[Goose]

Russian glide bomb attacks have been down significantly over the past couple months. Some have posited that the more open targeting for ATACMS and Storm Shadows pushed Russian fighters back further thus increasing logistical burden. It could be the risk of F16s with BVR missiles may be a component as well. VKS has been pretty risk averse since the opening days of the war.

You are absolutely right about the VKS being pretty risk averse. That could be a part of it. I am guessing that the weather is playing a major role in this. The Russia aircraft are supposed to be "all weather capable" but in reality that is a bit questionable. The troops are known for drinking the ethanol used as anti-freeze/anti-icing for example :-). At the very least availability goes down because ground support is much more difficult. You simply can't work outside and hanger space is limited. You also can't fly with any of your IFR gear not working. When the weather is good, you can. You also cannot reliably operate using airports that don't have IFR capability. Lots of the Russian "alternates" are in this category.

[Goose]

Russian glide bomb attacks have been down significantly over the past couple months. Some have posited that the more open targeting for ATACMS and Storm Shadows pushed Russian fighters back further thus increasing logistical burden. It could be the risk of F16s with BVR missiles may be a component as well. VKS has been pretty risk averse since the opening days of the war.

You are absolutely right about the VKS being pretty risk averse. That could be a part of it. I am guessing that the weather is playing a major role in this. The Russia aircraft are supposed to be "all weather capable" but in reality that is a bit questionable. The troops are known for drinking the ethanol used as anti-freeze/anti-icing for example :-). At the very least availability goes down because ground support is much more difficult. You simply can't work outside and hanger space is limited. You also can't fly with any of your IFR gear not working. When the weather is good, you can. You also cannot reliably operate using airports that don't have IFR capability. Lots of the Russian "alternates" are in this category.

[fullmetal]

Back to the electronic warfare topic, both Russia and Ukraine are now deploying drones controlled through fiber optic threads rather than jammable radio frequencies.

https://www.spotterglobal.com/es_AR/blog...ct-them-12

[fullmetal]

Back to the electronic warfare topic, both Russia and Ukraine are now deploying drones controlled through fiber optic threads rather than jammable radio frequencies.

https://www.spotterglobal.com/es_AR/blog...ct-them-12

[Goose]

Back to the electronic warfare topic, both Russia and Ukraine are now deploying drones controlled through fiber optic threads rather than jammable radio frequencies.

https://www.spotterglobal.com/es_AR/blog...ct-them-12

What is old is new again. Same technology as "wire-guided" torpedoes. For quite some years these "wires" have been fiber optics. The same patent covers missiles. https://patents.google.com/patent/EP2107332A1/en. In water of course, electromagnetic waves are not an option. These "tethered" (albeit by a very long tether) have the advantage that they can't be jammed and their video can't be intercepted by the enemy. They have several disadvantages however. The article lists some of them.

It is necessary to realize that the idea of having a very long spool of fiber optic cable at the launch site that the drone unrolls doesn't work. The spool has to be on the drone. That is an unavoidable weight penalty that limits the range of the drone. There is also a real problem with drone maneuverability and speed. The drone can only go as fast as the cable can unwind. At high speeds this is tricky. It is "doable" but requires very good manufacturing techniques on the spool. Just rolling them by hand isn't going to work for a high-performance drone :-).

Second, the drone will have trouble maneuvering because the cable unspooling  has to change direction as well. This often leads to the cable getting "hung up" and jammed in the unspooling gear. There is another very important point the article does not mention. Fiber optic cables are very strong and quite resistant to force along their "long" axis. However, they shatter very easily when their minimum bend radius is not honored. Those of you that have a fiber optic internet may wonder why those rather large boxes are used for the junctions in your cable. This is the reason. AT&T wants a 4 inch bend radius. This situation can easily be violated if the drone turns 90 degrees and the cable gets caught in a twig or similar. Imagine it flying a grid search. It will be fine as long as there are no sharp turns!

[Goose]

Back to the electronic warfare topic, both Russia and Ukraine are now deploying drones controlled through fiber optic threads rather than jammable radio frequencies.

https://www.spotterglobal.com/es_AR/blog...ct-them-12

What is old is new again. Same technology as "wire-guided" torpedoes. For quite some years these "wires" have been fiber optics. The same patent covers missiles. https://patents.google.com/patent/EP2107332A1/en. In water of course, electromagnetic waves are not an option. These "tethered" (albeit by a very long tether) have the advantage that they can't be jammed and their video can't be intercepted by the enemy. They have several disadvantages however. The article lists some of them.

It is necessary to realize that the idea of having a very long spool of fiber optic cable at the launch site that the drone unrolls doesn't work. The spool has to be on the drone. That is an unavoidable weight penalty that limits the range of the drone. There is also a real problem with drone maneuverability and speed. The drone can only go as fast as the cable can unwind. At high speeds this is tricky. It is "doable" but requires very good manufacturing techniques on the spool. Just rolling them by hand isn't going to work for a high-performance drone :-).

Second, the drone will have trouble maneuvering because the cable unspooling  has to change direction as well. This often leads to the cable getting "hung up" and jammed in the unspooling gear. There is another very important point the article does not mention. Fiber optic cables are very strong and quite resistant to force along their "long" axis. However, they shatter very easily when their minimum bend radius is not honored. Those of you that have a fiber optic internet may wonder why those rather large boxes are used for the junctions in your cable. This is the reason. AT&T wants a 4 inch bend radius. This situation can easily be violated if the drone turns 90 degrees and the cable gets caught in a twig or similar. Imagine it flying a grid search. It will be fine as long as there are no sharp turns!

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-dron...16890.html

It would appear Ukraine has severely restricted the Russian use of "drones" in their latest offensive by jamming their control and video links. This situation highlights one difference between Ukraine's drones and Russia's drones. While both sides rely to some extent on "commercial" FPV drones, Ukraine makes a much wider use of them. Russia has its "military grade" drones, such as the Orlan 10 and Orlan 30. https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/2024/04/18/ru...ed-system/. These Russian systems all share a design and therefore share vulnerabilities. If Ukraine can exploit a weakness in these systems and exploit it by jamming, all of them will go down at the same time. It appears that is what is happening.

Commercial drones often share similar control systems and RF protocols. However, there are many variations that by sheer dumb luck may be immune or less affected by a particular jamming approach. Commercial drones are also more easily modified because their systems are public domain (usually) and quite modular. Ukraine has shown the ability to "re-purpose" such drones and some ability to build their own drone variants. Ukraine can respond more flexibly to EW by Russia than visa-versa.

