[fullmetal]

There's an unconfirmed photo on Twitter purporting to show the only Pantsir in Chechnya hightailing it out of Grozny, referencing the evacuation of the Buk that was suspected of downing MH-17.

Four undersea telecom cables connecting Finland to nations across the Baltic Sea have been disrupted, with vessels linked to Russia/China in the vicinity.  Following a disruption in service of an electrical power cable between Estonia and Finland, a rapid response unit from the Helsinki Police boarded the ship from a military helicopter while the ship still had its anchors in the water (from dragging across the cables).  

https://yle.fi/a/74-20133516
https://twitter.com/TallbarFIN/status/18...5716795653
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/fin...024-12-26/

[fullmetal]

There's an unconfirmed photo on Twitter purporting to show the only Pantsir in Chechnya hightailing it out of Grozny, referencing the evacuation of the Buk that was suspected of downing MH-17.

Four undersea telecom cables connecting Finland to nations across the Baltic Sea have been disrupted, with vessels linked to Russia/China in the vicinity.  Following a disruption in service of an electrical power cable between Estonia and Finland, a rapid response unit from the Helsinki Police boarded the ship from a military helicopter while the ship still had its anchors in the water (from dragging across the cables).  

https://yle.fi/a/74-20133516
https://twitter.com/TallbarFIN/status/18...5716795653
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/fin...024-12-26/

[Hurlburt88]

really sad . . . Russia seems to be developing a pattern for shooting down civilian airliners.  I remember KAL 107 quite well back in 1983.   THis plus the Malasian flight and maybe more that I don't remember form a scary trend.   Crossing Russia is pretty useful to get to a lot of places given the massive landmass.

[Hurlburt88]

really sad . . . Russia seems to be developing a pattern for shooting down civilian airliners.  I remember KAL 107 quite well back in 1983.   THis plus the Malasian flight and maybe more that I don't remember form a scary trend.   Crossing Russia is pretty useful to get to a lot of places given the massive landmass.

[Goose]

really sad . . . Russia seems to be developing a pattern for shooting down civilian airliners.  I remember KAL 107 quite well back in 1983.   THis plus the Malasian flight and maybe more that I don't remember form a scary trend.   Crossing Russia is pretty useful to get to a lot of places given the massive landmass.

Russia is known to have serious command and control problems in their air defense system. Their personnel lack training and are therefore prone to mistakes. Their equipment lacks IFF equipment compatible with the civilian IFF systems. They are a dangerous entity. They become a significantly more dangerous entity when they are involved in some kind of conflict, real or imaginary.

KAL 107 was the most "justifiable" of their shoot-downs. The aircraft had violated Russian airspace. It was not on an "expected" track nor was it in contact with any Russian ATC. Of course, the Russian air defense did not attempt to contact the aircraft nor did the Russian pilot that shot it down attempt to contact the plane on 121.5. That by itself is inexcusable. The pilot that shot it down knew it was a 747, not an RC-135. He said that didn't matter, as any plane can be converted to a collection aircraft. Since it was night, he couldn't see it was a KAL flight. He was ordered to kill it, so he did (with some difficulty). Russia was about to conduct a missile test, and their failure to intercept KAL 107 initially was a major "black eye". The brass was in CYA mode.

The destruction of MH17 is difficult to figure out. It was not shot down by "regular" Russian air defense forces. There was no reason to believe the civilian flight could have been confused with any "threat" to ground forces. It was way too high. It is a mystery, really.

If in fact Russia shot down J2-8243, which at the moment seems probable, it was undoubtedly a total mixup by the Russian air defenses. When the voice recorder data becomes available it is probable we will know when the flight was in contact with Russian ATC. If it was before the shootdown, which it should have been, Russia has no excuse. We know Russia subsequently denied them permission to land, so it isn't that Russian ATC was non-existent. If a Ukrainian air attack arrived unexpectedly Russia should have immediately vectored all civilian traffic away from the area. If that was not done, it is on Russia that this plane was lost. That said, I would strongly recommend against getting anywhere near Russian air space these days. They are nervous, under pressure and poorly trained. Mistakes will be made.

The US also has made mistakes. The USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655 in 1988. The Vincennes had just had its helicopter shot at by Iranian vessels, so they were understandably a bit on edge. The IFF system of the Vincennes received a "short" mode 2 response from the aircraft that denied flight information normally present in civilian air traffic. This identified it as a probable military aircraft. The CIC subsequently (mistakenly) associated an intercept of an AUG-9 radar with the civilian aircraft. This convinced them it was indeed a "threat". The flight profile from a dual-use air base and the (erroneously described)descending flight toward Vincennes was consistent with an F-14 preparing to launch an anti-ship missile. The Vincennes and an accompanying destroyer both called on 243.0 and 121.5 MHz attempting to warn the aircraft away, but received no answer and the aircraft continued on course. They shot it down. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/17/acc...s-ukraine/ says a lot about it.

Why the aircraft ignored those calls will never be known. Mistakes were made on the Vincennes, but given the situation all parties should have been on high alert to avoid unintended consequences. Flying passenger aircraft over an area where vessels are shooting at each other is a recipe for disaster. Vincennes tried to get the aircraft to identify itself and change course. Neither happened.

Iran also recently (2020) shot down Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752. This erroneous shootdown was caused by very poor training of the Iranian personnel involved and the lack (once again) of civilian IFF capability on Russian missile systems. There was also no facility to "hand off" civilian arrivals and departures to the military. The Ukrainian aircraft was still transponding with ATC when hit by the missiles. Inexcusable. Equally inexcusable was not halting civilian flights when Iran had just struck US bases with cruise missiles and was expecting a response. The air defense network was on very high alert. The decision time for SHORD is very minimal. Mistakes can easily be made, even by well-trained crews, let alone guys who have never actually fired their missiles before. Civilian aircraft have no business in this environment.

[Goose]

really sad . . . Russia seems to be developing a pattern for shooting down civilian airliners.  I remember KAL 107 quite well back in 1983.   THis plus the Malasian flight and maybe more that I don't remember form a scary trend.   Crossing Russia is pretty useful to get to a lot of places given the massive landmass.

Russia is known to have serious command and control problems in their air defense system. Their personnel lack training and are therefore prone to mistakes. Their equipment lacks IFF equipment compatible with the civilian IFF systems. They are a dangerous entity. They become a significantly more dangerous entity when they are involved in some kind of conflict, real or imaginary.

KAL 107 was the most "justifiable" of their shoot-downs. The aircraft had violated Russian airspace. It was not on an "expected" track nor was it in contact with any Russian ATC. Of course, the Russian air defense did not attempt to contact the aircraft nor did the Russian pilot that shot it down attempt to contact the plane on 121.5. That by itself is inexcusable. The pilot that shot it down knew it was a 747, not an RC-135. He said that didn't matter, as any plane can be converted to a collection aircraft. Since it was night, he couldn't see it was a KAL flight. He was ordered to kill it, so he did (with some difficulty). Russia was about to conduct a missile test, and their failure to intercept KAL 107 initially was a major "black eye". The brass was in CYA mode.

The destruction of MH17 is difficult to figure out. It was not shot down by "regular" Russian air defense forces. There was no reason to believe the civilian flight could have been confused with any "threat" to ground forces. It was way too high. It is a mystery, really.

