[CardinalSagehen]

The math on going for it is relatively simple.  If you think you have more than a 3 in 7 chance of converting the touchdown, you should go for it because the value of a touchdown is 7 points and the value of the field goal whose points we took off the board was 3.  There are some additional caveats that go into the calculation (for example, if you don't convert, SC's subsequent possession starts at the 5 yard line or so;if you kick the field goal or score the touchdown, they get it around the 25 yard line), but broadly that is the calculation.  Last little bit if you are on the fence; generally if you are the underdog, you should be bold and take the higher variance outcome; if you are expected to win, you want to minimize the variance and reduce the likelihood that you wind up with some fluke things going against you and costing you the game.

I will note that under very similar circumstances, Helton elected to kick the field goal, and I was happy he did.  Had he elected to go for the touchdown and scored, it would been a 21-17 game instead of a 21-13 game.

BC

That's how I saw Shaw's choice. Sometimes you have to take risks to give yourself a chance to win.

Of course the way the rest of the game went, this one looked unneeded in hindsight. But obviously Shaw didn't know our passing game would click so well, defense would keep getting stops, etc.

Somebody posted the chart below last week, in the spirit of decrying Shaw's punts from inside the opponent's 40.  To me, the less obvious but perhaps equally important observation is that field goals generally are overvalued. Most of us don't assume Shaw is following a chart like this - he openly admits that he goes based on feel and whether he has a play in which he's very confident.

The ball was just inside the 4 yard-line in this case.  The chart says "go."  All the usual caveats apply; this is not a game of Blackjack where the right move is always the right move. I have not vetted the statistics behind this chart, nor would I be qualified to do so.  I also acknowledge that the field goal had already been made, which might alter the odds a tiny bit, but not very much because it was a chip-shot.  

My point is this - when Shaw's decision aligns with the math on 4th down, regardless of whether it works, it is cause for celebration in my opinion. He's a great coach in so many ways, but I think following the math on 4th down has been a bit of a blind spot for him. 

In addition to the quantitative aspect of this decision, the qualitative vote of confidence that it sent to the team - both to the offense and to the defense - was considerable and meaningful.  

[tweet]https://twitter.com/JaredDLee/status/1431350505767194624?s=20[/tweet]

[CardinalSagehen]

The math on going for it is relatively simple.  If you think you have more than a 3 in 7 chance of converting the touchdown, you should go for it because the value of a touchdown is 7 points and the value of the field goal whose points we took off the board was 3.  There are some additional caveats that go into the calculation (for example, if you don't convert, SC's subsequent possession starts at the 5 yard line or so;if you kick the field goal or score the touchdown, they get it around the 25 yard line), but broadly that is the calculation.  Last little bit if you are on the fence; generally if you are the underdog, you should be bold and take the higher variance outcome; if you are expected to win, you want to minimize the variance and reduce the likelihood that you wind up with some fluke things going against you and costing you the game.

I will note that under very similar circumstances, Helton elected to kick the field goal, and I was happy he did.  Had he elected to go for the touchdown and scored, it would been a 21-17 game instead of a 21-13 game.

BC

That's how I saw Shaw's choice. Sometimes you have to take risks to give yourself a chance to win.

Of course the way the rest of the game went, this one looked unneeded in hindsight. But obviously Shaw didn't know our passing game would click so well, defense would keep getting stops, etc.

Somebody posted the chart below last week, in the spirit of decrying Shaw's punts from inside the opponent's 40.  To me, the less obvious but perhaps equally important observation is that field goals generally are overvalued. Most of us don't assume Shaw is following a chart like this - he openly admits that he goes based on feel and whether he has a play in which he's very confident.

The ball was just inside the 4 yard-line in this case.  The chart says "go."  All the usual caveats apply; this is not a game of Blackjack where the right move is always the right move. I have not vetted the statistics behind this chart, nor would I be qualified to do so.  I also acknowledge that the field goal had already been made, which might alter the odds a tiny bit, but not very much because it was a chip-shot.  

My point is this - when Shaw's decision aligns with the math on 4th down, regardless of whether it works, it is cause for celebration in my opinion. He's a great coach in so many ways, but I think following the math on 4th down has been a bit of a blind spot for him. 

In addition to the quantitative aspect of this decision, the qualitative vote of confidence that it sent to the team - both to the offense and to the defense - was considerable and meaningful.  

[tweet]https://twitter.com/JaredDLee/status/1431350505767194624?s=20[/tweet]