[Goose]

While I know very little about the capabilities of the Patriot, I do know it isn't cheap.  If you opponent can make more offensive missiles than you can make defensive missiles it isn't a good situation.  It seems to me that we need a much cheaper solution for many situations and leave the Patriot to defend against the bigger missles.

You are correct that Patriot missiles are expensive. A PAC-3 MSE costs between $3.9 million  and $7 million per missile. That isn't so bad when one considers a THAAD missile costs between $12.7 and $15.5 million each. It must be said that Lockheed, RTX, Boeing etc. are incapable of building "cost effective" weapons systems. It just isn't in their DNA. It also isn't even mostly their fault. The DoD weapons procurement bureaucracy is most comfortable dealing with contractors that are a mirror image of the DoD bureaucracy. They have accomplished that goal.
 
It must be understood that the technical challenges of creating an effective ABM missile will ALWAYS result in the ABM costing much more than it's target. The "offensive" ballistic missile doesn't have to follow a fast-moving target. Its target just sits there. A simple GPS aided inertial navigation system is all that is required. If the ballistic missile is being used as an "area weapon" it doesn't have to be very accurate. Exactly which apartment building it hits doesn't matter much.
 
ABM missiles OTOH must be part of a system that can initially detect and track a ballistic missile launch. The ABM itself must have enough thrust to engage a ballistic missile target before said missile reaches its target. Thus the defensive system has both a speed and range requirement while the the offensive one only has a range requirement. The ABM must carry its own radar system (and associated antennas) to track the ballistic missile target. Obviously the offensive missile needs none of this. The ABM also must have a fusing system (hit to kill being one kind) to enable it to engage its target at the right moment. Again, the offensive missile needs none of this. The reliability of an ABM must also be very high. If it fails to destroy its target there usually is no second chance and friendly casualties result. If the offensive missile fails, no big deal. Just fire another one. For these reasons, the defensive missile system will always cost a considerable amount more.
 
Ukraine realizes that firing expensive Patriot missiles against air-breathing Shahed 136 class missiles is a big financial waste. They try to avoid the necessity of doing so. However, if the Patriot is protecting itself it may be necessary. Saving a missile that will almost immediately be destroyed anyway (along with other parts of the battery) is false economy. However, an Iskander-M will forever cost much less than a PAC-3. That is inherent in their respective missions.

[Goose]

While I know very little about the capabilities of the Patriot, I do know it isn't cheap.  If you opponent can make more offensive missiles than you can make defensive missiles it isn't a good situation.  It seems to me that we need a much cheaper solution for many situations and leave the Patriot to defend against the bigger missles.

You are correct that Patriot missiles are expensive. A PAC-3 MSE costs between $3.9 million  and $7 million per missile. That isn't so bad when one considers a THAAD missile costs between $12.7 and $15.5 million each. It must be said that Lockheed, RTX, Boeing etc. are incapable of building "cost effective" weapons systems. It just isn't in their DNA. It also isn't even mostly their fault. The DoD weapons procurement bureaucracy is most comfortable dealing with contractors that are a mirror image of the DoD bureaucracy. They have accomplished that goal.
 
It must be understood that the technical challenges of creating an effective ABM missile will ALWAYS result in the ABM costing much more than it's target. The "offensive" ballistic missile doesn't have to follow a fast-moving target. Its target just sits there. A simple GPS aided inertial navigation system is all that is required. If the ballistic missile is being used as an "area weapon" it doesn't have to be very accurate. Exactly which apartment building it hits doesn't matter much.
 
ABM missiles OTOH must be part of a system that can initially detect and track a ballistic missile launch. The ABM itself must have enough thrust to engage a ballistic missile target before said missile reaches its target. Thus the defensive system has both a speed and range requirement while the the offensive one only has a range requirement. The ABM must carry its own radar system (and associated antennas) to track the ballistic missile target. Obviously the offensive missile needs none of this. The ABM also must have a fusing system (hit to kill being one kind) to enable it to engage its target at the right moment. Again, the offensive missile needs none of this. The reliability of an ABM must also be very high. If it fails to destroy its target there usually is no second chance and friendly casualties result. If the offensive missile fails, no big deal. Just fire another one. For these reasons, the defensive missile system will always cost a considerable amount more.
 
Ukraine realizes that firing expensive Patriot missiles against air-breathing Shahed 136 class missiles is a big financial waste. They try to avoid the necessity of doing so. However, if the Patriot is protecting itself it may be necessary. Saving a missile that will almost immediately be destroyed anyway (along with other parts of the battery) is false economy. However, an Iskander-M will forever cost much less than a PAC-3. That is inherent in their respective missions.

[BostonCard]

The question is not the value of the defender missile versus the cost of the offensive missile, it is the value of the defender missile versus the value of what the offensive missile will hit.

BC

[BostonCard]

The question is not the value of the defender missile versus the cost of the offensive missile, it is the value of the defender missile versus the value of what the offensive missile will hit.

BC

[TrumpCard]

The question is not the value of the defender missile versus the cost of the offensive missile, it is the value of the defender missile versus the value of what the offensive missile will hit.

BC

The other thing that matters is the cost of the defensive missile relative to the amount of money Ukraine has to buy more missiles (or the amount of money other countries are willing to give or “loan” to Ukraine). That, plus, in the short to medium term, the available supply of the defensive missiles matters a lot too.

[TrumpCard]

The question is not the value of the defender missile versus the cost of the offensive missile, it is the value of the defender missile versus the value of what the offensive missile will hit.

BC

The other thing that matters is the cost of the defensive missile relative to the amount of money Ukraine has to buy more missiles (or the amount of money other countries are willing to give or “loan” to Ukraine). That, plus, in the short to medium term, the available supply of the defensive missiles matters a lot too.

[BostonCard]

The question is not the value of the defender missile versus the cost of the offensive missile, it is the value of the defender missile versus the value of what the offensive missile will hit.

BC

The other thing that matters is the cost of the defensive missile relative to the amount of money Ukraine has to buy more missiles (or the amount of money other countries are willing to give or “loan” to Ukraine). That, plus, in the short to medium term, the available supply of the defensive missiles matters a lot too.

