[GK3]

Thoughts on a Sunday morning in May: At the very moment the Free World needs an America to be led by an inspiring, serious and wise statesman or stateswoman, a commander-in-chief steeped in history and instinctively capable of zooming back and forth between details and the big picture of international relations, we are once again stuck with a "choice" between stumbling senility and oblivious narcissism. Any wonder why Hamas, Putin, Xi, the Iranian mullahs, et. al., are rubbing their hands and operating with unmitigated impunity? Their collective future is so bright they gotta wear shades. This is not good, folks.

Boy, did you hit the nail with the hammer that time!  We have a government led by someone who can't make a decison and stick by it, or even know what he really wants to when a given crisis arises. So everyone else, including the military sits around waiting for a real decision to be made with the appropriate directions and not getting that they sit like everyone else since jumping the gun or ending up crosswise with the NCA does not enhance ones career. 
I think this explains why there is more and more discussion from various Western European Countries about getting more involved. Poland and the Baltic States can see the writing on the wall that says if Ukraine loses, they are next.  It seems pretty clear now that in addition to Poland and the Baltic States, France and Belgium can see the writing on the wall and would rather fight in Ukraine than in Berlin, even though logistically it would be hard.  
We seem to finally be able to understand that if you give weapons to Country A  but tell them that can't use them against Country B except in Country A, you are being pretty stupid. If Ukraine can use the longer range weapons given to them by us to attack Russian Assembly points in Russia, it might help a lot.   The big challenge now is can anyone in Washington make a decision.

[GK3]

Thoughts on a Sunday morning in May: At the very moment the Free World needs an America to be led by an inspiring, serious and wise statesman or stateswoman, a commander-in-chief steeped in history and instinctively capable of zooming back and forth between details and the big picture of international relations, we are once again stuck with a "choice" between stumbling senility and oblivious narcissism. Any wonder why Hamas, Putin, Xi, the Iranian mullahs, et. al., are rubbing their hands and operating with unmitigated impunity? Their collective future is so bright they gotta wear shades. This is not good, folks.

Boy, did you hit the nail with the hammer that time!  We have a government led by someone who can't make a decison and stick by it, or even know what he really wants to when a given crisis arises. So everyone else, including the military sits around waiting for a real decision to be made with the appropriate directions and not getting that they sit like everyone else since jumping the gun or ending up crosswise with the NCA does not enhance ones career. 
I think this explains why there is more and more discussion from various Western European Countries about getting more involved. Poland and the Baltic States can see the writing on the wall that says if Ukraine loses, they are next.  It seems pretty clear now that in addition to Poland and the Baltic States, France and Belgium can see the writing on the wall and would rather fight in Ukraine than in Berlin, even though logistically it would be hard.  
We seem to finally be able to understand that if you give weapons to Country A  but tell them that can't use them against Country B except in Country A, you are being pretty stupid. If Ukraine can use the longer range weapons given to them by us to attack Russian Assembly points in Russia, it might help a lot.   The big challenge now is can anyone in Washington make a decision.

[dabigv13]

Biden has been a better foreign policy president than GWB, Obama, and Trump, by a wide margin.
Too bad plenty here seem to be drinking the right wing kool-aid that he is just some senile bumbler.

I have some critiques of his Ukraine policy, and think he may be too cautious about some things, but results wise, the Russian armed forces have been decimated, Ukraine two years later is still fighting with high morale and hardly any territorial loss since the first months of the war, US troops are not dying and no nukes have gone off. Things could certainly have been much worse in Ukraine. Could they have been better? Probably not in any meaningful way.

Allowing western weapons to be used in Russia itself would probably be appropriate policy but it's not going to fundamentally change the war. Biden doesn't have ability to suddenly get Ukraine F16s and the pilots to fly them and even if that was prioritized from day 1 of the war that would have meant leaving more important military aid out from prior aid packages. And if Ukraine did have some F16s, it doesn't change the calculus of Russia launching glide bombs from within their own territory covered by their own air defense systems that can keep Ukrainian jets too far back to engage the Russian jets.

What could Biden do that would significantly alter the course of the war? Directly involve the US military. I'm OK with that but I don't think most Americans are.

[dabigv13]

Biden has been a better foreign policy president than GWB, Obama, and Trump, by a wide margin.
Too bad plenty here seem to be drinking the right wing kool-aid that he is just some senile bumbler.

I have some critiques of his Ukraine policy, and think he may be too cautious about some things, but results wise, the Russian armed forces have been decimated, Ukraine two years later is still fighting with high morale and hardly any territorial loss since the first months of the war, US troops are not dying and no nukes have gone off. Things could certainly have been much worse in Ukraine. Could they have been better? Probably not in any meaningful way.

Allowing western weapons to be used in Russia itself would probably be appropriate policy but it's not going to fundamentally change the war. Biden doesn't have ability to suddenly get Ukraine F16s and the pilots to fly them and even if that was prioritized from day 1 of the war that would have meant leaving more important military aid out from prior aid packages. And if Ukraine did have some F16s, it doesn't change the calculus of Russia launching glide bombs from within their own territory covered by their own air defense systems that can keep Ukrainian jets too far back to engage the Russian jets.

What could Biden do that would significantly alter the course of the war? Directly involve the US military. I'm OK with that but I don't think most Americans are.

[Goose]

I've read that the U.S. is undertaking efforts to increase artillery production.  Like this recent article:  https://warriormaven.com/land/army-tripl...ing-rounds.  I'm not sure if these actions are the type that you all are saying are too little, too late.

As of now, according to the article I posted, Russia is providing 4.5 million rounds of artillery ammunition a year. This undoubtedly includes 122 mm for Russia, although that caliber has kind of fallen out of favor. According to the article you cite the US hopes to produce 60,000 rounds a month by "next summer". ATM I think the US production is between 35,000 and 45,000 a month (from memory). If the US meets its goal by next summer the US will be producing 720,000 rounds a year. Compare that to Russia's 4,500,000 right now, today. Yes, that is IMO very much too little and too late. Again, to be fair not all of the 4.5 million Russia makes a year are 152 mm, but IMO it is safe to say at least 1/3 are. So, why "next summer" and why so few rounds? Yes, it is more than we do now but much less than is going to be needed. The EU appears to be no better off and perhaps worse.