If in fact Russia shot down J2-8243, which at the moment seems probable, it was undoubtedly a total mixup by the Russian air defenses. When the voice recorder data becomes available it is probable we will know when the flight was in contact with Russian ATC. If it was before the shootdown, which it should have been, Russia has no excuse. We know Russia subsequently denied them permission to land, so it isn't that Russian ATC was non-existent. If a Ukrainian air attack arrived unexpectedly Russia should have immediately vectored all civilian traffic away from the area. If that was not done, it is on Russia that this plane was lost. That said, I would strongly recommend against getting anywhere near Russian air space these days. They are nervous, under pressure and poorly trained. Mistakes will be made.

The US also has made mistakes. The USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655 in 1988. The Vincennes had just had its helicopter shot at by Iranian vessels, so they were understandably a bit on edge. The IFF system of the Vincennes received a "short" mode 2 response from the aircraft that denied flight information normally present in civilian air traffic. This identified it as a probable military aircraft. The CIC subsequently (mistakenly) associated an intercept of an AUG-9 radar with the civilian aircraft. This convinced them it was indeed a "threat". The flight profile from a dual-use air base and the (erroneously described)descending flight toward Vincennes was consistent with an F-14 preparing to launch an anti-ship missile. The Vincennes and an accompanying destroyer both called on 243.0 and 121.5 MHz attempting to warn the aircraft away, but received no answer and the aircraft continued on course. They shot it down. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/17/acc...s-ukraine/ says a lot about it.

Why the aircraft ignored those calls will never be known. Mistakes were made on the Vincennes, but given the situation all parties should have been on high alert to avoid unintended consequences. Flying passenger aircraft over an area where vessels are shooting at each other is a recipe for disaster. Vincennes tried to get the aircraft to identify itself and change course. Neither happened.

Iran also recently (2020) shot down Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752. This erroneous shootdown was caused by very poor training of the Iranian personnel involved and the lack (once again) of civilian IFF capability on Russian missile systems. There was also no facility to "hand off" civilian arrivals and departures to the military. The Ukrainian aircraft was still transponding with ATC when hit by the missiles. Inexcusable. Equally inexcusable was not halting civilian flights when Iran had just struck US bases with cruise missiles and was expecting a response. The air defense network was on very high alert. The decision time for SHORD is very minimal. Mistakes can easily be made, even by well-trained crews, let alone guys who have never actually fired their missiles before. Civilian aircraft have no business in this environment.

[Mick]

1988 was the last time the American military inadvertently shot down a civilian jet, 36 years ago. For the Russians, it was the last 48 hours.

Given Goose's post, I have no confidence in the capability of our enemies to recognize civilian aircraft. Bad enough when it happens in wartime or to one of our allies. What will happen when Russia, Iran, China or North Korea "inadvertently" shoots downs an American civilian passenger jet? How will America react?

[Mick]

1988 was the last time the American military inadvertently shot down a civilian jet, 36 years ago. For the Russians, it was the last 48 hours.

Given Goose's post, I have no confidence in the capability of our enemies to recognize civilian aircraft. Bad enough when it happens in wartime or to one of our allies. What will happen when Russia, Iran, China or North Korea "inadvertently" shoots downs an American civilian passenger jet? How will America react?

[fullmetal]

Lloyd's List has an article out about the Eagle S
https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1151955/Rus...-equipment

It was outfitted with non-standard surveillance that allowed it to monitor NATO naval and air traffic.

The transmitting and receiving devices were used to record all radio frequencies, and upon reaching Russia were offloaded for analysis.

“They were monitoring all Nato naval ships and aircraft,” Lloyd’s List was told.

“They had all details on them. They were just matching their frequencies.

“Russians, Turkish, Indian radio officers were operating it.”

Eagle S also dropped “sensors-type devices” in the English Channel during a transit, they said.

They said no further equipment returned to the ship after it was offloaded for analysis, to their knowledge, but other devices were placed on another related tanker, Swiftsea Rider.

[fullmetal]

Lloyd's List has an article out about the Eagle S
https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1151955/Rus...-equipment

It was outfitted with non-standard surveillance that allowed it to monitor NATO naval and air traffic.

The transmitting and receiving devices were used to record all radio frequencies, and upon reaching Russia were offloaded for analysis.

“They were monitoring all Nato naval ships and aircraft,” Lloyd’s List was told.

“They had all details on them. They were just matching their frequencies.

“Russians, Turkish, Indian radio officers were operating it.”

Eagle S also dropped “sensors-type devices” in the English Channel during a transit, they said.

They said no further equipment returned to the ship after it was offloaded for analysis, to their knowledge, but other devices were placed on another related tanker, Swiftsea Rider.

[Goose]

Lloyd's List has an article out about the Eagle S
https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1151955/Rus...-equipment

It was outfitted with non-standard surveillance that allowed it to monitor NATO naval and air traffic.

The transmitting and receiving devices were used to record all radio frequencies, and upon reaching Russia were offloaded for analysis.

“They were monitoring all Nato naval ships and aircraft,” Lloyd’s List was told.

“They had all details on them. They were just matching their frequencies.

“Russians, Turkish, Indian radio officers were operating it.”

Eagle S also dropped “sensors-type devices” in the English Channel during a transit, they said.

They said no further equipment returned to the ship after it was offloaded for analysis, to their knowledge, but other devices were placed on another related tanker, Swiftsea Rider.

Nothing surprising about Russia using ostensibly commercial vessels for intelligence collection. What IS surprising is that they utilized a so-equipped vessel for "active measures" like ripping up power cables. Normally that would be avoided as such activity is much more prone to detection (and subsequent detention) than intelligence collection. Intelligence collectors are ideally unremarkable vessels just engaging in "normal commercial activities". Do NOTHING to call attention to yourselves. FWIW, "everybody" does the same.

Russia has forever maintained a fleet of "trawlers" that "fish" more in the ether than they do in the sea. Most of these ships are known AGIs. There is a joke about the one that sits off the mouth of Pearl Harbor. After the fall of the Soviet Union, it was recalled to Russia and not replaced. Eventually (like 15 years later) Russia dispatched a new "fishing vessel" to sit off the harbor. A US destroyer on the way into port signaled to it via flashing lamp "Glad you are back. It makes finding the channel entrance much easier" :-). For a look at the less clandestine Russian efforts look at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vishnya-cl...gence_ship https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yury_Ivano...gence_ship  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spy_ship

Both Russia and the US have in the past maintained various acknowledged intelligence collectors (AGIs). There were several types. The most "famous" ones were AGTRs named USS Oxford, USS Georgetown, USS Jamestown, USS Belmont and USS Liberty. The similar AEGRs were named USS Banner, USS Pueblo, and USS Long Beach. The AGs were USNS Private Jose F. Valdez, USNS Lt. James E. Robinson, and USNS Sgt. Joseph E. Muller. These later ships were somewhat more "deniable" as they had civilian crews.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technical_research_ship 

Pueblo was attacked and captured by North Korea. Liberty was attacked by Israeli warplanes and PT boats resulting in significant loss of life onboard. Nothing ever happened to Oxford, although she actually did a lot of important things for the country.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Pueblo_(AGER-2) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Liberty https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Oxford...ted_AGTR-1

[Goose]

Lloyd's List has an article out about the Eagle S
https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1151955/Rus...-equipment

It was outfitted with non-standard surveillance that allowed it to monitor NATO naval and air traffic.

