[Goose]

What a f-ing waste.

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/...ys/400181/

Estimates are that Russian casualties have exceeded 600,000.  Ukrainian casualties are fewer, but still way too many.

BC

Amen!

[Goose]

What a f-ing waste.

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/...ys/400181/

Estimates are that Russian casualties have exceeded 600,000.  Ukrainian casualties are fewer, but still way too many.

BC

Amen!

[Goose]

A cogent and balanced look at the state of the war in this interview with Michael Kofman.

https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/...looks.html

Agree it is a cogent and fairly balanced interview. I agree with some of it but have problems with a few things.

Is there any limit to the Russian supply of troops? Do you see that advantage fading at all, whether because of diminishing numbers or political backlash? 

It’s a good question. Russia’s advantage has been the ability to withstand very high levels of attrition because of the materiel and manpower resources they have, and also their significant capacity for mobilization of resources on a national scale — that is, defense industrial production, manpower recruitment, and the like.

But Russia’s actually operating under very significant constraints. And if anything, its advantage on the battlefield is likely to decline as we get into this winter and look further ahead into 2025. First, in terms of equipment, the Russian military has been sustaining very high levels of loss that are principally being replaced by Soviet-era stocks — not entirely, but at this stage, Russia is eating through its Soviet legacy, and its rate of equipment production is quite low relative to the numbers being lost on the battlefield.

This doesn’t mean that Russia is going to run out of armored fighting vehicles.

Agree. Kofman appears to forget this subsequently however

What it does mean is that the Russian military has increasingly been forced to adjust tactics to minimize their losses,

Since they aren't in any danger of running out they weren't "forced" to do anything. A better explanation is that Russia learned that their tactics were causing excessive losses of material and were ineffective. That is "good" for Russia not bad. Minimizing losses is in general a good tactic whenever possible.

 and that also reduces their ability to achieve any operationally meaningful breakthroughs.

Name one operationally significant "breakthrough" Russia has achieved in this entire war. They are structurally incapable of it. The trench warfare that currently dominates this war makes "breakthroughs" impossible to achieve if the retreating forces retain cohesion. They just fall back to the next trench line. At the beginning of the war when trench warfare had not set in, Ukraine was disorganized, and Russia had all its "elite" (category A) formations it was theoretically possible. In the event Russia's reorganization into BTGs and lack of training resulted in it not happening. Russia also was and is incapable of logistically sustaining fast moving breakthroughs. They are not resourced or trained to do that. Russia is now fighting as they did in WW II. Trundle up to the enemy MLR. Flatten everything with artillery and warm bodies. Force the enemy to retreat to the next line of resistance. Take a week or so to reorganize and bring up the required logistics. Repeat. No "breakthrough" desired.

When you look at manpower, the Russian government has significantly increased the payouts and benefits to recruit personnel. The reason for that is straightforward. It’s clear that at this rate of loss, the Russian contract recruitment campaign is unable to keep up. This too does not mean that Russia is going to run out of manpower, but it’s clear that they’re struggling, and they are not likely to be able to sustain this pace of operations, staying on the offensive with this rate of loss.

Why can't they? Why is it clear they can't keep up? So far they have. They are "struggling, not failing. Assuming they will fail is a fact not in evidence. More importantly contract troops aren't the only source of manpower. Putin just drafted 130,000 troops. On top of that, Putin can declare "special" mobilizations to augment his troop strength whenever he wants. This goes on all the time. If worse comes to worse Putin can declare a general mobilization and get all the troops he needs for a very, very long time. He doesn't want to do that because it carries a political and economic cost. We can have this conversation when Putin is forced to do it.

Which could mean there’s an incentive for both sides to come to the negotiating table. Perhaps a bit more of an incentive than there was a year ago?

The way I would put it is that the Russian military is actually operating under significant constraints. Given the likely decline in the relative advantage at the front line, Russia’s potential negotiating position actually isn’t all that strong. And while Russia has the resources to sustain the war in the near term, looking just a bit beyond that you see a fairly problematic picture in terms of the rate of inflation in Russia’s overheating economy, the deficit of skilled labor — because the state is pulling workers into the defense industry and contracting them to fight in the war — the steady depletion of Russia’s liquid reserves, and the fact that much of the budget is tied to the current oil price. The economic picture for Russia isn’t particularly rosy. The effort to juggle several different parts of this equation may not be sustainable. And this too must at some point weigh on the Russian leadership’s mind.

I am sure these problems do weigh on the Russian leadership's mind. They are doing everything the can to avoid the worst effects of these events. Ukraine's drone attacks on both military and commercial (oil) targets are materially adding to the problems. So is the termination of delivering Russian gas through Ukraine. However Russia isn't going to negotiate anything that doesn't involve Ukraine at best becoming a Russian vassal state. They are "all in" on the notion that Ukraine's problems are much worse than Russia's problems and that Ukraine will crack first. The ongoing destruction of the Ukrainian power grid and the continued pressure forcing retreats in the Donbas lend credence to that idea. Questions about the steadfastness of western support is an additional reason that Russia has no need at all to negotiate. As bad as things are in Russia they are worse in Ukraine.

However this war ends the situation in Russia will not be "good". If the war ends in a "victory" Putin can spin the hardships as "the price of victory". He can also promise "a brighter day ahead". Given the political fallout in eastern Europe of a Russian success Putin may be right. If the war is lost, the knowledge of the personnel losses (for nothing) spread through public and the economy is wrecked Putin will have big problems, best case. He isn't going to negotiate such a settlement under any conditions.

[Goose]

A cogent and balanced look at the state of the war in this interview with Michael Kofman.

https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/...looks.html

Agree it is a cogent and fairly balanced interview. I agree with some of it but have problems with a few things.

Is there any limit to the Russian supply of troops? Do you see that advantage fading at all, whether because of diminishing numbers or political backlash? 

It’s a good question. Russia’s advantage has been the ability to withstand very high levels of attrition because of the materiel and manpower resources they have, and also their significant capacity for mobilization of resources on a national scale — that is, defense industrial production, manpower recruitment, and the like.

But Russia’s actually operating under very significant constraints. And if anything, its advantage on the battlefield is likely to decline as we get into this winter and look further ahead into 2025. First, in terms of equipment, the Russian military has been sustaining very high levels of loss that are principally being replaced by Soviet-era stocks — not entirely, but at this stage, Russia is eating through its Soviet legacy, and its rate of equipment production is quite low relative to the numbers being lost on the battlefield.

This doesn’t mean that Russia is going to run out of armored fighting vehicles.

Agree. Kofman appears to forget this subsequently however

What it does mean is that the Russian military has increasingly been forced to adjust tactics to minimize their losses,

Since they aren't in any danger of running out they weren't "forced" to do anything. A better explanation is that Russia learned that their tactics were causing excessive losses of material and were ineffective. That is "good" for Russia not bad. Minimizing losses is in general a good tactic whenever possible.

 and that also reduces their ability to achieve any operationally meaningful breakthroughs.

Name one operationally significant "breakthrough" Russia has achieved in this entire war. They are structurally incapable of it. The trench warfare that currently dominates this war makes "breakthroughs" impossible to achieve if the retreating forces retain cohesion. They just fall back to the next trench line. At the beginning of the war when trench warfare had not set in, Ukraine was disorganized, and Russia had all its "elite" (category A) formations it was theoretically possible. In the event Russia's reorganization into BTGs and lack of training resulted in it not happening. Russia also was and is incapable of logistically sustaining fast moving breakthroughs. They are not resourced or trained to do that. Russia is now fighting as they did in WW II. Trundle up to the enemy MLR. Flatten everything with artillery and warm bodies. Force the enemy to retreat to the next line of resistance. Take a week or so to reorganize and bring up the required logistics. Repeat. No "breakthrough" desired.