Yes, that's why I said the "value" rather than the cost.  The value of the missiles to Ukraine might exceed their cost of production.

BC

[BostonCard]

The question is not the value of the defender missile versus the cost of the offensive missile, it is the value of the defender missile versus the value of what the offensive missile will hit.

BC

The other thing that matters is the cost of the defensive missile relative to the amount of money Ukraine has to buy more missiles (or the amount of money other countries are willing to give or “loan” to Ukraine). That, plus, in the short to medium term, the available supply of the defensive missiles matters a lot too.

Yes, that's why I said the "value" rather than the cost.  The value of the missiles to Ukraine might exceed their cost of production.

BC

[dabigv13]

A Ukrainian Mig-29 taxiing on improvised roadway airstrip. Uncommon footage.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1956841655220490633

[dabigv13]

A Ukrainian Mig-29 taxiing on improvised roadway airstrip. Uncommon footage.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1956841655220490633

[Goose]

The question is not the value of the defender missile versus the cost of the offensive missile, it is the value of the defender missile versus the value of what the offensive missile will hit.

BC

That question is "the question" when the defender has to decide whether or not to shoot an ABM at an incoming SRBM. The value is the net present value of the ABM. To be accurate, this value has to be multiplied by the kill probability.
 
However, "the question" when determining the number of ABMs to buy involves the actual cost of procuring the missiles, not the unknowable NPV of a particular missile shot once the war actually starts. The "goal" is to buy exactly the right number of defensive missiles. If you buy too few, at some point in the war you will "run out" and your opponent can maximize the effects of his SRBM weapons. Buy too many and you will have wasted money on weapons that you will never use.
 
When making that calculation, it is important to realize that ABMs are always more expensive than SRBMs. Relying on a plan to somehow overcome that limitation is necessarily going to fail. It is also important to consider the necessary "overkill" capacity required, if any. This estimate is important if firing multiple ABMs against incoming SRBMs is necessary. Given two opponents with equal budgets to spend, if one side selects pure defense and the other side selects pure offense, the defense will of necessity run out of missiles. Each missile costs more, which all by itself ensures this outcome. To avoid this situation, the defender will require a bigger budget. Given that an Iskander-M costs about $3 million, the Patriot PAC-3 costs between 1.3 and 2.3 times as much. That is the "multiplier". No way around it.
 
Of course, neither side will know exactly how many missiles of what type their opponents are buying. That said, defense has some significant built-in problems. The ratio is one of them. One doesn't want to be in a position of an "oops" when you launch your last ABM. You better have another way to equalize the situation.

[Goose]

The question is not the value of the defender missile versus the cost of the offensive missile, it is the value of the defender missile versus the value of what the offensive missile will hit.

BC

That question is "the question" when the defender has to decide whether or not to shoot an ABM at an incoming SRBM. The value is the net present value of the ABM. To be accurate, this value has to be multiplied by the kill probability.
 
However, "the question" when determining the number of ABMs to buy involves the actual cost of procuring the missiles, not the unknowable NPV of a particular missile shot once the war actually starts. The "goal" is to buy exactly the right number of defensive missiles. If you buy too few, at some point in the war you will "run out" and your opponent can maximize the effects of his SRBM weapons. Buy too many and you will have wasted money on weapons that you will never use.
 
When making that calculation, it is important to realize that ABMs are always more expensive than SRBMs. Relying on a plan to somehow overcome that limitation is necessarily going to fail. It is also important to consider the necessary "overkill" capacity required, if any. This estimate is important if firing multiple ABMs against incoming SRBMs is necessary. Given two opponents with equal budgets to spend, if one side selects pure defense and the other side selects pure offense, the defense will of necessity run out of missiles. Each missile costs more, which all by itself ensures this outcome. To avoid this situation, the defender will require a bigger budget. Given that an Iskander-M costs about $3 million, the Patriot PAC-3 costs between 1.3 and 2.3 times as much. That is the "multiplier". No way around it.
 
Of course, neither side will know exactly how many missiles of what type their opponents are buying. That said, defense has some significant built-in problems. The ratio is one of them. One doesn't want to be in a position of an "oops" when you launch your last ABM. You better have another way to equalize the situation.

[GK3]

The question is not the value of the defender missile versus the cost of the offensive missile, it is the value of the defender missile versus the value of what the offensive missile will hit.

BC

That question is "the question" when the defender has to decide whether or not to shoot an ABM at an incoming SRBM. The value is the net present value of the ABM. To be accurate, this value has to be multiplied by the kill probability.
 
However, "the question" when determining the number of ABMs to buy involves the actual cost of procuring the missiles, not the unknowable NPV of a particular missile shot once the war actually starts. The "goal" is to buy exactly the right number of defensive missiles. If you buy too few, at some point in the war you will "run out" and your opponent can maximize the effects of his SRBM weapons. Buy too many and you will have wasted money on weapons that you will never use.
 
When making that calculation, it is important to realize that ABMs are always more expensive than SRBMs. Relying on a plan to somehow overcome that limitation is necessarily going to fail. It is also important to consider the necessary "overkill" capacity required, if any. This estimate is important if firing multiple ABMs against incoming SRBMs is necessary. Given two opponents with equal budgets to spend, if one side selects pure defense and the other side selects pure offense, the defense will of necessity run out of missiles. Each missile costs more, which all by itself ensures this outcome. To avoid this situation, the defender will require a bigger budget. Given that an Iskander-M costs about $3 million, the Patriot PAC-3 costs between 1.3 and 2.3 times as much. That is the "multiplier". No way around it.
 
Of course, neither side will know exactly how many missiles of what type their opponents are buying. That said, defense has some significant built-in problems. The ratio is one of them. One doesn't want to be in a position of an "oops" when you launch your last ABM. You better have another way to equalize the situation.