One possible explanation of our not doing a better job is that "somebody" in the Army has counted the number of 155 mm artillery tubes Ukraine has and calculated the "maximum safe number" of shells they can fire, even assuming that replacement barrels are available. If that is indeed the case, it says that Ukraine is doomed, not due to lack of shells but due to lack of howitzers. I do hope that "somebody" told the administration about this, preferably a couple of years ago!

[Goose]

I've read that the U.S. is undertaking efforts to increase artillery production.  Like this recent article:  https://warriormaven.com/land/army-tripl...ing-rounds.  I'm not sure if these actions are the type that you all are saying are too little, too late.

As of now, according to the article I posted, Russia is providing 4.5 million rounds of artillery ammunition a year. This undoubtedly includes 122 mm for Russia, although that caliber has kind of fallen out of favor. According to the article you cite the US hopes to produce 60,000 rounds a month by "next summer". ATM I think the US production is between 35,000 and 45,000 a month (from memory). If the US meets its goal by next summer the US will be producing 720,000 rounds a year. Compare that to Russia's 4,500,000 right now, today. Yes, that is IMO very much too little and too late. Again, to be fair not all of the 4.5 million Russia makes a year are 152 mm, but IMO it is safe to say at least 1/3 are. So, why "next summer" and why so few rounds? Yes, it is more than we do now but much less than is going to be needed. The EU appears to be no better off and perhaps worse.

One possible explanation of our not doing a better job is that "somebody" in the Army has counted the number of 155 mm artillery tubes Ukraine has and calculated the "maximum safe number" of shells they can fire, even assuming that replacement barrels are available. If that is indeed the case, it says that Ukraine is doomed, not due to lack of shells but due to lack of howitzers. I do hope that "somebody" told the administration about this, preferably a couple of years ago!

[dabigv13]

I don't think we need to create hypotheticals- it's not easy to ramp up ammunition production quickly. A new factory was just opened producing 30k shells/months, almost doubling US production. We will soon be producing 10 times more than we were a few years ago.

Maybe it's too little, too late. Maybe it's ramping up as fast as possible given the funding and logistical constraints. I doubt Joe Biden can unilaterally make any decisions that would drastically increase our shell production. Congress waiting months to pass more aid didn't help matters.

[dabigv13]

I don't think we need to create hypotheticals- it's not easy to ramp up ammunition production quickly. A new factory was just opened producing 30k shells/months, almost doubling US production. We will soon be producing 10 times more than we were a few years ago.

Maybe it's too little, too late. Maybe it's ramping up as fast as possible given the funding and logistical constraints. I doubt Joe Biden can unilaterally make any decisions that would drastically increase our shell production. Congress waiting months to pass more aid didn't help matters.

[Goose]

I don't think we need to create hypotheticals- it's not easy to ramp up ammunition production quickly. A new factory was just opened producing 30k shells/months, almost doubling US production. We will soon be producing 10 times more than we were a few years ago.

I was aware of the "new" factory. However I haven't seen anything about the 10 times more. If you have a link, I would like to read it. AFAIK the 60K by next summer cited in the article by TrumpCard is the current estimate of the increase in production anticipated. If that isn't the case I am sure we all would like to know what is being done and how many rounds the Army expects to produce year over year.

Maybe it's too little, too late. Maybe it's ramping up as fast as possible given the funding and logistical constraints. I doubt Joe Biden can unilaterally make any decisions that would drastically increase our shell production. Congress waiting months to pass more aid didn't help matters.

The last sentence is indisputably correct. However, the president (through the Secretary of defense) has considerable power to re-program military spending. It is done all the time. Congress can indeed intervene and stop that kind of action, but given the situation in the Senate it seems unlikely that would happen. Instead of buying the programmed number of some item, like say the new light tank, the military can buy 155 mm instead. They will "defer" the acquisition of some item. The Joint Chiefs can come out with a position saying that militarily believes this is "essential" for the defense of the US. It can be done, but it would possibly ruffle some feathers. Most manufacturing logistics constraints respond quite well to treatment by dollars. We certainly did that buying IED jammers for Iraq. We still have them coming out of our ears. I am certain we can do more with 155 mm than we are. There is always the possibility there is some good reasons we aren't doing "more". I am not aware of any however.

[Goose]

I don't think we need to create hypotheticals- it's not easy to ramp up ammunition production quickly. A new factory was just opened producing 30k shells/months, almost doubling US production. We will soon be producing 10 times more than we were a few years ago.

I was aware of the "new" factory. However I haven't seen anything about the 10 times more. If you have a link, I would like to read it. AFAIK the 60K by next summer cited in the article by TrumpCard is the current estimate of the increase in production anticipated. If that isn't the case I am sure we all would like to know what is being done and how many rounds the Army expects to produce year over year.

Maybe it's too little, too late. Maybe it's ramping up as fast as possible given the funding and logistical constraints. I doubt Joe Biden can unilaterally make any decisions that would drastically increase our shell production. Congress waiting months to pass more aid didn't help matters.

The last sentence is indisputably correct. However, the president (through the Secretary of defense) has considerable power to re-program military spending. It is done all the time. Congress can indeed intervene and stop that kind of action, but given the situation in the Senate it seems unlikely that would happen. Instead of buying the programmed number of some item, like say the new light tank, the military can buy 155 mm instead. They will "defer" the acquisition of some item. The Joint Chiefs can come out with a position saying that militarily believes this is "essential" for the defense of the US. It can be done, but it would possibly ruffle some feathers. Most manufacturing logistics constraints respond quite well to treatment by dollars. We certainly did that buying IED jammers for Iraq. We still have them coming out of our ears. I am certain we can do more with 155 mm than we are. There is always the possibility there is some good reasons we aren't doing "more". I am not aware of any however.