When you look at manpower, the Russian government has significantly increased the payouts and benefits to recruit personnel. The reason for that is straightforward. It’s clear that at this rate of loss, the Russian contract recruitment campaign is unable to keep up. This too does not mean that Russia is going to run out of manpower, but it’s clear that they’re struggling, and they are not likely to be able to sustain this pace of operations, staying on the offensive with this rate of loss.

Why can't they? Why is it clear they can't keep up? So far they have. They are "struggling, not failing. Assuming they will fail is a fact not in evidence. More importantly contract troops aren't the only source of manpower. Putin just drafted 130,000 troops. On top of that, Putin can declare "special" mobilizations to augment his troop strength whenever he wants. This goes on all the time. If worse comes to worse Putin can declare a general mobilization and get all the troops he needs for a very, very long time. He doesn't want to do that because it carries a political and economic cost. We can have this conversation when Putin is forced to do it.

Which could mean there’s an incentive for both sides to come to the negotiating table. Perhaps a bit more of an incentive than there was a year ago?

The way I would put it is that the Russian military is actually operating under significant constraints. Given the likely decline in the relative advantage at the front line, Russia’s potential negotiating position actually isn’t all that strong. And while Russia has the resources to sustain the war in the near term, looking just a bit beyond that you see a fairly problematic picture in terms of the rate of inflation in Russia’s overheating economy, the deficit of skilled labor — because the state is pulling workers into the defense industry and contracting them to fight in the war — the steady depletion of Russia’s liquid reserves, and the fact that much of the budget is tied to the current oil price. The economic picture for Russia isn’t particularly rosy. The effort to juggle several different parts of this equation may not be sustainable. And this too must at some point weigh on the Russian leadership’s mind.

I am sure these problems do weigh on the Russian leadership's mind. They are doing everything the can to avoid the worst effects of these events. Ukraine's drone attacks on both military and commercial (oil) targets are materially adding to the problems. So is the termination of delivering Russian gas through Ukraine. However Russia isn't going to negotiate anything that doesn't involve Ukraine at best becoming a Russian vassal state. They are "all in" on the notion that Ukraine's problems are much worse than Russia's problems and that Ukraine will crack first. The ongoing destruction of the Ukrainian power grid and the continued pressure forcing retreats in the Donbas lend credence to that idea. Questions about the steadfastness of western support is an additional reason that Russia has no need at all to negotiate. As bad as things are in Russia they are worse in Ukraine.

However this war ends the situation in Russia will not be "good". If the war ends in a "victory" Putin can spin the hardships as "the price of victory". He can also promise "a brighter day ahead". Given the political fallout in eastern Europe of a Russian success Putin may be right. If the war is lost, the knowledge of the personnel losses (for nothing) spread through public and the economy is wrecked Putin will have big problems, best case. He isn't going to negotiate such a settlement under any conditions.

[BostonCard]

Prototype Russian stealth drone goes down in Ukraine.  Looks to have been taken out by the Russian fighter to prevent it from falling into Ukrainian hands when they lost contact with it.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c9qv3lnqy0vo

BC

[BostonCard]

Prototype Russian stealth drone goes down in Ukraine.  Looks to have been taken out by the Russian fighter to prevent it from falling into Ukrainian hands when they lost contact with it.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c9qv3lnqy0vo

BC

[gocard14]

https://www.newsweek.com/nato-ukraine-me...ls-1970816

Zelensky saying that if Ukraine is not admitted into NATO, they will pursue their own nuclear weapons. 

Hard to say how possible this is on a realistic time frame. On the one hand, Ukraine has had nukes before, has an advanced defense industry, and at least a few active nuclear power plants so presumably can access fissile materials. On the other hand, certainly not something where you can flip a switch and build nukes plus a compatible delivery system. Undoubtedly building a program would require importing a lot of western components/tech, which the US/Nato could throw up road blocks for. 

To me it feels like a tactic designed to get more conventional western support and a path to NATO, but one they feel forced to follow through on if western support wanes. At the very least it is another negotiating point they can use in their favor during any negotiated settlement.

[gocard14]

https://www.newsweek.com/nato-ukraine-me...ls-1970816

Zelensky saying that if Ukraine is not admitted into NATO, they will pursue their own nuclear weapons. 

Hard to say how possible this is on a realistic time frame. On the one hand, Ukraine has had nukes before, has an advanced defense industry, and at least a few active nuclear power plants so presumably can access fissile materials. On the other hand, certainly not something where you can flip a switch and build nukes plus a compatible delivery system. Undoubtedly building a program would require importing a lot of western components/tech, which the US/Nato could throw up road blocks for. 

To me it feels like a tactic designed to get more conventional western support and a path to NATO, but one they feel forced to follow through on if western support wanes. At the very least it is another negotiating point they can use in their favor during any negotiated settlement.

[dabigv13]

That's not really what he said. He said they are choosing NATO, though you could read it as an implicit threat to pursue nuclear weapons if they aren't admitted to NATO.

Ukraine would need significant time and resources to build a nuclear weapon. They have nuclear facilities but they don't have weapons grade fissile material and they don't have enrichment facilities to obtain it.

Would probably be years, and would be hard to keep secret, but they probably are better positioned than most non-nuclear states to obtain them.

From a WSJ reporter who was there for the speech-

https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1846935680816935283

I do think a Ukrainian loss to Russia would be a big proliferation nightmare, otherwise what recourse do small states have to larger irredentist neighbors. From Ukraine's perspective, seeking a nuclear deterrent is a perfectly sane and logical goal, IF they could do it in secret and do it quickly. Otherwise if Russia suspected Ukraine was close to obtaining a nuclear weapon during this conflict I would expect Russia would use their nuclear weapons first, and they have a lot of them.

[dabigv13]

That's not really what he said. He said they are choosing NATO, though you could read it as an implicit threat to pursue nuclear weapons if they aren't admitted to NATO.

Ukraine would need significant time and resources to build a nuclear weapon. They have nuclear facilities but they don't have weapons grade fissile material and they don't have enrichment facilities to obtain it.

Would probably be years, and would be hard to keep secret, but they probably are better positioned than most non-nuclear states to obtain them.

From a WSJ reporter who was there for the speech-

https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1846935680816935283

I do think a Ukrainian loss to Russia would be a big proliferation nightmare, otherwise what recourse do small states have to larger irredentist neighbors. From Ukraine's perspective, seeking a nuclear deterrent is a perfectly sane and logical goal, IF they could do it in secret and do it quickly. Otherwise if Russia suspected Ukraine was close to obtaining a nuclear weapon during this conflict I would expect Russia would use their nuclear weapons first, and they have a lot of them.

[TrumpCard]

Even on ISW, which has an obvious pro-Ukrainian bias, Russia has been advancing on numerous fronts.  Slowly, but consistently.  The rainy season can't come fast enough.

[TrumpCard]

Even on ISW, which has an obvious pro-Ukrainian bias, Russia has been advancing on numerous fronts.  Slowly, but consistently.  The rainy season can't come fast enough.