The transmitting and receiving devices were used to record all radio frequencies, and upon reaching Russia were offloaded for analysis.

“They were monitoring all Nato naval ships and aircraft,” Lloyd’s List was told.

“They had all details on them. They were just matching their frequencies.

“Russians, Turkish, Indian radio officers were operating it.”

Eagle S also dropped “sensors-type devices” in the English Channel during a transit, they said.

They said no further equipment returned to the ship after it was offloaded for analysis, to their knowledge, but other devices were placed on another related tanker, Swiftsea Rider.

Nothing surprising about Russia using ostensibly commercial vessels for intelligence collection. What IS surprising is that they utilized a so-equipped vessel for "active measures" like ripping up power cables. Normally that would be avoided as such activity is much more prone to detection (and subsequent detention) than intelligence collection. Intelligence collectors are ideally unremarkable vessels just engaging in "normal commercial activities". Do NOTHING to call attention to yourselves. FWIW, "everybody" does the same.

Russia has forever maintained a fleet of "trawlers" that "fish" more in the ether than they do in the sea. Most of these ships are known AGIs. There is a joke about the one that sits off the mouth of Pearl Harbor. After the fall of the Soviet Union, it was recalled to Russia and not replaced. Eventually (like 15 years later) Russia dispatched a new "fishing vessel" to sit off the harbor. A US destroyer on the way into port signaled to it via flashing lamp "Glad you are back. It makes finding the channel entrance much easier" :-). For a look at the less clandestine Russian efforts look at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vishnya-cl...gence_ship https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yury_Ivano...gence_ship  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spy_ship

Both Russia and the US have in the past maintained various acknowledged intelligence collectors (AGIs). There were several types. The most "famous" ones were AGTRs named USS Oxford, USS Georgetown, USS Jamestown, USS Belmont and USS Liberty. The similar AEGRs were named USS Banner, USS Pueblo, and USS Long Beach. The AGs were USNS Private Jose F. Valdez, USNS Lt. James E. Robinson, and USNS Sgt. Joseph E. Muller. These later ships were somewhat more "deniable" as they had civilian crews.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technical_research_ship 

Pueblo was attacked and captured by North Korea. Liberty was attacked by Israeli warplanes and PT boats resulting in significant loss of life onboard. Nothing ever happened to Oxford, although she actually did a lot of important things for the country.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Pueblo_(AGER-2) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Liberty https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Oxford...ted_AGTR-1

[Mick]

I wonder if a credible internal threat to Putin will arise in 2025.

This guy was profiled in December, 2023, claiming he would march on Moscow and defeat Putin in 2024:

I'm warrior 'Caesar' leading army of anti-Putin partisans – Russia is ticking time bomb and we will detonate it in 2024 | The US Sun

Said the same thing in December, 2024...

I’m warrior ‘Caesar’ leading anti-Putin army inside Russia – we’ll make sure Vlad falls just like weak pal Assad in 2025 – The US Sun | The US Sun

[Mick]

I wonder if a credible internal threat to Putin will arise in 2025.

This guy was profiled in December, 2023, claiming he would march on Moscow and defeat Putin in 2024:

I'm warrior 'Caesar' leading army of anti-Putin partisans – Russia is ticking time bomb and we will detonate it in 2024 | The US Sun

Said the same thing in December, 2024...

I’m warrior ‘Caesar’ leading anti-Putin army inside Russia – we’ll make sure Vlad falls just like weak pal Assad in 2025 – The US Sun | The US Sun

[Goose]

I wonder if a credible internal threat to Putin will arise in 2025.

I very much doubt it. If Putin is swept away it will IMO be a "happening" where civil unrest and riots lead to paralysis of the central government. It will be somewhat like what happened to Gorbachev, where the coup to overthrow him failed but he faded into irrelevance. I don't believe a movement led by an individual is possible. Putin can kill the individual. He can't kill mass protest and the belief he can no longer rule effectively. If he falls "soon", which I doubt he will, it will be because of losing the public confidence that he is an "adequate" leader and the need for "something else".

[Goose]

I wonder if a credible internal threat to Putin will arise in 2025.

I very much doubt it. If Putin is swept away it will IMO be a "happening" where civil unrest and riots lead to paralysis of the central government. It will be somewhat like what happened to Gorbachev, where the coup to overthrow him failed but he faded into irrelevance. I don't believe a movement led by an individual is possible. Putin can kill the individual. He can't kill mass protest and the belief he can no longer rule effectively. If he falls "soon", which I doubt he will, it will be because of losing the public confidence that he is an "adequate" leader and the need for "something else".

[Goose]

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...a-attacks/

Hopefully this is wrong. Mechanized brigades have no business defending static objectives. Their strength is attacking weak points in the enemy lines and outflanking enemy advances. Putting them in the line to defend is NUTS! That is a leg infantry job. Don't waste your mobile reserve.

[Goose]

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...a-attacks/

Hopefully this is wrong. Mechanized brigades have no business defending static objectives. Their strength is attacking weak points in the enemy lines and outflanking enemy advances. Putting them in the line to defend is NUTS! That is a leg infantry job. Don't waste your mobile reserve.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/finla...28081.html

Russia is once again resorting to "brute force" rather than technology. Russia is known to have both ships and underwater craft designed to destroy seabed cables specifically in a "deniable" fashion. They can of course also destroy seabed pipelines but that isn't their "specialty". So far, these assets haven't been used. Normal commercial ships have been. Hopefully the Nordic countries and Poland will react by escorting each and every commercial ship of any size that will/has called in a Russian port and/or is a suspected part of the shadow fleet. If they so much as twitch, board and impound them. They are not registered in Russia so Russia has no standing to complain about such enforcement.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/finla...28081.html

Russia is once again resorting to "brute force" rather than technology. Russia is known to have both ships and underwater craft designed to destroy seabed cables specifically in a "deniable" fashion. They can of course also destroy seabed pipelines but that isn't their "specialty". So far, these assets haven't been used. Normal commercial ships have been. Hopefully the Nordic countries and Poland will react by escorting each and every commercial ship of any size that will/has called in a Russian port and/or is a suspected part of the shadow fleet. If they so much as twitch, board and impound them. They are not registered in Russia so Russia has no standing to complain about such enforcement.

[dabigv13]

Very cool video.

In a first, Ukrainian Group 13's Magura V5 USV downs Russian Mi-8 helicopter over the Black Sea last night

The Magura Sea Drone V5 is equipped with R73 short range infrared missiles, analogous to a Sidewinder missile. Ukraine continues to innovate new methods of combining legacy and novel weapons to good effect.

Had to watch a couple times to appreciate what's happening. The helicopter releases flares but to no avail, and you can see an explosion and the helicopter crashing into the sea.

https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1873995413998756134

[dabigv13]

Very cool video.

In a first, Ukrainian Group 13's Magura V5 USV downs Russian Mi-8 helicopter over the Black Sea last night

The Magura Sea Drone V5 is equipped with R73 short range infrared missiles, analogous to a Sidewinder missile. Ukraine continues to innovate new methods of combining legacy and novel weapons to good effect.

Had to watch a couple times to appreciate what's happening. The helicopter releases flares but to no avail, and you can see an explosion and the helicopter crashing into the sea.

https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1873995413998756134

[M T]

Had to watch a couple times to appreciate what's happening. The helicopter releases flares but to no avail, and you can see an explosion and the helicopter crashing into the sea.