I agree that there is no way to just play defense and win.  I think Russia assumed that its "offense" would so over power Ukraine's defense early on that the war was over before it started.  Three and half years later we know that didn't work.  Ukraine has shown if you are smart and creative you can find new ways to do old things that changes everyone's thinking and forces the other side to rethink their plans. 
From what I have read, the Patriot sometimes has a hard time intercepting Iskandar missiles.  Do they still have any old S300 systems that might work?  I presume the Iskandar's Mobile launch platform makes it very hard to find and destroy before they launch. It seems like Ukraine's best option is to continue launching as many drones as possible targeting Russian manufacturing and production facilities, particularly Gas, Oil and Weapons Technology.  Maybe if they can make the war too expensive Putin may actually have to consider a cease fire.

[GK3]

The question is not the value of the defender missile versus the cost of the offensive missile, it is the value of the defender missile versus the value of what the offensive missile will hit.

BC

That question is "the question" when the defender has to decide whether or not to shoot an ABM at an incoming SRBM. The value is the net present value of the ABM. To be accurate, this value has to be multiplied by the kill probability.
 
However, "the question" when determining the number of ABMs to buy involves the actual cost of procuring the missiles, not the unknowable NPV of a particular missile shot once the war actually starts. The "goal" is to buy exactly the right number of defensive missiles. If you buy too few, at some point in the war you will "run out" and your opponent can maximize the effects of his SRBM weapons. Buy too many and you will have wasted money on weapons that you will never use.
 
When making that calculation, it is important to realize that ABMs are always more expensive than SRBMs. Relying on a plan to somehow overcome that limitation is necessarily going to fail. It is also important to consider the necessary "overkill" capacity required, if any. This estimate is important if firing multiple ABMs against incoming SRBMs is necessary. Given two opponents with equal budgets to spend, if one side selects pure defense and the other side selects pure offense, the defense will of necessity run out of missiles. Each missile costs more, which all by itself ensures this outcome. To avoid this situation, the defender will require a bigger budget. Given that an Iskander-M costs about $3 million, the Patriot PAC-3 costs between 1.3 and 2.3 times as much. That is the "multiplier". No way around it.
 
Of course, neither side will know exactly how many missiles of what type their opponents are buying. That said, defense has some significant built-in problems. The ratio is one of them. One doesn't want to be in a position of an "oops" when you launch your last ABM. You better have another way to equalize the situation.

I agree that there is no way to just play defense and win.  I think Russia assumed that its "offense" would so over power Ukraine's defense early on that the war was over before it started.  Three and half years later we know that didn't work.  Ukraine has shown if you are smart and creative you can find new ways to do old things that changes everyone's thinking and forces the other side to rethink their plans. 
From what I have read, the Patriot sometimes has a hard time intercepting Iskandar missiles.  Do they still have any old S300 systems that might work?  I presume the Iskandar's Mobile launch platform makes it very hard to find and destroy before they launch. It seems like Ukraine's best option is to continue launching as many drones as possible targeting Russian manufacturing and production facilities, particularly Gas, Oil and Weapons Technology.  Maybe if they can make the war too expensive Putin may actually have to consider a cease fire.

[Goose]

I agree that there is no way to just play defense and win.  I think Russia assumed that its "offense" would so over power Ukraine's defense early on that the war was over before it started.  Three and half years later we know that didn't work.  Ukraine has shown if you are smart and creative you can find new ways to do old things that changes everyone's thinking and forces the other side to rethink their plans.

For certain Russia (and virtually everybody else) expected Ukraine to collapse very quickly. At that point neither Russia nor Ukraine was thinking in terms of an Iskander vs Patriot battle going on for even weeks, let alone years :-). Ukraine had no Patriots at that point. Ukraine has indeed shown an ability to adapt to a very unique situation. While all wars are "unique" in some aspects, the Ukraine ware is totally unlike anything previously observed. Ukraine was fortunate to be attacked by a country that had no effective military (or political except for Putin) leadership and no trained, motivated military force that was prepared to fight Ukraine. This is an almost unheard of event in history. That gave Ukraine the precious gift of time. "Ask anything of me but time". Ukraine also had allies that gave technology to Ukraine that Ukraine could never afforded on their own nor been able to quickly produce. Ukraine has made good use of their opportunities and is holding on by cleverly Macgyvering together an effective military force from piles of differing components. It is however highly improbable such a scenario will play out in the future. For that reason, IMO one has to be very, very careful generalizing from events in Ukraine to future conflicts.

From what I have read, the Patriot sometimes has a hard time intercepting Iskandar missiles.  Do they still have any old S300 systems that might work?

S-300s and S-400s would undoubtedly fare even worse against a modern Iskander-M. The Iskander-M always was "advertised" to have certain anti-interception enhancements over a simple "ballistic" missile. A missile following a ballistic trajectory uses its rocket engine(s) to reach a certain altitude and then falls on its target. Once the engines burn out, the trajectory of the ballistic missile is completely mathematically predictable unless the missile can maneuver. Unlike almost all previous SRBMs the Iskander-M can maneuver, at least to some degree. The forces involved when a missile is falling out of the sky at Mach 5+ are such that no "sharp turns" are possible but tweaks are.
 
The Iskander-M was always known to have depressed trajectory capability. The purpose of that was to trade off some range in exchange for reducing the response time available for the ABM. This has been a Russian specialty going back to the 1970s. Soviet submarines in the Sea of Cortez anybody :-). Patriot doesn't have to do anything "special" to deal with it. The continuously updated tracking solution will work fine when the SRBM does become visible. The Iskander-M also has other defensive capabilities. Supposedly it can use a jammer to jam the radar of the ABM. AFAIK we haven't heard about that happening in Ukraine. The Iskander-M can be programmed to maneuver slightly (subject to g loading) at predetermined points in its trajectory. It is very probable the Patriot tracking algorithms used in Ukraine are not designed to accommodate such maneuvers. A ballistic trajectory is assumed. In some cases better tracking algorithms may be available but not enabled for use in Ukraine. That situation may persist.
 
It must also be recognized that the Patriot (like the Iskander-M) has a kinetic energy budget and g loading limitations. The Patriot may have committed itself to an intercept at a certain place and time. If the Iskander-M maneuvers it is entirely possible the Patriot has no feasible response. The Iskander-M may beat it to the "new" target and there is no answer. This situation becomes more likely as the Patriot is asked to cover a larger footprint. As a point defense system Patriot can depend on the fact the incoming missile must eventually come toward the Patriot. As an area defense weapon that is not true. The Patriot might have had only one (or a small family) trajectory that would "work". Once the situation changes, there may simply be no remedial action the Patriot can take.
 