[M T]

I would expect that Ukraine could build & deliver a dirty nuclear bomb in short order. That is not to say that is a good thing, but consider if Russia used a nuclear bomb on Ukraine.

[M T]

I would expect that Ukraine could build & deliver a dirty nuclear bomb in short order. That is not to say that is a good thing, but consider if Russia used a nuclear bomb on Ukraine.

[GK3]

I would expect that Ukraine could build & deliver a dirty nuclear bomb in short order. That is not to say that is a good thing, but consider if Russia used a nuclear bomb on Ukraine.

Not sure at all of the accuracy of this information. Saw something that stated that 20 or so North Korean soldiers have disappeared and are believe defecting or have defected to Ukraine. Senior North Korean officers in Ukraine are apparently not eager that this information get out. It might make going home a bad idea.

[GK3]

I would expect that Ukraine could build & deliver a dirty nuclear bomb in short order. That is not to say that is a good thing, but consider if Russia used a nuclear bomb on Ukraine.

Not sure at all of the accuracy of this information. Saw something that stated that 20 or so North Korean soldiers have disappeared and are believe defecting or have defected to Ukraine. Senior North Korean officers in Ukraine are apparently not eager that this information get out. It might make going home a bad idea.

[M T]

Not sure at all of the accuracy of this information.  Saw something that stated that 20 or so North Korean soldiers have disappeared and are believe defecting or have defected to Ukraine.  Senior North Korean officers in Ukraine are apparently not eager that this information get out.  It might make going home a bad idea.

Just to provide a source to track back the claims, here's a Newsweek article that echoes these assertions.
https://www.newsweek.com/north-korean-tr...rt-1969726
It references a Ukraine broadcast report, quoting "intelligence officials".

And a related article about a claim that a number of North Koreans were killed in a missile strike earlier in October.
https://www.newsweek.com/north-korean-so...ts-1964313
This article references both Ukrainian and Russian sources, describing what the US would call a technical team.

[M T]

Not sure at all of the accuracy of this information.  Saw something that stated that 20 or so North Korean soldiers have disappeared and are believe defecting or have defected to Ukraine.  Senior North Korean officers in Ukraine are apparently not eager that this information get out.  It might make going home a bad idea.

Just to provide a source to track back the claims, here's a Newsweek article that echoes these assertions.
https://www.newsweek.com/north-korean-tr...rt-1969726
It references a Ukraine broadcast report, quoting "intelligence officials".

And a related article about a claim that a number of North Koreans were killed in a missile strike earlier in October.
https://www.newsweek.com/north-korean-so...ts-1964313
This article references both Ukrainian and Russian sources, describing what the US would call a technical team.

[Goose]

That's not really what he said. He said they are choosing NATO, though you could read it as an implicit threat to pursue nuclear weapons if they aren't admitted to NATO.

Ukraine would need significant time and resources to build a nuclear weapon. They have nuclear facilities but they don't have weapons grade fissile material and they don't have enrichment facilities to obtain it.

You are absolutely correct. Even if they had enriched materials they also don't have the facilities to concentrate it up to weapons grade. Ukraine never designed, build or maintained nuclear weapons. All Soviet weapons facilities were elsewhere. Those lamenting the fact Ukraine gave all the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine back to Russia should consider that the Soviet era weapons had to be re-manufactured every 10 years or so.  Ukraine had no facilities to do that. The conventional explosives the Soviets used in their weapons become increasingly unstable over time. By now they would be 30+ years old. The weapons would be unreliable at best and likely to explode on launch, probably without a nuclear explosion but that isn't for sure.

Would probably be years, and would be hard to keep secret, but they probably are better positioned than most non-nuclear states to obtain them.

From a WSJ reporter who was there for the speech-

https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1846935680816935283

I do think a Ukrainian loss to Russia would be a big proliferation nightmare, otherwise what recourse do small states have to larger irredentist neighbors. 

I agree that lots of small states would at least consider developing such weapons, and some undoubtedly would at least attempt it. It will indeed be a proliferation nightmare. It will also probably lead to small states that have such weapons threatening those that don't. The security precautions these states have may fail and result in terrorists/criminals obtaining the weapons. These states could also simply sell nuclear weapons to whoever can pay.

From Ukraine's perspective, seeking a nuclear deterrent is a perfectly sane and logical goal, IF they could do it in secret and do it quickly. Otherwise if Russia suspected Ukraine was close to obtaining a nuclear weapon during this conflict I would expect Russia would use their nuclear weapons first, and they have a lot of them.

It don't agree it is a sane and logical goal. It initially sounds like it might be, but your second sentence explains why it isn't. Russia's strategic deterrent is invulnerable to anything Ukraine could muster. Ukraine can't even reach many of the missile silos in Siberia. If even a single FBM submarine survives, Ukraine will become a nuclear wasteland in under an hour. That helps them how? If Russia was "sane" the threat of one or more Ukrainian nuclear strikes inside Russia would convince Russia that carrying on the conventional war in Ukraine was not worth it. However, even without the nuclear threat that is already true. Russia will simply tell Ukraine what will happen if Ukraine uses a nuclear weapon and rely on the fact Ukraine IS sane and will not invoke their own total annihilation.

The US and Russia are and have been in a MAD situation for years. OTOH Russia could survive a strategic nuclear strike by Ukraine. In 30 years that might not be true, but for the foreseeable future it is. The converse is not true. Nobody doubts for a nanosecond that if Ukraine executes a nuclear strike on Russia that Russia will respond with massive strategic retaliation. Of course, if Russia is wrong and Ukraine is actually crazy enough to do it, none of us want to think of what MIGHT happen. Russia might accidentally launch a missile that was not re-targeted to Ukraine. If an SSN  in the bastion area detects a Russian FBM preparing to launch, do the attack it preemptively? Do lots of missile launches by Russia require an immediate US response? All kinds of messy possibilities here.

I would expect that Ukraine could build & deliver a dirty nuclear bomb in short order. That is not to say that is a good thing, but consider if Russia used a nuclear bomb on Ukraine.

Probably they could, but while a "dirty" bomb is capable of doing some damage and scaring lots of people it is orders of magnitude less of a problem than even a "small" fission weapon. That "dirty" bomb would also probably kill a lot of the Ukrainians who built and delivered it. Designing and building good effective shielding that is light enough for a weapon on short notice isn't all that easy. Using such a weapon would also bring on "quite a few" real nuclear weapons from Russia. They may be tactical weapons, not a "full on" strategic strike, but that would certainly be enough.  It would be a suicidal action by Ukraine to no purpose.

---

Ukraine joining NATO is an "interesting" concept. IMO there is only a very small chance that can ever happen. Going through the scenarios one sees the following: If Ukraine is totally defeated and Russia swallows all of it, the point is moot. If negotiations result in Russia keeping its ill-gotten gains and a "rump" Ukraine results, two things will be true. First, Russia will never, ever sign a treaty that doesn't forbid a "defeated" Ukraine from joining NATO. Therefore attempting to join NATO re-starts the war. Second, NATO wants no part of defending an even more impoverished Ukraine that will be in an even worse strategic and tactical bind than they are now. If NATO did, it would be doing it right now. NATO doesn't want to see Ukraine fall to Russia. NATO is willing to assist them in all means short of war. That says it all. Even if the US, the UK, and Poland want to "actively" defend Ukraine in the future (which is a "fact" not in evidence), Turkey, Hungary, and probably several others definitely do not.