On a slightly different subject, IMO we need to be aware that the word "drone" covers a very diverse set of vehicles of vastly differing size, range, speed, altitude restrictions, payload capacity, and intended missions. A Shahed  136, an Orlan 30, a Bayraktar TB2, a Mavic 3, and a Maverick missile are all "drones" in some sense of the word. EW that "works" against some of them may do nothing on others. Many published articles make statements about "drones" that only apply to a subclass of such vehicles.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-dron...16890.html

It would appear Ukraine has severely restricted the Russian use of "drones" in their latest offensive by jamming their control and video links. This situation highlights one difference between Ukraine's drones and Russia's drones. While both sides rely to some extent on "commercial" FPV drones, Ukraine makes a much wider use of them. Russia has its "military grade" drones, such as the Orlan 10 and Orlan 30. https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/2024/04/18/ru...ed-system/. These Russian systems all share a design and therefore share vulnerabilities. If Ukraine can exploit a weakness in these systems and exploit it by jamming, all of them will go down at the same time. It appears that is what is happening.

Commercial drones often share similar control systems and RF protocols. However, there are many variations that by sheer dumb luck may be immune or less affected by a particular jamming approach. Commercial drones are also more easily modified because their systems are public domain (usually) and quite modular. Ukraine has shown the ability to "re-purpose" such drones and some ability to build their own drone variants. Ukraine can respond more flexibly to EW by Russia than visa-versa.

On a slightly different subject, IMO we need to be aware that the word "drone" covers a very diverse set of vehicles of vastly differing size, range, speed, altitude restrictions, payload capacity, and intended missions. A Shahed  136, an Orlan 30, a Bayraktar TB2, a Mavic 3, and a Maverick missile are all "drones" in some sense of the word. EW that "works" against some of them may do nothing on others. Many published articles make statements about "drones" that only apply to a subclass of such vehicles.

[Goose]

https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-...ack-2025-1

This sort of confirms that the F-16s are playing a major role in destroying Russian "winged drones", aka cruise missiles. They could undoubtedly play a larger role if there were more of them.

I think the Ukrainian pilot is justly proud of shooting down 6 drones. Apparently his loadout was just two AMRAAMs and two sidewinders. The jet often carries 4 AMRAAMs and two sidewinders. It can carry 6 AMRAAMs but then it has no short-range missile armament. I might caution him however that he may get an email from some F16I pilots/WSOs saying that they are tied or perhaps ahead of him in single mission winged missile kills.

[Goose]

https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-...ack-2025-1

This sort of confirms that the F-16s are playing a major role in destroying Russian "winged drones", aka cruise missiles. They could undoubtedly play a larger role if there were more of them.

I think the Ukrainian pilot is justly proud of shooting down 6 drones. Apparently his loadout was just two AMRAAMs and two sidewinders. The jet often carries 4 AMRAAMs and two sidewinders. It can carry 6 AMRAAMs but then it has no short-range missile armament. I might caution him however that he may get an email from some F16I pilots/WSOs saying that they are tied or perhaps ahead of him in single mission winged missile kills.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/nato-needs-fo...57395.html

Italy is very concerned, and for good reason. For many years Italy has had the responsibility of "covering" the Russian operated port of Tartus. This requires continuous surface ship and submarine deployments in the eastern Mediterranean. During the Cold War, the US 6th fleet was very strong. It "handled" the Russian's increasing desire for a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean. Now the 6th fleet is a joke. Italy has been carrying out the mission for years with a Navy that is quite a bit smaller than the 6th fleet was. They still are carrying out that mission. The occasional "visit" by US Carrieir Battle Groups does little to remove the strain. If Russia obtains a port in Libya Italy will have another, much closer (and therefore more dangerous) threat to deal with. You bet they are "concerned". 

The Russian presence at Tartus was "very significant" from about 2015 on, making Italy's problems worse. A Slava class cruiser was rotated to that port religiously. Its purpose was to provide air defense for both the port of Tartus and for the air base at Khmeimim. There was a rotation between Moskva, Varyag, and Marshal Ustinov, each spending a year or so "on station". After about 2019 the "rotation" became less important because the Russians had established adequate land-based air defense and the situation in Syria was more stable.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_cr...yag_(1983) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_cruiser_Moskva https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_cr...al_Ustinov

The utility of Tartus to Russia has become much less since the start of the Ukraine war. Before Türkiye started enforcing the Montreaux convention Russia could easily move both warships and material to/from the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. There was literally a rotation of Frigates between Mediterranean duty and Black Sea duty, sometimes on a monthly basis. There was also an every-three-days delivery of support material via Russian National Ships. Now, Russia cannot do any of this. This puts Tartus on the far end of a very long supply line from the Northern Fleet or from St. Petersburg. It is almost more of a liability than an asset. Russia has removed the last of its Kilo submarines from the  Mediterranean Sea. These SSKs require a very capable home port to operate efficiently. They have good range, but require lots of material/fuel/repair support to utilize it. On the end of the long supply line, they don't have that. They can no longer reach a dry dock for necessary maintenance availabilities without a very long voyage north. Re-opening the Black Sea to naval vessel traffic would "cure" all this, but IMO Russia pulling most of its naval assets from the area is a recognition of the current serious logistical shortfalls.  Of course, the loss of many naval assets in the Ukraine war is problematic as well.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/nato-needs-fo...57395.html

Italy is very concerned, and for good reason. For many years Italy has had the responsibility of "covering" the Russian operated port of Tartus. This requires continuous surface ship and submarine deployments in the eastern Mediterranean. During the Cold War, the US 6th fleet was very strong. It "handled" the Russian's increasing desire for a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean. Now the 6th fleet is a joke. Italy has been carrying out the mission for years with a Navy that is quite a bit smaller than the 6th fleet was. They still are carrying out that mission. The occasional "visit" by US Carrieir Battle Groups does little to remove the strain. If Russia obtains a port in Libya Italy will have another, much closer (and therefore more dangerous) threat to deal with. You bet they are "concerned". 