The event took place near the western end of Crimea, in the Black Sea.

The first 10 seconds of action (to 0:23) shows what appears to be a fixed-wing aircraft firing on the drone.

If you're wondering about 1:14 to 1:32 of the video, the text indicates it is another missile clearly fired from the sea drone at another helicopter.  It is claimed that the second helicopter suffered fire damage but was able to return to base.  I can't tell whether we see the missile continue on past the helicopter, or we see a flare fired at about the time of impact.  I think the latter.

The first missile (the video doesn't show its launch) follows what appears to be a ballistic-type path (but powered the whole way), going up before coming down at the helicopter. The second missile follows a path that seems appropriate for a surface-to-air missile.

[M T]

Had to watch a couple times to appreciate what's happening. The helicopter releases flares but to no avail, and you can see an explosion and the helicopter crashing into the sea.

The event took place near the western end of Crimea, in the Black Sea.

The first 10 seconds of action (to 0:23) shows what appears to be a fixed-wing aircraft firing on the drone.

If you're wondering about 1:14 to 1:32 of the video, the text indicates it is another missile clearly fired from the sea drone at another helicopter.  It is claimed that the second helicopter suffered fire damage but was able to return to base.  I can't tell whether we see the missile continue on past the helicopter, or we see a flare fired at about the time of impact.  I think the latter.

The first missile (the video doesn't show its launch) follows what appears to be a ballistic-type path (but powered the whole way), going up before coming down at the helicopter. The second missile follows a path that seems appropriate for a surface-to-air missile.

[GK3]

Ultimately this is Yvonne’s call, but given the enormity of the situation, far be it for me to put the kibosh on the discussion, even though technically it is political.

If you are looking to a Stanford sports angle to it (aside from the analogies), there is this:

[tweet]https://twitter.com/looseshoulders/status/1497845117977182208?s=21[/tweet]

As for Putin, whether he wins or loses on the battlefield, he has already lost:
1) given Eastern European countries (plus Sweden and Finland) a strong rationale for joining NATO.
2) has exposed his army as a paper tiger
3) has done what US presidents going back three administrations have failed to do: get the European NATO allies to invest in defense
4) has convinced Europe to wean itself off Russian natural gas and will probably accelerate the transition from imported fossil fuels more generally
5) has devastated his country’s economy
6) has obliterated what was left of his reputation

It is heartbreaking that the Ukrainian people have suffered, and while I hope against hope that they repel the invaders, right now I am just praying that we can get to a cease fire to allow innocent civilians to evacuate.

BC

I'm not nearly as "optimistic" as you are regarding what this all has shown to date or what it will lead to in the future.
WAY too many wildcards, starting with the nut who invaded Ukraine - that's what a megalomaniac with absolute power (and no conscience) looks like.  Scary and unpredictable.

I don’t disagree with your take at all.  I think Putin has lost, but I don’t think that means that everything will turn out well for Western democracies.  In the best case scenario, it has brought misery and destruction to the Ukrainian people, a refugee crisis of 2 million and counting, a potential food crisis in countries that depend on Russian and Ukrainian wheat, higher energy prices for everyone and the potential of having to restart coal plants to make up for reduced gas.  And then there is the possibility of the conflict inadvertently widening, and even though I would consider this an unlikely event, that “megalomaniac with absolute power (and no conscience)” controls the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.

So, yeah, this qualifies as an L for everyone.

BC

I am hoping that Ukraine can hold out for at least another year, but it will take a lot of western help.  This article on the economic situation in Russia and how it is being handled is quite interesting.
https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eur...es?lang=en
  I found the recruiting bonuses and starting salaries for recruits mindboggling.  When they need 20,000 to 30,000 new recruits a month, the rising costs are going to be significant. It seems like they are robbing Peter to pay Paul.  With effectively no unemployment, every man who joins the Army becomes a man who won't be working in a factory supporting the war.  I was also unaware that Russia was becoming Xenophobic.  This may limit their ability to use their eastern, non Russian nationals to the extent they would like.  There is also the rising cost of care for the wounded and payments to families who lost a loved one. 
I agree on you comments on Megalomania and Absolute Power.  His economy could drive Putin to do something very stupid if the wheels start to come off in a big way.  Putin's actions will be studied lonog after he is gone by future generations of econ and poly sci students. Russia has also proven itself vulnerable to Ukraine's inventive use of drones and sabatoge to take out big ticket items that hurt the Russian war effort and cannot be easily replaced.  Unfortunately, Ukraine's own limitations are even worse than the ones Putin has to deal with.
The grain export declines this year could cause other problems.
https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insig...port-curbs

[GK3]

Ultimately this is Yvonne’s call, but given the enormity of the situation, far be it for me to put the kibosh on the discussion, even though technically it is political.

If you are looking to a Stanford sports angle to it (aside from the analogies), there is this:

[tweet]https://twitter.com/looseshoulders/status/1497845117977182208?s=21[/tweet]

As for Putin, whether he wins or loses on the battlefield, he has already lost:
1) given Eastern European countries (plus Sweden and Finland) a strong rationale for joining NATO.
2) has exposed his army as a paper tiger
3) has done what US presidents going back three administrations have failed to do: get the European NATO allies to invest in defense
4) has convinced Europe to wean itself off Russian natural gas and will probably accelerate the transition from imported fossil fuels more generally
5) has devastated his country’s economy
6) has obliterated what was left of his reputation

It is heartbreaking that the Ukrainian people have suffered, and while I hope against hope that they repel the invaders, right now I am just praying that we can get to a cease fire to allow innocent civilians to evacuate.

BC

I'm not nearly as "optimistic" as you are regarding what this all has shown to date or what it will lead to in the future.
WAY too many wildcards, starting with the nut who invaded Ukraine - that's what a megalomaniac with absolute power (and no conscience) looks like.  Scary and unpredictable.

I don’t disagree with your take at all.  I think Putin has lost, but I don’t think that means that everything will turn out well for Western democracies.  In the best case scenario, it has brought misery and destruction to the Ukrainian people, a refugee crisis of 2 million and counting, a potential food crisis in countries that depend on Russian and Ukrainian wheat, higher energy prices for everyone and the potential of having to restart coal plants to make up for reduced gas.  And then there is the possibility of the conflict inadvertently widening, and even though I would consider this an unlikely event, that “megalomaniac with absolute power (and no conscience)” controls the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.

So, yeah, this qualifies as an L for everyone.

BC

I am hoping that Ukraine can hold out for at least another year, but it will take a lot of western help.  This article on the economic situation in Russia and how it is being handled is quite interesting.
https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eur...es?lang=en
  I found the recruiting bonuses and starting salaries for recruits mindboggling.  When they need 20,000 to 30,000 new recruits a month, the rising costs are going to be significant. It seems like they are robbing Peter to pay Paul.  With effectively no unemployment, every man who joins the Army becomes a man who won't be working in a factory supporting the war.  I was also unaware that Russia was becoming Xenophobic.  This may limit their ability to use their eastern, non Russian nationals to the extent they would like.  There is also the rising cost of care for the wounded and payments to families who lost a loved one. 
I agree on you comments on Megalomania and Absolute Power.  His economy could drive Putin to do something very stupid if the wheels start to come off in a big way.  Putin's actions will be studied lonog after he is gone by future generations of econ and poly sci students. Russia has also proven itself vulnerable to Ukraine's inventive use of drones and sabatoge to take out big ticket items that hurt the Russian war effort and cannot be easily replaced.  Unfortunately, Ukraine's own limitations are even worse than the ones Putin has to deal with.
The grain export declines this year could cause other problems.
https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insig...port-curbs

[M T]

It's telling that this topic has gone on so long and that an early message here (March 2022) could be seen as a recent message.  (I also have clicked in the wrong spot and  brought up the first page of a topic, thinking it was the most recent page.)