[BostonCard]

This is sort of a bad news/good news article about shell production in Europe: https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/05...rm-ukraine (I gifted the article so it shouldn't be behind the paywall)

There is a supply crunch for materials that go into shells; the article cites that there is one remaining TNT producer in Europe, in Poland.  Other raw materials have to be imported (for example, cotton linters, an ingredient in nitrocellulose, has to be procured from China).

The good news, such as it is, is:

EU-wide annual shell production is projected to reach at least 1.4m by the end of 2024, up from around 500,000 a year ago.

BC

[BostonCard]

This is sort of a bad news/good news article about shell production in Europe: https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/05...rm-ukraine (I gifted the article so it shouldn't be behind the paywall)

There is a supply crunch for materials that go into shells; the article cites that there is one remaining TNT producer in Europe, in Poland.  Other raw materials have to be imported (for example, cotton linters, an ingredient in nitrocellulose, has to be procured from China).

The good news, such as it is, is:

EU-wide annual shell production is projected to reach at least 1.4m by the end of 2024, up from around 500,000 a year ago.

BC

[GK3]

Biden has been a better foreign policy president than GWB, Obama, and Trump, by a wide margin.
Too bad plenty here seem to be drinking the right wing kool-aid that he is just some senile bumbler.

I have some critiques of his Ukraine policy, and think he may be too cautious about some things, but results wise, the Russian armed forces have been decimated, Ukraine two years later is still fighting with high morale and hardly any territorial loss since the first months of the war, US troops are not dying and no nukes have gone off. Things could certainly have been much worse in Ukraine. Could they have been better? Probably not in any meaningful way.

Allowing western weapons to be used in Russia itself would probably be appropriate policy but it's not going to fundamentally change the war. Biden doesn't have ability to suddenly get Ukraine F16s and the pilots to fly them and even if that was prioritized from day 1 of the war that would have meant leaving more important military aid out from prior aid packages. And if Ukraine did have some F16s, it doesn't change the calculus of Russia launching glide bombs from within their own territory covered by their own air defense systems that can keep Ukrainian jets too far back to engage the Russian jets.

What could Biden do that would significantly alter the course of the war? Directly involve the US military. I'm OK with that but I don't think most Americans are.

I am not a "Rightwing Cool Aide Drinker" by any stretch of the imagination. Once we made the decision to assist Ukraine, someone should have made a list of what Ukraine needed long term and short term to survive. Artillery, Rockets, Tanks, APC's, HIMARS, etc. etc.  At that point once the need was identified, an immediate effort should have begun to provide those materials.  Instead, it has been a situation where a decision to do something has only been done after months of hand wringing.
My biases are not political,  but the result of personal experiece long ago as an member of the US Military in SE Asia. 
When politics takes presidence over what is needed by the military to achieve an objective people often die for no good reason.
If we want to stop Putin, we need to make that decison one way or another and either get out, or get in, all the way.  Western Europe seems to be waking up to the fact they can't really count on us going forward. 
We have to decide who we are and what we stand for and then act, one way or the other.  
The world we live in today, is not the world of our fathers, or maybe for some your grandfathers.  It is no longer just Russia versus Europe.  China certainly has a vote in today's world and we can no longer be the sole major defender of freedom and some form of democracy.  We can't be the sole power that is willing to keep Taiwan indepedent, or the sole power that keeps Ukraine a free country. It is no longer 1941.

[GK3]

Biden has been a better foreign policy president than GWB, Obama, and Trump, by a wide margin.
Too bad plenty here seem to be drinking the right wing kool-aid that he is just some senile bumbler.

I have some critiques of his Ukraine policy, and think he may be too cautious about some things, but results wise, the Russian armed forces have been decimated, Ukraine two years later is still fighting with high morale and hardly any territorial loss since the first months of the war, US troops are not dying and no nukes have gone off. Things could certainly have been much worse in Ukraine. Could they have been better? Probably not in any meaningful way.

Allowing western weapons to be used in Russia itself would probably be appropriate policy but it's not going to fundamentally change the war. Biden doesn't have ability to suddenly get Ukraine F16s and the pilots to fly them and even if that was prioritized from day 1 of the war that would have meant leaving more important military aid out from prior aid packages. And if Ukraine did have some F16s, it doesn't change the calculus of Russia launching glide bombs from within their own territory covered by their own air defense systems that can keep Ukrainian jets too far back to engage the Russian jets.

What could Biden do that would significantly alter the course of the war? Directly involve the US military. I'm OK with that but I don't think most Americans are.

I am not a "Rightwing Cool Aide Drinker" by any stretch of the imagination. Once we made the decision to assist Ukraine, someone should have made a list of what Ukraine needed long term and short term to survive. Artillery, Rockets, Tanks, APC's, HIMARS, etc. etc.  At that point once the need was identified, an immediate effort should have begun to provide those materials.  Instead, it has been a situation where a decision to do something has only been done after months of hand wringing.
My biases are not political,  but the result of personal experiece long ago as an member of the US Military in SE Asia. 
When politics takes presidence over what is needed by the military to achieve an objective people often die for no good reason.
If we want to stop Putin, we need to make that decison one way or another and either get out, or get in, all the way.  Western Europe seems to be waking up to the fact they can't really count on us going forward. 
We have to decide who we are and what we stand for and then act, one way or the other.  
The world we live in today, is not the world of our fathers, or maybe for some your grandfathers.  It is no longer just Russia versus Europe.  China certainly has a vote in today's world and we can no longer be the sole major defender of freedom and some form of democracy.  We can't be the sole power that is willing to keep Taiwan indepedent, or the sole power that keeps Ukraine a free country. It is no longer 1941.

[Goose]

This is sort of a bad news/good news article about shell production in Europe: https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/05...rm-ukraine (I gifted the article so it shouldn't be behind the paywall)

There is a supply crunch for materials that go into shells; the article cites that there is one remaining TNT producer in Europe, in Poland.  Other raw materials have to be imported (for example, cotton linters, an ingredient in nitrocellulose, has to be procured from China).