FWIW Iskander-M has an uplink receiver. It can (in theory) be re-targeted in flight. It also can be commanded to maneuver in order to avoid an intercept. AFAIK there is no evidence that is being done in Ukraine. The maneuvers in  Ukraine are (so far) not "interactive". In theory they can be, so going forward it must be considered. Like many alleged Russian capabilities they may start as out vaporware, but when given motivation and money, they make it work. We might be, once again, forcing them to become competent.

I presume the Iskandar's Mobile launch platform makes it very hard to find and destroy before they launch.

Very true. It was true of SCUDS back in 1990s and Russia has developed a much better TEL for the Iskander-M that Iraq had back then. It can be considered an exact analog of a HIMARS firing its two PrSM.

It seems like Ukraine's best option is to continue launching as many drones as possible targeting Russian manufacturing and production facilities, particularly Gas, Oil and Weapons Technology.  Maybe if they can make the war too expensive Putin may actually have to consider a cease fire.

I doubt the expense will be the issue. If Russia finally does give up, it will be something else that pushes them over the edge. More sanctions might do that. However, Ukraine has to continue doing what it can. Just like Russia's SRBMs aren't going to drive Ukraine out of the war, Ukraine's drone strikes on Russian manufacturing and production won't drive Russia out either. Neither exist at the required scale to do that. However, both sides will persist.

[Goose]

I agree that there is no way to just play defense and win.  I think Russia assumed that its "offense" would so over power Ukraine's defense early on that the war was over before it started.  Three and half years later we know that didn't work.  Ukraine has shown if you are smart and creative you can find new ways to do old things that changes everyone's thinking and forces the other side to rethink their plans.

For certain Russia (and virtually everybody else) expected Ukraine to collapse very quickly. At that point neither Russia nor Ukraine was thinking in terms of an Iskander vs Patriot battle going on for even weeks, let alone years :-). Ukraine had no Patriots at that point. Ukraine has indeed shown an ability to adapt to a very unique situation. While all wars are "unique" in some aspects, the Ukraine ware is totally unlike anything previously observed. Ukraine was fortunate to be attacked by a country that had no effective military (or political except for Putin) leadership and no trained, motivated military force that was prepared to fight Ukraine. This is an almost unheard of event in history. That gave Ukraine the precious gift of time. "Ask anything of me but time". Ukraine also had allies that gave technology to Ukraine that Ukraine could never afforded on their own nor been able to quickly produce. Ukraine has made good use of their opportunities and is holding on by cleverly Macgyvering together an effective military force from piles of differing components. It is however highly improbable such a scenario will play out in the future. For that reason, IMO one has to be very, very careful generalizing from events in Ukraine to future conflicts.

From what I have read, the Patriot sometimes has a hard time intercepting Iskandar missiles.  Do they still have any old S300 systems that might work?

S-300s and S-400s would undoubtedly fare even worse against a modern Iskander-M. The Iskander-M always was "advertised" to have certain anti-interception enhancements over a simple "ballistic" missile. A missile following a ballistic trajectory uses its rocket engine(s) to reach a certain altitude and then falls on its target. Once the engines burn out, the trajectory of the ballistic missile is completely mathematically predictable unless the missile can maneuver. Unlike almost all previous SRBMs the Iskander-M can maneuver, at least to some degree. The forces involved when a missile is falling out of the sky at Mach 5+ are such that no "sharp turns" are possible but tweaks are.
 
The Iskander-M was always known to have depressed trajectory capability. The purpose of that was to trade off some range in exchange for reducing the response time available for the ABM. This has been a Russian specialty going back to the 1970s. Soviet submarines in the Sea of Cortez anybody :-). Patriot doesn't have to do anything "special" to deal with it. The continuously updated tracking solution will work fine when the SRBM does become visible. The Iskander-M also has other defensive capabilities. Supposedly it can use a jammer to jam the radar of the ABM. AFAIK we haven't heard about that happening in Ukraine. The Iskander-M can be programmed to maneuver slightly (subject to g loading) at predetermined points in its trajectory. It is very probable the Patriot tracking algorithms used in Ukraine are not designed to accommodate such maneuvers. A ballistic trajectory is assumed. In some cases better tracking algorithms may be available but not enabled for use in Ukraine. That situation may persist.
 
It must also be recognized that the Patriot (like the Iskander-M) has a kinetic energy budget and g loading limitations. The Patriot may have committed itself to an intercept at a certain place and time. If the Iskander-M maneuvers it is entirely possible the Patriot has no feasible response. The Iskander-M may beat it to the "new" target and there is no answer. This situation becomes more likely as the Patriot is asked to cover a larger footprint. As a point defense system Patriot can depend on the fact the incoming missile must eventually come toward the Patriot. As an area defense weapon that is not true. The Patriot might have had only one (or a small family) trajectory that would "work". Once the situation changes, there may simply be no remedial action the Patriot can take.
 
FWIW Iskander-M has an uplink receiver. It can (in theory) be re-targeted in flight. It also can be commanded to maneuver in order to avoid an intercept. AFAIK there is no evidence that is being done in Ukraine. The maneuvers in  Ukraine are (so far) not "interactive". In theory they can be, so going forward it must be considered. Like many alleged Russian capabilities they may start as out vaporware, but when given motivation and money, they make it work. We might be, once again, forcing them to become competent.

I presume the Iskandar's Mobile launch platform makes it very hard to find and destroy before they launch.

Very true. It was true of SCUDS back in 1990s and Russia has developed a much better TEL for the Iskander-M that Iraq had back then. It can be considered an exact analog of a HIMARS firing its two PrSM.

It seems like Ukraine's best option is to continue launching as many drones as possible targeting Russian manufacturing and production facilities, particularly Gas, Oil and Weapons Technology.  Maybe if they can make the war too expensive Putin may actually have to consider a cease fire.