If Ukraine succeeds in forcing a solution where Russia returns its ill-gotten gains and agrees to stay out of Ukraine's foreign policy, NATO might accept a victorious Ukraine (at least partially out of a sense of obligation). It must be remembered that the US military, particularly the Army wants no part of a war in Ukraine. It is viewed as a "bridge too far" with good reason. Any war between NATO and Russia is fraught with nuclear dangers. Obviously Ukraine and Russia have a history and are in the middle of a war right now. Accepting Ukraine into NATO creates a whole new set of dangers to the alliance. Again, if NATO wanted them they could be voted in tomorrow. I see little likelihood it will ever happen.

[Goose]

That's not really what he said. He said they are choosing NATO, though you could read it as an implicit threat to pursue nuclear weapons if they aren't admitted to NATO.

Ukraine would need significant time and resources to build a nuclear weapon. They have nuclear facilities but they don't have weapons grade fissile material and they don't have enrichment facilities to obtain it.

You are absolutely correct. Even if they had enriched materials they also don't have the facilities to concentrate it up to weapons grade. Ukraine never designed, build or maintained nuclear weapons. All Soviet weapons facilities were elsewhere. Those lamenting the fact Ukraine gave all the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine back to Russia should consider that the Soviet era weapons had to be re-manufactured every 10 years or so.  Ukraine had no facilities to do that. The conventional explosives the Soviets used in their weapons become increasingly unstable over time. By now they would be 30+ years old. The weapons would be unreliable at best and likely to explode on launch, probably without a nuclear explosion but that isn't for sure.

Would probably be years, and would be hard to keep secret, but they probably are better positioned than most non-nuclear states to obtain them.

From a WSJ reporter who was there for the speech-

https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1846935680816935283

I do think a Ukrainian loss to Russia would be a big proliferation nightmare, otherwise what recourse do small states have to larger irredentist neighbors. 

I agree that lots of small states would at least consider developing such weapons, and some undoubtedly would at least attempt it. It will indeed be a proliferation nightmare. It will also probably lead to small states that have such weapons threatening those that don't. The security precautions these states have may fail and result in terrorists/criminals obtaining the weapons. These states could also simply sell nuclear weapons to whoever can pay.

From Ukraine's perspective, seeking a nuclear deterrent is a perfectly sane and logical goal, IF they could do it in secret and do it quickly. Otherwise if Russia suspected Ukraine was close to obtaining a nuclear weapon during this conflict I would expect Russia would use their nuclear weapons first, and they have a lot of them.

It don't agree it is a sane and logical goal. It initially sounds like it might be, but your second sentence explains why it isn't. Russia's strategic deterrent is invulnerable to anything Ukraine could muster. Ukraine can't even reach many of the missile silos in Siberia. If even a single FBM submarine survives, Ukraine will become a nuclear wasteland in under an hour. That helps them how? If Russia was "sane" the threat of one or more Ukrainian nuclear strikes inside Russia would convince Russia that carrying on the conventional war in Ukraine was not worth it. However, even without the nuclear threat that is already true. Russia will simply tell Ukraine what will happen if Ukraine uses a nuclear weapon and rely on the fact Ukraine IS sane and will not invoke their own total annihilation.

The US and Russia are and have been in a MAD situation for years. OTOH Russia could survive a strategic nuclear strike by Ukraine. In 30 years that might not be true, but for the foreseeable future it is. The converse is not true. Nobody doubts for a nanosecond that if Ukraine executes a nuclear strike on Russia that Russia will respond with massive strategic retaliation. Of course, if Russia is wrong and Ukraine is actually crazy enough to do it, none of us want to think of what MIGHT happen. Russia might accidentally launch a missile that was not re-targeted to Ukraine. If an SSN  in the bastion area detects a Russian FBM preparing to launch, do the attack it preemptively? Do lots of missile launches by Russia require an immediate US response? All kinds of messy possibilities here.

I would expect that Ukraine could build & deliver a dirty nuclear bomb in short order. That is not to say that is a good thing, but consider if Russia used a nuclear bomb on Ukraine.

Probably they could, but while a "dirty" bomb is capable of doing some damage and scaring lots of people it is orders of magnitude less of a problem than even a "small" fission weapon. That "dirty" bomb would also probably kill a lot of the Ukrainians who built and delivered it. Designing and building good effective shielding that is light enough for a weapon on short notice isn't all that easy. Using such a weapon would also bring on "quite a few" real nuclear weapons from Russia. They may be tactical weapons, not a "full on" strategic strike, but that would certainly be enough.  It would be a suicidal action by Ukraine to no purpose.

---

Ukraine joining NATO is an "interesting" concept. IMO there is only a very small chance that can ever happen. Going through the scenarios one sees the following: If Ukraine is totally defeated and Russia swallows all of it, the point is moot. If negotiations result in Russia keeping its ill-gotten gains and a "rump" Ukraine results, two things will be true. First, Russia will never, ever sign a treaty that doesn't forbid a "defeated" Ukraine from joining NATO. Therefore attempting to join NATO re-starts the war. Second, NATO wants no part of defending an even more impoverished Ukraine that will be in an even worse strategic and tactical bind than they are now. If NATO did, it would be doing it right now. NATO doesn't want to see Ukraine fall to Russia. NATO is willing to assist them in all means short of war. That says it all. Even if the US, the UK, and Poland want to "actively" defend Ukraine in the future (which is a "fact" not in evidence), Turkey, Hungary, and probably several others definitely do not.

If Ukraine succeeds in forcing a solution where Russia returns its ill-gotten gains and agrees to stay out of Ukraine's foreign policy, NATO might accept a victorious Ukraine (at least partially out of a sense of obligation). It must be remembered that the US military, particularly the Army wants no part of a war in Ukraine. It is viewed as a "bridge too far" with good reason. Any war between NATO and Russia is fraught with nuclear dangers. Obviously Ukraine and Russia have a history and are in the middle of a war right now. Accepting Ukraine into NATO creates a whole new set of dangers to the alliance. Again, if NATO wanted them they could be voted in tomorrow. I see little likelihood it will ever happen.

[dabigv13]

https://www.twz.com/news-features/nearly...s-spy-boss

Budanov sometimes lies or exaggerates. Haven't seen any photo or video evidence of substantial numbers of North Korean regular troops yet.

[dabigv13]

https://www.twz.com/news-features/nearly...s-spy-boss

Budanov sometimes lies or exaggerates. Haven't seen any photo or video evidence of substantial numbers of North Korean regular troops yet.

[Goose]

https://www.twz.com/news-features/nearly...s-spy-boss

Budanov sometimes lies or exaggerates. Haven't seen any photo or video evidence of substantial numbers of North Korean regular troops yet.

Agree. Both sides do that. Remember the flapex when Russia was supposedly recruiting "thousands" of Syrian fighters? There were undoubtedly some such fighters but not enough to really "matter". It is also difficult to imagine how North Korean forces would be integrated into the Russian ORBAT. Would Korean units exist at the battalion level or would individual soldiers be attached to existing Russian formations? I can see how it would make sense to have Korean units operate and maintain the Korean ballistic weapons being provided, but it wouldn't require 11K troops to do that.