The good news, such as it is, is:

EU-wide annual shell production is projected to reach at least 1.4m by the end of 2024, up from around 500,000 a year ago.

BC

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/29/us/pe...93c37a624b

This is a (IMO) good recent article on the new Texas plant. It "will" produce 30,000 shells a month, although it isn't finished yet. It is producing some number now while parts of it are still under construction. That will result in a production of about 66,000 shells a month when the plant is operating at full capacity. Some interesting quotes from the article:

To keep Ukraine’s artillery crews supplied, the Pentagon set a production target last year of 100,000 shells per month by the end of 2025.

The 100,000-per-month goal represents a nearly tenfold increase in production from a few years ago.

“The steady increase of artillery ammunition production is significant for long-term U.S. and Ukrainian needs,” said Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “but even in the best case scenario, I would say those late-2025 output targets will arrive late in this war, and it is likely that Russian artillery output will still be higher than the U.S. and Europe combined at that point.”
“Let’s say a year and a half from now both the U.S. and Europe are making, or buying, over a million shells each,” he added. “That’s still probably less than Russia is going to produce this year.”

The 10 fold increase is a very red herring. The "baseline" was the "normal" yearly production well before the Ukraine war, approximately 10,000 shells a year. This was based on demand, not capacity. The existing US capacity was essentially three times that, and was very quickly increased to about 30,000 per year, near our maximum capacity.

The obvious question is whether this will be "enough", especially since it will not match projected Russian output. It would be nice to hear something from the DoD explaining why they think it will be or if not what will be done instead.

One last quote:

“When government and industry work together and Congress gives us sufficient latitude, we can still do great things in this country really fast,” Mr. Bush added.

ADDITION: https://www.yahoo.com/news/major-ammo-su...34441.html
Interesting (although self-serving) comment about him "warning" the EU two years ago.

[Goose]

This is sort of a bad news/good news article about shell production in Europe: https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/05...rm-ukraine (I gifted the article so it shouldn't be behind the paywall)

There is a supply crunch for materials that go into shells; the article cites that there is one remaining TNT producer in Europe, in Poland.  Other raw materials have to be imported (for example, cotton linters, an ingredient in nitrocellulose, has to be procured from China).

The good news, such as it is, is:

EU-wide annual shell production is projected to reach at least 1.4m by the end of 2024, up from around 500,000 a year ago.

BC

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/29/us/pe...93c37a624b

This is a (IMO) good recent article on the new Texas plant. It "will" produce 30,000 shells a month, although it isn't finished yet. It is producing some number now while parts of it are still under construction. That will result in a production of about 66,000 shells a month when the plant is operating at full capacity. Some interesting quotes from the article:

To keep Ukraine’s artillery crews supplied, the Pentagon set a production target last year of 100,000 shells per month by the end of 2025.

The 100,000-per-month goal represents a nearly tenfold increase in production from a few years ago.

“The steady increase of artillery ammunition production is significant for long-term U.S. and Ukrainian needs,” said Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “but even in the best case scenario, I would say those late-2025 output targets will arrive late in this war, and it is likely that Russian artillery output will still be higher than the U.S. and Europe combined at that point.”
“Let’s say a year and a half from now both the U.S. and Europe are making, or buying, over a million shells each,” he added. “That’s still probably less than Russia is going to produce this year.”

The 10 fold increase is a very red herring. The "baseline" was the "normal" yearly production well before the Ukraine war, approximately 10,000 shells a year. This was based on demand, not capacity. The existing US capacity was essentially three times that, and was very quickly increased to about 30,000 per year, near our maximum capacity.

The obvious question is whether this will be "enough", especially since it will not match projected Russian output. It would be nice to hear something from the DoD explaining why they think it will be or if not what will be done instead.

One last quote:

“When government and industry work together and Congress gives us sufficient latitude, we can still do great things in this country really fast,” Mr. Bush added.

ADDITION: https://www.yahoo.com/news/major-ammo-su...34441.html
Interesting (although self-serving) comment about him "warning" the EU two years ago.

[dabigv13]

I've already been warned for political expression in this thread for my above post, so I'll have to defer on really engaging. Is anyone else getting those?

[dabigv13]

I've already been warned for political expression in this thread for my above post, so I'll have to defer on really engaging. Is anyone else getting those?

[Goose]

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/...st-package

This is very good news. It will undoubtedly make the F-16s much more effective in running down cruise missiles and "low tech" Iranian drones, much as the IAF, Jordan, and the US demonstrated in the Iranian attack on Israel.

https://thecardboard.org/board/showthrea...#pid407040

Only four months to get it done :). The Swedes indeed can be decisive and act. Of course, the aircraft are not in Ukraine yet, so it probably will still take a while before it can be used. The same can be said about the F-16s. In order to use the aircraft the pilots have to be trained (easy) and the flight crew back in the tube need to be trained (not so easy). The Erieye radar is a very capable system and can "see" lots of things. The Link-16 capability will (at least in theory) allow passing targeting information to F-16s and controlling the air battle from the ASC-890. It takes training to do this, but I am sure the Swedes are more than capable of providing it. I just hope the trainees have a thick skin, because they will undoubtedly need it at times. The pilots will have little trouble learning to fly the aircraft. There are probably some pilots in Ukraine that flew AN-24s or its successors. Obviously out of a job right now and not fighter pilot material. Transition should be easy.

[Goose]

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/...st-package

This is very good news. It will undoubtedly make the F-16s much more effective in running down cruise missiles and "low tech" Iranian drones, much as the IAF, Jordan, and the US demonstrated in the Iranian attack on Israel.

https://thecardboard.org/board/showthrea...#pid407040

Only four months to get it done :). The Swedes indeed can be decisive and act. Of course, the aircraft are not in Ukraine yet, so it probably will still take a while before it can be used. The same can be said about the F-16s. In order to use the aircraft the pilots have to be trained (easy) and the flight crew back in the tube need to be trained (not so easy). The Erieye radar is a very capable system and can "see" lots of things. The Link-16 capability will (at least in theory) allow passing targeting information to F-16s and controlling the air battle from the ASC-890. It takes training to do this, but I am sure the Swedes are more than capable of providing it. I just hope the trainees have a thick skin, because they will undoubtedly need it at times. The pilots will have little trouble learning to fly the aircraft. There are probably some pilots in Ukraine that flew AN-24s or its successors. Obviously out of a job right now and not fighter pilot material. Transition should be easy.