The Russian presence at Tartus was "very significant" from about 2015 on, making Italy's problems worse. A Slava class cruiser was rotated to that port religiously. Its purpose was to provide air defense for both the port of Tartus and for the air base at Khmeimim. There was a rotation between Moskva, Varyag, and Marshal Ustinov, each spending a year or so "on station". After about 2019 the "rotation" became less important because the Russians had established adequate land-based air defense and the situation in Syria was more stable.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_cr...yag_(1983) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_cruiser_Moskva https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_cr...al_Ustinov

The utility of Tartus to Russia has become much less since the start of the Ukraine war. Before Türkiye started enforcing the Montreaux convention Russia could easily move both warships and material to/from the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. There was literally a rotation of Frigates between Mediterranean duty and Black Sea duty, sometimes on a monthly basis. There was also an every-three-days delivery of support material via Russian National Ships. Now, Russia cannot do any of this. This puts Tartus on the far end of a very long supply line from the Northern Fleet or from St. Petersburg. It is almost more of a liability than an asset. Russia has removed the last of its Kilo submarines from the  Mediterranean Sea. These SSKs require a very capable home port to operate efficiently. They have good range, but require lots of material/fuel/repair support to utilize it. On the end of the long supply line, they don't have that. They can no longer reach a dry dock for necessary maintenance availabilities without a very long voyage north. Re-opening the Black Sea to naval vessel traffic would "cure" all this, but IMO Russia pulling most of its naval assets from the area is a recognition of the current serious logistical shortfalls.  Of course, the loss of many naval assets in the Ukraine war is problematic as well.

[BostonCard]

Maybe Italy can learn from the Ukrainian navy?

BC

[BostonCard]

Maybe Italy can learn from the Ukrainian navy?

BC

[GK3]

Maybe Italy can learn from the Ukrainian navy?

BC

ISW latest reports indicate some increasing unhappiness with the Russian Elites and the conduct of the war.  Ukraine continues to do considerable long range damage to Russian storage facilities and Push may come to Shove fairly soon.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...ary-9-2025

[GK3]

Maybe Italy can learn from the Ukrainian navy?

BC

ISW latest reports indicate some increasing unhappiness with the Russian Elites and the conduct of the war.  Ukraine continues to do considerable long range damage to Russian storage facilities and Push may come to Shove fairly soon.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...ary-9-2025

[fullmetal]

Fuel depots have been taking the brunt of Ukrainian drone strikes lately, and those are, I think, excellent strategic targets.

[fullmetal]

Fuel depots have been taking the brunt of Ukrainian drone strikes lately, and those are, I think, excellent strategic targets.

[Goose]

Maybe Italy can learn from the Ukrainian navy?

BC

Actually, one can argue that the Ukrainians are merely imitating the Italians usage of self-developed unconventional weapons. The attack on the British Fleet in Alexandria harbor by Decima Flottiglia MAS left the BBs HMS Valiant and HMS Queen Elizabeth sitting on the harbor bottom. Italy definitely beat Ukraine in the tonnage war :).  Unfortunately for Italy they had a competent set of opponents in the Royal Navy and US Navy that actually had a warplan that involved denying Italy the ability to mount any naval threat. They had the (overwhelming) power to execute that plan and did so, resulting in the amphibious invasion of Italy. Ukraine has a Russian navy that really never had a plan (or intention) to do the same to Ukraine. They arguably never had the power to do so either. Thus Ukraine has been left the freedom to develop and employ novel and creative weapons against the Russian navy.

Today, Italy can't use any kind of kinetic weapons against Russia. Wonderful drones will do them no good. Their mission is to do what Ukraine's navy could not, namely convince the Russians that their navy would have no chance at all if a conflict broke out. This is "deterrence" is not as dramatic as actually damaging a Russian ship but is even more important. Preventing war is the Italian navy's job. They do that by demonstrating to the Russians that the can't go anywhere in the Mediterranean without a NATO "shadow" ensuring that they don't engage in any "improper activities". It is critical that the Russians actually see this shadow, so there is no doubt in their minds they are being watched. It is a boring thankless task, but it has to be done. It keeps lots of guys at sea and badly stresses a navy that is relatively short of assets. Of course, they have more assets in the Med than we do, so they get the job. They do get help from US maritime surveillance capabilities, but that's about it.

[Goose]

Maybe Italy can learn from the Ukrainian navy?

BC

Actually, one can argue that the Ukrainians are merely imitating the Italians usage of self-developed unconventional weapons. The attack on the British Fleet in Alexandria harbor by Decima Flottiglia MAS left the BBs HMS Valiant and HMS Queen Elizabeth sitting on the harbor bottom. Italy definitely beat Ukraine in the tonnage war :).  Unfortunately for Italy they had a competent set of opponents in the Royal Navy and US Navy that actually had a warplan that involved denying Italy the ability to mount any naval threat. They had the (overwhelming) power to execute that plan and did so, resulting in the amphibious invasion of Italy. Ukraine has a Russian navy that really never had a plan (or intention) to do the same to Ukraine. They arguably never had the power to do so either. Thus Ukraine has been left the freedom to develop and employ novel and creative weapons against the Russian navy.

Today, Italy can't use any kind of kinetic weapons against Russia. Wonderful drones will do them no good. Their mission is to do what Ukraine's navy could not, namely convince the Russians that their navy would have no chance at all if a conflict broke out. This is "deterrence" is not as dramatic as actually damaging a Russian ship but is even more important. Preventing war is the Italian navy's job. They do that by demonstrating to the Russians that the can't go anywhere in the Mediterranean without a NATO "shadow" ensuring that they don't engage in any "improper activities". It is critical that the Russians actually see this shadow, so there is no doubt in their minds they are being watched. It is a boring thankless task, but it has to be done. It keeps lots of guys at sea and badly stresses a navy that is relatively short of assets. Of course, they have more assets in the Med than we do, so they get the job. They do get help from US maritime surveillance capabilities, but that's about it.

[Goose]

ISW latest reports indicate some increasing unhappiness with the Russian Elites and the conduct of the war.  Ukraine continues to do considerable long range damage to Russian storage facilities and Push may come to Shove fairly soon.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...ary-9-2025

Thanks for the link. For quite sometime there have been members of the "elite" that have called for a "larger" effort by Russia, including a full mobilization. This group is apparently getting larger. IMO this increase comes from members of the elite that fear Putin will negotiate and stop the war. That definitely makes all of the military much less important and diminishes the defense budget. These elites obviously don't want that to happen, as they derive their power and financial success from the military largess. If peace breaks out, it is bad for them. Worse still, when the inevitable search for scapegoats starts, it quite probably will be some (or most) of these elites suddenly found to be "corrupt". Since the current status-quo might not be acceptable to Putin, upping the ante is the only way to keep this war going. That is what these "elites" want, and they fear Putin will not do it.