 Of course, if all you want is bodies, it perhaps doesn't matter. North Korea has a population of 26 million. Russia has a population of 146 million. An 18% increase in available troop strength would certainly benefit Russia. North Korea obviously can't commit its entire military strength to Russia in Ukraine. However North Korea maintains a much larger percentage of their population in the military than Russia does. They have the fourth largest military in the world with a troop strength of 1.3 million. North Korea can indeed supply Russia a lot of "bodies". One of Russia's paramount goals is avoiding the need for a "general mobilization". Anything that helps that is pure gold for them.

[Goose]

https://www.twz.com/news-features/nearly...s-spy-boss

Budanov sometimes lies or exaggerates. Haven't seen any photo or video evidence of substantial numbers of North Korean regular troops yet.

Agree. Both sides do that. Remember the flapex when Russia was supposedly recruiting "thousands" of Syrian fighters? There were undoubtedly some such fighters but not enough to really "matter". It is also difficult to imagine how North Korean forces would be integrated into the Russian ORBAT. Would Korean units exist at the battalion level or would individual soldiers be attached to existing Russian formations? I can see how it would make sense to have Korean units operate and maintain the Korean ballistic weapons being provided, but it wouldn't require 11K troops to do that.

 Of course, if all you want is bodies, it perhaps doesn't matter. North Korea has a population of 26 million. Russia has a population of 146 million. An 18% increase in available troop strength would certainly benefit Russia. North Korea obviously can't commit its entire military strength to Russia in Ukraine. However North Korea maintains a much larger percentage of their population in the military than Russia does. They have the fourth largest military in the world with a troop strength of 1.3 million. North Korea can indeed supply Russia a lot of "bodies". One of Russia's paramount goals is avoiding the need for a "general mobilization". Anything that helps that is pure gold for them.

[dabigv13]

Budanov may have been telling the truth

Video of North Korean troops

https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1847204271210574233

And South Korea with some confirmation as well

South Korea’s spy agency reported Friday that at least 1,500 North Korean Special Forces are training in far eastern Russia, and it showed satellite photos tracking their movements.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202...ps-buryat/

[dabigv13]

Budanov may have been telling the truth

Video of North Korean troops

https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1847204271210574233

And South Korea with some confirmation as well

South Korea’s spy agency reported Friday that at least 1,500 North Korean Special Forces are training in far eastern Russia, and it showed satellite photos tracking their movements.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202...ps-buryat/

[dabigv13]

More video. North Korean troops being outfitted with Russian uniforms.

https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/1847317531477844036

[dabigv13]

More video. North Korean troops being outfitted with Russian uniforms.

https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/1847317531477844036

[Goose]

More video. North Korean troops being outfitted with Russian uniforms.

https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/1847317531477844036

Thanks for both of these posts. We will see how tactically significant this deployment will be in November. One somewhat scary observation is that these North Korean units may have spent lots of time training to fight as infantry in cold and wet weather. There is lots of that in North Korea. These troops may be "better" quality than what Russia has been deploying and may also fight better as a unit. The upcoming bad weather may be their forte. We shall soon see. Hopefully this is mostly a "stunt" and will not matter, but at this point we can't be sure.

[Goose]

More video. North Korean troops being outfitted with Russian uniforms.

https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/1847317531477844036

Thanks for both of these posts. We will see how tactically significant this deployment will be in November. One somewhat scary observation is that these North Korean units may have spent lots of time training to fight as infantry in cold and wet weather. There is lots of that in North Korea. These troops may be "better" quality than what Russia has been deploying and may also fight better as a unit. The upcoming bad weather may be their forte. We shall soon see. Hopefully this is mostly a "stunt" and will not matter, but at this point we can't be sure.

[M T]

I don't see how individual North Korean soldiers would be spread out amongst Russian troops -- too many language (and probably cultural) differences.   It makes sense for them to fight as a unit or units.

For North Korea, this gives the first chance for these troops to face actual battle conditions.  No matter how well trained they are, this is an important step.  If N.K. is anticipating fighting their own battles in the next decade, this will be important for them.

Since N.K. and Russia recently signed a "defensive" mutual support treaty (sounds a bit like NATO, except for the matter that one of them is doing the invasion), this shouldn't be surprising.

I continue to believe the world is aligning again into an Axis vs Allies division, with limited wars beginning to be merged.  I pray for peace, but I think we need to brace & prepare for a widening war, with at-least cyber attacks on government and civilian infrastructure and individuals throughout the West.

In the last year, these are the cybersecurity advisories on Russia, North Korea, Iran, and China from CISA.gov

• CISA, FBI, NSA, and International Partners Release Advisory on Iranian Cyber Actors Targeting Critical Infrastructure Organizations Using Brute Force
  
• CISA and FBI Release Fact Sheet on Protecting Against Iranian Targeting of Accounts Associated with National Political Organizations
  
• Russian Military Cyber Actors Target US and Global Critical Infrastructure
  
• Iran-based Cyber Actors Enabling Ransomware Attacks on US Organizations
  
• North Korea Cyber Group Conducts Global Espionage Campaign to Advance Regime’s Military and Nuclear Programs
  
• (Russian) SVR Cyber Actors Adapt Tactics for Initial Cloud Access
  
• (China) PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure
  
• Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Exploiting JetBrains TeamCity CVE Globally
  
• Russian FSB Cyber Actor Star Blizzard Continues Worldwide Spear-phishing Campaigns
  
• (Iran) IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities
  
• People's Republic of China-Linked Cyber Actors Hide in Router Firmware
  

[M T]

I don't see how individual North Korean soldiers would be spread out amongst Russian troops -- too many language (and probably cultural) differences.   It makes sense for them to fight as a unit or units.

For North Korea, this gives the first chance for these troops to face actual battle conditions.  No matter how well trained they are, this is an important step.  If N.K. is anticipating fighting their own battles in the next decade, this will be important for them.

Since N.K. and Russia recently signed a "defensive" mutual support treaty (sounds a bit like NATO, except for the matter that one of them is doing the invasion), this shouldn't be surprising.

I continue to believe the world is aligning again into an Axis vs Allies division, with limited wars beginning to be merged.  I pray for peace, but I think we need to brace & prepare for a widening war, with at-least cyber attacks on government and civilian infrastructure and individuals throughout the West.

In the last year, these are the cybersecurity advisories on Russia, North Korea, Iran, and China from CISA.gov

• CISA, FBI, NSA, and International Partners Release Advisory on Iranian Cyber Actors Targeting Critical Infrastructure Organizations Using Brute Force
  
• CISA and FBI Release Fact Sheet on Protecting Against Iranian Targeting of Accounts Associated with National Political Organizations
  
• Russian Military Cyber Actors Target US and Global Critical Infrastructure
  
• Iran-based Cyber Actors Enabling Ransomware Attacks on US Organizations
  
• North Korea Cyber Group Conducts Global Espionage Campaign to Advance Regime’s Military and Nuclear Programs
  
• (Russian) SVR Cyber Actors Adapt Tactics for Initial Cloud Access
  
• (China) PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure
  
• Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Exploiting JetBrains TeamCity CVE Globally
  
• Russian FSB Cyber Actor Star Blizzard Continues Worldwide Spear-phishing Campaigns
  
• (Iran) IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities
  
• People's Republic of China-Linked Cyber Actors Hide in Router Firmware
  

[dabigv13]

The "West", is already at war with Russia, China, NK, Iran. The problem is those countries know it, and we'd rather pretend we aren't.

[dabigv13]

The "West", is already at war with Russia, China, NK, Iran. The problem is those countries know it, and we'd rather pretend we aren't.