[Mick]

Telegraph's interview on Soviet Russian plans to destroy NATO. First of a series of seven from outside commentators.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-plot-de...12961.html

[Mick]

Telegraph's interview on Soviet Russian plans to destroy NATO. First of a series of seven from outside commentators.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-plot-de...12961.html

[gocard14]

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/...st-package

This is very good news. It will undoubtedly make the F-16s much more effective in running down cruise missiles and "low tech" Iranian drones, much as the IAF, Jordan, and the US demonstrated in the Iranian attack on Israel.

https://thecardboard.org/board/showthrea...#pid407040

Only four months to get it done :). The Swedes indeed can be decisive and act. Of course, the aircraft are not in Ukraine yet, so it probably will still take a while before it can be used. The same can be said about the F-16s. In order to use the aircraft the pilots have to be trained (easy) and the flight crew back in the tube need to be trained (not so easy). The Erieye radar is a very capable system and can "see" lots of things. The Link-16 capability will (at least in theory) allow passing targeting information to F-16s and controlling the air battle from the ASC-890. It takes training to do this, but I am sure the Swedes are more than capable of providing it. I just hope the trainees have a thick skin, because they will undoubtedly need it at times. The pilots will have little trouble learning to fly the aircraft. There are probably some pilots in Ukraine that flew AN-24s or its successors. Obviously out of a job right now and not fighter pilot material. Transition should be easy.

Nice prediction. I was pleasantly surprised to see this. While there is probably nothing short of a giant pile of JASSMs that will be as effective a force-multiplier for the forthcoming F16s, my understanding of the complexity of using AWACS to control air ops was that it would be too much to add mid-war. Partly this was based on the Russians apparent inability to use their Mainstays to their capabilities. I am happy to see the Swedes disagree with that assessment. 

I also wonder how effective a single airframe can be. Beggars can't be choosers and all, and I know they have a long dwell time in the air, but Ukraine will have to pick and choose its spots to maximize effectiveness.

[gocard14]

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/...st-package

This is very good news. It will undoubtedly make the F-16s much more effective in running down cruise missiles and "low tech" Iranian drones, much as the IAF, Jordan, and the US demonstrated in the Iranian attack on Israel.

https://thecardboard.org/board/showthrea...#pid407040

Only four months to get it done :). The Swedes indeed can be decisive and act. Of course, the aircraft are not in Ukraine yet, so it probably will still take a while before it can be used. The same can be said about the F-16s. In order to use the aircraft the pilots have to be trained (easy) and the flight crew back in the tube need to be trained (not so easy). The Erieye radar is a very capable system and can "see" lots of things. The Link-16 capability will (at least in theory) allow passing targeting information to F-16s and controlling the air battle from the ASC-890. It takes training to do this, but I am sure the Swedes are more than capable of providing it. I just hope the trainees have a thick skin, because they will undoubtedly need it at times. The pilots will have little trouble learning to fly the aircraft. There are probably some pilots in Ukraine that flew AN-24s or its successors. Obviously out of a job right now and not fighter pilot material. Transition should be easy.

Nice prediction. I was pleasantly surprised to see this. While there is probably nothing short of a giant pile of JASSMs that will be as effective a force-multiplier for the forthcoming F16s, my understanding of the complexity of using AWACS to control air ops was that it would be too much to add mid-war. Partly this was based on the Russians apparent inability to use their Mainstays to their capabilities. I am happy to see the Swedes disagree with that assessment. 

I also wonder how effective a single airframe can be. Beggars can't be choosers and all, and I know they have a long dwell time in the air, but Ukraine will have to pick and choose its spots to maximize effectiveness.

[Goose]

Nice prediction.

I wish I could claim it as a prediction. It was a hope. Actually I am surprised Ukraine got as "modern" an aircraft as they did. Sweden has some even older but similar aircraft. These aircraft were theoretically serviceable, but I kind of doubted that was true. Getting an aircraft from the current inventory is a real coup.

 I was pleasantly surprised to see this. While there is probably nothing short of a giant pile of JASSMs that will be as effective a force-multiplier for the forthcoming F16s, my understanding of the complexity of using AWACS to control air ops was that it would be too much to add mid-war. Partly this was based on the Russians apparent inability to use their Mainstays to their capabilities. I am happy to see the Swedes disagree with that assessment.

We will see how this works out. Initially using this capability to match F-16s to incoming drones and cruise missiles will be good training to do the more complex task of controlling the air battle when the other side has aircraft that can evade and maneuver. Drones generally don't do that :-).

 
I also wonder how effective a single airframe can be. Beggars can't be choosers and all, and I know they have a long dwell time in the air, but Ukraine will have to pick and choose its spots to maximize effectiveness.

This is indeed a concern. In the defensive anti-drone anti cruise missile battle I can see Ukraine flying the wings off their only platform. I think Sweden actually has two more aircraft in service, and Ukraine has a track  record of being very persuasive :-). We can only hope this approach works well enough to make it an issue.

[Goose]

Nice prediction.

I wish I could claim it as a prediction. It was a hope. Actually I am surprised Ukraine got as "modern" an aircraft as they did. Sweden has some even older but similar aircraft. These aircraft were theoretically serviceable, but I kind of doubted that was true. Getting an aircraft from the current inventory is a real coup.

 I was pleasantly surprised to see this. While there is probably nothing short of a giant pile of JASSMs that will be as effective a force-multiplier for the forthcoming F16s, my understanding of the complexity of using AWACS to control air ops was that it would be too much to add mid-war. Partly this was based on the Russians apparent inability to use their Mainstays to their capabilities. I am happy to see the Swedes disagree with that assessment.