What I wish for 2025 may not be realistic, but I hope Ukraine can survive longer than Putin does.

[M T]

It's telling that this topic has gone on so long and that an early message here (March 2022) could be seen as a recent message.  (I also have clicked in the wrong spot and  brought up the first page of a topic, thinking it was the most recent page.)

What I wish for 2025 may not be realistic, but I hope Ukraine can survive longer than Putin does.

[Goose]

I am hoping that Ukraine can hold out for at least another year, but it will take a lot of western help.

As are we all. The western help issue is complicated by the apparent intention of the US to obtain some kind of a negotiated cease-fire at a minimum. Zelenskyy is saying the same, more or less. Whether this is his preference, a policy change forced upon him by the situation inside Ukraine, or the belief he has no other choice due to US policy is unknown. Ukraine's ability to fight on another year is questionable. However, that won't matter if the US forces a "solution" of the war in the nearer term. Putin may just keep saying "Nyet"  until the US loses patience and gives him exactly what he wants. If Ukraine decides that will be the ultimate result, they probably will quit fighting before that happens. OTOH it is just possible that Putin will overplay his hand and cause the US to dig in their heels. Hope for the latter.

This article on the economic situation in Russia and how it is being handled is quite interesting.
https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eur...es?lang=en
I found the recruiting bonuses and starting salaries for recruits mindboggling.  When they need 20,000 to 30,000 new recruits a month, the rising costs are going to be significant. It seems like they are robbing Peter to pay Paul.  With effectively no unemployment, every man who joins the Army becomes a man who won't be working in a factory supporting the war.

Unfortunately the ability of western economists to predict what will happen in Russia is universally horrible. This was true back in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and is even more true today. Essentially nobody predicted the economic collapse at that time. Subsequent attempts to help Russia transition to a market economy led by said economists completely failed. Western economists don't understand the economics of "the center" that ran Russia during the Cold War and still does today. These economists shouldn't feel so bad as the Russians don't understand it either :-). Russia actually has several economies that interact but are largely independent of each other. The 19% inflation felt in Moscow or St. Petersburg largely doesn't exist in the rural areas.  There are so many subsidized industries operating in Russia that "normal" economic principals simply don't apply. This doesn't mean the Russian economy is "just fine". It does mean we don't understand it well enough to make reliable predictions. As the article rightly points out, Russia isn't even gathering and releasing the (unreliable) economic data it used to. Even if the economy was understood the lack of data makes forecasting its trajectory impossible.

I was also unaware that Russia was becoming Xenophobic.  This may limit their ability to use their eastern, non Russian nationals to the extent they would like. 

Russia has always been Xenophobic. The racial pecking order has always existed. Ukrainians, even though "fellow Slavs" were always to some degree second class citizens. Georgians are barbarians, making Stalin's rise to power a bit of a surprise. He reinforced the stereotype. If you aren't an "ethnic Russian", you are some kind of "untermensch". That however in no way inhibits the Russian ability to use these people as cannon fodder. Right now, Russia is using 10,000 Koreans (the ultimate "foreigners") to fight their battles.  There are more on the way. No problem at all.

There is also the rising cost of care for the wounded and payments to families who lost a loved one. 
I agree on you comments on Megalomania and Absolute Power.  His economy could drive Putin to do something very stupid if the wheels start to come off in a big way.  Putin's actions will be studied long after he is gone by future generations of econ and poly sci students. Russia has also proven itself vulnerable to Ukraine's inventive use of drones and sabatoge to take out big ticket items that hurt the Russian war effort and cannot be easily replaced.

Unfortunately those Ukrainian successes, while in some cases quite significant, have not yet proven adequate to stop Russia. The destruction of Russian logistics, particularly the large ammunition dumps, has helped. It is not near enough.

Unfortunately, Ukraine's own limitations are even worse than the ones Putin has to deal with.
The grain export declines this year could cause other problems.
https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insig...port-curbs

Ukraine does indeed have its own problems. IMO the biggest one right now is the concern that the US is going to throw them under the bus in negotiations. My fear is that Putin will insist on sanctions relief (and asset unfreezing) to even start talking. Putin is certainly under pressure as the article cited indicates. He may not be able to survive it. We don't really know if and when it will "get him", but it is a factor. If however this pressure is significantly reduced, his odds get a lot better. He can now stall and wait for his troops to swallow the rest of Ukraine (possibly at great human cost) or for Ukraine to collapse. That is the scenario I think Zelenskyy and the rest of Ukraine greatly fears.

[Goose]

I am hoping that Ukraine can hold out for at least another year, but it will take a lot of western help.

As are we all. The western help issue is complicated by the apparent intention of the US to obtain some kind of a negotiated cease-fire at a minimum. Zelenskyy is saying the same, more or less. Whether this is his preference, a policy change forced upon him by the situation inside Ukraine, or the belief he has no other choice due to US policy is unknown. Ukraine's ability to fight on another year is questionable. However, that won't matter if the US forces a "solution" of the war in the nearer term. Putin may just keep saying "Nyet"  until the US loses patience and gives him exactly what he wants. If Ukraine decides that will be the ultimate result, they probably will quit fighting before that happens. OTOH it is just possible that Putin will overplay his hand and cause the US to dig in their heels. Hope for the latter.

This article on the economic situation in Russia and how it is being handled is quite interesting.
https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eur...es?lang=en
I found the recruiting bonuses and starting salaries for recruits mindboggling.  When they need 20,000 to 30,000 new recruits a month, the rising costs are going to be significant. It seems like they are robbing Peter to pay Paul.  With effectively no unemployment, every man who joins the Army becomes a man who won't be working in a factory supporting the war.

Unfortunately the ability of western economists to predict what will happen in Russia is universally horrible. This was true back in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and is even more true today. Essentially nobody predicted the economic collapse at that time. Subsequent attempts to help Russia transition to a market economy led by said economists completely failed. Western economists don't understand the economics of "the center" that ran Russia during the Cold War and still does today. These economists shouldn't feel so bad as the Russians don't understand it either :-). Russia actually has several economies that interact but are largely independent of each other. The 19% inflation felt in Moscow or St. Petersburg largely doesn't exist in the rural areas.  There are so many subsidized industries operating in Russia that "normal" economic principals simply don't apply. This doesn't mean the Russian economy is "just fine". It does mean we don't understand it well enough to make reliable predictions. As the article rightly points out, Russia isn't even gathering and releasing the (unreliable) economic data it used to. Even if the economy was understood the lack of data makes forecasting its trajectory impossible.

I was also unaware that Russia was becoming Xenophobic.  This may limit their ability to use their eastern, non Russian nationals to the extent they would like. 