[needle]

That's not really what he said. He said they are choosing NATO, though you could read it as an implicit threat to pursue nuclear weapons if they aren't admitted to NATO.

Ukraine would need significant time and resources to build a nuclear weapon. They have nuclear facilities but they don't have weapons grade fissile material and they don't have enrichment facilities to obtain it.

You are absolutely correct. Even if they had enriched materials they also don't have the facilities to concentrate it up to weapons grade. Ukraine never designed, build or maintained nuclear weapons. All Soviet weapons facilities were elsewhere. Those lamenting the fact Ukraine gave all the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine back to Russia should consider that the Soviet era weapons had to be re-manufactured every 10 years or so.  Ukraine had no facilities to do that. The conventional explosives the Soviets used in their weapons become increasingly unstable over time. By now they would be 30+ years old. The weapons would be unreliable at best and likely to explode on launch, probably without a nuclear explosion but that isn't for sure.

Would probably be years, and would be hard to keep secret, but they probably are better positioned than most non-nuclear states to obtain them.

From a WSJ reporter who was there for the speech-

https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1846935680816935283

I do think a Ukrainian loss to Russia would be a big proliferation nightmare, otherwise what recourse do small states have to larger irredentist neighbors. 

I agree that lots of small states would at least consider developing such weapons, and some undoubtedly would at least attempt it. It will indeed be a proliferation nightmare. It will also probably lead to small states that have such weapons threatening those that don't. The security precautions these states have may fail and result in terrorists/criminals obtaining the weapons. These states could also simply sell nuclear weapons to whoever can pay.

From Ukraine's perspective, seeking a nuclear deterrent is a perfectly sane and logical goal, IF they could do it in secret and do it quickly. Otherwise if Russia suspected Ukraine was close to obtaining a nuclear weapon during this conflict I would expect Russia would use their nuclear weapons first, and they have a lot of them.

It don't agree it is a sane and logical goal. It initially sounds like it might be, but your second sentence explains why it isn't. Russia's strategic deterrent is invulnerable to anything Ukraine could muster. Ukraine can't even reach many of the missile silos in Siberia. If even a single FBM submarine survives, Ukraine will become a nuclear wasteland in under an hour. That helps them how? If Russia was "sane" the threat of one or more Ukrainian nuclear strikes inside Russia would convince Russia that carrying on the conventional war in Ukraine was not worth it. However, even without the nuclear threat that is already true. Russia will simply tell Ukraine what will happen if Ukraine uses a nuclear weapon and rely on the fact Ukraine IS sane and will not invoke their own total annihilation.

The US and Russia are and have been in a MAD situation for years. OTOH Russia could survive a strategic nuclear strike by Ukraine. In 30 years that might not be true, but for the foreseeable future it is. The converse is not true. Nobody doubts for a nanosecond that if Ukraine executes a nuclear strike on Russia that Russia will respond with massive strategic retaliation. Of course, if Russia is wrong and Ukraine is actually crazy enough to do it, none of us want to think of what MIGHT happen. Russia might accidentally launch a missile that was not re-targeted to Ukraine. If an SSN  in the bastion area detects a Russian FBM preparing to launch, do the attack it preemptively? Do lots of missile launches by Russia require an immediate US response? All kinds of messy possibilities here.

I would expect that Ukraine could build & deliver a dirty nuclear bomb in short order. That is not to say that is a good thing, but consider if Russia used a nuclear bomb on Ukraine.

Probably they could, but while a "dirty" bomb is capable of doing some damage and scaring lots of people it is orders of magnitude less of a problem than even a "small" fission weapon. That "dirty" bomb would also probably kill a lot of the Ukrainians who built and delivered it. Designing and building good effective shielding that is light enough for a weapon on short notice isn't all that easy. Using such a weapon would also bring on "quite a few" real nuclear weapons from Russia. They may be tactical weapons, not a "full on" strategic strike, but that would certainly be enough.  It would be a suicidal action by Ukraine to no purpose.

---

Ukraine joining NATO is an "interesting" concept. IMO there is only a very small chance that can ever happen. Going through the scenarios one sees the following: If Ukraine is totally defeated and Russia swallows all of it, the point is moot. If negotiations result in Russia keeping its ill-gotten gains and a "rump" Ukraine results, two things will be true. First, Russia will never, ever sign a treaty that doesn't forbid a "defeated" Ukraine from joining NATO. Therefore attempting to join NATO re-starts the war. Second, NATO wants no part of defending an even more impoverished Ukraine that will be in an even worse strategic and tactical bind than they are now. If NATO did, it would be doing it right now. NATO doesn't want to see Ukraine fall to Russia. NATO is willing to assist them in all means short of war. That says it all. Even if the US, the UK, and Poland want to "actively" defend Ukraine in the future (which is a "fact" not in evidence), Turkey, Hungary, and probably several others definitely do not.

If Ukraine succeeds in forcing a solution where Russia returns its ill-gotten gains and agrees to stay out of Ukraine's foreign policy, NATO might accept a victorious Ukraine (at least partially out of a sense of obligation). It must be remembered that the US military, particularly the Army wants no part of a war in Ukraine. It is viewed as a "bridge too far" with good reason. Any war between NATO and Russia is fraught with nuclear dangers. Obviously Ukraine and Russia have a history and are in the middle of a war right now. Accepting Ukraine into NATO creates a whole new set of dangers to the alliance. Again, if NATO wanted them they could be voted in tomorrow. I see little likelihood it will ever happen.

And yet, on Zelenskyy's NATO/nuclear "or" statement, does this--from an RU politics/policy expert--not ring true: "I bet for Russia, there is no 'or'. There is either Ukraine in NATO and eventually with nukes or no Ukraine."

https://x.com/kirlant/status/1846975575132721206

While here at home, from a U.S.-Russia relations scholar: "The White House doesn’t seem to view its Ukraine policy as an issue that goes to the heart of the US’s credibility as a military superpower, and so to its ability to defend not just its allies but itself. But it seems pretty clear that US allies and adversaries do."

https://x.com/ruth_deyermond/status/1845903297384685911

So here we are.

[needle]

That's not really what he said. He said they are choosing NATO, though you could read it as an implicit threat to pursue nuclear weapons if they aren't admitted to NATO.

Ukraine would need significant time and resources to build a nuclear weapon. They have nuclear facilities but they don't have weapons grade fissile material and they don't have enrichment facilities to obtain it.

You are absolutely correct. Even if they had enriched materials they also don't have the facilities to concentrate it up to weapons grade. Ukraine never designed, build or maintained nuclear weapons. All Soviet weapons facilities were elsewhere. Those lamenting the fact Ukraine gave all the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine back to Russia should consider that the Soviet era weapons had to be re-manufactured every 10 years or so.  Ukraine had no facilities to do that. The conventional explosives the Soviets used in their weapons become increasingly unstable over time. By now they would be 30+ years old. The weapons would be unreliable at best and likely to explode on launch, probably without a nuclear explosion but that isn't for sure.

Would probably be years, and would be hard to keep secret, but they probably are better positioned than most non-nuclear states to obtain them.

From a WSJ reporter who was there for the speech-

https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1846935680816935283

I do think a Ukrainian loss to Russia would be a big proliferation nightmare, otherwise what recourse do small states have to larger irredentist neighbors. 