We will see how this works out. Initially using this capability to match F-16s to incoming drones and cruise missiles will be good training to do the more complex task of controlling the air battle when the other side has aircraft that can evade and maneuver. Drones generally don't do that :-).

 
I also wonder how effective a single airframe can be. Beggars can't be choosers and all, and I know they have a long dwell time in the air, but Ukraine will have to pick and choose its spots to maximize effectiveness.

This is indeed a concern. In the defensive anti-drone anti cruise missile battle I can see Ukraine flying the wings off their only platform. I think Sweden actually has two more aircraft in service, and Ukraine has a track  record of being very persuasive :-). We can only hope this approach works well enough to make it an issue.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-spec...48694.html

Hallelujah! About time! Now we just need to make sure they have enough of these items. It would also be "nice" to utilize this technology on larger drones that can carry a larger warhead, fly longer ranges, and search larger areas well behind Russian lines. This would not be all that expensive for NATO to do either. and it uses components we make.

To be clear, this type of technology isn't all that "new" in itself. The AARGM utilizes this type of technology to search for enemy radars that have shut down. The infrared CCD imaging  system and the W band radar both contribute to the solution. The Storm Shadow also has image recognition mode in its terminal guidance. What is "innovative" is creating a system to do this that fits on a small drone. The SWAP requirements are a big challenge, and don't be too surprised if it has to go through iterative improvements to make it work "well". Ukraine is probably using "alpha" versions right now. There is really no adequate way to test these weapons on a test range. Field testing is essential to work out design flaws in the recognition system. I hope these drones have a "backlink" so Ukraine can evaluate what they actually do in "real life". Cramming all that into the drone may be impossible however.

IMO an anti-radiation drone is a much better solution to the destruction of GPS jammers. I am continually amazed that Ukraine hasn't developed that capability. It is MUCH easier than developing a robust (possibly multi-spectrum) image recognition approach. It is also longer range. Perhaps they encountered some problem I am not aware of, but it still seems strange.

There are a couple of problems with using "small" drones to kill GPS jammers. One is that the jammer can be quite a distance away from the front line. The drone has to be able to fly that far. Second, searching for a jammer may require searching a wide area. If no geolocation or (at a minimum) line of bearing information is available it seems very improbable the "multicopter" drones have the endurance to reliably "find" the jammers. If a line of bearing (or geo) is available the drone can fly a dead-reckoning course that will get it in the immediate neighborhood. The probability of finding a jammer by image recognition is thereby greatly improved. The DR plot can be improved by using a compass and accelerometer (https://www.adafruit.com/product/1120) to compensate for "windage". It isn't good enough to qualify as an "INS" but it doesn't need to be.

Decoys are a serious problem for image recognition systems. A bunch of plywood GPS jammer antennas can make it very difficult to find the "real" ones. That is why "military grade" image recognition systems are almost always multi-spectrum. Building something that will "fool" the software in both/many spectra isn't at all easy. It does however increase the SWAP requirements and the $ requirements. There is no free lunch.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-spec...48694.html

Hallelujah! About time! Now we just need to make sure they have enough of these items. It would also be "nice" to utilize this technology on larger drones that can carry a larger warhead, fly longer ranges, and search larger areas well behind Russian lines. This would not be all that expensive for NATO to do either. and it uses components we make.

To be clear, this type of technology isn't all that "new" in itself. The AARGM utilizes this type of technology to search for enemy radars that have shut down. The infrared CCD imaging  system and the W band radar both contribute to the solution. The Storm Shadow also has image recognition mode in its terminal guidance. What is "innovative" is creating a system to do this that fits on a small drone. The SWAP requirements are a big challenge, and don't be too surprised if it has to go through iterative improvements to make it work "well". Ukraine is probably using "alpha" versions right now. There is really no adequate way to test these weapons on a test range. Field testing is essential to work out design flaws in the recognition system. I hope these drones have a "backlink" so Ukraine can evaluate what they actually do in "real life". Cramming all that into the drone may be impossible however.

IMO an anti-radiation drone is a much better solution to the destruction of GPS jammers. I am continually amazed that Ukraine hasn't developed that capability. It is MUCH easier than developing a robust (possibly multi-spectrum) image recognition approach. It is also longer range. Perhaps they encountered some problem I am not aware of, but it still seems strange.

There are a couple of problems with using "small" drones to kill GPS jammers. One is that the jammer can be quite a distance away from the front line. The drone has to be able to fly that far. Second, searching for a jammer may require searching a wide area. If no geolocation or (at a minimum) line of bearing information is available it seems very improbable the "multicopter" drones have the endurance to reliably "find" the jammers. If a line of bearing (or geo) is available the drone can fly a dead-reckoning course that will get it in the immediate neighborhood. The probability of finding a jammer by image recognition is thereby greatly improved. The DR plot can be improved by using a compass and accelerometer (https://www.adafruit.com/product/1120) to compensate for "windage". It isn't good enough to qualify as an "INS" but it doesn't need to be.

Decoys are a serious problem for image recognition systems. A bunch of plywood GPS jammer antennas can make it very difficult to find the "real" ones. That is why "military grade" image recognition systems are almost always multi-spectrum. Building something that will "fool" the software in both/many spectra isn't at all easy. It does however increase the SWAP requirements and the $ requirements. There is no free lunch.

[M T]

If you didn't follow the link in Goose's message, you might have missed what I thought was the point of the article.

Ukraine's special forces have developed new software that allows drones to fly without the use of GPS, limiting the impact of Russian jamming.

The software, called Eagle Eyes, allows unmanned drones to travel using sight rather than satellite-based GPS navigation, The Economist reported.

It uses AI to compare live video of the area below the drone to a map made from photos and video that a reconnaissance aircraft previously collected, the report said.
...
The software can also recognize targets, like missile launchers and tanks, and can drop bombs or fly into them without the drone operator needing to give the order,

Using vision to hit a particular target based upon its visual features seems to me to be a different capability than following a map & imagery to a location.