I doubt the expense will be the issue. If Russia finally does give up, it will be something else that pushes them over the edge. More sanctions might do that. However, Ukraine has to continue doing what it can. Just like Russia's SRBMs aren't going to drive Ukraine out of the war, Ukraine's drone strikes on Russian manufacturing and production won't drive Russia out either. Neither exist at the required scale to do that. However, both sides will persist.

[dabigv13]

Ukrainian photographer Efrem Lukatsky published the first images of the new long-range cruise missile “Flamingo,” which has reportedly entered serial production.

The photographs, taken on August 14 at a facility of the Ukrainian defense company Fire Point, show the missile in assembly. According to Lukatsky, the system is designed to strike targets at distances of more than 3,000 kilometers.

https://united24media.com/latest-news/ex...line-10815

Ukraine has successfully used long range drones that are much slower and with much smaller warheads to good effect. If these range and warhead numbers are correct and Ukraine can produce a decent number of these, Russia will be very stretched to protect their infrastructure and possibly even military targets. As cruise missiles, they are probably easier to intercept than ballistic missiles, but this would be much tougher to intercept than the slow long range drones Ukraine has used thus far.

[dabigv13]

Ukrainian photographer Efrem Lukatsky published the first images of the new long-range cruise missile “Flamingo,” which has reportedly entered serial production.

The photographs, taken on August 14 at a facility of the Ukrainian defense company Fire Point, show the missile in assembly. According to Lukatsky, the system is designed to strike targets at distances of more than 3,000 kilometers.

https://united24media.com/latest-news/ex...line-10815

Ukraine has successfully used long range drones that are much slower and with much smaller warheads to good effect. If these range and warhead numbers are correct and Ukraine can produce a decent number of these, Russia will be very stretched to protect their infrastructure and possibly even military targets. As cruise missiles, they are probably easier to intercept than ballistic missiles, but this would be much tougher to intercept than the slow long range drones Ukraine has used thus far.

[Goose]

Ukrainian photographer Efrem Lukatsky published the first images of the new long-range cruise missile “Flamingo,” which has reportedly entered serial production.

The photographs, taken on August 14 at a facility of the Ukrainian defense company Fire Point, show the missile in assembly. According to Lukatsky, the system is designed to strike targets at distances of more than 3,000 kilometers.

https://united24media.com/latest-news/ex...line-10815

Ukraine has successfully used long range drones that are much slower and with much smaller warheads to good effect. If these range and warhead numbers are correct and Ukraine can produce a decent number of these, Russia will be very stretched to protect their infrastructure and possibly even military targets. As cruise missiles, they are probably easier to intercept than ballistic missiles, but this would be much tougher to intercept than the slow long range drones Ukraine has used thus far.

IMO you are exactly right here. If past history is a guide, Ukraine will intermix (whenever possible) the higher performance cruise missiles with a much larger number of "slow" drones. It can then for certain overload the Russian defensive systems. The long range drones create a greatly expanded target set. Russia simply cannot use point defense systems at each and every possible target. Russia has shown no signs of using their air force for this mission. As long as that is true, these drones will get through.
 
Unfortunately there is some similar type of bad news for Ukraine
https://www.twz.com/news-features/russia...or-ukraine
These drones cannot be intercepted by the FPV drone interceptors Ukraine has been deploying. The drones are too slow. The good news is that the warhead of these jet powered drones is pretty small.

[Goose]

Ukrainian photographer Efrem Lukatsky published the first images of the new long-range cruise missile “Flamingo,” which has reportedly entered serial production.

The photographs, taken on August 14 at a facility of the Ukrainian defense company Fire Point, show the missile in assembly. According to Lukatsky, the system is designed to strike targets at distances of more than 3,000 kilometers.

https://united24media.com/latest-news/ex...line-10815

Ukraine has successfully used long range drones that are much slower and with much smaller warheads to good effect. If these range and warhead numbers are correct and Ukraine can produce a decent number of these, Russia will be very stretched to protect their infrastructure and possibly even military targets. As cruise missiles, they are probably easier to intercept than ballistic missiles, but this would be much tougher to intercept than the slow long range drones Ukraine has used thus far.

IMO you are exactly right here. If past history is a guide, Ukraine will intermix (whenever possible) the higher performance cruise missiles with a much larger number of "slow" drones. It can then for certain overload the Russian defensive systems. The long range drones create a greatly expanded target set. Russia simply cannot use point defense systems at each and every possible target. Russia has shown no signs of using their air force for this mission. As long as that is true, these drones will get through.
 
Unfortunately there is some similar type of bad news for Ukraine
https://www.twz.com/news-features/russia...or-ukraine
These drones cannot be intercepted by the FPV drone interceptors Ukraine has been deploying. The drones are too slow. The good news is that the warhead of these jet powered drones is pretty small.

[GK3]

[quote="dabigv13" pid='435502' dateline='1755462318']

Ukrainian photographer Efrem Lukatsky published the first images of the new long-range cruise missile “Flamingo,” which has reportedly entered serial production.

The photographs, taken on August 14 at a facility of the Ukrainian defense company Fire Point, show the missile in assembly. According to Lukatsky, the system is designed to strike targets at distances of more than 3,000 kilometers.[/qu


https://united24media.com/latest-news/ex...line-10815

Ukraine has successfully used long range drones that are much slower and with much smaller warheads to good effect. If these range and warhead numbers are correct and Ukraine can produce a decent number of these, Russia will be very stretched to protect their infrastructure and possibly even military targets. As cruise missiles, they are probably easier to intercept than ballistic missiles, but this would be much tougher to intercept than the slow long range drones Ukraine has used thus far.

IMO you are exactly right here. If past history is a guide, Ukraine will intermix (whenever possible) the higher performance cruise missiles with a much larger number of "slow" drones. It can then for certain overload the Russian defensive systems. The long range drones create a greatly expanded target set. Russia simply cannot use point defense systems at each and every possible target. Russia has shown no signs of using their air force for this mission. As long as that is true, these drones will get through.
 
Unfortunately there is some similar type of bad news for Ukraine
https://www.twz.com/news-features/russia...or-ukraine
These drones cannot be intercepted by the FPV drone interceptors Ukraine has been deploying. The drones are too slow. The good news is that the warhead of these jet powered drones is pretty small.