I also find it unbelievable that any Russian would want to "restore maneuver warfare". Russia clearly demonstrated at the start of this war, when they had all the freedom of maneuver anyone could want, that they were incompetent at this type of warfare. The battle that exists now maximizes the benefit of Russia's superior numbers while minimizing the impact of their strategic, organizational and logistical limitations. If by "maneuver warfare"  one means a Ukrainian collapse, it makes sense, but in no other context does it.

IMO the damage Ukraine is doing to fuel and ammunition supplies is considerable, and is therefore important. At the same time, it isn't sufficient to materially change the course of the conflict. If Ukraine could increase this damage and couple it with damaging the refining and exporting capability of Russia, that could begin to become strategically important. Ukraine has shown the capability to sporadically do this. What Ukraine now needs is the ability to sustain repeated attacks on the same objective. As the Germans pointed out at the end of WW II, they were able to "work around" most bomb damage fairly quickly if allowed to do so. What they couldn't overcome was the repeated bombings of the same objective that destroyed the "work arounds" and made it unsafe/pointless to attempt new ones.

[Goose]

ISW latest reports indicate some increasing unhappiness with the Russian Elites and the conduct of the war.  Ukraine continues to do considerable long range damage to Russian storage facilities and Push may come to Shove fairly soon.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgro...ary-9-2025

Thanks for the link. For quite sometime there have been members of the "elite" that have called for a "larger" effort by Russia, including a full mobilization. This group is apparently getting larger. IMO this increase comes from members of the elite that fear Putin will negotiate and stop the war. That definitely makes all of the military much less important and diminishes the defense budget. These elites obviously don't want that to happen, as they derive their power and financial success from the military largess. If peace breaks out, it is bad for them. Worse still, when the inevitable search for scapegoats starts, it quite probably will be some (or most) of these elites suddenly found to be "corrupt". Since the current status-quo might not be acceptable to Putin, upping the ante is the only way to keep this war going. That is what these "elites" want, and they fear Putin will not do it.

I also find it unbelievable that any Russian would want to "restore maneuver warfare". Russia clearly demonstrated at the start of this war, when they had all the freedom of maneuver anyone could want, that they were incompetent at this type of warfare. The battle that exists now maximizes the benefit of Russia's superior numbers while minimizing the impact of their strategic, organizational and logistical limitations. If by "maneuver warfare"  one means a Ukrainian collapse, it makes sense, but in no other context does it.

IMO the damage Ukraine is doing to fuel and ammunition supplies is considerable, and is therefore important. At the same time, it isn't sufficient to materially change the course of the conflict. If Ukraine could increase this damage and couple it with damaging the refining and exporting capability of Russia, that could begin to become strategically important. Ukraine has shown the capability to sporadically do this. What Ukraine now needs is the ability to sustain repeated attacks on the same objective. As the Germans pointed out at the end of WW II, they were able to "work around" most bomb damage fairly quickly if allowed to do so. What they couldn't overcome was the repeated bombings of the same objective that destroyed the "work arounds" and made it unsafe/pointless to attempt new ones.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-says-...22932.html

Well, my hope Ukraine would hit refining facilities appears to be met. Now, will they persist? They hit this refinery once before, but almost a year ago, That won't cut it. They need to hit this refinery again within 3 days. Create a continuous set of problems that Russia can never get ahead of. Drones, even relatively large ones aren't going to obliterate such facilities. They simply lack the destructive power to do that. They can however "break" them and keep them broken. That is what Ukraine needs.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-says-...22932.html

Well, my hope Ukraine would hit refining facilities appears to be met. Now, will they persist? They hit this refinery once before, but almost a year ago, That won't cut it. They need to hit this refinery again within 3 days. Create a continuous set of problems that Russia can never get ahead of. Drones, even relatively large ones aren't going to obliterate such facilities. They simply lack the destructive power to do that. They can however "break" them and keep them broken. That is what Ukraine needs.

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-says-...22932.html

Well, my hope Ukraine would hit refining facilities appears to be met. Now, will they persist? They hit this refinery once before, but almost a year ago, That won't cut it. They need to hit this refinery again within 3 days. Create a continuous set of problems that Russia can never get ahead of. Drones, even relatively large ones aren't going to obliterate such facilities. They simply lack the destructive power to do that. They can however "break" them and keep them broken. That is what Ukraine needs.

Some recent articles regarding weapons and tactics and impact of drones on the conflict:
Ukrained drones drop molten metal on Russian forces: https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/07/europe/uk...an%20tanks.

Another video of the a similar weapon:  https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...tanks-now/

A report contending that in some areas of the battlefield, Ukraines tanks operate freely while Russian tanks are hunkered down far behind the froint being used as inaccurate artillery.  If true another sign that drones are rapidly becoming the weapon of choice.  Doing all this with cheap drones against targets that cost millions.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...er-russia/

In a war where Ukraine is out gunned in the air, and lacking adequate ground forces, hordes of cheap drones flown by men not immediately on the front lines seems to be allowing Ukraine to stay in the fight.  They also seem to have made more advances in their ability to jam russian drones.  Those thermite dropping drones could be pretty scary, open trenches aren't going to help you too much of a drone operator can fly the drone up and down the trench line dropping molten metal on its occupants.  Sort a scary thought.

One last sample, a $400 drone destroying a costly T-80  https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/31/magaz...e-war.html

This all going to make every country step back and deside where to spend its R&D funds going forward.

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-says-...22932.html

Well, my hope Ukraine would hit refining facilities appears to be met. Now, will they persist? They hit this refinery once before, but almost a year ago, That won't cut it. They need to hit this refinery again within 3 days. Create a continuous set of problems that Russia can never get ahead of. Drones, even relatively large ones aren't going to obliterate such facilities. They simply lack the destructive power to do that. They can however "break" them and keep them broken. That is what Ukraine needs.

Some recent articles regarding weapons and tactics and impact of drones on the conflict:
Ukrained drones drop molten metal on Russian forces: https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/07/europe/uk...an%20tanks.

Another video of the a similar weapon:  https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...tanks-now/

A report contending that in some areas of the battlefield, Ukraines tanks operate freely while Russian tanks are hunkered down far behind the froint being used as inaccurate artillery.  If true another sign that drones are rapidly becoming the weapon of choice.  Doing all this with cheap drones against targets that cost millions.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...er-russia/

In a war where Ukraine is out gunned in the air, and lacking adequate ground forces, hordes of cheap drones flown by men not immediately on the front lines seems to be allowing Ukraine to stay in the fight.  They also seem to have made more advances in their ability to jam russian drones.  Those thermite dropping drones could be pretty scary, open trenches aren't going to help you too much of a drone operator can fly the drone up and down the trench line dropping molten metal on its occupants.  Sort a scary thought.