Using Eagle Eyes, the drone should be better able to put ordnance on or surveil a particular location, without depending on GPS. (I also expect the maps to have both daylight visual and nighttime infra-red). If the same or different technology also includes the capability to find the current position of a mobile target, that would be a bonus. (I definitely agree that decoys and searches make it problematic. If used unwisely, the enemy can light up a launcher or jammer, shut down & move, and be ready to detect & destroy any drone that comes looking at the old position.)

I wonder if Ukraine pre-deploys these small drones to an area, perhaps landing them on rooftops or other inaccessible areas near previous launcher locations. When the launcher again is active, Ukraine can (if not jammed) give the order to take-off again but without as much transit time.

[M T]

If you didn't follow the link in Goose's message, you might have missed what I thought was the point of the article.

Ukraine's special forces have developed new software that allows drones to fly without the use of GPS, limiting the impact of Russian jamming.

The software, called Eagle Eyes, allows unmanned drones to travel using sight rather than satellite-based GPS navigation, The Economist reported.

It uses AI to compare live video of the area below the drone to a map made from photos and video that a reconnaissance aircraft previously collected, the report said.
...
The software can also recognize targets, like missile launchers and tanks, and can drop bombs or fly into them without the drone operator needing to give the order,

Using vision to hit a particular target based upon its visual features seems to me to be a different capability than following a map & imagery to a location.

Using Eagle Eyes, the drone should be better able to put ordnance on or surveil a particular location, without depending on GPS. (I also expect the maps to have both daylight visual and nighttime infra-red). If the same or different technology also includes the capability to find the current position of a mobile target, that would be a bonus. (I definitely agree that decoys and searches make it problematic. If used unwisely, the enemy can light up a launcher or jammer, shut down & move, and be ready to detect & destroy any drone that comes looking at the old position.)

I wonder if Ukraine pre-deploys these small drones to an area, perhaps landing them on rooftops or other inaccessible areas near previous launcher locations. When the launcher again is active, Ukraine can (if not jammed) give the order to take-off again but without as much transit time.

[Goose]

If you didn't follow the link in Goose's message, you might have missed what I thought was the point of the article.

Ukraine's special forces have developed new software that allows drones to fly without the use of GPS, limiting the impact of Russian jamming.

The software, called Eagle Eyes, allows unmanned drones to travel using sight rather than satellite-based GPS navigation, The Economist reported.

It uses AI to compare live video of the area below the drone to a map made from photos and video that a reconnaissance aircraft previously collected, the report said.
...
The software can also recognize targets, like missile launchers and tanks, and can drop bombs or fly into them without the drone operator needing to give the order,

The Eagle Eye system is similar in concept to the terrain contour matching used by the Tomahawk missile before GPS was deployed. The missile has an onboard radar altimeter that would illuminate the ground and allow the missile to locate itself by the contours of the ground. The ground contours were measured by satellites and could be kept quite current. The Eagle Eye uses natural illumination to allow the software to match views collected by previous overflights. This is order of magnitude more difficult, so doing it is quite an achievement. This approach allows the drone to either fly to a particular position or to follow a programmed course (such as a line of bearing) through the terrain.

If indeed the video is gathered by reconnaissance aircraft or other previous drone flights, it must be problematic. The aircraft and drones gathering the data are presumably GPS denied in the same manner the attacking drone would be. One wonders if perhaps that isn't where the data is coming from :-). It is of course possible the drones/aircraft gathering the data have much better GPS capability than the average "cheap" drone does. I am guessing that the "mapping" software uses AI (or human "I", the way it used to be done) to identify ground features that are easily recognizable and don't move much, like roads, power lines, rail roads, hills, rivers, fences, buildings etc. These features are "extracted" and the pattern recognition AI software in the drone is "trained" to use these reference features to locate itself. I would speculate the software does not work well in a heavily forested flat featureless area. Then again, neither do humans :-).

Using vision to hit a particular target based upon its visual features seems to me to be a different capability than following a map & imagery to a location. 

Using Eagle Eyes, the drone should be better able to put ordnance on or surveil a particular location, without depending on GPS.  (I also expect the maps to have both daylight visual and nighttime infra-red).  If the same or different technology also includes the capability to find the current position of a mobile target, that would be a bonus.  (I definitely agree that decoys and searches make it problematic.  If used unwisely, the enemy can light up a launcher or jammer, shut down & move, and be ready to detect & destroy any drone that comes looking at the old position.)

It is different software technology but it uses the same hardware sensors. Placing decoys near the "real" jammer, close enough to be confusing but far enough from each other that fratricide is not a problem will greatly reduce the probability of hitting the real one. Hunting a mobile target is a "feature" that comes with the ability to recognize the target via software. However searching for it with no real idea which way it went or its intended destination is "trusting to luck".

I think Ukraine wanted to develop a technology that would work with any kind of target, not just one that transmits. The S-400 type of target can be silent most of the time, so relying on its radar to give its location away is not an admissible solution. The S-400 TEL is a very distinctive target and therefore should be easy to recognize. Blowing up the radar is a much better solution though :-).

[Goose]

If you didn't follow the link in Goose's message, you might have missed what I thought was the point of the article.

Ukraine's special forces have developed new software that allows drones to fly without the use of GPS, limiting the impact of Russian jamming.

The software, called Eagle Eyes, allows unmanned drones to travel using sight rather than satellite-based GPS navigation, The Economist reported.

It uses AI to compare live video of the area below the drone to a map made from photos and video that a reconnaissance aircraft previously collected, the report said.
...
The software can also recognize targets, like missile launchers and tanks, and can drop bombs or fly into them without the drone operator needing to give the order,

The Eagle Eye system is similar in concept to the terrain contour matching used by the Tomahawk missile before GPS was deployed. The missile has an onboard radar altimeter that would illuminate the ground and allow the missile to locate itself by the contours of the ground. The ground contours were measured by satellites and could be kept quite current. The Eagle Eye uses natural illumination to allow the software to match views collected by previous overflights. This is order of magnitude more difficult, so doing it is quite an achievement. This approach allows the drone to either fly to a particular position or to follow a programmed course (such as a line of bearing) through the terrain.