I agree that lots of small states would at least consider developing such weapons, and some undoubtedly would at least attempt it. It will indeed be a proliferation nightmare. It will also probably lead to small states that have such weapons threatening those that don't. The security precautions these states have may fail and result in terrorists/criminals obtaining the weapons. These states could also simply sell nuclear weapons to whoever can pay.

From Ukraine's perspective, seeking a nuclear deterrent is a perfectly sane and logical goal, IF they could do it in secret and do it quickly. Otherwise if Russia suspected Ukraine was close to obtaining a nuclear weapon during this conflict I would expect Russia would use their nuclear weapons first, and they have a lot of them.

It don't agree it is a sane and logical goal. It initially sounds like it might be, but your second sentence explains why it isn't. Russia's strategic deterrent is invulnerable to anything Ukraine could muster. Ukraine can't even reach many of the missile silos in Siberia. If even a single FBM submarine survives, Ukraine will become a nuclear wasteland in under an hour. That helps them how? If Russia was "sane" the threat of one or more Ukrainian nuclear strikes inside Russia would convince Russia that carrying on the conventional war in Ukraine was not worth it. However, even without the nuclear threat that is already true. Russia will simply tell Ukraine what will happen if Ukraine uses a nuclear weapon and rely on the fact Ukraine IS sane and will not invoke their own total annihilation.

The US and Russia are and have been in a MAD situation for years. OTOH Russia could survive a strategic nuclear strike by Ukraine. In 30 years that might not be true, but for the foreseeable future it is. The converse is not true. Nobody doubts for a nanosecond that if Ukraine executes a nuclear strike on Russia that Russia will respond with massive strategic retaliation. Of course, if Russia is wrong and Ukraine is actually crazy enough to do it, none of us want to think of what MIGHT happen. Russia might accidentally launch a missile that was not re-targeted to Ukraine. If an SSN  in the bastion area detects a Russian FBM preparing to launch, do the attack it preemptively? Do lots of missile launches by Russia require an immediate US response? All kinds of messy possibilities here.

I would expect that Ukraine could build & deliver a dirty nuclear bomb in short order. That is not to say that is a good thing, but consider if Russia used a nuclear bomb on Ukraine.

Probably they could, but while a "dirty" bomb is capable of doing some damage and scaring lots of people it is orders of magnitude less of a problem than even a "small" fission weapon. That "dirty" bomb would also probably kill a lot of the Ukrainians who built and delivered it. Designing and building good effective shielding that is light enough for a weapon on short notice isn't all that easy. Using such a weapon would also bring on "quite a few" real nuclear weapons from Russia. They may be tactical weapons, not a "full on" strategic strike, but that would certainly be enough.  It would be a suicidal action by Ukraine to no purpose.

---

Ukraine joining NATO is an "interesting" concept. IMO there is only a very small chance that can ever happen. Going through the scenarios one sees the following: If Ukraine is totally defeated and Russia swallows all of it, the point is moot. If negotiations result in Russia keeping its ill-gotten gains and a "rump" Ukraine results, two things will be true. First, Russia will never, ever sign a treaty that doesn't forbid a "defeated" Ukraine from joining NATO. Therefore attempting to join NATO re-starts the war. Second, NATO wants no part of defending an even more impoverished Ukraine that will be in an even worse strategic and tactical bind than they are now. If NATO did, it would be doing it right now. NATO doesn't want to see Ukraine fall to Russia. NATO is willing to assist them in all means short of war. That says it all. Even if the US, the UK, and Poland want to "actively" defend Ukraine in the future (which is a "fact" not in evidence), Turkey, Hungary, and probably several others definitely do not.

If Ukraine succeeds in forcing a solution where Russia returns its ill-gotten gains and agrees to stay out of Ukraine's foreign policy, NATO might accept a victorious Ukraine (at least partially out of a sense of obligation). It must be remembered that the US military, particularly the Army wants no part of a war in Ukraine. It is viewed as a "bridge too far" with good reason. Any war between NATO and Russia is fraught with nuclear dangers. Obviously Ukraine and Russia have a history and are in the middle of a war right now. Accepting Ukraine into NATO creates a whole new set of dangers to the alliance. Again, if NATO wanted them they could be voted in tomorrow. I see little likelihood it will ever happen.

And yet, on Zelenskyy's NATO/nuclear "or" statement, does this--from an RU politics/policy expert--not ring true: "I bet for Russia, there is no 'or'. There is either Ukraine in NATO and eventually with nukes or no Ukraine."

https://x.com/kirlant/status/1846975575132721206

While here at home, from a U.S.-Russia relations scholar: "The White House doesn’t seem to view its Ukraine policy as an issue that goes to the heart of the US’s credibility as a military superpower, and so to its ability to defend not just its allies but itself. But it seems pretty clear that US allies and adversaries do."

https://x.com/ruth_deyermond/status/1845903297384685911

So here we are.

[Goose]

And yet, on Zelenskyy's NATO/nuclear "or" statement, does this--from an RU politics/policy expert--not ring true: "I bet for Russia, there is no 'or'. There is either Ukraine in NATO and eventually with nukes or no Ukraine."

https://x.com/kirlant/status/1846975575132721206

If Ukraine survives this war it will require some kind of security "arrangement". For Russia, Ukraine surviving as anything but a rump vassal state is unacceptable. For Russia this is the only possible outcome. For that reason they have no opinion on any other possibilities :-). Therefore for the Ukraine to survive Russia must lose this current war and be either unable or unwilling to continue the fight in the near term.

A free and (more or less) intact Ukraine resulting from that victory will require some kind of security "arrangements". Ukraine itself is very very unlikely to construct a credible nuclear deterrent no matter how much time you give them. If it can't achieve some kind of MAD it won't help them. They are not economically strong enough to develop and maintain a credible deterrent. Attempting to do so is a waste of time and money. If Russia was starting from scratch today they probably couldn't do it either. Having the weapons themselves, expensive and difficult as it would be, is not near enough. You have to be able to deliver them reliably if attacked by a Russian first strike. That costs even more money. Having a "North Korea like" or even "Israeli like"  deterrent does Ukraine no good at all. North Korea only wants to deter/threaten non-nuclear neighbors. If any of the "Nuclear 5" had sufficient reason to launch a nuclear strike against them, North Korea's weapons would be useless. It would not survive. Its opponent, while possibly severely damaged, would. North Korea's other problem is that if it gets into a conventional war with any of the "Nuclear 5" resorting to its nuclear capability ensures its total annihilation. Nuclear weapons are no answer at all for Ukraine against Russia for the same reason.

As NATO realized a long time ago even if you have a nuclear deterrent you must be credibly able to fight and win a conventional conflict with Russia. The barriers to using your nuclear weapons are so high that nobody wants to take the risk of using them except in extremis. A full nuclear exchange annihilates both sides. At one point NATO's policy was to fight conventionally as long as possible and then use a tactical nuclear weapon if necessary as a "message". The danger of this policy was obvious and the rapid escalation to MAD was very real. Despite that, when NATO upgraded its forces and looked like it might be able to win a conventional war outright Russia adopted the same "solution".

I have already raised the points that make Ukraine ever joining NATO unlikely. The other question is that even if Ukraine was part of NATO, would the majority of NATO, particularly the US, respond positively to an Article 5 invocation by Ukraine? As of right now, I expect the answer is no. If it were "important" to us, we would be fighting now. That is a real problem for the future. Ukraine also knows from Minsk and Minsk II that bilateral agreements aren't worth much either. IMO the problem is that "the west" doesn't see Ukraine being part of Russia as an existential threat. It was that way for a long time and we are still here. Of course, one can say almost the same thing about all the "Warsaw Pact" states. Lots of rightly nervous people out there. Until that belief publicly and credibly changes, IMO the situation will remain dangerous.