One last sample, a $400 drone destroying a costly T-80  https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/31/magaz...e-war.html

This all going to make every country step back and deside where to spend its R&D funds going forward.

[Leftcoast]

This all going to make every country step back and deside where to spend its R&D funds going forward.

I always wonder about the US Navy when I see reports of mass attacks by cheap(ish) drones against high value targets.  Will there come a time when the US carrier based fleets are on the wrong side of that equation? 

The new Ford class aircraft carrier costs an estimated $13 billion to build and outfit.  Very well protected and with power projection that's unparalleled and unique to the US but ... the nations thought the same of the Battleship into the 1930s.  Is the drone problem something that will (eventually) turn the page on the modern behemoth aircraft carrier? 

($13B=13,000 ea $1,000,000 drones)

[Leftcoast]

This all going to make every country step back and deside where to spend its R&D funds going forward.

I always wonder about the US Navy when I see reports of mass attacks by cheap(ish) drones against high value targets.  Will there come a time when the US carrier based fleets are on the wrong side of that equation? 

The new Ford class aircraft carrier costs an estimated $13 billion to build and outfit.  Very well protected and with power projection that's unparalleled and unique to the US but ... the nations thought the same of the Battleship into the 1930s.  Is the drone problem something that will (eventually) turn the page on the modern behemoth aircraft carrier? 

($13B=13,000 ea $1,000,000 drones)

[TrumpCard]

It's worth heaping praise on the folks posting in this thread for keeping it (mostly) non-political, so that readers here can continue to get insights from people who are knowledgeable on subjects relevant to the conflict in Ukraine.  I regret that the So Cal fires thread required moderator intervention.  Hopefully we can do better on other Off-Topic subjects going forward.  I have lost interest in football over the years, both because of research on concussions and because my family takes up the free time I used to have for sports spectatorship.  But I still value this board and the people here.

[TrumpCard]

It's worth heaping praise on the folks posting in this thread for keeping it (mostly) non-political, so that readers here can continue to get insights from people who are knowledgeable on subjects relevant to the conflict in Ukraine.  I regret that the So Cal fires thread required moderator intervention.  Hopefully we can do better on other Off-Topic subjects going forward.  I have lost interest in football over the years, both because of research on concussions and because my family takes up the free time I used to have for sports spectatorship.  But I still value this board and the people here.

[Goose]

This all going to make every country step back and deside where to spend its R&D funds going forward.

I always wonder about the US Navy when I see reports of mass attacks by cheap(ish) drones against high value targets.  Will there come a time when the US carrier based fleets are on the wrong side of that equation? 

The new Ford class aircraft carrier costs an estimated $13 billion to build and outfit.  Very well protected and with power projection that's unparalleled and unique to the US but ... the nations thought the same of the Battleship into the 1930s.  Is the drone problem something that will (eventually) turn the page on the modern behemoth aircraft carrier? 

($13B=13,000 ea $1,000,000 drones)

For the particular example you cite, the answer is probably "no". First of all, an aircraft carrier is actually pretty hard to find. It moves around enough that if you launch a lot of drones towards where your LEO satellite located it, by the time they fly the 300 miles (minimum) to get there, it will be many miles (30 minimum, probably more) away in an unknown direction. The drones will have to go find it. They can do this, but many of them will guess the wrong direction and not ever find the carrier. Of course that means they all have to carry a good radar, which pushes the price up. It also means they can't all be using their radar, as they will interfere with each other :-). How one manages that problem is a good question.

Of course, the E2 will have seen this swarm of drones approaching with almost constant bearing long before they get anywhere near the carrier. The carrier will sortie all fighters they have available to go "thin out" the swarm. As has been demonstrated at least twice in the middle east recently, that is quite doable and effective. An entire country that wasn't even moving was defended from drones :-). None got through. What did get through were a few ballistic missiles. Ukraine has also had significant success in defending against drone swarms with far, far, less counter air that a carrier can put up. https://www.twz.com/air/murder-hornet-ni...w-official.

Even assuming there are quite a few "leakers" that eventually enter the Inner Air Defense Zone, the escorts (at a minimum, 3 guided missile combatants and possibly more in a "wartime" scenario) can engage lots of targets. The air wing in the air has to be reminded that  the TAO has given the escort "weapons free" authority. Verify your mode 5 is on and working. Stay outside the IADZ until everybody has calmed down :-). That should do the job. If it doesn't the carrier herself has several CWIS RAM and also EA capability. Given all of the above, conventional long range drones are not going to be the problem. At least in exercises, this approach seems to work. That doesn't mean the Navy can "forget about it". They still need to maintain an adequate superiority to this kind of attack. One can thank the Russians during the cold war for sensitizing the Navy to the problem. The Russians are also good at using quantity as a weapon, so that was part of the drill.

Ballistic missiles are a different beast altogether. China is touting their DF-xx series missiles as "carrier killers". Different subject for a later post maybe, but not really "drone related".

[Goose]

This all going to make every country step back and deside where to spend its R&D funds going forward.

I always wonder about the US Navy when I see reports of mass attacks by cheap(ish) drones against high value targets.  Will there come a time when the US carrier based fleets are on the wrong side of that equation? 

The new Ford class aircraft carrier costs an estimated $13 billion to build and outfit.  Very well protected and with power projection that's unparalleled and unique to the US but ... the nations thought the same of the Battleship into the 1930s.  Is the drone problem something that will (eventually) turn the page on the modern behemoth aircraft carrier? 

($13B=13,000 ea $1,000,000 drones)

For the particular example you cite, the answer is probably "no". First of all, an aircraft carrier is actually pretty hard to find. It moves around enough that if you launch a lot of drones towards where your LEO satellite located it, by the time they fly the 300 miles (minimum) to get there, it will be many miles (30 minimum, probably more) away in an unknown direction. The drones will have to go find it. They can do this, but many of them will guess the wrong direction and not ever find the carrier. Of course that means they all have to carry a good radar, which pushes the price up. It also means they can't all be using their radar, as they will interfere with each other :-). How one manages that problem is a good question.