If indeed the video is gathered by reconnaissance aircraft or other previous drone flights, it must be problematic. The aircraft and drones gathering the data are presumably GPS denied in the same manner the attacking drone would be. One wonders if perhaps that isn't where the data is coming from :-). It is of course possible the drones/aircraft gathering the data have much better GPS capability than the average "cheap" drone does. I am guessing that the "mapping" software uses AI (or human "I", the way it used to be done) to identify ground features that are easily recognizable and don't move much, like roads, power lines, rail roads, hills, rivers, fences, buildings etc. These features are "extracted" and the pattern recognition AI software in the drone is "trained" to use these reference features to locate itself. I would speculate the software does not work well in a heavily forested flat featureless area. Then again, neither do humans :-).

Using vision to hit a particular target based upon its visual features seems to me to be a different capability than following a map & imagery to a location. 

Using Eagle Eyes, the drone should be better able to put ordnance on or surveil a particular location, without depending on GPS.  (I also expect the maps to have both daylight visual and nighttime infra-red).  If the same or different technology also includes the capability to find the current position of a mobile target, that would be a bonus.  (I definitely agree that decoys and searches make it problematic.  If used unwisely, the enemy can light up a launcher or jammer, shut down & move, and be ready to detect & destroy any drone that comes looking at the old position.)

It is different software technology but it uses the same hardware sensors. Placing decoys near the "real" jammer, close enough to be confusing but far enough from each other that fratricide is not a problem will greatly reduce the probability of hitting the real one. Hunting a mobile target is a "feature" that comes with the ability to recognize the target via software. However searching for it with no real idea which way it went or its intended destination is "trusting to luck".

I think Ukraine wanted to develop a technology that would work with any kind of target, not just one that transmits. The S-400 type of target can be silent most of the time, so relying on its radar to give its location away is not an admissible solution. The S-400 TEL is a very distinctive target and therefore should be easy to recognize. Blowing up the radar is a much better solution though :-).

[Goose]

https://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.co...revention/

https://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.co...ention.pdf

Those of you who are interested should read the white paper linked above. (The internet article is also interesting.) The paper describes in more detail some of the beam-forming methodology that I have previously referenced. It also discusses some "simple" GPS jamming waveforms. If that is all the Russians are using, I am very disappointed :-). I doubt that is the whole story. This company presents a method that allows drones to defeat GPS jamming. That said, the ability to generate a null of the jammer generates a line of bearing (LOB) to the jammer. This allows the drone to fly toward the jammer until it passes overhead. It can then return and kill it. Even allowing for some hyperbole, it can be done. Why is it not happening in Ukraine? There is nothing in the Infinidome white paper that is "novel".

As I understand it the SDB and the JDAM (after software modifications) are operating "properly" in Ukraine. Does that match what others have read?

[Goose]

https://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.co...revention/

https://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.co...ention.pdf

Those of you who are interested should read the white paper linked above. (The internet article is also interesting.) The paper describes in more detail some of the beam-forming methodology that I have previously referenced. It also discusses some "simple" GPS jamming waveforms. If that is all the Russians are using, I am very disappointed :-). I doubt that is the whole story. This company presents a method that allows drones to defeat GPS jamming. That said, the ability to generate a null of the jammer generates a line of bearing (LOB) to the jammer. This allows the drone to fly toward the jammer until it passes overhead. It can then return and kill it. Even allowing for some hyperbole, it can be done. Why is it not happening in Ukraine? There is nothing in the Infinidome white paper that is "novel".

As I understand it the SDB and the JDAM (after software modifications) are operating "properly" in Ukraine. Does that match what others have read?

[Goose]

https://www.nato.int/docu/review/article...index.html

Sharable ammunition "details" that are a problem most people would assume was long ago solved. Just another "issue" for NATO to deal with. I suspect Ukraine has indeed (as the article points out) done a lot of inadvertent "compatibility testing". Of course, these experiments are not well controlled so who knows if the results can be used to further beat down these issues.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/german-army-i...48165.html

It would appear that Germany has something in the neighborhood of 400,000 to maybe 500,000 155 mm shells on order to replace their existing stocks. Of course, Rheinmetall is building another factory to meet this new order. If we are lucky, maybe it comes online in a year.

[Goose]

https://www.nato.int/docu/review/article...index.html

Sharable ammunition "details" that are a problem most people would assume was long ago solved. Just another "issue" for NATO to deal with. I suspect Ukraine has indeed (as the article points out) done a lot of inadvertent "compatibility testing". Of course, these experiments are not well controlled so who knows if the results can be used to further beat down these issues.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/german-army-i...48165.html

It would appear that Germany has something in the neighborhood of 400,000 to maybe 500,000 155 mm shells on order to replace their existing stocks. Of course, Rheinmetall is building another factory to meet this new order. If we are lucky, maybe it comes online in a year.

[GK3]

I presume we must be working on or already have something similar.

https://www.eurasiantimes.com/airbus-unv...y-wingman/

[GK3]

I presume we must be working on or already have something similar.

https://www.eurasiantimes.com/airbus-unv...y-wingman/

[Goose]

I presume we must be working on or already have something similar.

https://www.eurasiantimes.com/airbus-unv...y-wingman/

Both the USAF and the USN have programs to provide the "loyal wingman". These programs are much further along than the EADS one is. That said, exactly what the "best" version of this concept is remains elusive. The USAF is somewhat gun-shy about building a lot of something that may turn out to be inadequate or obsolescent.  Since none of these "concepts" has been used in a real conflict, there are no "lessons learned" or any data to know what is appropriate.

[Goose]

I presume we must be working on or already have something similar.

https://www.eurasiantimes.com/airbus-unv...y-wingman/

Both the USAF and the USN have programs to provide the "loyal wingman". These programs are much further along than the EADS one is. That said, exactly what the "best" version of this concept is remains elusive. The USAF is somewhat gun-shy about building a lot of something that may turn out to be inadequate or obsolescent.  Since none of these "concepts" has been used in a real conflict, there are no "lessons learned" or any data to know what is appropriate.