" work went on with the first approach, it was heavily deprecated. The solution was to make the USAF essentially 100% stealth. This approach had other big advantages.  Stealth also basically "won" the air-to-air battle because the enemy would be wiped out in BVR engagements before they knew what hit them. Stealth also didn't require the continued costly spiral development of equipment to counter improvements in enemy radar and missile technology.

Stealth also removed the need for Weasels to take on the high-risk mission of "trolling" for enemy radars to kill them. The YGBSM is indeed a good commentary on the Weasel mission.  As Desert Shield/Desert Storm amply demonstrated carrying 4 HARMS per Weasel wasn't NEAR enough. The F-117s "proved" they didn't need EA. Kosovo later disproved that, but by then it was academic. Thus the end of Weasels. Thus also the end of any special purpose EA in the USAF. They never "liked" it anyway. The ELINT mission survives in the USAF. The USN is in a different situation, so they have the EA-18G, which is the only such assent in US inventory today. Ostensibly, the USAF will "borrow" EA-18G units if they need them. It has been done, but I expect in a "real war" the USN would suddenly be too busy :-). The USN OTOH will loose their dedicated ELINT capability with the final demise of VQ-1 in 2025. The slack is supposedly going to be taken up by a mixture of P-8s and drones. The P-8 has an ESM system, the AN/ALQ-240. It is much better than the ALR-66 the P-3C used, but it is very unlikely (IMO) that the ELINT mission will be high enough priority to actually replace VQ-1. There is a unit in JAX that has the task of preserving the Navy ELINT culture. Good luck with that.

The "100% stealth" plan quite possibly would have been executed had the cold war continued and military spending remained in the 4-5% of GDP range. However, without the "peer" enemy with an continually improving IADS, spending all that money (for either approach) wasn't deemed appropriate by the NCA. The "peace dividend" put paid to 100% stealth, even if it were ever possible. The cost of stealth also escalated greatly due to USAF gross mismanagement and the corporate culture generated by consolidation in the defense industry. It was also not helped by Congress intervening (once again, see TFX) to demand a single stealth platform meet all the needs of all the services. Whether that was possible at reasonable cost is arguable, but it certainly wasn't possible in the absence of clear-eyed "supervision" to ensure the program philosophical goals were being met. That didn't happen. The F-35 is a good airplane, but IMO it is vastly more expensive than it needed to be and not affordable enough to come anywhere near the 100% stealth goal. Once again, the adopted solution did not meet the objectives of the program. Nobody said anything (and "survived" anyway). The Emperor had no clothes, but at least had underwear. That was deemed "good enough".

The USAF eventually figured out that their "magic bullet" wasn't the whole answer if they didn't have enough of them and couldn't get the money to execute the "original" intent. Thus the "two tier" approach we have today with "lots" of 4th generation aircraft and "some" F-35s to lead the strike. The plan is that the F-35 gets well inside the IADS and destroys it, either by the F-35s own kinetic effects or by using "network centric" handoffs to 4th generation aircraft loitering outside the effective IADS range. This approach probably will "work". The Israelis have used it to good effect with their F-35Is. It clearly isn't perfect however. They have lost some 4th generation aircraft to SAM sites that went undetected. They are also not playing the "first team".

There will be no "successor" to the F-35 as such, because the USAF undoubtedly will be switching to autonomous unmanned stealth drones for the next generation "fighter". The development has been underway for a while. It continues now at a much more visible level. Politically, it will be a very hard sell in the USAF, which is run by pilots. It is also going to be very expensive. The B-21 at least was designed with the "high-low" mix well understood. It is a "bomber", but is morphing into a "super F-35" that can "do it all", including ELINT, battle management, and weapons designation/handoff. The pitifully few we will procure (if the program survives) will be great aircraft. Both of them :-).