Of course, the E2 will have seen this swarm of drones approaching with almost constant bearing long before they get anywhere near the carrier. The carrier will sortie all fighters they have available to go "thin out" the swarm. As has been demonstrated at least twice in the middle east recently, that is quite doable and effective. An entire country that wasn't even moving was defended from drones :-). None got through. What did get through were a few ballistic missiles. Ukraine has also had significant success in defending against drone swarms with far, far, less counter air that a carrier can put up. https://www.twz.com/air/murder-hornet-ni...w-official.

Even assuming there are quite a few "leakers" that eventually enter the Inner Air Defense Zone, the escorts (at a minimum, 3 guided missile combatants and possibly more in a "wartime" scenario) can engage lots of targets. The air wing in the air has to be reminded that  the TAO has given the escort "weapons free" authority. Verify your mode 5 is on and working. Stay outside the IADZ until everybody has calmed down :-). That should do the job. If it doesn't the carrier herself has several CWIS RAM and also EA capability. Given all of the above, conventional long range drones are not going to be the problem. At least in exercises, this approach seems to work. That doesn't mean the Navy can "forget about it". They still need to maintain an adequate superiority to this kind of attack. One can thank the Russians during the cold war for sensitizing the Navy to the problem. The Russians are also good at using quantity as a weapon, so that was part of the drill.

Ballistic missiles are a different beast altogether. China is touting their DF-xx series missiles as "carrier killers". Different subject for a later post maybe, but not really "drone related".

[fullmetal]

Are those ballistic missiles the oft-hyped "hypersonic" missiles I've been hearing about?

[fullmetal]

Are those ballistic missiles the oft-hyped "hypersonic" missiles I've been hearing about?

[Goose]

Are those ballistic missiles the oft-hyped "hypersonic" missiles I've been hearing about?

Mostly no, but in one case "sort of". The vast majority are "garden variety" ballistic missiles. The theory China is espousing is that if they locate the carrier using a LEO satellite (or other means) they can then launch a ballistic missile that will arrive very quickly, within a few tens of minutes if the Chinese command and control functions efficiently. The theory is that the carrier couldn't have gone very far during that time. The DF-21D is equipped with a Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MaRV) that can be "steered" somehow by a satellite that has a current picture of the carrier. Obviously this creates considerable constraints on how the weapon can be employed. First, you have to find the carrier, and second you then have to have a second satellite that is able to target the warhead. It also seems improbable that the satellite would be able to guide the reentry vehicle to the target. It doesn't have the resolution to do it. That would mean that, like the AAMRAM, there is a terminal guidance radar in the MaRV. Hard to make that work, and even if you could the MaRV vehicle is limited in its ability to maneuver (no wings or tail), its current energy state, the size of its radar antenna, and the electronics required to make all this work. Besides that, the escorts can jam the radar in the MaRV, and also can also simply shoot it down. Again, this isn't something we should ignore, but the Navy thinks it has it pretty well under control. Of course, if the MaRV carries a nuke, none of this matters.

The DF-27 is equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle which can chase after a carrier, at least until it runs out of energy. This is the "hypersonic missile" part. This approach is better than the MaRV in that the glide vehicle has wings that will keep it in the air longer and allow it to maneuver. How this all is mechanized is unclear. More importantly, it is a "bigger" package that maybe can do a better job of finding the carrier without the help of another satellite. Otherwise, it has all the same problems. Does it work? Nobody knows. Can we shoot it down? Sure. Is it harder to hit than a Kinzhal? Probably not. In fact, it is arguably exactly the same situation. It could be stealthier, but its infrared signature and massive doppler work against that idea.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dongfeng_(missile)

[Goose]

Are those ballistic missiles the oft-hyped "hypersonic" missiles I've been hearing about?

Mostly no, but in one case "sort of". The vast majority are "garden variety" ballistic missiles. The theory China is espousing is that if they locate the carrier using a LEO satellite (or other means) they can then launch a ballistic missile that will arrive very quickly, within a few tens of minutes if the Chinese command and control functions efficiently. The theory is that the carrier couldn't have gone very far during that time. The DF-21D is equipped with a Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MaRV) that can be "steered" somehow by a satellite that has a current picture of the carrier. Obviously this creates considerable constraints on how the weapon can be employed. First, you have to find the carrier, and second you then have to have a second satellite that is able to target the warhead. It also seems improbable that the satellite would be able to guide the reentry vehicle to the target. It doesn't have the resolution to do it. That would mean that, like the AAMRAM, there is a terminal guidance radar in the MaRV. Hard to make that work, and even if you could the MaRV vehicle is limited in its ability to maneuver (no wings or tail), its current energy state, the size of its radar antenna, and the electronics required to make all this work. Besides that, the escorts can jam the radar in the MaRV, and also can also simply shoot it down. Again, this isn't something we should ignore, but the Navy thinks it has it pretty well under control. Of course, if the MaRV carries a nuke, none of this matters.

The DF-27 is equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle which can chase after a carrier, at least until it runs out of energy. This is the "hypersonic missile" part. This approach is better than the MaRV in that the glide vehicle has wings that will keep it in the air longer and allow it to maneuver. How this all is mechanized is unclear. More importantly, it is a "bigger" package that maybe can do a better job of finding the carrier without the help of another satellite. Otherwise, it has all the same problems. Does it work? Nobody knows. Can we shoot it down? Sure. Is it harder to hit than a Kinzhal? Probably not. In fact, it is arguably exactly the same situation. It could be stealthier, but its infrared signature and massive doppler work against that idea.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dongfeng_(missile)

[GK3]

Are those ballistic missiles the oft-hyped "hypersonic" missiles I've been hearing about?

Mostly no, but in one case "sort of". The vast majority are "garden variety" ballistic missiles. The theory China is espousing is that if they locate the carrier using a LEO satellite (or other means) they can then launch a ballistic missile that will arrive very quickly, within a few tens of minutes if the Chinese command and control functions efficiently. The theory is that the carrier couldn't have gone very far during that time. The DF-21D is equipped with a Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MaRV) that can be "steered" somehow by a satellite that has a current picture of the carrier. Obviously this creates considerable constraints on how the weapon can be employed. First, you have to find the carrier, and second you then have to have a second satellite that is able to target the warhead. It also seems improbable that the satellite would be able to guide the reentry vehicle to the target. It doesn't have the resolution to do it. That would mean that, like the AAMRAM, there is a terminal guidance radar in the MaRV. Hard to make that work, and even if you could the MaRV vehicle is limited in its ability to maneuver (no wings or tail), its current energy state, the size of its radar antenna, and the electronics required to make all this work. Besides that, the escorts can jam the radar in the MaRV, and also can also simply shoot it down. Again, this isn't something we should ignore, but the Navy thinks it has it pretty well under control. Of course, if the MaRV carries a nuke, none of this matters.