Thanks once again to Goose and others who can provide the insight into the current state of military tech. Back in my day things were much different;

[GK3]

[quote="dabigv13" pid='435502' dateline='1755462318']

Ukrainian photographer Efrem Lukatsky published the first images of the new long-range cruise missile “Flamingo,” which has reportedly entered serial production.

The photographs, taken on August 14 at a facility of the Ukrainian defense company Fire Point, show the missile in assembly. According to Lukatsky, the system is designed to strike targets at distances of more than 3,000 kilometers.[/qu


https://united24media.com/latest-news/ex...line-10815

Ukraine has successfully used long range drones that are much slower and with much smaller warheads to good effect. If these range and warhead numbers are correct and Ukraine can produce a decent number of these, Russia will be very stretched to protect their infrastructure and possibly even military targets. As cruise missiles, they are probably easier to intercept than ballistic missiles, but this would be much tougher to intercept than the slow long range drones Ukraine has used thus far.

IMO you are exactly right here. If past history is a guide, Ukraine will intermix (whenever possible) the higher performance cruise missiles with a much larger number of "slow" drones. It can then for certain overload the Russian defensive systems. The long range drones create a greatly expanded target set. Russia simply cannot use point defense systems at each and every possible target. Russia has shown no signs of using their air force for this mission. As long as that is true, these drones will get through.
 
Unfortunately there is some similar type of bad news for Ukraine
https://www.twz.com/news-features/russia...or-ukraine
These drones cannot be intercepted by the FPV drone interceptors Ukraine has been deploying. The drones are too slow. The good news is that the warhead of these jet powered drones is pretty small.

Thanks once again to Goose and others who can provide the insight into the current state of military tech. Back in my day things were much different;

[Mick]

I've been thinking about my father-in-law recently, a great guy with multiple Stanford degrees in Aeronautical Engineering. He worked for NASA for years, worked on the Mercury and Gemini missions. He consulted with the Fairchild Republic design team on the A-10 Thunderbolt / Warthog.

I seem to recall reading that Ukraine asked for 100 old A-10s. Did we ever approve and deliver those?

[Mick]

I've been thinking about my father-in-law recently, a great guy with multiple Stanford degrees in Aeronautical Engineering. He worked for NASA for years, worked on the Mercury and Gemini missions. He consulted with the Fairchild Republic design team on the A-10 Thunderbolt / Warthog.

I seem to recall reading that Ukraine asked for 100 old A-10s. Did we ever approve and deliver those?

[dabigv13]

No A-10s were ever delivered, and I don't think Ukraine really ever wanted them.

“Ukraine hasn't expressed much interest. I think they, rightfully, are concerned about their survivability,” Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said during a House Armed Services Committee hearing Wednesday.

https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2024/0...ys/395821/

[dabigv13]

No A-10s were ever delivered, and I don't think Ukraine really ever wanted them.

“Ukraine hasn't expressed much interest. I think they, rightfully, are concerned about their survivability,” Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said during a House Armed Services Committee hearing Wednesday.

https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2024/0...ys/395821/

[TrumpCard]

NYT is saying that Zelenskyy is demanding a full prisoner exchange in any negotiated resolution.  This position resonates with me because, although land is a zero sum game, Russia would get little value from retaining Ukrainian prisoners, whereas Ukrainian society would benefit hugely from the reunification of families.

[TrumpCard]

NYT is saying that Zelenskyy is demanding a full prisoner exchange in any negotiated resolution.  This position resonates with me because, although land is a zero sum game, Russia would get little value from retaining Ukrainian prisoners, whereas Ukrainian society would benefit hugely from the reunification of families.

[GK3]

NYT is saying that Zelenskyy is demanding a full prisoner exchange in any negotiated resolution.  This position resonates with me because, although land is a zero sum game, Russia would get little value from retaining Ukrainian prisoners, whereas Ukrainian society would benefit hugely from the reunification of families.

Nothing else makes any sense. I don't think they have any chance of getting Crimea back and will have trouble with the Donbass area, but I do not see how Ukraine survives unless it pretty much returns to where it was after the loss of Crimea.

On another subject, the A10 was a wonderful aircraft and if you were on the ground there was nothing better to see above you but an A 10. But that was yesterday.  Drones and other technology have changed things so much.  The so-called Front Lines seem now to be northing more than a rough area manned by small groups, over flown by hordes of small drones. Of course geography plays a role.  I would think drones work well in fairly open terrain, but how would they have worked in the jungles of SE Asia back in the day.

[GK3]

NYT is saying that Zelenskyy is demanding a full prisoner exchange in any negotiated resolution.  This position resonates with me because, although land is a zero sum game, Russia would get little value from retaining Ukrainian prisoners, whereas Ukrainian society would benefit hugely from the reunification of families.

Nothing else makes any sense. I don't think they have any chance of getting Crimea back and will have trouble with the Donbass area, but I do not see how Ukraine survives unless it pretty much returns to where it was after the loss of Crimea.

On another subject, the A10 was a wonderful aircraft and if you were on the ground there was nothing better to see above you but an A 10. But that was yesterday.  Drones and other technology have changed things so much.  The so-called Front Lines seem now to be northing more than a rough area manned by small groups, over flown by hordes of small drones. Of course geography plays a role.  I would think drones work well in fairly open terrain, but how would they have worked in the jungles of SE Asia back in the day.

[BostonCard]

No A-10s were ever delivered, and I don't think Ukraine really ever wanted them.

“Ukraine hasn't expressed much interest. I think they, rightfully, are concerned about their survivability,” Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said during a House Armed Services Committee hearing Wednesday.

https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2024/0...ys/395821/

On the question of A10’s, I know they are meant as attack aircraft, but could they have been used to hunt for drones or would they have been too slow for that?  I was thinking that they might make decent Shahed hunters, given that those drones fly slowly, and the A10’s vulnerability to enemy missiles would be limited given that to knock out drones they can be flying well within Ukranian territory.

BC

[BostonCard]

No A-10s were ever delivered, and I don't think Ukraine really ever wanted them.