Russia has always been Xenophobic. The racial pecking order has always existed. Ukrainians, even though "fellow Slavs" were always to some degree second class citizens. Georgians are barbarians, making Stalin's rise to power a bit of a surprise. He reinforced the stereotype. If you aren't an "ethnic Russian", you are some kind of "untermensch". That however in no way inhibits the Russian ability to use these people as cannon fodder. Right now, Russia is using 10,000 Koreans (the ultimate "foreigners") to fight their battles.  There are more on the way. No problem at all.

There is also the rising cost of care for the wounded and payments to families who lost a loved one. 
I agree on you comments on Megalomania and Absolute Power.  His economy could drive Putin to do something very stupid if the wheels start to come off in a big way.  Putin's actions will be studied long after he is gone by future generations of econ and poly sci students. Russia has also proven itself vulnerable to Ukraine's inventive use of drones and sabatoge to take out big ticket items that hurt the Russian war effort and cannot be easily replaced.

Unfortunately those Ukrainian successes, while in some cases quite significant, have not yet proven adequate to stop Russia. The destruction of Russian logistics, particularly the large ammunition dumps, has helped. It is not near enough.

Unfortunately, Ukraine's own limitations are even worse than the ones Putin has to deal with.
The grain export declines this year could cause other problems.
https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insig...port-curbs

Ukraine does indeed have its own problems. IMO the biggest one right now is the concern that the US is going to throw them under the bus in negotiations. My fear is that Putin will insist on sanctions relief (and asset unfreezing) to even start talking. Putin is certainly under pressure as the article cited indicates. He may not be able to survive it. We don't really know if and when it will "get him", but it is a factor. If however this pressure is significantly reduced, his odds get a lot better. He can now stall and wait for his troops to swallow the rest of Ukraine (possibly at great human cost) or for Ukraine to collapse. That is the scenario I think Zelenskyy and the rest of Ukraine greatly fears.

[M T]

Another complication for Ukraine, and maybe some impact on Russia
    Ukraine to end transit of Russian gas into Europe

Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are to end on Wednesday, when a five-year deal between Ukraine's gas transit operator Naftogaz and Russia's Gazprom expires.
...a number of eastern [EU] member states still depend largely on the supplies, making Russia about €5bn ($5.2bn; £4.2bn) a year.
On Friday, Slovakia's Prime Minister Robert Fico - who had just made a surprise visit to Moscow for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin - threatened to stop the supply of electricity to Ukraine.
Poland has offered to support Kyiv in case Slovakia cuts off its electricity exports - supplies that are crucial to Ukraine, whose power plants come under regular attack from Russia.
Moldova - which is not part of the EU - could be seriously affected by the end of the transit agreement.
Once the Ukrainian transit route is cut off, the Black Sea's TurkStream - which reaches Turkey, Hungary and Serbia - will be the only Russian gas supply to European countries.

[M T]

Another complication for Ukraine, and maybe some impact on Russia
    Ukraine to end transit of Russian gas into Europe

Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are to end on Wednesday, when a five-year deal between Ukraine's gas transit operator Naftogaz and Russia's Gazprom expires.
...a number of eastern [EU] member states still depend largely on the supplies, making Russia about €5bn ($5.2bn; £4.2bn) a year.
On Friday, Slovakia's Prime Minister Robert Fico - who had just made a surprise visit to Moscow for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin - threatened to stop the supply of electricity to Ukraine.
Poland has offered to support Kyiv in case Slovakia cuts off its electricity exports - supplies that are crucial to Ukraine, whose power plants come under regular attack from Russia.
Moldova - which is not part of the EU - could be seriously affected by the end of the transit agreement.
Once the Ukrainian transit route is cut off, the Black Sea's TurkStream - which reaches Turkey, Hungary and Serbia - will be the only Russian gas supply to European countries.

[Goose]

New Year GPS Jamming Special

OK, there is now certainly enough of this stuff in the public domain that I feel it can be discussed without me getting in any "trouble" :-). Some of this "technology" was always so blindingly obvious it was never classified. Other parts of it was classified, and still is. In some cases some of the classified part has been publicly exposed, but that doesn't mean one can talk about it with impunity.

The GPS used in your phone or on a small recreational drone obviously is not fitted with anti-jam technology. Neither are most commercial aircraft, although the ability to detect jamming is becoming much more common. These GPS receivers are also designed under the assumption that the GPS signals will always be relatively weak. Typically the signal is -125 (or so) dBm in a 2.046 MHz bandwidth. It will never, ever be much stronger than that. The thermal noise in that bandwidth is -111 dBm, so the signal is actually buried in the noise. GPS "works" because the signal structure "code" allows sophisticated correlation detection of the signal. This "processing gain" of 43 dB theoretically allows a GPS receiver to work with a received power of -154 dBm. These receivers are not designed for and cannot tolerate very strong signals at their inputs. There shouldn't be any, because the GPS bands are reserved for that purpose alone. The GPS receiver will deeply saturate and suppress the much weaker GPS signals if a "strong" signal arrives at its antenna. The "weakest link" in the receiver is almost always the RF preamplifier. Most "commercial grade" GPS allow the use of an external antenna and preamplifier.

Step 1 in revealing GPS anti-jam technology available today is to look at https://www.everythingrf.com/search/anti...ands=;GPS;. This link contains many "anti-jam" products, clearly demonstrating the capability exists.

The most obvious anti-jam technology available rests on the the fact that the GPS satellites are in orbit well above the surface of the earth while jammers are almost exclusively located on the surface of the earth. If the external GPS antenna is built to ignore signals arriving from "low" elevation angles it will resist jammers operating on the surface of the earth. Quoting a link (https://www.tallysman.com/app/uploads/20...N-v3.0.pdf) from the above article

GNSS jammers are becoming a threat to successful satellite tracking, even though they are illegal in many jurisdictions. Jammers are indiscriminate. They prevent the reception of wanted GNSS signals by emitting strong electronic “noise” in the same frequency band as the GNSS signals. The result is the LNA (low noise amplifier) in the GNSS antenna saturates; resulting in no signal being passed to the GNSS receiver. Tallysman’s solution to this is to provide an AJ option to its single band Accutenna® TW3000 family of antennas. This option modifies the radiation pattern of the GNSS antenna such that it is “deaf” to signals arriving from and elevation angle of -10° to +15° from the horizon while slightly increasing the gain of the antenna at zenith. Since jamming signals typically originate at low elevations, using a Tallysman AJ antenna mitigates a significant portion of jamming signals.

Many other vendors make similar antennas. The Safran offering includes a preamplifier with high dynamic range which will not saturate nearly as easily as the ones provided in the "common" commercial GPS antennas. This approach works well against many types of jamming. It works less well against "spoofing" as spoofing does not rely on preamplifier saturation. There are other issues. One is that in some situation one or more GPS satellites in the available constellation will be at or near the horizon. This is ALWAYS the case at "high" latitudes. Ukraine doesn't have that problem. The other is that while the antenna is "deaf" at low angles, it isn't "stone deaf". If the jammer is strong enough or you are "close enough" it can still be a problem. In the vast majority of the cases, this approach will "work".    

The other (and inherently more capable) approach rests upon adaptive antenna technology. The Stanford connection is Prof. Bernard Widrow (https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/1448022) and John Treichler (https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADB019329.pdf plus other). This obviously isn't new. Technology exists, and has existed since the early 1990s to build effectively "jam proof" GPS receivers. In the intervening years the technology has become relatively inexpensive. The technology has been kept somewhat "quiet" but that was never a absolutely the case. The link https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Controlled...rn_antenna contains links that date to 2017. The brief nature of this link indicates that it wasn't considered "OK" until recently to talk much about it. The link https://www.gpsworld.com/anti-jam-techno...-the-crpa/ talks about the history and the "state of the art" back in the late 1990s/early 2000s. Equipment existed that worked very well and could easily be fitted to aircraft. It was too large and too expensive to be fitted to JDAMs delivered in circa 1998 however.