The DF-27 is equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle which can chase after a carrier, at least until it runs out of energy. This is the "hypersonic missile" part. This approach is better than the MaRV in that the glide vehicle has wings that will keep it in the air longer and allow it to maneuver. How this all is mechanized is unclear. More importantly, it is a "bigger" package that maybe can do a better job of finding the carrier without the help of another satellite. Otherwise, it has all the same problems. Does it work? Nobody knows. Can we shoot it down? Sure. Is it harder to hit than a Kinzhal? Probably not. In fact, it is arguably exactly the same situation. It could be stealthier, but its infrared signature and massive doppler work against that idea.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dongfeng_(missile)

Thanks, Goose, very interesting stuff.  I found this article which I am having to reread a few times as it contains a lot of information about drone warfare. 
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News...ing-drone-
defenses/#:~:text=At%20the%20simplest%20end%2C%20this,different%20types%20of%20communication%20systems.
What do you think of the conclusions drawn in this article?
It seems to me that drones are changing warfare like tanks did in WWI.  Now it is a "you can run, but you can't hide" problem if you can make your drones even partially jam proof. 
In the past, you could dig in and avoid most damage unless a artillery round hit your bunker, but now they just fly the drone down your trench and drop molten metal on you.  Drones seem to be making it possible for Ukraine to fend off Russians much larger manpower numbers. A million drones produced in 1 year versus 1 million draftees from Russia.
It seems like the country who makes the first unjammable drone (is that even possible?) is truly going to have the upper hand. So much of modern warfare is dependent upon command, control and supply.  If you can use your drones effectively to hit both the command centers and the supply sources you might have something. So can you makes a jam proof drone with jam proof controls becomes sort of the holy grail. I think the loss of a $400 dollar drone seems to much prefered to the loss of another soldier.  Replace bodies with drones concept might give Ukraine a chance. 
One last question, can drones be effective in areas where the ground is totally covered by jungle or similar.  Think SE Asia in 1967.

[GK3]

Are those ballistic missiles the oft-hyped "hypersonic" missiles I've been hearing about?

Mostly no, but in one case "sort of". The vast majority are "garden variety" ballistic missiles. The theory China is espousing is that if they locate the carrier using a LEO satellite (or other means) they can then launch a ballistic missile that will arrive very quickly, within a few tens of minutes if the Chinese command and control functions efficiently. The theory is that the carrier couldn't have gone very far during that time. The DF-21D is equipped with a Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MaRV) that can be "steered" somehow by a satellite that has a current picture of the carrier. Obviously this creates considerable constraints on how the weapon can be employed. First, you have to find the carrier, and second you then have to have a second satellite that is able to target the warhead. It also seems improbable that the satellite would be able to guide the reentry vehicle to the target. It doesn't have the resolution to do it. That would mean that, like the AAMRAM, there is a terminal guidance radar in the MaRV. Hard to make that work, and even if you could the MaRV vehicle is limited in its ability to maneuver (no wings or tail), its current energy state, the size of its radar antenna, and the electronics required to make all this work. Besides that, the escorts can jam the radar in the MaRV, and also can also simply shoot it down. Again, this isn't something we should ignore, but the Navy thinks it has it pretty well under control. Of course, if the MaRV carries a nuke, none of this matters.

The DF-27 is equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle which can chase after a carrier, at least until it runs out of energy. This is the "hypersonic missile" part. This approach is better than the MaRV in that the glide vehicle has wings that will keep it in the air longer and allow it to maneuver. How this all is mechanized is unclear. More importantly, it is a "bigger" package that maybe can do a better job of finding the carrier without the help of another satellite. Otherwise, it has all the same problems. Does it work? Nobody knows. Can we shoot it down? Sure. Is it harder to hit than a Kinzhal? Probably not. In fact, it is arguably exactly the same situation. It could be stealthier, but its infrared signature and massive doppler work against that idea.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dongfeng_(missile)

Thanks, Goose, very interesting stuff.  I found this article which I am having to reread a few times as it contains a lot of information about drone warfare. 
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News...ing-drone-
defenses/#:~:text=At%20the%20simplest%20end%2C%20this,different%20types%20of%20communication%20systems.
What do you think of the conclusions drawn in this article?
It seems to me that drones are changing warfare like tanks did in WWI.  Now it is a "you can run, but you can't hide" problem if you can make your drones even partially jam proof. 
In the past, you could dig in and avoid most damage unless a artillery round hit your bunker, but now they just fly the drone down your trench and drop molten metal on you.  Drones seem to be making it possible for Ukraine to fend off Russians much larger manpower numbers. A million drones produced in 1 year versus 1 million draftees from Russia.
It seems like the country who makes the first unjammable drone (is that even possible?) is truly going to have the upper hand. So much of modern warfare is dependent upon command, control and supply.  If you can use your drones effectively to hit both the command centers and the supply sources you might have something. So can you makes a jam proof drone with jam proof controls becomes sort of the holy grail. I think the loss of a $400 dollar drone seems to much prefered to the loss of another soldier.  Replace bodies with drones concept might give Ukraine a chance. 
One last question, can drones be effective in areas where the ground is totally covered by jungle or similar.  Think SE Asia in 1967.

[GK3]

Are those ballistic missiles the oft-hyped "hypersonic" missiles I've been hearing about?

Mostly no, but in one case "sort of". The vast majority are "garden variety" ballistic missiles. The theory China is espousing is that if they locate the carrier using a LEO satellite (or other means) they can then launch a ballistic missile that will arrive very quickly, within a few tens of minutes if the Chinese command and control functions efficiently. The theory is that the carrier couldn't have gone very far during that time. The DF-21D is equipped with a Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MaRV) that can be "steered" somehow by a satellite that has a current picture of the carrier. Obviously this creates considerable constraints on how the weapon can be employed. First, you have to find the carrier, and second you then have to have a second satellite that is able to target the warhead. It also seems improbable that the satellite would be able to guide the reentry vehicle to the target. It doesn't have the resolution to do it. That would mean that, like the AAMRAM, there is a terminal guidance radar in the MaRV. Hard to make that work, and even if you could the MaRV vehicle is limited in its ability to maneuver (no wings or tail), its current energy state, the size of its radar antenna, and the electronics required to make all this work. Besides that, the escorts can jam the radar in the MaRV, and also can also simply shoot it down. Again, this isn't something we should ignore, but the Navy thinks it has it pretty well under control. Of course, if the MaRV carries a nuke, none of this matters.