[Goose]

And yet, on Zelenskyy's NATO/nuclear "or" statement, does this--from an RU politics/policy expert--not ring true: "I bet for Russia, there is no 'or'. There is either Ukraine in NATO and eventually with nukes or no Ukraine."

https://x.com/kirlant/status/1846975575132721206

If Ukraine survives this war it will require some kind of security "arrangement". For Russia, Ukraine surviving as anything but a rump vassal state is unacceptable. For Russia this is the only possible outcome. For that reason they have no opinion on any other possibilities :-). Therefore for the Ukraine to survive Russia must lose this current war and be either unable or unwilling to continue the fight in the near term.

A free and (more or less) intact Ukraine resulting from that victory will require some kind of security "arrangements". Ukraine itself is very very unlikely to construct a credible nuclear deterrent no matter how much time you give them. If it can't achieve some kind of MAD it won't help them. They are not economically strong enough to develop and maintain a credible deterrent. Attempting to do so is a waste of time and money. If Russia was starting from scratch today they probably couldn't do it either. Having the weapons themselves, expensive and difficult as it would be, is not near enough. You have to be able to deliver them reliably if attacked by a Russian first strike. That costs even more money. Having a "North Korea like" or even "Israeli like"  deterrent does Ukraine no good at all. North Korea only wants to deter/threaten non-nuclear neighbors. If any of the "Nuclear 5" had sufficient reason to launch a nuclear strike against them, North Korea's weapons would be useless. It would not survive. Its opponent, while possibly severely damaged, would. North Korea's other problem is that if it gets into a conventional war with any of the "Nuclear 5" resorting to its nuclear capability ensures its total annihilation. Nuclear weapons are no answer at all for Ukraine against Russia for the same reason.

As NATO realized a long time ago even if you have a nuclear deterrent you must be credibly able to fight and win a conventional conflict with Russia. The barriers to using your nuclear weapons are so high that nobody wants to take the risk of using them except in extremis. A full nuclear exchange annihilates both sides. At one point NATO's policy was to fight conventionally as long as possible and then use a tactical nuclear weapon if necessary as a "message". The danger of this policy was obvious and the rapid escalation to MAD was very real. Despite that, when NATO upgraded its forces and looked like it might be able to win a conventional war outright Russia adopted the same "solution".

I have already raised the points that make Ukraine ever joining NATO unlikely. The other question is that even if Ukraine was part of NATO, would the majority of NATO, particularly the US, respond positively to an Article 5 invocation by Ukraine? As of right now, I expect the answer is no. If it were "important" to us, we would be fighting now. That is a real problem for the future. Ukraine also knows from Minsk and Minsk II that bilateral agreements aren't worth much either. IMO the problem is that "the west" doesn't see Ukraine being part of Russia as an existential threat. It was that way for a long time and we are still here. Of course, one can say almost the same thing about all the "Warsaw Pact" states. Lots of rightly nervous people out there. Until that belief publicly and credibly changes, IMO the situation will remain dangerous.

[Goose]

I don't see how individual North Korean soldiers would be spread out amongst Russian troops -- too many language (and probably cultural) differences.   It makes sense for them to fight as a unit or units.

In may ways having them fight as a unit "makes sense". However, from a Russian point of view it has several important downsides. As a single unit the Korean leadership may be unwilling to fight where and how Russia wants them to. They would have their own agenda and military philosophy. As a unit would have the ability to enforce it and act on their own. That isn't at all "the Russian way". The two groups also might not fully trust each other. Consider the row that was created when the US military refused to allow their sub-units to be assigned willy-nilly to reinforce existing French and British formations. There is lots of historical precedent for severe problems in using "allied" troops, especially when one ally is dominant in the partnership. The British willingness "to fight to the last Australian" is a good example of that, where both sides spoke the same language (mostly). 

While assigning Korean troops to Russian formations may seem a bit strange, that is exactly what the KATUSA program did for the US Army in the Korean war. While couched as a "liaison" program it was in reality an early-on attempt to use Korean manpower to make up for a lack of US manpower. Many US Army squads had two KATUSA troops to make up the numbers. It didn't work real well, but then not much did in the early days of the Korean war. Later on in the war and after the war it actually did.

For North Korea, this gives the first chance for these troops to face actual battle conditions.  No matter how well trained they are, this is an important step.  If N.K. is anticipating fighting their own battles in the next decade, this will be important for them.

Since N.K. and Russia recently signed a "defensive" mutual support treaty (sounds a bit like NATO, except for the matter that one of them is doing the invasion), this shouldn't be surprising.

The experience may be useful, but I suspect most of those Koreans won't be coming back. IMO the most important benefit seen by the North Korean leadership is the access to Russian technology and advanced weapons in return for the troops. I suspect the North will be disappointed but by then it will be too late to complain about Russia not living up to the deal. I suspect the North has extracted a promise from Russia to give them the design and know-how to build a fusion device. The North wants it and avoiding the uncertainties and delays inherent in doing it yourself is very valuable. North Korea may also have problems testing an H bomb. Using a Russian design might obviate the need to do so.

[Goose]

I don't see how individual North Korean soldiers would be spread out amongst Russian troops -- too many language (and probably cultural) differences.   It makes sense for them to fight as a unit or units.

In may ways having them fight as a unit "makes sense". However, from a Russian point of view it has several important downsides. As a single unit the Korean leadership may be unwilling to fight where and how Russia wants them to. They would have their own agenda and military philosophy. As a unit would have the ability to enforce it and act on their own. That isn't at all "the Russian way". The two groups also might not fully trust each other. Consider the row that was created when the US military refused to allow their sub-units to be assigned willy-nilly to reinforce existing French and British formations. There is lots of historical precedent for severe problems in using "allied" troops, especially when one ally is dominant in the partnership. The British willingness "to fight to the last Australian" is a good example of that, where both sides spoke the same language (mostly). 

While assigning Korean troops to Russian formations may seem a bit strange, that is exactly what the KATUSA program did for the US Army in the Korean war. While couched as a "liaison" program it was in reality an early-on attempt to use Korean manpower to make up for a lack of US manpower. Many US Army squads had two KATUSA troops to make up the numbers. It didn't work real well, but then not much did in the early days of the Korean war. Later on in the war and after the war it actually did.

For North Korea, this gives the first chance for these troops to face actual battle conditions.  No matter how well trained they are, this is an important step.  If N.K. is anticipating fighting their own battles in the next decade, this will be important for them.

Since N.K. and Russia recently signed a "defensive" mutual support treaty (sounds a bit like NATO, except for the matter that one of them is doing the invasion), this shouldn't be surprising.

The experience may be useful, but I suspect most of those Koreans won't be coming back. IMO the most important benefit seen by the North Korean leadership is the access to Russian technology and advanced weapons in return for the troops. I suspect the North will be disappointed but by then it will be too late to complain about Russia not living up to the deal. I suspect the North has extracted a promise from Russia to give them the design and know-how to build a fusion device. The North wants it and avoiding the uncertainties and delays inherent in doing it yourself is very valuable. North Korea may also have problems testing an H bomb. Using a Russian design might obviate the need to do so.