[DocSavage87]

I don't necessarily think we need a different view of what the government should be doing (change of philosophy), which as I understand it is part of "Build Back Better". The failures of our epidemic response were not caused by not having assigned responsibility to structures in the government to do so. It was a failure to execute by the people who were supposed to be managing/overseeing these departments (President and Congress).

I'm not sure if disbanding the WH NSC Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense caused a hole in the responsibilities or a lack of leadership at the WH level, as this op-ed implies:  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/n...story.html 

The counter to this op-ed was that not everybody on that team left but was transferred to another unit.  I also heard that unit had a different emphasis, one that was focused more on biowarfare than something like pandemic response.  In any case, if there was "another" unit, they failed miserably in doing things like coordinating PPE and other resource buying among the fed and state level, making sure there were parallel testing developments in the early days, etc.

I found another op-ed on the changes that may have impacted how responsibilities were assigned for US domestic readiness or large-scale pandemic response:
https://www.justsecurity.org/69197/lesso...readiness/

[DocSavage87]

I don't necessarily think we need a different view of what the government should be doing (change of philosophy), which as I understand it is part of "Build Back Better". The failures of our epidemic response were not caused by not having assigned responsibility to structures in the government to do so. It was a failure to execute by the people who were supposed to be managing/overseeing these departments (President and Congress).

I'm not sure if disbanding the WH NSC Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense caused a hole in the responsibilities or a lack of leadership at the WH level, as this op-ed implies:  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/n...story.html 

The counter to this op-ed was that not everybody on that team left but was transferred to another unit.  I also heard that unit had a different emphasis, one that was focused more on biowarfare than something like pandemic response.  In any case, if there was "another" unit, they failed miserably in doing things like coordinating PPE and other resource buying among the fed and state level, making sure there were parallel testing developments in the early days, etc.

I found another op-ed on the changes that may have impacted how responsibilities were assigned for US domestic readiness or large-scale pandemic response:
https://www.justsecurity.org/69197/lesso...readiness/