Looking at the everythingrf.com link one sees many quite compact units for sale. One of the Raytheon offerings is outlined here. https://www.rtx.com/news/news-center/202...erythingRF.
The date is July 2023. Another "interesting" offering is from infiniDome (https://infinidome.com/), an Israeli company. This URL is worth a look. Two years ago this company was somewhat widely advertising their products. Then crickets. I think they got their hand slapped by somebody. Obviously they are back, and obviously they have a product that has been used on lots of UAVs.

From all of the above it is pretty clear that UAVs of any significant range that need GPS can be easily equipped to be very difficult to jam. I seriously wonder about what is actually going on in Ukraine. I can believe that JDAMs were not originally built to operate in a contested EW environment. I can't believe Ukrainian drones that are not "line of sight" controlled (and thus need GPS to fly home) are not equipped to do so.

There is a lot more to all of this. With a two-channel adaptive antenna it is quite easy to determine the relative angle between a jamming signal and a UAV. The UAV can adjust its heading until the jamming signal is at 0 degrees, right on the nose of the UAV. By switching to a third antenna periodically (or "waggling" up and down like Wild Weasels did before a Shrike launch) an estimate of the declination angle can be obtained. When that angle becomes 45 degrees or so, the UAV can fly right down the beam and destroy the jammer. You can use a PLUTO+ SDR to do exactly that. It costs 199.39 on Amazon. Two small 1/4 wavelength (4.94 cm) vertical antennas mounted upside-down will work just fine and cost very little. Ukraine obviously has the technical skill to do this. It isn't even "hard", especially compared to some of the things they ARE doing. If jamming is so ubiquitous, why are they not?

[Goose]

New Year GPS Jamming Special

OK, there is now certainly enough of this stuff in the public domain that I feel it can be discussed without me getting in any "trouble" :-). Some of this "technology" was always so blindingly obvious it was never classified. Other parts of it was classified, and still is. In some cases some of the classified part has been publicly exposed, but that doesn't mean one can talk about it with impunity.

The GPS used in your phone or on a small recreational drone obviously is not fitted with anti-jam technology. Neither are most commercial aircraft, although the ability to detect jamming is becoming much more common. These GPS receivers are also designed under the assumption that the GPS signals will always be relatively weak. Typically the signal is -125 (or so) dBm in a 2.046 MHz bandwidth. It will never, ever be much stronger than that. The thermal noise in that bandwidth is -111 dBm, so the signal is actually buried in the noise. GPS "works" because the signal structure "code" allows sophisticated correlation detection of the signal. This "processing gain" of 43 dB theoretically allows a GPS receiver to work with a received power of -154 dBm. These receivers are not designed for and cannot tolerate very strong signals at their inputs. There shouldn't be any, because the GPS bands are reserved for that purpose alone. The GPS receiver will deeply saturate and suppress the much weaker GPS signals if a "strong" signal arrives at its antenna. The "weakest link" in the receiver is almost always the RF preamplifier. Most "commercial grade" GPS allow the use of an external antenna and preamplifier.

Step 1 in revealing GPS anti-jam technology available today is to look at https://www.everythingrf.com/search/anti...ands=;GPS;. This link contains many "anti-jam" products, clearly demonstrating the capability exists.

The most obvious anti-jam technology available rests on the the fact that the GPS satellites are in orbit well above the surface of the earth while jammers are almost exclusively located on the surface of the earth. If the external GPS antenna is built to ignore signals arriving from "low" elevation angles it will resist jammers operating on the surface of the earth. Quoting a link (https://www.tallysman.com/app/uploads/20...N-v3.0.pdf) from the above article

GNSS jammers are becoming a threat to successful satellite tracking, even though they are illegal in many jurisdictions. Jammers are indiscriminate. They prevent the reception of wanted GNSS signals by emitting strong electronic “noise” in the same frequency band as the GNSS signals. The result is the LNA (low noise amplifier) in the GNSS antenna saturates; resulting in no signal being passed to the GNSS receiver. Tallysman’s solution to this is to provide an AJ option to its single band Accutenna® TW3000 family of antennas. This option modifies the radiation pattern of the GNSS antenna such that it is “deaf” to signals arriving from and elevation angle of -10° to +15° from the horizon while slightly increasing the gain of the antenna at zenith. Since jamming signals typically originate at low elevations, using a Tallysman AJ antenna mitigates a significant portion of jamming signals.

Many other vendors make similar antennas. The Safran offering includes a preamplifier with high dynamic range which will not saturate nearly as easily as the ones provided in the "common" commercial GPS antennas. This approach works well against many types of jamming. It works less well against "spoofing" as spoofing does not rely on preamplifier saturation. There are other issues. One is that in some situation one or more GPS satellites in the available constellation will be at or near the horizon. This is ALWAYS the case at "high" latitudes. Ukraine doesn't have that problem. The other is that while the antenna is "deaf" at low angles, it isn't "stone deaf". If the jammer is strong enough or you are "close enough" it can still be a problem. In the vast majority of the cases, this approach will "work".    

The other (and inherently more capable) approach rests upon adaptive antenna technology. The Stanford connection is Prof. Bernard Widrow (https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/1448022) and John Treichler (https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADB019329.pdf plus other). This obviously isn't new. Technology exists, and has existed since the early 1990s to build effectively "jam proof" GPS receivers. In the intervening years the technology has become relatively inexpensive. The technology has been kept somewhat "quiet" but that was never a absolutely the case. The link https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Controlled...rn_antenna contains links that date to 2017. The brief nature of this link indicates that it wasn't considered "OK" until recently to talk much about it. The link https://www.gpsworld.com/anti-jam-techno...-the-crpa/ talks about the history and the "state of the art" back in the late 1990s/early 2000s. Equipment existed that worked very well and could easily be fitted to aircraft. It was too large and too expensive to be fitted to JDAMs delivered in circa 1998 however.

Looking at the everythingrf.com link one sees many quite compact units for sale. One of the Raytheon offerings is outlined here. https://www.rtx.com/news/news-center/202...erythingRF.
The date is July 2023. Another "interesting" offering is from infiniDome (https://infinidome.com/), an Israeli company. This URL is worth a look. Two years ago this company was somewhat widely advertising their products. Then crickets. I think they got their hand slapped by somebody. Obviously they are back, and obviously they have a product that has been used on lots of UAVs.

From all of the above it is pretty clear that UAVs of any significant range that need GPS can be easily equipped to be very difficult to jam. I seriously wonder about what is actually going on in Ukraine. I can believe that JDAMs were not originally built to operate in a contested EW environment. I can't believe Ukrainian drones that are not "line of sight" controlled (and thus need GPS to fly home) are not equipped to do so.