“Ukraine hasn't expressed much interest. I think they, rightfully, are concerned about their survivability,” Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said during a House Armed Services Committee hearing Wednesday.

https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2024/0...ys/395821/

On the question of A10’s, I know they are meant as attack aircraft, but could they have been used to hunt for drones or would they have been too slow for that?  I was thinking that they might make decent Shahed hunters, given that those drones fly slowly, and the A10’s vulnerability to enemy missiles would be limited given that to knock out drones they can be flying well within Ukranian territory.

BC

[Goose]

On the question of A10’s, I know they are meant as attack aircraft, but could they have been used to hunt for drones or would they have been too slow for that?  I was thinking that they might make decent Shahed hunters, given that those drones fly slowly, and the A10’s vulnerability to enemy missiles would be limited given that to knock out drones they can be flying well within Ukranian territory.

BC

The A-10 is plenty fast enough to hunt drones. The max speed of the Shahed-136 is 115 mph. An A-10 can cruise at 420 mph. However, the A-10 is a terrible air-to-air platform. It has lots of weight devoted to armor. Good if you want to survive a MPADS, useless if there is no ground to air threat. The original A-10 didn't even have a radar. Most importantly, the A-10 is literally built around a GAU-8 cannon. Very heavy and hard to maintain. Great for tank busting (kind of). Useless against drones. The A-10 also has two engines. Twice as much maintenance. Good if you have an air to ground threat. Useless otherwise. The A-10 control system is very much unlike modern fly-by-wire cockpits. Training is therefore unique. One can go on and on. There are good reasons the USAF doesn't want to keep its A-10s. They had their time and place. So did F-4Us. As a matter of fact, to hunt drones an F-4U with a radar pod would be a better choice :-).

[Goose]

On the question of A10’s, I know they are meant as attack aircraft, but could they have been used to hunt for drones or would they have been too slow for that?  I was thinking that they might make decent Shahed hunters, given that those drones fly slowly, and the A10’s vulnerability to enemy missiles would be limited given that to knock out drones they can be flying well within Ukranian territory.

BC

The A-10 is plenty fast enough to hunt drones. The max speed of the Shahed-136 is 115 mph. An A-10 can cruise at 420 mph. However, the A-10 is a terrible air-to-air platform. It has lots of weight devoted to armor. Good if you want to survive a MPADS, useless if there is no ground to air threat. The original A-10 didn't even have a radar. Most importantly, the A-10 is literally built around a GAU-8 cannon. Very heavy and hard to maintain. Great for tank busting (kind of). Useless against drones. The A-10 also has two engines. Twice as much maintenance. Good if you have an air to ground threat. Useless otherwise. The A-10 control system is very much unlike modern fly-by-wire cockpits. Training is therefore unique. One can go on and on. There are good reasons the USAF doesn't want to keep its A-10s. They had their time and place. So did F-4Us. As a matter of fact, to hunt drones an F-4U with a radar pod would be a better choice :-).

[ADPinWDC]

WHAT DO WE GOT HERE? Summit on Ukraine at White House today. 

The Chief of NATO, Mark Rutte, declared "It was a successful day." -- by that we think he means that 1) USA and Europe emerged from the huddle without any bitter differences, mostly nuance; 2) For Rutte, EU members (minus Spain) remain committed to a bold new ambition of 5% of GDP toward Defense spending by 2032.  Bravo.  #UkraineWar    Rutte believes that Trump was essential to push NATO to 5%.  

A) Instead of just a Ceasefire (unsure one would hold), the West Team are now aiming for a "Peace Deal", which would involve an end to hostile actions and some territorial concessions to Russia in the East (perhaps not as much as Russia wants, but mostly what they have taken by force). 
-- another year of war and bloodshed will not "win" that territory back.  Russia has installed tens of thousands of mines (says ISW). 
Even 70% of Ukrainians now (says Gallup) are exhausted of war, and favor an end to violence, even if it means losing territory. 
MAJOR SHIFT:   https://news.gallup.com/poll/693203/ukra...apses.aspx

B) Trump stated that "USA will participate in security assurances" -- but this does not mean troops.  That is a bright red line for USA. Instead, USA will SELL (not give) weapons into Europe to pass along to Ukraine, because that counts toward the 5% of SPENDING on defense. 
USA can sell F-35s (not F-22s) and the long parts and weapons train for F-35s, and Patriot missile batteries, helicopters, communications gear...
Plus... "Golden Dome".  

C) Ukraine can only make its national payroll now by hiring itself out to be the "European Defense" against craven, greedy Russian Bear.
Ukraine can fund some of their defense spending with new minerals exploitation and agricultural goods. Ukraine desperately must rebuild its ravaged economy, and 3-5 million refugees need to be brought back home from mostly Europe (Poland). 
European youths (under 35) mostly do not want to serve in the military.  [My daughter served in US Army Logistics over there, 2015-2018]. 
Ukraine cannot keep suffering losses, but they can be paid to "DEFEND".  Europe prefers to write checks, not send soldiers.

TODAY:  
"Europe must stop relying on avoiding the worst-possible outcome and hoping for the best when it comes to Trump. They need to stop relying on changing his mind and dramatically step up their support for the Ukrainian army. They have to show that they’re really in this for the long run by providing way more weaponry, way more support, and maybe eventually committing to putting forces on the ground to protect any peace that eventually comes." 
Prof. Matthias Matthijs, Senior Fellow at CFR, and Prof at SAIS. 
https://www.cfr.org/article/major-takeaw...an-leaders

[ADPinWDC]

WHAT DO WE GOT HERE? Summit on Ukraine at White House today. 

The Chief of NATO, Mark Rutte, declared "It was a successful day." -- by that we think he means that 1) USA and Europe emerged from the huddle without any bitter differences, mostly nuance; 2) For Rutte, EU members (minus Spain) remain committed to a bold new ambition of 5% of GDP toward Defense spending by 2032.  Bravo.  #UkraineWar    Rutte believes that Trump was essential to push NATO to 5%.  