The DF-27 is equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle which can chase after a carrier, at least until it runs out of energy. This is the "hypersonic missile" part. This approach is better than the MaRV in that the glide vehicle has wings that will keep it in the air longer and allow it to maneuver. How this all is mechanized is unclear. More importantly, it is a "bigger" package that maybe can do a better job of finding the carrier without the help of another satellite. Otherwise, it has all the same problems. Does it work? Nobody knows. Can we shoot it down? Sure. Is it harder to hit than a Kinzhal? Probably not. In fact, it is arguably exactly the same situation. It could be stealthier, but its infrared signature and massive doppler work against that idea.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dongfeng_(missile)

Thanks, Goose, very interesting stuff.  I found this article which I am having to reread a few times as it contains a lot of information about drone warfare. 
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News...ing-drone-
defenses/#:~:text=At%20the%20simplest%20end%2C%20this,different%20types%20of%20communication%20systems.
What do you think of the conclusions drawn in this article?
It seems to me that drones are changing warfare like tanks did in WWI.  Now it is a "you can run, but you can't hide" problem if you can make your drones even partially jam proof. 
In the past, you could dig in and avoid most damage unless a artillery round hit your bunker, but now they just fly the drone down your trench and drop molten metal on you.  Drones seem to be making it possible for Ukraine to fend off Russians much larger manpower numbers. A million drones produced in 1 year versus 1 million draftees from Russia.
It seems like the country who makes the first unjammable drone (is that even possible?) is truly going to have the upper hand. So much of modern warfare is dependent upon command, control and supply.  If you can use your drones effectively to hit both the command centers and the supply sources you might have something. So can you makes a jam proof drone with jam proof controls becomes sort of the holy grail. I think the loss of a $400 dollar drone seems to much prefered to the loss of another soldier.  Replace bodies with drones concept might give Ukraine a chance. 
One last question, can drones be effective in areas where the ground is totally covered by jungle or similar.  Think SE Asia in 1967.

Apparently Germany is going to be making its new 155 self propelled gun availible to the Ukraine.  Turret is unmanned. Can fire 9 rounds per minute up to ranges of 25 miles and with very long range ammo, up to 35 miles. I believe those figures are far better than our 155mm guns.
I presume we must have something similar in the works, but this seems to be a significant improvement over past gear.
https://www.twz.com/land/ukraine-gets-fi...may-follow
Looking at other similar stuff, it sure appears that Germany knows how to build weapons for war. 
Drones plus this weapon can make enemy movement within 25 km of the MLR pretty difficult.

[GK3]

Are those ballistic missiles the oft-hyped "hypersonic" missiles I've been hearing about?

Mostly no, but in one case "sort of". The vast majority are "garden variety" ballistic missiles. The theory China is espousing is that if they locate the carrier using a LEO satellite (or other means) they can then launch a ballistic missile that will arrive very quickly, within a few tens of minutes if the Chinese command and control functions efficiently. The theory is that the carrier couldn't have gone very far during that time. The DF-21D is equipped with a Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MaRV) that can be "steered" somehow by a satellite that has a current picture of the carrier. Obviously this creates considerable constraints on how the weapon can be employed. First, you have to find the carrier, and second you then have to have a second satellite that is able to target the warhead. It also seems improbable that the satellite would be able to guide the reentry vehicle to the target. It doesn't have the resolution to do it. That would mean that, like the AAMRAM, there is a terminal guidance radar in the MaRV. Hard to make that work, and even if you could the MaRV vehicle is limited in its ability to maneuver (no wings or tail), its current energy state, the size of its radar antenna, and the electronics required to make all this work. Besides that, the escorts can jam the radar in the MaRV, and also can also simply shoot it down. Again, this isn't something we should ignore, but the Navy thinks it has it pretty well under control. Of course, if the MaRV carries a nuke, none of this matters.

The DF-27 is equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle which can chase after a carrier, at least until it runs out of energy. This is the "hypersonic missile" part. This approach is better than the MaRV in that the glide vehicle has wings that will keep it in the air longer and allow it to maneuver. How this all is mechanized is unclear. More importantly, it is a "bigger" package that maybe can do a better job of finding the carrier without the help of another satellite. Otherwise, it has all the same problems. Does it work? Nobody knows. Can we shoot it down? Sure. Is it harder to hit than a Kinzhal? Probably not. In fact, it is arguably exactly the same situation. It could be stealthier, but its infrared signature and massive doppler work against that idea.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dongfeng_(missile)

Thanks, Goose, very interesting stuff.  I found this article which I am having to reread a few times as it contains a lot of information about drone warfare. 
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News...ing-drone-
defenses/#:~:text=At%20the%20simplest%20end%2C%20this,different%20types%20of%20communication%20systems.
What do you think of the conclusions drawn in this article?
It seems to me that drones are changing warfare like tanks did in WWI.  Now it is a "you can run, but you can't hide" problem if you can make your drones even partially jam proof. 
In the past, you could dig in and avoid most damage unless a artillery round hit your bunker, but now they just fly the drone down your trench and drop molten metal on you.  Drones seem to be making it possible for Ukraine to fend off Russians much larger manpower numbers. A million drones produced in 1 year versus 1 million draftees from Russia.
It seems like the country who makes the first unjammable drone (is that even possible?) is truly going to have the upper hand. So much of modern warfare is dependent upon command, control and supply.  If you can use your drones effectively to hit both the command centers and the supply sources you might have something. So can you makes a jam proof drone with jam proof controls becomes sort of the holy grail. I think the loss of a $400 dollar drone seems to much prefered to the loss of another soldier.  Replace bodies with drones concept might give Ukraine a chance. 
One last question, can drones be effective in areas where the ground is totally covered by jungle or similar.  Think SE Asia in 1967.

Apparently Germany is going to be making its new 155 self propelled gun availible to the Ukraine.  Turret is unmanned. Can fire 9 rounds per minute up to ranges of 25 miles and with very long range ammo, up to 35 miles. I believe those figures are far better than our 155mm guns.
I presume we must have something similar in the works, but this seems to be a significant improvement over past gear.
https://www.twz.com/land/ukraine-gets-fi...may-follow
Looking at other similar stuff, it sure appears that Germany knows how to build weapons for war. 
Drones plus this weapon can make enemy movement within 25 km of the MLR pretty difficult.