There is a lot more to all of this. With a two-channel adaptive antenna it is quite easy to determine the relative angle between a jamming signal and a UAV. The UAV can adjust its heading until the jamming signal is at 0 degrees, right on the nose of the UAV. By switching to a third antenna periodically (or "waggling" up and down like Wild Weasels did before a Shrike launch) an estimate of the declination angle can be obtained. When that angle becomes 45 degrees or so, the UAV can fly right down the beam and destroy the jammer. You can use a PLUTO+ SDR to do exactly that. It costs 199.39 on Amazon. Two small 1/4 wavelength (4.94 cm) vertical antennas mounted upside-down will work just fine and cost very little. Ukraine obviously has the technical skill to do this. It isn't even "hard", especially compared to some of the things they ARE doing. If jamming is so ubiquitous, why are they not?

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-sol...40547.html

In so far as this is an accurate description, it is an indication of Ukraine becoming militarily dysfunctional. Creating a new formation from scratch from inexperienced personnel is always difficult. Doing so without a cadre of experienced officers and NCOs is pretty much impossible. The number of AWOL troops at the beginning should have been a massive red flag. No way this problem should have remained unaddressed during the training. Further, the more "normal" methodology of providing reconnaissance would be to attach a drone specialty formation to the brigade. Expecting the brigade to buy and train an organic drone unit while being deployed into battle is clearly insane.

Most importantly, why would anyone send an armored brigade (especially an "unblooded" one) into an infantry fight? What are they supposed to do? If Russia was using a large armored force itself, it might make some sense, but an armored force isn't designed to stop "meat attacks". It can remain in reserve to plug gaps and exploit opportunities, but putting it into the "line" would just make all its vehicles targets. Ukraine doesn't need this kind  of nonsense. It is a very "Russian" thing to do. Breaking the unit up and dispersing its troops into existing formations obviously renders them what the original formations were. Infantry. Should have been done the minute AWOL problems started in France.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-sol...40547.html

In so far as this is an accurate description, it is an indication of Ukraine becoming militarily dysfunctional. Creating a new formation from scratch from inexperienced personnel is always difficult. Doing so without a cadre of experienced officers and NCOs is pretty much impossible. The number of AWOL troops at the beginning should have been a massive red flag. No way this problem should have remained unaddressed during the training. Further, the more "normal" methodology of providing reconnaissance would be to attach a drone specialty formation to the brigade. Expecting the brigade to buy and train an organic drone unit while being deployed into battle is clearly insane.

Most importantly, why would anyone send an armored brigade (especially an "unblooded" one) into an infantry fight? What are they supposed to do? If Russia was using a large armored force itself, it might make some sense, but an armored force isn't designed to stop "meat attacks". It can remain in reserve to plug gaps and exploit opportunities, but putting it into the "line" would just make all its vehicles targets. Ukraine doesn't need this kind  of nonsense. It is a very "Russian" thing to do. Breaking the unit up and dispersing its troops into existing formations obviously renders them what the original formations were. Infantry. Should have been done the minute AWOL problems started in France.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-su-...13866.html

IMO a really good article, particularly the historical aspects of it. FWIW, the pilot being interviewed indicates the JDAM-ERs and SDBs are working well in the current EW scenario. So, what is true? Is Russia successfully jamming GPS everywhere or have we developed effective countermeasures? I have no idea.

IMO the main "takeaway" from the article is this:

Viking says, referring to the need for beyond-visual-range missiles to target the aircraft launching the glide bombs.
“Without all these means, if the Russians continue to throw glide bombs, then the consequences will be terrible, they will simply squeeze us out, no matter how incredible our infantry is.”

The Russian glide bomb problem became one of the main arguments for accelerating Ukrainian F-16 deliveries, although it remains to be seen how effective these might be in pushing back the Russian jets launching glide bombs from across the border.

Indeed. It also appears it will "remain to be seen" as there simply aren't enough F-16s with trained pilots ready to take on the mission. The article also states:

Despite limited F-16 deliveries so far and continued losses to the Soviet-era fleet of tactical jets, Viking says there is no shortage of trained manpower or aircraft at this point. Instead, what the Ukrainian Air Force lacks is air-launched weapons.

This is obviously nonsense. The F-16s delivered to Ukraine carry the AIM-120D AMRAAM. We know this because there are photos of Ukrainian F-16s carrying that missile and the US has stated it was supplied. If they had "enough" operational F-16s and pilots, they wouldn't lack air-launched BVR weapons.

The first quote references "across the border". This statement isn't literally accurate. The correct statement would be "from Russian controlled airspace". The Russia-Ukraine border is relevant only in so far as Russia assuredly controls the airspace on their side of that border, at least in most places :-). Obviously that is not true in parts of Kursk :-). Similarly, Russia controls the airspace in occupied Ukrainian territory. Their aircraft can launch glide weapons from these "sanctuaries". AMRAAMs can take away 90 miles of that airspace, which is "enough" to stop the glide bombs from reaching Ukrainian lines. Unfortunately, we aren't seeing this even attempted.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-su-...13866.html

IMO a really good article, particularly the historical aspects of it. FWIW, the pilot being interviewed indicates the JDAM-ERs and SDBs are working well in the current EW scenario. So, what is true? Is Russia successfully jamming GPS everywhere or have we developed effective countermeasures? I have no idea.

IMO the main "takeaway" from the article is this:

Viking says, referring to the need for beyond-visual-range missiles to target the aircraft launching the glide bombs.
“Without all these means, if the Russians continue to throw glide bombs, then the consequences will be terrible, they will simply squeeze us out, no matter how incredible our infantry is.”

The Russian glide bomb problem became one of the main arguments for accelerating Ukrainian F-16 deliveries, although it remains to be seen how effective these might be in pushing back the Russian jets launching glide bombs from across the border.

Indeed. It also appears it will "remain to be seen" as there simply aren't enough F-16s with trained pilots ready to take on the mission. The article also states:

Despite limited F-16 deliveries so far and continued losses to the Soviet-era fleet of tactical jets, Viking says there is no shortage of trained manpower or aircraft at this point. Instead, what the Ukrainian Air Force lacks is air-launched weapons.

This is obviously nonsense. The F-16s delivered to Ukraine carry the AIM-120D AMRAAM. We know this because there are photos of Ukrainian F-16s carrying that missile and the US has stated it was supplied. If they had "enough" operational F-16s and pilots, they wouldn't lack air-launched BVR weapons.

The first quote references "across the border". This statement isn't literally accurate. The correct statement would be "from Russian controlled airspace". The Russia-Ukraine border is relevant only in so far as Russia assuredly controls the airspace on their side of that border, at least in most places :-). Obviously that is not true in parts of Kursk :-). Similarly, Russia controls the airspace in occupied Ukrainian territory. Their aircraft can launch glide weapons from these "sanctuaries". AMRAAMs can take away 90 miles of that airspace, which is "enough" to stop the glide bombs from reaching Ukrainian lines. Unfortunately, we aren't seeing this even attempted.

[dabigv13]

Russian glide bomb attacks have been down significantly over the past couple months. Some have posited that the more open targeting for ATACMS and Storm Shadows pushed Russian fighters back further thus increasing logistical burden. It could be the risk of F16s with BVR missiles may be a component as well. VKS has been pretty risk averse since the opening days of the war.

[dabigv13]

Russian glide bomb attacks have been down significantly over the past couple months. Some have posited that the more open targeting for ATACMS and Storm Shadows pushed Russian fighters back further thus increasing logistical burden. It could be the risk of F16s with BVR missiles may be a component as well. VKS has been pretty risk averse since the opening days of the war.