A) Instead of just a Ceasefire (unsure one would hold), the West Team are now aiming for a "Peace Deal", which would involve an end to hostile actions and some territorial concessions to Russia in the East (perhaps not as much as Russia wants, but mostly what they have taken by force). 
-- another year of war and bloodshed will not "win" that territory back.  Russia has installed tens of thousands of mines (says ISW). 
Even 70% of Ukrainians now (says Gallup) are exhausted of war, and favor an end to violence, even if it means losing territory. 
MAJOR SHIFT:   https://news.gallup.com/poll/693203/ukra...apses.aspx

B) Trump stated that "USA will participate in security assurances" -- but this does not mean troops.  That is a bright red line for USA. Instead, USA will SELL (not give) weapons into Europe to pass along to Ukraine, because that counts toward the 5% of SPENDING on defense. 
USA can sell F-35s (not F-22s) and the long parts and weapons train for F-35s, and Patriot missile batteries, helicopters, communications gear...
Plus... "Golden Dome".  

C) Ukraine can only make its national payroll now by hiring itself out to be the "European Defense" against craven, greedy Russian Bear.
Ukraine can fund some of their defense spending with new minerals exploitation and agricultural goods. Ukraine desperately must rebuild its ravaged economy, and 3-5 million refugees need to be brought back home from mostly Europe (Poland). 
European youths (under 35) mostly do not want to serve in the military.  [My daughter served in US Army Logistics over there, 2015-2018]. 
Ukraine cannot keep suffering losses, but they can be paid to "DEFEND".  Europe prefers to write checks, not send soldiers.

TODAY:  
"Europe must stop relying on avoiding the worst-possible outcome and hoping for the best when it comes to Trump. They need to stop relying on changing his mind and dramatically step up their support for the Ukrainian army. They have to show that they’re really in this for the long run by providing way more weaponry, way more support, and maybe eventually committing to putting forces on the ground to protect any peace that eventually comes." 
Prof. Matthias Matthijs, Senior Fellow at CFR, and Prof at SAIS. 
https://www.cfr.org/article/major-takeaw...an-leaders

[Mick]

TODAY:  
"Europe must stop relying on avoiding the worst-possible outcome and hoping for the best when it comes to Trump. They need to stop relying on changing his mind and dramatically step up their support for the Ukrainian army. They have to show that they’re really in this for the long run by providing way more weaponry, way more support, and maybe eventually committing to putting forces on the ground to protect any peace that eventually comes." 
Prof. Matthias Matthijs, Senior Fellow at CFR, and Prof at SAIS. 
https://www.cfr.org/article/major-takeaw...an-leaders

Americans have been begging NATO Europeans for years to increase their % of GDP devoted to the military. Given Putin's clear intent to rebuild the Soviet Union, I suspect they will take this threat seriously. Germany, France, Italy and the UK combined have (near as I can tell) a little over 700,000 active members of the military. Russia alone has 623k active, 188k on reserve (I'm sure Goose can come up with more accurate figures). NATO combined has (I think) 850k frontline military with 650k in reserve (inclusive of USA). I think NATO collectively outspends Russia by 3:1.

I don't know why it's taken NATO/Europe so long to wake up. Glad they have.

[Mick]

TODAY:  
"Europe must stop relying on avoiding the worst-possible outcome and hoping for the best when it comes to Trump. They need to stop relying on changing his mind and dramatically step up their support for the Ukrainian army. They have to show that they’re really in this for the long run by providing way more weaponry, way more support, and maybe eventually committing to putting forces on the ground to protect any peace that eventually comes." 
Prof. Matthias Matthijs, Senior Fellow at CFR, and Prof at SAIS. 
https://www.cfr.org/article/major-takeaw...an-leaders

Americans have been begging NATO Europeans for years to increase their % of GDP devoted to the military. Given Putin's clear intent to rebuild the Soviet Union, I suspect they will take this threat seriously. Germany, France, Italy and the UK combined have (near as I can tell) a little over 700,000 active members of the military. Russia alone has 623k active, 188k on reserve (I'm sure Goose can come up with more accurate figures). NATO combined has (I think) 850k frontline military with 650k in reserve (inclusive of USA). I think NATO collectively outspends Russia by 3:1.

I don't know why it's taken NATO/Europe so long to wake up. Glad they have.

[dabigv13]

Not sure these meetings have really made any progress. Unless and until Putin feels some consequences, it is nothing to him to keep feeding his soldiers into the meat grinder.

Giving Putin the heavily fortified regions of Donetsk that Ukraine still controls in exchange for a promise is not a serious proposal for peace. Would just weaken Ukraine and give Russia an easier path to their war aim of a vassal Ukraine. Putin has not kept his promises before which is why we are in this mess.

.......

The Gallup poll showed 70% of Ukrainians favor a negotiated settlement but the question did not specify what if any territory would be lost.

When different negotiated settlements are polled with their details, support is much lower.

https://kyivindependent.com/over-70-of-u...oll-shows/

....

Ukraine destroyed a Russian fuel train with FPV drones in occupied Zaporhizhia

https://x.com/JimmySecUK/status/1957798389392777486

They also recently severely injured a Russian Lieutenant General, deputy commander of one of their army groups, driving in a vehicle in Kursk with an FPV drone.

https://x.com/GloOouD/status/1957822695325753390

[dabigv13]

Not sure these meetings have really made any progress. Unless and until Putin feels some consequences, it is nothing to him to keep feeding his soldiers into the meat grinder.

Giving Putin the heavily fortified regions of Donetsk that Ukraine still controls in exchange for a promise is not a serious proposal for peace. Would just weaken Ukraine and give Russia an easier path to their war aim of a vassal Ukraine. Putin has not kept his promises before which is why we are in this mess.

.......

The Gallup poll showed 70% of Ukrainians favor a negotiated settlement but the question did not specify what if any territory would be lost.

When different negotiated settlements are polled with their details, support is much lower.

https://kyivindependent.com/over-70-of-u...oll-shows/

....

Ukraine destroyed a Russian fuel train with FPV drones in occupied Zaporhizhia

https://x.com/JimmySecUK/status/1957798389392777486

They also recently severely injured a Russian Lieutenant General, deputy commander of one of their army groups, driving in a vehicle in Kursk with an FPV drone.

https://x.com/GloOouD/status/1957822695325753390